Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Chinook
ShyTorque. Thanks, and I note what you say, that nothing will ever change your views.
But just two final points before we agree to disagree; first, you have not challenged my statement that THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE.
And second, I'm surprised to see you embracing the conspiricy and cover-up theory. Given the very large number of aircrew and ex-aircrew members who must have been involved in all the many stages of this long saga, do you really believe that none of them would have blown the whistle? The idea is not worthy of you.
With all good wishes, as always, John Purdey.
But just two final points before we agree to disagree; first, you have not challenged my statement that THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE.
And second, I'm surprised to see you embracing the conspiricy and cover-up theory. Given the very large number of aircrew and ex-aircrew members who must have been involved in all the many stages of this long saga, do you really believe that none of them would have blown the whistle? The idea is not worthy of you.
With all good wishes, as always, John Purdey.
Just a numbered other
JP, thans for considering my points so carefully.
To take up a few of yours:
Forget the R/T angle. The last thing on your mind in extremis would be making a radio call. SH helos are often, as this one was, out of comms with any agency. In any case they would be using the old maxim Aviate, Navigate, Communicate in that order. In your plank, you would make your call once everything else was in order.
I agree with Shytorque's post. There is a lot more to this than meets the eye. That does not make us 'conspiracy theorists'. It is a fact that piling all the blame on the pilots diverted attention away from the other factors. It is a fact that the people who brought the finding of gross negligence also had a hand in sanctioning the risky flight full of IPs in an aircraft type which was rushed into service (by the same people) whilst Boscome Down had grounded their example. I could go on, but the point is made.
Where is your proof that they knowingly flew on with no references on the ground? The flight was conducted quite properly under Visual Flight Rules. Something caused it to crash in low cloud. That something has, if it was negligence, to be proven beyond any doubt whatsoever. It has not been.
If we accept that at waypoint change they could see the light house, then they did know exactly where they were. The reasons for the aircraft to turn slightly right towards, rather than away from, the high ground are unknown. If, as you theorise, the crew decided to pop into the low cloud and crest the mull, then they were indeed negligent. From my experience I have yet to meet any SH pilots with suicidal tendencies, yet this is what you, Wratten and Day would have us believe of Jon and Rick. I am afraid that if you want me to believe it, I will require proof. The very same proof that the RAF's own rules demanded, and which does not exist.
To take up a few of yours:
Forget the R/T angle. The last thing on your mind in extremis would be making a radio call. SH helos are often, as this one was, out of comms with any agency. In any case they would be using the old maxim Aviate, Navigate, Communicate in that order. In your plank, you would make your call once everything else was in order.
I agree with Shytorque's post. There is a lot more to this than meets the eye. That does not make us 'conspiracy theorists'. It is a fact that piling all the blame on the pilots diverted attention away from the other factors. It is a fact that the people who brought the finding of gross negligence also had a hand in sanctioning the risky flight full of IPs in an aircraft type which was rushed into service (by the same people) whilst Boscome Down had grounded their example. I could go on, but the point is made.
what I should have asked was whether you would have done so in the conditions faced by this crew , ie at low level, in cloud, at speed and without any references on the ground?
THEY WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE. No-one has yet answered this crucial argument.
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JP,
Certainly I'll challenge it, not that I understand why you should want me to do so.
Your statement "that the crew were not where they thought they were" is again mere hypothesis unless you have some evidence not disclosed to the BOI. I don't deny it as a possibility at all, in fact if you read my last reply properly I did say that the aircraft had a known history of TANS position errors. There is no evidence to prove that there was such a position error on the fated flight, but there might have been one. If so, it may or may not have had a bearing on the cause of the accident.
However, how can anyone know what two pilots, now deceased THOUGHT? In the absence of a CVR or FDR there is no evidence appertaining to even what the pilots SAID or DID, let alone thought.
You seem to be confusing supposition as factual evidence, a remarkably common disorder in this case, I note. You're not an MOD spokesman, are you, JP?
Again, I repeat. I would of course accept evidence that proved without any doubt the reason for the accident, whatever the cause. As I said, I think everyone would and we could all desist from wearing out our keyboards and go to bed at a more reasonable hour.
BUT... the sole reason for the campaign is that this has not happened, yet the crew were judged to have been guilty of gross negligence on an interpretation of circumstantial evidence.
Perhaps you could just remind me where I said that I support a conspiracy theory? My understanding of the definition of conspiracy is [a secret plan to commit a crime]. I don't think anyone has had secret plans to commit a crime, merely an incorrect interpretation of evidence has taken place, possibly for reasons already stated.
