Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Caz
As you don't seem to believe that this kit was ever fitted, here is part of a photo I have of an RAF HC2 Chinook cockpit (the left hand pilot's bit): I have pasted (lower right) an image (from manufacturers material) of an RDU (Remote Display Unit) of the kit in question highlighted with some text; I have also highlighted with text an actual display on the console - I'll leave it to you to decide if they are the same display.
As you don't seem to believe that this kit was ever fitted, here is part of a photo I have of an RAF HC2 Chinook cockpit (the left hand pilot's bit): I have pasted (lower right) an image (from manufacturers material) of an RDU (Remote Display Unit) of the kit in question highlighted with some text; I have also highlighted with text an actual display on the console - I'll leave it to you to decide if they are the same display.
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tucumseh
Your 5811
Just trying to keep everything simple; not everyone would be familiar with the procedures existent at the time. The mere fact that a piece of equipment is fitted to an aircraft does not mean it can be used whenever and wherever the Crew decide - WE 177 springs to mind!!
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task. Such an authorisation as would have needed for the demonstration that Walter suggests would have required (at the very least) the written approval of AOC 1 Group and any such approval would have included express weather minima for the demonstration.
Walter
Nice photo.
What was the aircraft Mark and Number and when exactly was the photo taken?
Your 5811
Just trying to keep everything simple; not everyone would be familiar with the procedures existent at the time. The mere fact that a piece of equipment is fitted to an aircraft does not mean it can be used whenever and wherever the Crew decide - WE 177 springs to mind!!
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task. Such an authorisation as would have needed for the demonstration that Walter suggests would have required (at the very least) the written approval of AOC 1 Group and any such approval would have included express weather minima for the demonstration.
Walter
Nice photo.
What was the aircraft Mark and Number and when exactly was the photo taken?
Caz
It appears to be the same as this one posted here (top row centre!) which would suggest it was, according to the website Chinook HC2 ZA720 (BR) and taken in 2005 during a 'fly in' at The Helicopter Museum. Of course, before anyone else suggests it, that doesn't mean that WK's item of interest could not have been installed years earlier ...
Regards
W
It appears to be the same as this one posted here (top row centre!) which would suggest it was, according to the website Chinook HC2 ZA720 (BR) and taken in 2005 during a 'fly in' at The Helicopter Museum. Of course, before anyone else suggests it, that doesn't mean that WK's item of interest could not have been installed years earlier ...
Regards
W
caz
Quite so. But I can assure you the authorisation to carry WE177 was preceded by comprehensive testing to satisfy the airworthiness signatory that, for example, it was not prematurely released due to an EMC problem.
Similarly, when one has installed a new fuel computer the same comprehensive testing is mandatory; followed by a statement as to what level of release is granted for all aircraft equipment. If you speak to any helicopter Design Authority they will tell you one thing about EMC failures – they will put up with a lot, but they will not tolerate interference with the fuel computer. There should be no thought whatsoever given to “read across”. Only a complete fool would say otherwise (and yes, I know some).
When you say;
I accept your word without hesitation.
But what is far more definite is this. There was No clearance, be it switch on, limited or full, to use a substantial part of the aircraft avionics. The underlying reason is clear. The aircraft had not been released to service in accordance with the regulations.
The primary reason was because Boscombe had not recommended CA Release, largely because they considered the implementation of the FADEC and its software “positively dangerous”.
The only possible reason why so many radiating devices did not have clearance was because EMC testing was incomplete. (Indeed, why would Boscombe waste money conducting full EMC testing on an as yet unverified FADEC build standard? Answer – you don’t).
Despite this, Controller Air (Sir Donald Spiers) was prevailed upon to issue a CA Release when validation and verification was incomplete. As you know, the Release to Service Authority merely subsumes this CAR within his RTS, as Part A.
So, CA clearly knew (or should have been told) he was signing a document for which there was no audit trail to even the V&V minima. What is not entirely clear, at least to me, is whether this most serious breach of the airworthiness regulations was made known to the RTSA. Of course, there are those who believe it was the RTSA or his seniors who prevailed upon Sir Donald to sign – the political imperative to be seen to fly the Mk2. Either way, the aircrew were let down by the most appalling breach of Duty of Care and clearest act of gross negligence imaginable.
