Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
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Where to Begin
Cazatou,
I disagree with so much in your last post that it is difficult to know where to begin! So a few thoughts, not necessarily in any order of priority:
That there was a duty of care failure seems to be beyond doubt, but where this occurred is subject to significant doubt – you obviously like the hypotheses turned into facts approach of the Senior Reviewing Officers – who you now say numbered three and not two.
The join in the both the BoI and Stn Cdr Odiham’s comments is very obvious and shows a clearly imposed change of direction. I know this can happen very easily – it did to a BoI where I was the junior member on a Buccaneer crash – we started again with all new people except for myself when the AOC did not like the first verdict! What is clear, unless you accept hypotheses as facts, is that there has to be doubt – read the first four paragraphs of the Stn Cdr’s comments to see his doubts – read the Senior Reviewing Officers own doubts – doubts ignored when it came to the verdict. If there is doubt then the three Senior Reviewing Officers would appear to have joined together to deliberately ignore the “rules” in AP3207. It was at this level and not the BoI or the Stn Cdrs that the Gross Negligence decision was made – a decision that to this day leaves two pilots’ families with a criminal slur against their sons/husbands/fathers names. If you are happy that justice can be dispensed in this way with no defence and no appeal then there is little that I can say here to change your mind. However, given that this verdict could not happen today and the findings of the FAI and HoL amongst others, are against MOD I can only assume that they (whoever they are in Main Building) are content to apply the same ethical standards to this case as they do to families appealing against shell shocked victims of WW1 being found guilty of cowardice and shot as deserters!
The fact that (by direction?) the Stn Cdr Odiham reluctantly accepts that the pilots failed to exercise their duty of care may, if it were to be true (but we will never know) be negligence, but it is not automatically gross negligence. Read my post on how a gross negligence verdict may be arrived at and the criminal implications of manslaughter, and tell me how this equates to three senior RAF officers in the command chain coming to a verdict with no defence of the accused and no appeal. Read the excellent Juridical Review Part 6 of 2001 for a totally independent view of the shortcomings of RAF justice in this case.
You have been very selective in your response – what is your view on the conclusions that the two reviewing officers (I assume without CAS this time, but you may know differently) came to on the Glen Ogle accident. Here, thanks to a fully functioning ADR and CVR the BoI could show conclusively that the actions of the pilot (for whatever reason) led to the loss of the aircraft and the death of his navigator – what price the duty of care here. One of the reviewing officers actually commented “Regardless of the circumstances of this particular accident, I agree that [the pilot] should be absolved from blame.” A fairly inconsistent approach to the dispensing of justice when compared to the Chinook I suggest.
Why have you, by implication at least, introduced the red herring of crew duty time – this was not a factor in the accident as you well know.
Why were the obvious airworthiness issues of the Chinook fleet, and ZD 576, and the flight safety critical defects being suffered at the time virtually ignored by the BoI and totally ignored by the senior reviewing officers – where was the full examination of the evidence that was available by the review procedure – I have never seen such a biased outcome as this – I believe its called situating the appreciation! Add to this Boscombe’s concerns, which contrary to MOD statements later were not just with their own trials but also with the defects being experienced on the in-service fleet, with the latter being the stated reason for trials stopping, and you have to wonder why none of this was drawn to the BoI’s attention or commented on by the Review process,
Yes I was aware of the limitations of the Stn Cdr Aldergrove’s comments. He is the only one to comment on the illegal maintenance practices of the detachment wrt ZD 576, but then he accepts them with no idea of their potential implications.
You are correct that the verdict did not change in the Review Process (but it was different to the BoI itself) and that is because the three senior reviewing officers agreed the verdict between them with the two in the procedural chain actually brining it in. Neither Stn Cdr mentions Gross Negligence. I cannot say more for the moment, but the Mull Group has absolute proof of this, and as you were clearly in the thick of things at the time (IFS?) you will probably know to which very senior level correspondence I am referring!
As I recall the AOC’s comments were dated Apr 95 well before the anniversary of the crash – are you saying that the BoI was then delayed beyond June 1995?
I could go on, but I do not believe you will be convinced – as a simple engineer though I am amazed at how many pilots seem to be content that criminal (in) justice could be dispensed in this manner.
JB
I disagree with so much in your last post that it is difficult to know where to begin! So a few thoughts, not necessarily in any order of priority:
That there was a duty of care failure seems to be beyond doubt, but where this occurred is subject to significant doubt – you obviously like the hypotheses turned into facts approach of the Senior Reviewing Officers – who you now say numbered three and not two.
The join in the both the BoI and Stn Cdr Odiham’s comments is very obvious and shows a clearly imposed change of direction. I know this can happen very easily – it did to a BoI where I was the junior member on a Buccaneer crash – we started again with all new people except for myself when the AOC did not like the first verdict! What is clear, unless you accept hypotheses as facts, is that there has to be doubt – read the first four paragraphs of the Stn Cdr’s comments to see his doubts – read the Senior Reviewing Officers own doubts – doubts ignored when it came to the verdict. If there is doubt then the three Senior Reviewing Officers would appear to have joined together to deliberately ignore the “rules” in AP3207. It was at this level and not the BoI or the Stn Cdrs that the Gross Negligence decision was made – a decision that to this day leaves two pilots’ families with a criminal slur against their sons/husbands/fathers names. If you are happy that justice can be dispensed in this way with no defence and no appeal then there is little that I can say here to change your mind. However, given that this verdict could not happen today and the findings of the FAI and HoL amongst others, are against MOD I can only assume that they (whoever they are in Main Building) are content to apply the same ethical standards to this case as they do to families appealing against shell shocked victims of WW1 being found guilty of cowardice and shot as deserters!