The continued insistence by MOD that theirs is the ONLY possible interpretation of circumstantial evidence is very strange, until one considers the fact that MOD themselves (and their test pilots) were very unhappy with the integrity and safety of the aircraft and yet the RAF policy was to insist that the aircraft was pressed into operational service before these concerns were resolved.
In my opinion, the fact that this flight was ordered or allowed to depart in the circumstances means shows that negligence, or a disregard for flight safety, occurred some way up the chain of command.
That is why the concern about a possible cover-up is there. I'm not saying that it did occur, but there does seems to be as much circumstantial evidence for that as there is for the verdict that the pilots were grossly negligent.
Certainly I'll challenge it, not that I understand why you should want me to do so.
Your statement "that the crew were not where they thought they were" is again mere hypothesis unless you have some evidence not disclosed to the BOI. I don't deny it as a possibility at all, in fact if you read my last reply properly I did say that the aircraft had a known history of TANS position errors. There is no evidence to prove that there was such a position error on the fated flight, but there might have been one. If so, it may or may not have had a bearing on the cause of the accident.
However, how can anyone know what two pilots, now deceased THOUGHT? In the absence of a CVR or FDR there is no evidence appertaining to even what the pilots SAID or DID, let alone thought.
You seem to be confusing supposition as factual evidence, a remarkably common disorder in this case, I note. You're not an MOD spokesman, are you, JP?
Again, I repeat. I would of course accept evidence that proved without any doubt the reason for the accident, whatever the cause. As I said, I think everyone would and we could all desist from wearing out our keyboards and go to bed at a more reasonable hour.
BUT... the sole reason for the campaign is that this has not happened, yet the crew were judged to have been guilty of gross negligence on an interpretation of circumstantial evidence.
Perhaps you could just remind me where I said that I support a conspiracy theory? My understanding of the definition of conspiracy is [a secret plan to commit a crime]. I don't think anyone has had secret plans to commit a crime, merely an incorrect interpretation of evidence has taken place, possibly for reasons already stated.
The continued insistence by MOD that theirs is the ONLY possible interpretation of circumstantial evidence is very strange, until one considers the fact that MOD themselves (and their test pilots) were very unhappy with the integrity and safety of the aircraft and yet the RAF policy was to insist that the aircraft was pressed into operational service before these concerns were resolved.
In my opinion, the fact that this flight was ordered or allowed to depart in the circumstances means shows that negligence, or a disregard for flight safety, occurred some way up the chain of command.
That is why the concern about a possible cover-up is there. I'm not saying that it did occur, but there does seems to be as much circumstantial evidence for that as there is for the verdict that the pilots were grossly negligent.
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Chinook
ArkRoyal. Thanks for the reply; there is no point in rehearsing all the arguments again, but I will just say that I certainly do not (repeat not) accept that they could see the lighthouse; the Keeper said it was in fog for heavens sake, and he should know.
ShyTorque. Certainly not an MOD spokesman! Merely an aviator trying to bring a little objectivity to this discussion. If I were an MOD spokesman, then I would have emphasised the fact that the CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE, but about 500 yards to the right of their intended fix over the lighthouse - which is where they crashed (caused partly by a misplotted waypoint and partly by what seems to have been some drift in one or other or both the nav systems). This matter of track error was given only a passing reference in Noon's statement, and that is something I have never understood.
Meanwhile, we are not going to persuade each other, and neither of you seemed to examine the choice between locked controls and crew error, so I think matters are best left there.
With all good wishes for the New Year. JP.
ShyTorque. Certainly not an MOD spokesman! Merely an aviator trying to bring a little objectivity to this discussion. If I were an MOD spokesman, then I would have emphasised the fact that the CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE, but about 500 yards to the right of their intended fix over the lighthouse - which is where they crashed (caused partly by a misplotted waypoint and partly by what seems to have been some drift in one or other or both the nav systems). This matter of track error was given only a passing reference in Noon's statement, and that is something I have never understood.
Meanwhile, we are not going to persuade each other, and neither of you seemed to examine the choice between locked controls and crew error, so I think matters are best left there.
With all good wishes for the New Year. JP.
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Oh well, John has gone.
He said he was trying to bring objectivity to the discussion. Unfortunately he failed to do so because he exhibited his opinion, which is subjectivity instead, according at least to the Oxford dictionary.
Shame he didn't explain how he Knew what the crew were thinking.