The mere fact that a piece of equipment is fitted to an aircraft does not mean it can be used whenever and wherever the Crew decide - WE 177 springs to mind!!
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
Similarly, when one has installed a new fuel computer the same comprehensive testing is mandatory; followed by a statement as to what level of release is granted for all aircraft equipment. If you speak to any helicopter Design Authority they will tell you one thing about EMC failures – they will put up with a lot, but they will not tolerate interference with the fuel computer. There should be no thought whatsoever given to “read across”. Only a complete fool would say otherwise (and yes, I know some).
When you say;
There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
But what is far more definite is this. There was No clearance, be it switch on, limited or full, to use a substantial part of the aircraft avionics. The underlying reason is clear. The aircraft had not been released to service in accordance with the regulations.
The primary reason was because Boscombe had not recommended CA Release, largely because they considered the implementation of the FADEC and its software “positively dangerous”.
The only possible reason why so many radiating devices did not have clearance was because EMC testing was incomplete. (Indeed, why would Boscombe waste money conducting full EMC testing on an as yet unverified FADEC build standard? Answer – you don’t).
Despite this, Controller Air (Sir Donald Spiers) was prevailed upon to issue a CA Release when validation and verification was incomplete. As you know, the Release to Service Authority merely subsumes this CAR within his RTS, as Part A.
So, CA clearly knew (or should have been told) he was signing a document for which there was no audit trail to even the V&V minima. What is not entirely clear, at least to me, is whether this most serious breach of the airworthiness regulations was made known to the RTSA. Of course, there are those who believe it was the RTSA or his seniors who prevailed upon Sir Donald to sign – the political imperative to be seen to fly the Mk2. Either way, the aircrew were let down by the most appalling breach of Duty of Care and clearest act of gross negligence imaginable.
Avoid imitations
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WK said:
Walter, How did you come to this conclusion; where did you hear this from? It's not true, certainly not in the low level, VFR, SH environment.
I was RAF trained (initially jet fixed wing) and have been flying helicopters since 1979, 15 of them in RAF SH, quite a lot of it as instructor, some of it in that theatre. I later flew Search and Rescue, then Police, now corporate. In none of those roles do we rely on a DME system "above all other", in the VFR environment.
P.S. can we PLEASE get the photo above re-sized to suit the forum, so we don't have to keep scrolling across the pages?
the one thing helo pilots tend to trust above all other references is a DME system of some sort located locally, a good example being a TACAN on a heli-deck
I was RAF trained (initially jet fixed wing) and have been flying helicopters since 1979, 15 of them in RAF SH, quite a lot of it as instructor, some of it in that theatre. I later flew Search and Rescue, then Police, now corporate. In none of those roles do we rely on a DME system "above all other", in the VFR environment.
P.S. can we PLEASE get the photo above re-sized to suit the forum, so we don't have to keep scrolling across the pages?
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tucumseh
A very interesting post with which I cannot argue as I was not involved in at all with the introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into Service.
However, that does not in any way detract from the basic failures of Airmanship demonstrated by the Pilots on this flight - for example the disparate subscale settings on the Pilots Barometric Altimeters which would inevitably have caused confusion regarding actual aircraft altitude in relation to Safety Altitude as the aircraft climbed in IMC.
A very interesting post with which I cannot argue as I was not involved in at all with the introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into Service.
However, that does not in any way detract from the basic failures of Airmanship demonstrated by the Pilots on this flight - for example the disparate subscale settings on the Pilots Barometric Altimeters which would inevitably have caused confusion regarding actual aircraft altitude in relation to Safety Altitude as the aircraft climbed in IMC.
Caz, I'm not familiar with the altimeter setting SOPs which applied to the Chinook force at the time, but can you be certain that with 2 baro alts and (I assume) a rad alt, that there was any mandatory requirement for both pilots to have the same subscale setting at that phase of flight?
Various aircraft have different altimeter SOPs. For example some trucky aircraft with 3 altimeters often used to fly with a different subscale setting on the back up altimeter until top of climb. They also had very different rad alt SOPs compared to other aircraft I've flown.
How different were the subscale settings, by the way?
