Caz
As you are referring, in part, to the SuperTANS and its associated systems, GPS, Doppler and HEA, it is always worth adding, just to place matters in context;
SuperTANS – Crew were told to ignore “Error” messages as “meaningless” and, in any case, the lead AAIB investigator stated it was off at impact – perhaps because of such meaningless information being presented to the crew.
GPS – No Initial Operating Clearance
Doppler – Inaccurate over water (as they all are)
HEA – The tube run was overly long, through many bulkheads and with many joins, which were prone to leakages and, hence, incorrect height data.
Four out of four with significant problems. The first three, although mentioned in the Release to Service (RTS), did not have clearance for use. The last isn’t mentioned at all. We all know why MoD hasn’t tried the angle “The crew were negligent because they used equipment that wasn’t cleared for use”. It is because the very existence of the RTS is a gross misrepresentation of the formal advice from Boscombe Down – that the aircraft was not airworthy and should not have been be released – and incriminates the man who signed it. (Beags – I won’t bother this time!).
As always these days, I have to add the caveat that MoD now denies the existence of this RTS, saying the civilian Controller Aircraft signed the only Release used by the RAF. (Which no doubt makes the copies I have from November 1993 to January 1996, issued by ACAS, forgeries). I’m really looking forward to Lord Philip asking the obvious questions of those I mention, as neither has been interviewed before. (It follows their evidence will be “new”, which will presumably satisfy MoD’s criteria).
Best wishes