I cannot understand his final reference to "the choice between locked controls or crew error". It's the first reference to this I have heard. Were these choices offered by the BOI?
He said he was trying to bring objectivity to the discussion. Unfortunately he failed to do so because he exhibited his opinion, which is subjectivity instead, according at least to the Oxford dictionary.
Shame he didn't explain how he Knew what the crew were thinking.
I cannot understand his final reference to "the choice between locked controls or crew error". It's the first reference to this I have heard. Were these choices offered by the BOI?
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As a now long in the tooth President of two RAF BoI and staffer of many others in a Gp HQ, can I express an opinion at this very late stage of the debate? Given the absence of black box information. voice recordings. and eye witnesses of the impact, it seems to me that any judgement has to be rooted in supposition, and that the absolute criteria of doubt eradication can never be met in this case.
I imagine that many, like myself, would tend to share JP's subjective views. But such opinion must bow to the over-riding need for 100%proof, in the absence of which only an open verdict can be justified. The morally safe course would be to set aside the AMs' decision.
I imagine that many, like myself, would tend to share JP's subjective views. But such opinion must bow to the over-riding need for 100%proof, in the absence of which only an open verdict can be justified. The morally safe course would be to set aside the AMs' decision.
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Perhaps not directly relevant, but interesting to note that as at July 2000 the US Army had still not sorted their CH47 Flight Control lock-up and associated problems. I wonder if the matter has yet been resolved? The following were taken from :
http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/ma...Summaries.html
CH-47-99-ASAM-02, 16 February 1999:
Title: Actions to reduce susceptibility to Flight Control lock-up and/or uncommanded maneuvers.
Summary: The H-47 community has reported several incidents in which the aircraft experienced uncommanded maneuvers or Flight Control lock up in flight. The USASC, AMCOM, and Boeing are conducting an investigation into this hazard. The investigating agencies analyzed suspect components and performed analytical tear-downs. AMCOM issued CH-47-98-ASAM-01 and CH-47-96-ASAM-06 as a result of the reported incidents. Factors which have been present and may contribute to uncommanded maneuvers or Flight Control lock-up include, but are not limited to: contamination of hydraulic fluid, internal parts out of tolerance, corrosion on internal parts, high barium content in preservative hydraulic fluids, hands off flying, and internal FOD created by wear of aluminum parts. The investigation team conducted simulations to analyze the interaction of these factors with aircraft flight. The simulations demonstrated that when such factors are present and actual hands on flying is not being observed, the aircraft may perform uncommanded movements with a slow degradation in flight capabilities. The computer simulation is not sophisticated enough at this time to produce the exact maneuvers of the incident aircraft, therefore we have not been able to establish a rigorous cause and effect relationship between any single factor or combination of factors for which the specific flight control anomalies have occurred. To resolve corrosion hazards with the Integrated Lower Control Actuator (ILCA) control valve, the CH-47 PMO will fund and request an engineering change to manufacture the control valve from corrosive resistant material.
CH-47-00-ASAM-03, 1 July 2000:
Title: Hydraulic Fluid sampling from Flight Control and Utility Systems.
Summary: The H-47 community has reported several incidents in which the aircraft experienced uncommanded maneuvers or flight control lock up while in flight. Contaminated Hydraulic Fluid is a factor which has been present and may have contributed to the uncommanded maneuvers or flight control lock up. To resolve this hydraulic fluid contamination factor, a periodic sampling interval of 50 flight hours or 100 calendar days for the Number One, Number Two, and Utility Hydraulic Systems will be initiated.
http://www.chinook-helicopter.com/ma...Summaries.html
CH-47-99-ASAM-02, 16 February 1999:
Title: Actions to reduce susceptibility to Flight Control lock-up and/or uncommanded maneuvers.
Summary: The H-47 community has reported several incidents in which the aircraft experienced uncommanded maneuvers or Flight Control lock up in flight. The USASC, AMCOM, and Boeing are conducting an investigation into this hazard. The investigating agencies analyzed suspect components and performed analytical tear-downs. AMCOM issued CH-47-98-ASAM-01 and CH-47-96-ASAM-06 as a result of the reported incidents. Factors which have been present and may contribute to uncommanded maneuvers or Flight Control lock-up include, but are not limited to: contamination of hydraulic fluid, internal parts out of tolerance, corrosion on internal parts, high barium content in preservative hydraulic fluids, hands off flying, and internal FOD created by wear of aluminum parts. The investigation team conducted simulations to analyze the interaction of these factors with aircraft flight. The simulations demonstrated that when such factors are present and actual hands on flying is not being observed, the aircraft may perform uncommanded movements with a slow degradation in flight capabilities. The computer simulation is not sophisticated enough at this time to produce the exact maneuvers of the incident aircraft, therefore we have not been able to establish a rigorous cause and effect relationship between any single factor or combination of factors for which the specific flight control anomalies have occurred. To resolve corrosion hazards with the Integrated Lower Control Actuator (ILCA) control valve, the CH-47 PMO will fund and request an engineering change to manufacture the control valve from corrosive resistant material.