Various aircraft have different altimeter SOPs. For example some trucky aircraft with 3 altimeters often used to fly with a different subscale setting on the back up altimeter until top of climb. They also had very different rad alt SOPs compared to other aircraft I've flown.
How different were the subscale settings, by the way?
caz:
I don't think that tucumseh ever said that you were involved with the Chinook Mk2 introduction into service caz, and that certainly wasn't the point he was making. What he says is that there was no authorisation for most of the avionics fitted, probably because they had not been fully tested for ECM, an absolute sine qua non for CAR let alone RTS. Do you accept that or not? If what tuc is saying is true then the aircraft was not airworthy and CAR and RTS were acts of Gross Negligence. So let's just sort than one out before going on your interminable airmanship roundabout, which I just know will get us back to the topic of breakfast! Is tuc right or wrong caz? If wrong, why?
A very interesting post with which I cannot argue as I was not involved in at all with the introduction of the Chinook Mk2 into Service.
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Wrathmonk
Quite correct - the position is as described to me as was familiar to some aircrew as early as early '95 (therefore, the early HC2s). While the photo was later it was handy to copy.
Now why don't you make a really useful contribution by asking your colleagues whether there were any significant changes to this layout from the first HC2s? - oh, and posting your conclusion on the open forum.
Quite correct - the position is as described to me as was familiar to some aircrew as early as early '95 (therefore, the early HC2s). While the photo was later it was handy to copy.
Now why don't you make a really useful contribution by asking your colleagues whether there were any significant changes to this layout from the first HC2s? - oh, and posting your conclusion on the open forum.
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Caz
I don't understand why you of all people should be raising the altimeter subscale settings and RADALT warning settings as more inexplicable anomalies now.
You were the first to try explain them.
From what you originally wrote, I asked around and did the homework and came up with what I believe was the only reasonable explanation for them all:
the navigator's baro alt subscale was set to the regional pressure setting;
the handling pilot's was as to give a QFE for landing at the altitude of that LZ (happened to be the same as Aldergrove);
one RADALT warning height was set way too high to go off - so was "out of the way";
the other (69ft? from memory) was set appropriately for an imminent landing in adverse conditions (something like your words?).
So it looked from the altimeter settings alone that they may well have been intending to approach closely or land at that LZ.
I don't understand why you of all people should be raising the altimeter subscale settings and RADALT warning settings as more inexplicable anomalies now.
You were the first to try explain them.
From what you originally wrote, I asked around and did the homework and came up with what I believe was the only reasonable explanation for them all:
the navigator's baro alt subscale was set to the regional pressure setting;
the handling pilot's was as to give a QFE for landing at the altitude of that LZ (happened to be the same as Aldergrove);
one RADALT warning height was set way too high to go off - so was "out of the way";
the other (69ft? from memory) was set appropriately for an imminent landing in adverse conditions (something like your words?).
So it looked from the altimeter settings alone that they may well have been intending to approach closely or land at that LZ.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 8th Nov 2009 at 22:46. Reason: spelling
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ShyTorque
RE the trust of DME systems, I picked up this impression over time from various publications, manuals, etc – did not expect any argument on it, you do surprise me but I do not argue your experience – have you asked anyone you know who flies/has flown North sea or Navy helos?
Anyway, regarding this particular piece of kit, this is how its use is described in one manufacturer's (ACI) blurb:
<<This radio set works in conjunction with an AN/PRC-112 handheld radio transponder in order to precisely locate downed or missing pilots – in a single pass under harsh conditions ….>> (my emphasis).
Implies trust, doesn't it?
And this does fit with their approach to that LZ which was an ideal location for such a demo/exercise with the local weather fixed on the landmass and very predictable for that time of day in Summer with a strong southerly forecast – days ahead and very common conditions there – you could count on them. Why wouldn't you want to check out the new capability when you could be passing the ideal location anyway without delaying the schedule at all? (Cost of flying hours and availability of a/c for training?) Why else would they have gone to the Mull in those conditions with an obviously more sensible route pre-planned? They were using a callsign appropriate for a SAR exercise rescuing a downed pilot, I have been told by a couple of very different sources.
