caz
The mere fact that a piece of equipment is fitted to an aircraft does not mean it can be used whenever and wherever the Crew decide - WE 177 springs to mind!!
This flight was tasked as a straightforward Passenger carrying flight from Aldergrove to Inverness. There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
Quite so. But I can assure you the authorisation to carry WE177 was preceded by comprehensive testing to satisfy the airworthiness signatory that, for example, it was not prematurely released due to an EMC problem.
Similarly, when one has installed a new fuel computer the same comprehensive testing is mandatory; followed by a statement as to what level of release is granted for all aircraft equipment. If you speak to any helicopter Design Authority they will tell you one thing about EMC failures – they will put up with a lot, but they will not tolerate interference with the fuel computer. There should be no thought whatsoever given to “read across”. Only a complete fool would say otherwise (and yes, I know some).
When you say;
There was NO authorisation for any demonstration of the capabilities of the aircraft other than those that were required to complete the Transit Task.
I accept your word without hesitation.
But what is far more definite is this. There was
No clearance, be it switch on, limited or full, to use a substantial part of the aircraft avionics. The underlying reason is clear. The aircraft had not been released to service in accordance with the regulations.
The primary reason was because Boscombe had not recommended CA Release, largely because they considered the implementation of the FADEC and its software “
positively dangerous”.
The only possible reason why so many radiating devices did not have clearance was because EMC testing was incomplete. (Indeed, why would Boscombe waste money conducting full EMC testing on an as yet unverified FADEC build standard? Answer – you don’t).
Despite this, Controller Air (Sir Donald Spiers) was prevailed upon to issue a CA Release when validation and verification was incomplete. As you know, the Release to Service Authority merely subsumes this CAR within his RTS, as Part A.
So, CA clearly knew (or should have been told) he was signing a document for which there was no audit trail to even the V&V minima. What is not entirely clear, at least to me, is whether this most serious breach of the airworthiness regulations was made known to the RTSA. Of course, there are those who believe it was the RTSA or his seniors who prevailed upon Sir Donald to sign – the political imperative to be seen to fly the Mk2. Either way, the aircrew were let down by the most appalling breach of Duty of Care and clearest act of gross negligence imaginable.