CH-47-00-ASAM-03, 1 July 2000:
Title: Hydraulic Fluid sampling from Flight Control and Utility Systems.
Summary: The H-47 community has reported several incidents in which the aircraft experienced uncommanded maneuvers or flight control lock up while in flight. Contaminated Hydraulic Fluid is a factor which has been present and may have contributed to the uncommanded maneuvers or flight control lock up. To resolve this hydraulic fluid contamination factor, a periodic sampling interval of 50 flight hours or 100 calendar days for the Number One, Number Two, and Utility Hydraulic Systems will be initiated.
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Chinook
Smartman. Your background on Bs of I makes your comment paricularly interesting. Just to be quite clear about your views, we are talking about an aircraft with no apparent unservicability, at very low level, off intended track, hitting cloud covered high ground. As a Flight Safety staff officer, would your verdict have been 'Unknown Cause' ? Only curious. John Purdey.
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JP
You really are getting bogged down with all this. The fact is almost every aviator that visits this thread would agree that throughout the entire chain of events that led to this dissaster, mistakes were made. The issue is that the RAFs own rulebook clearly states that there should be proof beyond all doubt for a finding of Gross or Culpible Negligence, and that for such a finding the aircrew must be alive to tell their side of the story. On this occasion the AVMs did not stick to this ruling, and it had dreadful ramifications for the familys concerned.
I was an SH pilot for 20 years, it does not sound as if you were one. You keep stating that the boys were flying very low and off intended track. SH crews fly at 100 ft agl routinely, it is our bread and butter, if we need to we are authorised to 50 ft agl. We do not fly at those heights without visual references. Just because the lighthouse keeper said he was in fog does not mean that it (the lighthouse) could not be seen from another vantage point. We also have freedom to manouvre right or left of any track line, and often if we can identify waypoints early, we will turn early or cut the corner. Your arguments are totally subjective and YOU HAVE NO PROOF!
Furthermore, not wishing to answer for smartman, so i will answer for myself as a Flight Safety officer, my findings would have been exactly that "Cause Unknown" because nobody to date has provided one bit of evidence to prove otherwise.
You really are getting bogged down with all this. The fact is almost every aviator that visits this thread would agree that throughout the entire chain of events that led to this dissaster, mistakes were made. The issue is that the RAFs own rulebook clearly states that there should be proof beyond all doubt for a finding of Gross or Culpible Negligence, and that for such a finding the aircrew must be alive to tell their side of the story. On this occasion the AVMs did not stick to this ruling, and it had dreadful ramifications for the familys concerned.
I was an SH pilot for 20 years, it does not sound as if you were one. You keep stating that the boys were flying very low and off intended track. SH crews fly at 100 ft agl routinely, it is our bread and butter, if we need to we are authorised to 50 ft agl. We do not fly at those heights without visual references. Just because the lighthouse keeper said he was in fog does not mean that it (the lighthouse) could not be seen from another vantage point. We also have freedom to manouvre right or left of any track line, and often if we can identify waypoints early, we will turn early or cut the corner. Your arguments are totally subjective and YOU HAVE NO PROOF!
Furthermore, not wishing to answer for smartman, so i will answer for myself as a Flight Safety officer, my findings would have been exactly that "Cause Unknown" because nobody to date has provided one bit of evidence to prove otherwise.
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JP
As implied, I lean to the view that the most likely/most probable cause was pilot error; it is also my opinion that many military operators would give a similar pragmatic head-bowed shrug (clouds with solid centres, etc etc). And, even if the Board's finding had been accepted by the AMs, as a flight safety staffer I would be acting on my 'probability verdict' and seeking ways of avoiding a repeat performance.
But, with today's rules concerning demonstration of proof, I would be bound to accept an 'open' verdict. And given those rules, surely there is no other option?