Had they been lined up with that LZ (as I have tried to explain many times) they would have had an easy, safe wave-off to the left – their premature turn to 035 makes sense if they had been expecting the handset to have been at the LZ but in the event was ½ mile or so up the hill.
You know, this equipment has been fitted to some HC2 Chinooks for a long time now and yet no one who has actually used the kit has posted on this thread to clear up some of the issues - if only for academic interest - the UK must be the only country in the world that regards this kit as a super secret item - why would that be? No acknowledgement of a known LZ for Chinooks at the Mull - no acknowledgement of the existence let alone description of use for so long of a piece of kit so much used by NATO countries - this is not how it should be in a free country. However remote you may think the possibility of its use was in this case, there still remains a possibility for the many reasons I have put to you - and because of the implications, this aspect needs to be thoroughly explored, not stonewalled.
How about getting a fuller and more plausible account of this crash out before Xmas so as to give some closure to those affected directly other than leaving doubts as to the abilities of those pilots?
They had not got lost in cloud while hurrying along listening to pop music, being famished and fatigued and therefore negligent in their preparation/planning - they had not failed to cope with the new a/c - they had been misled by others who should be brought to justice.
RE the trust of DME systems, I picked up this impression over time from various publications, manuals, etc – did not expect any argument on it, you do surprise me but I do not argue your experience – have you asked anyone you know who flies/has flown North sea or Navy helos?
Anyway, regarding this particular piece of kit, this is how its use is described in one manufacturer's (ACI) blurb:
<<This radio set works in conjunction with an AN/PRC-112 handheld radio transponder in order to precisely locate downed or missing pilots – in a single pass under harsh conditions ….>> (my emphasis).
Implies trust, doesn't it?
And this does fit with their approach to that LZ which was an ideal location for such a demo/exercise with the local weather fixed on the landmass and very predictable for that time of day in Summer with a strong southerly forecast – days ahead and very common conditions there – you could count on them. Why wouldn't you want to check out the new capability when you could be passing the ideal location anyway without delaying the schedule at all? (Cost of flying hours and availability of a/c for training?) Why else would they have gone to the Mull in those conditions with an obviously more sensible route pre-planned? They were using a callsign appropriate for a SAR exercise rescuing a downed pilot, I have been told by a couple of very different sources.
Had they been lined up with that LZ (as I have tried to explain many times) they would have had an easy, safe wave-off to the left – their premature turn to 035 makes sense if they had been expecting the handset to have been at the LZ but in the event was ½ mile or so up the hill.
You know, this equipment has been fitted to some HC2 Chinooks for a long time now and yet no one who has actually used the kit has posted on this thread to clear up some of the issues - if only for academic interest - the UK must be the only country in the world that regards this kit as a super secret item - why would that be? No acknowledgement of a known LZ for Chinooks at the Mull - no acknowledgement of the existence let alone description of use for so long of a piece of kit so much used by NATO countries - this is not how it should be in a free country. However remote you may think the possibility of its use was in this case, there still remains a possibility for the many reasons I have put to you - and because of the implications, this aspect needs to be thoroughly explored, not stonewalled.
How about getting a fuller and more plausible account of this crash out before Xmas so as to give some closure to those affected directly other than leaving doubts as to the abilities of those pilots?
They had not got lost in cloud while hurrying along listening to pop music, being famished and fatigued and therefore negligent in their preparation/planning - they had not failed to cope with the new a/c - they had been misled by others who should be brought to justice.
Last edited by walter kennedy; 8th Nov 2009 at 23:45. Reason: addition
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Cazatou,
Having given up on the no breakfast, breaking crew duty and listening to pop music slurs, you are now reverting to poor airmanship due to incorrect altimeter procedure.
Read Walters 5133 and my 5139.
There was nothing found on the altimeter subscale that suggests poor airmanship.
Having given up on the no breakfast, breaking crew duty and listening to pop music slurs, you are now reverting to poor airmanship due to incorrect altimeter procedure.
Read Walters 5133 and my 5139.
There was nothing found on the altimeter subscale that suggests poor airmanship.
Walter
I've met some rude people in my life but that will be surpassed if I was ever to meet you! My post was to help out on a question from Caz not to offer any views one way or the other - I'm sorry if this is not a 'useful contribution' to your campaign. The only time I have been in a Chinook is as SLF in the back so to me it's just another black box and, unlike some, I won't offer a professional opinion on something I have no professional knowledge on. There are plenty of Chinook / SH / rotary operators on here who have made their view clear many, many times.
