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Old 15th Aug 2009, 06:14
  #5574 (permalink)  
tucumseh
 
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: uk
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But very relevant to those trying to understand what could have happened here

But Wratten & Day understood, allegedly. I believe they also understood the ramifications if it were revealed how the regulations were ignored when accepting the Mk2 (a) off contract and (b) into Service. That they didn’t understand and chose to ignore and/or suppress expert testimony is the whole point of this thread.


Forget the FADEC? Why? If known problems with any system introduce any doubt whatsoever, then the MoD’s position is undermined. Only MoD and their supporters want to forget FADEC. That’s why they lie or continue to be selective with the facts, even when MoD themselves have subsequently acknowledged the truth. For example, the ongoing claims that there had only been control malfunctions on the ground, 13 years after MoD admitted at least 5 in the 2 month period before the crash. That is a lot, regardless of how many Mk2s had been converted; or manufactured from new if Ingram is to be believed. (He isn’t). Why lie on such a simple point? It’s ludicrous, yet indicative of the depths to which MoD will go to hide the truth.

MoD UK were, I believe, the release customer for that FADEC/Software version. To have this rate of control malfunctions, coupled with hundreds of problems in the software, smacks of one thing. Design Immaturity. That is where MoD don’t want to go, for the simple reason that accepting a Safety Critical design off contract and into Service, knowing it to be immature, is gross negligence and failure of Duty of Care. As it also entails making a series of false statements, it could also be construed as fraud. That it continued to happen long after 1994, under the same stewardship in PE, is a further indictment. Precisely the same issues have cropped up with tragic regularity over recent years in Coroners’ Courts.

In summary, an immature design, one still in the development phase, was released to service in Nov 1993. You may, just, take a chance on such immaturity if there is an over-riding operational imperative. May I suggest such immaturity and the limitations it imposes rendered it unwise to use a Mk2 for that final VVIP flight? The pilots knew this.
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