Hope you don't think I'm fence-sitting. At the end of the day, the likes of you and I and the AMs will always hold our well-qualified professional opinions - I just happen to think that they don't match the legal requirements.
As an aside, there was a post some way back saying that it didn't take any courage to elect for a verdict of pilot error. Perhaps in this politically correct world the reverse is true!
As implied, I lean to the view that the most likely/most probable cause was pilot error; it is also my opinion that many military operators would give a similar pragmatic head-bowed shrug (clouds with solid centres, etc etc). And, even if the Board's finding had been accepted by the AMs, as a flight safety staffer I would be acting on my 'probability verdict' and seeking ways of avoiding a repeat performance.
But, with today's rules concerning demonstration of proof, I would be bound to accept an 'open' verdict. And given those rules, surely there is no other option?
Hope you don't think I'm fence-sitting. At the end of the day, the likes of you and I and the AMs will always hold our well-qualified professional opinions - I just happen to think that they don't match the legal requirements.
As an aside, there was a post some way back saying that it didn't take any courage to elect for a verdict of pilot error. Perhaps in this politically correct world the reverse is true!
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we are talking about an aircraft with no apparent unservicability
at very low level
As a Flight Safety staff officer, would your verdict have been 'Unknown Cause' ? Only curious
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Smartman,
I concur with your thoughts, well put.
JP, The campaign began only because the RAF's own requirements for standards of proof were ignored. As we all know, this had major ramifications for the pilots' families, who were in no way to blame for the accident, whatever the circumstances.
The over-ruling of the verdict of the BOI stank (still does) because of the debacle of the introduction into service of the aircraft type and the apparent flouting of the requirement for a Controller Aircraft Release to Service. While Boscombe test pilots refused to fly theirs 10 minutes up the road to Odiham for maintenance, and MOD were suing the manufacturer, this crew was ordered to fly an aircraft full of some of the most important intelligence personnel in the NI theatre.
I don't think any of us can look at the available evidence and say that the pilots didn't make errors (I think their worst mistake was to take off, although I understand the pressure they were under).
However, take a look at the big picture! Major management errors were also surely made and the Air Marshalls themselves are surely responsible for them, directly or indirectly.
The(ir) decision to over-rule the findings of Wing Commander Pulford, President of the BOI could be interpreted as a method of negating the requirement for further questions to be asked, on a wider scale, about the premature introduction of the Chinook Mk2.
The final cause of this accident is still unknown.
I concur with your thoughts, well put.
JP, The campaign began only because the RAF's own requirements for standards of proof were ignored. As we all know, this had major ramifications for the pilots' families, who were in no way to blame for the accident, whatever the circumstances.
The over-ruling of the verdict of the BOI stank (still does) because of the debacle of the introduction into service of the aircraft type and the apparent flouting of the requirement for a Controller Aircraft Release to Service. While Boscombe test pilots refused to fly theirs 10 minutes up the road to Odiham for maintenance, and MOD were suing the manufacturer, this crew was ordered to fly an aircraft full of some of the most important intelligence personnel in the NI theatre.
I don't think any of us can look at the available evidence and say that the pilots didn't make errors (I think their worst mistake was to take off, although I understand the pressure they were under).
However, take a look at the big picture! Major management errors were also surely made and the Air Marshalls themselves are surely responsible for them, directly or indirectly.
The(ir) decision to over-rule the findings of Wing Commander Pulford, President of the BOI could be interpreted as a method of negating the requirement for further questions to be asked, on a wider scale, about the premature introduction of the Chinook Mk2.
The final cause of this accident is still unknown.
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Chinook
Smartman et al; As I said, just curious, and very interested in your repl. But I had not heard before that for a crew to be found negligent, they must survive the incident, according to the RAF rule book - as one of you has just said. If that is so, then we are into a totally new dimension.
Regards to all. JP
Regards to all. JP
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Hi everyone.
Firstly, Mr Purdey I'm not ignoring your post of 9 January. I'm just trawling through some paperwork so that I can find the information I want to use in reply. Sorry it's taking longer than anticipated.
Secondly, as an aside from the Chinook accident, you may all recall that there were suggestions that Sgt Vince Philips (of Bravo 20) was responsible for compromising their position after insertion. Following an 11 year campaign by his family, Vince has been cleared of any wrongdoing, and his family have letters from Mr Hoon telling them that Vince was a hero. Quite right too!!
Looks like our campaign has a few more years to run then!