I have made my position quite clear on this topic and that is I don't know without any doubt whatsoever what happened that day (and to be honest I don't think anybody, without any doubt whatsoever, will ever know) and therefore support the view that the finding of gross negligence is untenable. I assume from your determination to find out whether your own theory has any truth then you must feel the same.
Your (apparent) sarcastic responses to those who don't want to listen to your views will only further undermine any support you may have remaining. If it helps your ego then, yes, a box similar to the one pictured in the example you provided may have been fitted to a Chinook HC2 in April 2005. Is it the magical black box you speak of? I don't know. Was it fitted 10 years earlier? I don't know. If it was so secret why was it not removed (or covered) before going on a 'spotters' photoshoot (as "special" control panels used to be on certain fast jet types)? I don't know. Why did the aircraft impact the Mull? I don't know! Happy?
I've met some rude people in my life but that will be surpassed if I was ever to meet you! My post was to help out on a question from Caz not to offer any views one way or the other - I'm sorry if this is not a 'useful contribution' to your campaign. The only time I have been in a Chinook is as SLF in the back so to me it's just another black box and, unlike some, I won't offer a professional opinion on something I have no professional knowledge on. There are plenty of Chinook / SH / rotary operators on here who have made their view clear many, many times.
I have made my position quite clear on this topic and that is I don't know without any doubt whatsoever what happened that day (and to be honest I don't think anybody, without any doubt whatsoever, will ever know) and therefore support the view that the finding of gross negligence is untenable. I assume from your determination to find out whether your own theory has any truth then you must feel the same.
Your (apparent) sarcastic responses to those who don't want to listen to your views will only further undermine any support you may have remaining. If it helps your ego then, yes, a box similar to the one pictured in the example you provided may have been fitted to a Chinook HC2 in April 2005. Is it the magical black box you speak of? I don't know. Was it fitted 10 years earlier? I don't know. If it was so secret why was it not removed (or covered) before going on a 'spotters' photoshoot (as "special" control panels used to be on certain fast jet types)? I don't know. Why did the aircraft impact the Mull? I don't know! Happy?
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ShyTorque
RE the trust of DME systems, I picked up this impression over time from various publications, manuals, etc – did not expect any argument on it, you do surprise me but I do not argue your experience – have you asked anyone you know who flies/has flown North sea or Navy helos?
RE the trust of DME systems, I picked up this impression over time from various publications, manuals, etc – did not expect any argument on it, you do surprise me but I do not argue your experience – have you asked anyone you know who flies/has flown North sea or Navy helos?
Bear in mind that I fully understood the RAF training system at that time, as an SH instructor and I didn't just "pick up impressions" from books. Any crew using a DME system, VFR or IFR, would not rush towards a landing point at 160 kts in the climb, which was as fast as a Chinook helicopter can go in straight and level flight, or probably in a slight descent.
It is totally logical for a helicopter crew to slow down and remain in visual contact with the surface when operating in deteriorating weather conditions; that is how RAF SH has traditionally operated (there is no other logical way to do the job if you intend to land) and that is what this crew were trained to do.
How this Chinook got to 160 kts at the Mull, from a low airspeed, where the yachtsman witness thought it was carrying out a sea search only a short time before, is the one thing that we experienced SH operators could never work out. Gp. Captain Pete Crawford couldn't, either. As you will know, he wrote that in his part of the accident report.
One possible scenario is a runaway up of an engine, caused by a DECU fault. I'm not saying it happened, but it is possible. I've suffered such a failure myself, albeit not on a Chinook. A colleague of that time had a similar problem some time before, on the same aircraft type. After both events, the manufacturer could not reproduce the faults. The faults were perhaps not reproduced because it was not a recognised failure mode. Afterwards I asked to practice the failure in the simulator that we used for recurrent pilot training. It wasn't possible because it wasn't programmable - the manufacturer didn't recognise the failure as a possibility so it didn't exist.
While there MAY have been some action by the crew that was not strictly in accordance with the regulations (and as non-aircrew I can’t possibly comment) I though the Haddon-Cave report would stop people concentrating on the “final act”.
This report quite clearly reiterates what people with airworthiness delegation have hammered into them from day 1 – everyone is responsible for safety and you lost Crown Immunity in 1993. It has taken the Nimrod tragedy for this to finally sink in and the impact on other cases, notably Mull, is clear. As I outlined above, gross negligence is far easier to demonstrate against those involved in releasing the aircraft to service.
If MoD were to order a “Haddon-Cave” report on Chinook the first, and possibly only, question necessary would be “What part of “positively dangerous” did you not understand, or thought you could ignore?”. This negligence was infinitely worse than anything those named by H-C did (which, God knows, was bad enough). At the very least there should be a document signed by the Chinook Project Director, to his boss (DHP), his 2 Star (DGA2) and 3 Star (CA) outlining why he believed the Boscombe statement wrong. No-one in his right mind would sign a recommendation or CA Release with this Boscombe statement hanging over them. Yet, at the time, and for some years thereafter, it was common for pressure to be brought to bear on Boscombe staff to dilute such reports, in order to prevent slippage or cost overruns. I've seen them cave in, so it is indicative of the scale of the problem, and to their eternal credit, that they stuck to their guns.
Turning to Walter’s secret and devious kit. He will always have a point given, for example, a BoI witness declined to name “classified” kit that was in the aircraft. Yet, there is no record of a Classified Supplement to the Release to Service. (The CS should be noted, but is not promulgated in the main document).
I guess many here will dismiss this as fanny detail, but it is fundamental to the airworthiness of the aircraft. It is a simple question – like many that the investigation simply did not address. The regulations and design procedures exist to ensure you simply can’t bring electronic kit into the aircraft and use it willy-nilly. The same regulations recognise that aircrew are not infallible, that they will sometimes make mistakes. That is why you have defences in depth, yet all the evidence shows that these defences were not provided; indeed knowingly omitted or allowed to erode. Read Haddon-Cave: substitute “Chinook” for “Nimrod” and it still makes perfect sense.
This report quite clearly reiterates what people with airworthiness delegation have hammered into them from day 1 – everyone is responsible for safety and you lost Crown Immunity in 1993. It has taken the Nimrod tragedy for this to finally sink in and the impact on other cases, notably Mull, is clear. As I outlined above, gross negligence is far easier to demonstrate against those involved in releasing the aircraft to service.
If MoD were to order a “Haddon-Cave” report on Chinook the first, and possibly only, question necessary would be “What part of “positively dangerous” did you not understand, or thought you could ignore?”. This negligence was infinitely worse than anything those named by H-C did (which, God knows, was bad enough). At the very least there should be a document signed by the Chinook Project Director, to his boss (DHP), his 2 Star (DGA2) and 3 Star (CA) outlining why he believed the Boscombe statement wrong. No-one in his right mind would sign a recommendation or CA Release with this Boscombe statement hanging over them. Yet, at the time, and for some years thereafter, it was common for pressure to be brought to bear on Boscombe staff to dilute such reports, in order to prevent slippage or cost overruns. I've seen them cave in, so it is indicative of the scale of the problem, and to their eternal credit, that they stuck to their guns.
Turning to Walter’s secret and devious kit. He will always have a point given, for example, a BoI witness declined to name “classified” kit that was in the aircraft. Yet, there is no record of a Classified Supplement to the Release to Service. (The CS should be noted, but is not promulgated in the main document).
I guess many here will dismiss this as fanny detail, but it is fundamental to the airworthiness of the aircraft. It is a simple question – like many that the investigation simply did not address. The regulations and design procedures exist to ensure you simply can’t bring electronic kit into the aircraft and use it willy-nilly. The same regulations recognise that aircrew are not infallible, that they will sometimes make mistakes. That is why you have defences in depth, yet all the evidence shows that these defences were not provided; indeed knowingly omitted or allowed to erode. Read Haddon-Cave: substitute “Chinook” for “Nimrod” and it still makes perfect sense.