Finally, here is the latest press release from the Mull of Kintyre Group:
Mull of Kintyre Group elects new Chairman as campaign continues
The Mull of Kintyre Group met this week and elected The Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot, MP, as its new Chairman.
Mr Arbuthnot said at the meeting: “This is a job that clearly needs doing and I am delighted to take on this important role.” He replaces Lord Chalfont who established the Group in June 2000.
Calling Lord Chalfont’s idea of setting up a Select Committee in the Lords to examine the crash “brilliantly anarchic”, Mr Arbuthnot went on to praise the Committee’s work. “This was a group of exceptionally distinguished cross-party peers, who agreed unanimously that the pilots should never have been charged with gross negligence with no doubt whatsoever. That the Government chose not only to reject the Select Committee’s finding, but also to whip the debate about it on 5th November illustrates their anxiety about this affair. I hope they realize that it will not fade until justice is done.”
As a Defence Minster shortly after the crash, Mr Arbuthnot became convinced that a grave miscarriage of justice occurred in the condemnation of the pilots. He publicly apologized during a June 2000 debate for supporting the two reviewing officers of a RAF Board of Inquiry. Sir John Day and Sir William Wratten overturned the Board’s original finding that doubts existed over whether the pilots could be found to be negligent. After a Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry, that of the Public Accounts Committee and Lord Jauncey’s Select Committee, these two remain the only individuals participating in a formal inquiry into the crash convinced of the pilots’ guilt.
Mr Arbuthnot will lead the Group following eight years of campaigning to clear the pilots names of the charge of gross negligence.
As always, I'll keep you updated.
Regards
Brian
Firstly, Mr Purdey I'm not ignoring your post of 9 January. I'm just trawling through some paperwork so that I can find the information I want to use in reply. Sorry it's taking longer than anticipated.
Secondly, as an aside from the Chinook accident, you may all recall that there were suggestions that Sgt Vince Philips (of Bravo 20) was responsible for compromising their position after insertion. Following an 11 year campaign by his family, Vince has been cleared of any wrongdoing, and his family have letters from Mr Hoon telling them that Vince was a hero. Quite right too!!
Looks like our campaign has a few more years to run then!
Finally, here is the latest press release from the Mull of Kintyre Group:
Mull of Kintyre Group elects new Chairman as campaign continues
The Mull of Kintyre Group met this week and elected The Rt. Hon. James Arbuthnot, MP, as its new Chairman.
Mr Arbuthnot said at the meeting: “This is a job that clearly needs doing and I am delighted to take on this important role.” He replaces Lord Chalfont who established the Group in June 2000.
Calling Lord Chalfont’s idea of setting up a Select Committee in the Lords to examine the crash “brilliantly anarchic”, Mr Arbuthnot went on to praise the Committee’s work. “This was a group of exceptionally distinguished cross-party peers, who agreed unanimously that the pilots should never have been charged with gross negligence with no doubt whatsoever. That the Government chose not only to reject the Select Committee’s finding, but also to whip the debate about it on 5th November illustrates their anxiety about this affair. I hope they realize that it will not fade until justice is done.”
As a Defence Minster shortly after the crash, Mr Arbuthnot became convinced that a grave miscarriage of justice occurred in the condemnation of the pilots. He publicly apologized during a June 2000 debate for supporting the two reviewing officers of a RAF Board of Inquiry. Sir John Day and Sir William Wratten overturned the Board’s original finding that doubts existed over whether the pilots could be found to be negligent. After a Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry, that of the Public Accounts Committee and Lord Jauncey’s Select Committee, these two remain the only individuals participating in a formal inquiry into the crash convinced of the pilots’ guilt.
Mr Arbuthnot will lead the Group following eight years of campaigning to clear the pilots names of the charge of gross negligence.
As always, I'll keep you updated.
Regards
Brian
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JP
As far as aircraft serviceability is concerned, the only people who can testify to that tragically perished in the ensuing crash. The AAIB most definitely NEVER said the aircraft was serviceable.
Indeed they said something extremely close to:"The pre impact serviceability of ZD576 could not be positively established."
In other words, please don't make the common error of failing to differentiate between "absence of evidence" and "evidence of absence."
Another point you may wish to consider is that ; matters of opinion are NOT matters of fact.
can't you at least agree that the single most striking characteristic of this whole sorry saga is an almost complete absence of reliable facts?
Eight and a half years, how utterly depressing!
As far as aircraft serviceability is concerned, the only people who can testify to that tragically perished in the ensuing crash. The AAIB most definitely NEVER said the aircraft was serviceable.