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Walter
Your (apparent) sarcastic responses to those who don't want to listen to your views will only further undermine any support you may have remaining. If it helps your ego then, yes, a box similar to the one pictured in the example you provided may have been fitted to a Chinook HC2 in April 2005. Is it the magical black box you speak of? I don't know. Was it fitted 10 years earlier? I don't know. If it was so secret why was it not removed (or covered) before going on a 'spotters' photoshoot (as "special" control panels used to be on certain fast jet types)? I don't know. Why did the aircraft impact the Mull? I don't know! Happy?
Your (apparent) sarcastic responses to those who don't want to listen to your views will only further undermine any support you may have remaining. If it helps your ego then, yes, a box similar to the one pictured in the example you provided may have been fitted to a Chinook HC2 in April 2005. Is it the magical black box you speak of? I don't know. Was it fitted 10 years earlier? I don't know. If it was so secret why was it not removed (or covered) before going on a 'spotters' photoshoot (as "special" control panels used to be on certain fast jet types)? I don't know. Why did the aircraft impact the Mull? I don't know! Happy?
Like you I cannot say for certain the box mentioned was not fitted but, having spent the first 14 years of my time as an aircraft technician, what I can say for sure is as follows
If the equipment Walter talks about was fitted there would, with out any shadow of a doubt be a paper trail. Not just trials paperwork etc but also aircraft rectification paperwork, ie it would have featured all over the F700
The equipment would have been fitted by RAF technicians.
The command chain within the Chinook Engineering would have been fully aware.
The authoriser would have been aware.
The command chain within 7 SF would have been aware.
Fellow 7 Sqn aircrew would almost certainly have been aware.
The supposed user units on the ground would have been aware.
As you can imagine the list of folk who would have known is fairly extensive and if you consider how much the HC report uncovered, MP's expenses etc etc then, to me it's simply inconceivable that someone has not come forward yet.
I have pointed this out to Walter in the past but like anything that does not fit with his theory he simply puts his fingers in his ears and shouts blah blah blah.
Like you I have no idea if this equipment was fitted but the odds on someone not substantiating Walters claim
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SFFP – F700
Funny you should mention the paper trail – work done on ZD576 just before the last trip did not have a 700 raised.
ShyTorque
I think the only way to establish how much reliance RAF pilots would put in such a system (CPLS) and what they used it for is to ask those who have used it in several theatres since 1995 – sadly, it is input from these guys that is absent from this thread.
<<Any crew using a DME system, VFR or IFR, would not rush towards a landing point at 160 kts in the climb, which was as fast as a Chinook helicopter can go in straight and level flight, or probably in a slight descent.>>
For years now I have repeatedly reccommended anyone interested in this case to start with working through the Boeing document “Mull of Kintyre -Analysis of Available Data” (8-7D20-DS S-03 06, Enclosure 4 Dated: June 18,2002) available on the web: this is not the simulation but old fashioned distance/time calculations using the available data and the like – even if you do not accept the results at face value, it gives you a framework with which to guide your own sums; such basic calculations are especially useful in this case as to have got to the position of waypoint change when it did, it would have had to have maintained its high cruise speed all the way and kept very much on the 027 track – that is, there was no possibility of their having been going slow earlier in the route (eg near the yachtsman) – perceptions of speed of unfamiliar a/c without their being very near to a familiar object can be very unreliable; on the final leg from the position of wpt change to impact, the author (Mitchel) calculated (using retreived data also) that they had started to slow down in terms of airspeed but this was masked by the increase in tailwind as they approached the landmass. Hopefully, this may lead you to a different understanding of the speed.
A further significant point from the above document is that the author concluded that there had not been a sustained climb of any great magnitude on this last leg and that the full collective found was probably the result of a last second manouevre as the engines had not had time to respond (spool up). We know that the engines had been matched in power and also not at full power – together with the lighthouse keeper's testimony that there had been no discernible change in sound rather puts to bed the undemanded engine run up I suggest – as I have said before, I thought the immediate action would be to pull up on the trust lever while you sort it out isn't it? (prevent overspeed of rotors?) And this could have been the hand of God that saved them – didn't happen.
From my hypothesis and some chartwork, I estimate that they thought themselves about ½ mile further out than they were at wpt change when they turned right onto 035 – if you have reduced thrust and are coasting in, a Chinook slows down pretty quick with drag alone – I have asked this before but have never got a decent answer “Starting at 135 kts TAS, what could you get down to in ½ mile if holding straight and level with minimum thrust balancing weight only (coasting/letting the speed wash off)?”.