Indeed they said something extremely close to:"The pre impact serviceability of ZD576 could not be positively established."
In other words, please don't make the common error of failing to differentiate between "absence of evidence" and "evidence of absence."
Another point you may wish to consider is that ; matters of opinion are NOT matters of fact.
can't you at least agree that the single most striking characteristic of this whole sorry saga is an almost complete absence of reliable facts?
Eight and a half years, how utterly depressing!
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Chocks Wahay
Quote from your last post:
"The reviewing officers at HQ didn't blame the pilots."
Which office at HQ were you in? I was in the Flight Safety office where we co-ordinated all the inputs from the various specialist sections. I regret to say that you are wrong in your assertion.
One More Point,
Neither the AOC in C STC or AOC 1 Gp to whose lot it fell to pronounce the conclusion of the BOI and its findings were in those respective Posts at the time of the Accident.
In addition do not forget that the then CAS reviewed the entire BOI and concurred with the findings of "Negligence to a gross degree"in respect of both pilots.
Quote from your last post:
"The reviewing officers at HQ didn't blame the pilots."
Which office at HQ were you in? I was in the Flight Safety office where we co-ordinated all the inputs from the various specialist sections. I regret to say that you are wrong in your assertion.
One More Point,
Neither the AOC in C STC or AOC 1 Gp to whose lot it fell to pronounce the conclusion of the BOI and its findings were in those respective Posts at the time of the Accident.
In addition do not forget that the then CAS reviewed the entire BOI and concurred with the findings of "Negligence to a gross degree"in respect of both pilots.
Avoid imitations
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K52,
Perhaps you could remind us who occupied those two offices at the time of the accident. Thank you.
Perhaps you could remind us who occupied those two offices at the time of the accident. Thank you.
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Chinook
Tandemrotor. You claim that there is an almost complete absence of facts. I must say that that is one of the most extraordinary contributions in this over-long exchange.
The facts as to (approximate) height over the sea, airspeed, misplotted waypoint, height of waypoint, height at which aircraft struck the hillside, weather conditions are all very well established.
The only piece of missing evidence is the reasoning that presumably went on in the cockpit as to the choice between safely turning away from the cloud-covered high ground, and trying to fly over it. The one thing we next know is the tragic result of pressing on, which turned out to be mistaken because THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE. John Purdey
Tigs2. On 16th Jan you said that '...for such a finding (ie of gross negligence) the crew must be alive to tell their side of the story'. If that is so, it completely destoys the MOD position. Please give chapter and verse of your source. JP.
The facts as to (approximate) height over the sea, airspeed, misplotted waypoint, height of waypoint, height at which aircraft struck the hillside, weather conditions are all very well established.
The only piece of missing evidence is the reasoning that presumably went on in the cockpit as to the choice between safely turning away from the cloud-covered high ground, and trying to fly over it. The one thing we next know is the tragic result of pressing on, which turned out to be mistaken because THE CREW WERE NOT WHERE THEY THOUGHT THEY WERE. John Purdey
Tigs2. On 16th Jan you said that '...for such a finding (ie of gross negligence) the crew must be alive to tell their side of the story'. If that is so, it completely destoys the MOD position. Please give chapter and verse of your source. JP.
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JP
We may be able to assist each other.
As one of two technical experts, who advised legal council representing the pilots throughout the entire FAI, I believe I am reasonably well familiar with which 'facts' were established to the satisfaction of 'legal' standards. (In this court, merely 'balance of probability'!)
I believe Sheriff Sir Steven Young was also familiar with the weight of so called, 'factual' evidence to which the MoD cling.
Which presumably, is why he was singularly unconvinced of the argument, powerfully put, by counsel for said Ministry.
The HoL Select Committee report into this accident, also had some extaordinarily scathing comments to make, about matters, stated in person by AM Day, as fact, which patently were not (I have no doubt a fellow ppruner will be able to remind you of the precise language used should you desire clarification!)
So, let's look at the points you raise:
'FACT 1' - "(approximate) height over the sea"
Since there is no evidence whatever as to this parameter, save the evidence of a yachtsman, can this be factual, or was it his opinion? - If it is fact, what of his further assertion, that he could see the coastline of the Mull all the way up to the wall surrounding the lighthouse? He also believed the crew would too!
- Fact or opinion?