Funny you should mention the paper trail – work done on ZD576 just before the last trip did not have a 700 raised.
ShyTorque
I think the only way to establish how much reliance RAF pilots would put in such a system (CPLS) and what they used it for is to ask those who have used it in several theatres since 1995 – sadly, it is input from these guys that is absent from this thread.
<<Any crew using a DME system, VFR or IFR, would not rush towards a landing point at 160 kts in the climb, which was as fast as a Chinook helicopter can go in straight and level flight, or probably in a slight descent.>>
For years now I have repeatedly reccommended anyone interested in this case to start with working through the Boeing document “Mull of Kintyre -Analysis of Available Data” (8-7D20-DS S-03 06, Enclosure 4 Dated: June 18,2002) available on the web: this is not the simulation but old fashioned distance/time calculations using the available data and the like – even if you do not accept the results at face value, it gives you a framework with which to guide your own sums; such basic calculations are especially useful in this case as to have got to the position of waypoint change when it did, it would have had to have maintained its high cruise speed all the way and kept very much on the 027 track – that is, there was no possibility of their having been going slow earlier in the route (eg near the yachtsman) – perceptions of speed of unfamiliar a/c without their being very near to a familiar object can be very unreliable; on the final leg from the position of wpt change to impact, the author (Mitchel) calculated (using retreived data also) that they had started to slow down in terms of airspeed but this was masked by the increase in tailwind as they approached the landmass. Hopefully, this may lead you to a different understanding of the speed.
A further significant point from the above document is that the author concluded that there had not been a sustained climb of any great magnitude on this last leg and that the full collective found was probably the result of a last second manouevre as the engines had not had time to respond (spool up). We know that the engines had been matched in power and also not at full power – together with the lighthouse keeper's testimony that there had been no discernible change in sound rather puts to bed the undemanded engine run up I suggest – as I have said before, I thought the immediate action would be to pull up on the trust lever while you sort it out isn't it? (prevent overspeed of rotors?) And this could have been the hand of God that saved them – didn't happen.
From my hypothesis and some chartwork, I estimate that they thought themselves about ½ mile further out than they were at wpt change when they turned right onto 035 – if you have reduced thrust and are coasting in, a Chinook slows down pretty quick with drag alone – I have asked this before but have never got a decent answer “Starting at 135 kts TAS, what could you get down to in ½ mile if holding straight and level with minimum thrust balancing weight only (coasting/letting the speed wash off)?”.
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Walter,
"SFFP – F700
Funny you should mention the paper trail – work done on ZD576 just before the last trip did not have a 700 raised."
I can remember numerous occasions during my days as an aircraft technician when work, of a minor nature was done on aircraft without paperwork being raised. If time was against then simply re racking a box and curing a crew in snag rarely saw any paperwork raised as to so would impose a servicing penalty.
But in all the years I spent as very young AC to becoming an experienced Sgt I cannot recall one instance of a modification of the type you suggest being incorporated without any paperwork being raised.
As I have said before you ask questions but when the answers do not fit you simply ignore
"SFFP – F700
Funny you should mention the paper trail – work done on ZD576 just before the last trip did not have a 700 raised."
I can remember numerous occasions during my days as an aircraft technician when work, of a minor nature was done on aircraft without paperwork being raised. If time was against then simply re racking a box and curing a crew in snag rarely saw any paperwork raised as to so would impose a servicing penalty.
But in all the years I spent as very young AC to becoming an experienced Sgt I cannot recall one instance of a modification of the type you suggest being incorporated without any paperwork being raised.
As I have said before you ask questions but when the answers do not fit you simply ignore
Avoid imitations
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ShyTorque
I think the only way to establish how much reliance RAF pilots would put in such a system (CPLS) and what they used it for is to ask those who have used it in several theatres since 1995 – sadly, it is input from these guys that is absent from this thread.
I think the only way to establish how much reliance RAF pilots would put in such a system (CPLS) and what they used it for is to ask those who have used it in several theatres since 1995 – sadly, it is input from these guys that is absent from this thread.