'FACT 2' - "airspeed"
I believe the AAIB identified as accurately as they possibly could, the speed of the aircraft at impact, but I suspect your implication is that the airspeed at some time prior to impact has been established as a 'fact'! Perhaps you rely upon the Boeing simulation, which takes a 'best guess' at airspeed 3.9secs prior to impact. I say again "SIMULATION"
-Fact or opinion?
'FACT 3' - "weather conditions"
A yachtsman has given the only evidence regarding weather, that pertains to the conditions being experienced by the crew as they approached the Mull. His description unequivocally describes conditions suitable for low level VFR.
Naturally the MoD prefer the evidence of the lighthouse keepers at least 300' asl, in hill fog.
-Fact or opinion?
Are you getting the hang of this yet?
I don't feel it necessary to comment on issues such as, misplotted waypoints (500m I believe), height of waypoint, height at which aircraft struck hillside, etc. As I cannot believe any case can be built around these factors alone.
So JP, as far as your assertion that my posting, "is one of the most extraordinary contributions in this over-long exchange" is concerned,
- that would of course be simply a 'matter of opinion' and not a 'matter of fact.'
I will leave you with one 'fact' to think about:
Not even the AAIB, ever said the aircraft was serviceable prior to impact.
- FACT!
We may be able to assist each other.
As one of two technical experts, who advised legal council representing the pilots throughout the entire FAI, I believe I am reasonably well familiar with which 'facts' were established to the satisfaction of 'legal' standards. (In this court, merely 'balance of probability'!)
I believe Sheriff Sir Steven Young was also familiar with the weight of so called, 'factual' evidence to which the MoD cling.
Which presumably, is why he was singularly unconvinced of the argument, powerfully put, by counsel for said Ministry.
The HoL Select Committee report into this accident, also had some extaordinarily scathing comments to make, about matters, stated in person by AM Day, as fact, which patently were not (I have no doubt a fellow ppruner will be able to remind you of the precise language used should you desire clarification!)
So, let's look at the points you raise:
'FACT 1' - "(approximate) height over the sea"
Since there is no evidence whatever as to this parameter, save the evidence of a yachtsman, can this be factual, or was it his opinion? - If it is fact, what of his further assertion, that he could see the coastline of the Mull all the way up to the wall surrounding the lighthouse? He also believed the crew would too!
- Fact or opinion?
'FACT 2' - "airspeed"
I believe the AAIB identified as accurately as they possibly could, the speed of the aircraft at impact, but I suspect your implication is that the airspeed at some time prior to impact has been established as a 'fact'! Perhaps you rely upon the Boeing simulation, which takes a 'best guess' at airspeed 3.9secs prior to impact. I say again "SIMULATION"
-Fact or opinion?
'FACT 3' - "weather conditions"
A yachtsman has given the only evidence regarding weather, that pertains to the conditions being experienced by the crew as they approached the Mull. His description unequivocally describes conditions suitable for low level VFR.
Naturally the MoD prefer the evidence of the lighthouse keepers at least 300' asl, in hill fog.
-Fact or opinion?
Are you getting the hang of this yet?
I don't feel it necessary to comment on issues such as, misplotted waypoints (500m I believe), height of waypoint, height at which aircraft struck hillside, etc. As I cannot believe any case can be built around these factors alone.
So JP, as far as your assertion that my posting, "is one of the most extraordinary contributions in this over-long exchange" is concerned,
- that would of course be simply a 'matter of opinion' and not a 'matter of fact.'
I will leave you with one 'fact' to think about:
Not even the AAIB, ever said the aircraft was serviceable prior to impact.
- FACT!
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ShyTorque
Which "Offices" do you refer to?
The Appointments of Senior Officers to various posts are a matter of public record ( they are even published in the National Press).
If you wish to know who was in which section at HQ 1 Gp by name then I must refuse to accommodate you. What was written, and by whom. in briefing notes for Senior Officers was "In Confidence" and will remain so as far as I am concerned.
You have to bear in mind, however, that the final conclusion was the same at Group level, at Command Level and when reviewed personally by CAS; (himself a former AOC 1 Gp).
You, of course, know better.
Which "Offices" do you refer to?
The Appointments of Senior Officers to various posts are a matter of public record ( they are even published in the National Press).
If you wish to know who was in which section at HQ 1 Gp by name then I must refuse to accommodate you. What was written, and by whom. in briefing notes for Senior Officers was "In Confidence" and will remain so as far as I am concerned.
You have to bear in mind, however, that the final conclusion was the same at Group level, at Command Level and when reviewed personally by CAS; (himself a former AOC 1 Gp).
You, of course, know better.