The fact that (by direction?) the Stn Cdr Odiham reluctantly accepts that the pilots failed to exercise their duty of care may, if it were to be true (but we will never know) be negligence, but it is not automatically gross negligence. Read my post on how a gross negligence verdict may be arrived at and the criminal implications of manslaughter, and tell me how this equates to three senior RAF officers in the command chain coming to a verdict with no defence of the accused and no appeal. Read the excellent Juridical Review Part 6 of 2001 for a totally independent view of the shortcomings of RAF justice in this case.
You have been very selective in your response – what is your view on the conclusions that the two reviewing officers (I assume without CAS this time, but you may know differently) came to on the Glen Ogle accident. Here, thanks to a fully functioning ADR and CVR the BoI could show conclusively that the actions of the pilot (for whatever reason) led to the loss of the aircraft and the death of his navigator – what price the duty of care here. One of the reviewing officers actually commented “Regardless of the circumstances of this particular accident, I agree that [the pilot] should be absolved from blame.” A fairly inconsistent approach to the dispensing of justice when compared to the Chinook I suggest.
Why have you, by implication at least, introduced the red herring of crew duty time – this was not a factor in the accident as you well know.
Why were the obvious airworthiness issues of the Chinook fleet, and ZD 576, and the flight safety critical defects being suffered at the time virtually ignored by the BoI and totally ignored by the senior reviewing officers – where was the full examination of the evidence that was available by the review procedure – I have never seen such a biased outcome as this – I believe its called situating the appreciation! Add to this Boscombe’s concerns, which contrary to MOD statements later were not just with their own trials but also with the defects being experienced on the in-service fleet, with the latter being the stated reason for trials stopping, and you have to wonder why none of this was drawn to the BoI’s attention or commented on by the Review process,
Yes I was aware of the limitations of the Stn Cdr Aldergrove’s comments. He is the only one to comment on the illegal maintenance practices of the detachment wrt ZD 576, but then he accepts them with no idea of their potential implications.
You are correct that the verdict did not change in the Review Process (but it was different to the BoI itself) and that is because the three senior reviewing officers agreed the verdict between them with the two in the procedural chain actually brining it in. Neither Stn Cdr mentions Gross Negligence. I cannot say more for the moment, but the Mull Group has absolute proof of this, and as you were clearly in the thick of things at the time (IFS?) you will probably know to which very senior level correspondence I am referring!
As I recall the AOC’s comments were dated Apr 95 well before the anniversary of the crash – are you saying that the BoI was then delayed beyond June 1995?
I could go on, but I do not believe you will be convinced – as a simple engineer though I am amazed at how many pilots seem to be content that criminal (in) justice could be dispensed in this manner.
JB
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I have said it before, as have others and I will say it again, there is no way, I repeat no way that anyone posting on hear will ever ever ever change JP or the Cat's mind.
Whether they are simply mis informed, part of the MOD machine or of the same the same evil vein as the malicious d246 we will never know but not one single person on here will ever illicit an honest answer to a question we pose to this slippery pair as they spin better than Mandelson ever did and will distort everything we ask, so lets try to ignore them and back Brian with the real purpose of this thread
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Whether they are simply mis informed, part of the MOD machine or of the same the same evil vein as the malicious d246 we will never know but not one single person on here will ever illicit an honest answer to a question we pose to this slippery pair as they spin better than Mandelson ever did and will distort everything we ask, so lets try to ignore them and back Brian with the real purpose of this thread
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
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John Blakeley
You wrote:
<<Yes I was aware of the limitations of the Stn Cdr Aldergrove’s comments. He is the only one to comment on the illegal maintenance practices of the detachment wrt ZD 576, but then he accepts them with no idea of their potential implications.>>
.
And there was that rumour of concerns by the RAF’s SIB?
Is anyone here in a position to ask the ground detachment if there was anything new/ unfamiliar in the nav racks immediately before that flight?
You wrote:
<<Yes I was aware of the limitations of the Stn Cdr Aldergrove’s comments. He is the only one to comment on the illegal maintenance practices of the detachment wrt ZD 576, but then he accepts them with no idea of their potential implications.>>
.
And there was that rumour of concerns by the RAF’s SIB?
Is anyone here in a position to ask the ground detachment if there was anything new/ unfamiliar in the nav racks immediately before that flight?
Walter - Who are you?
Walter direct questions if i may, because you come across as a fool who has read an accident report and then found an internet search engine.
1. Have you served in a military force?
2. Was it the Royal Air Force?
3. What did you fly?
4. Have you flown a helicopter around the west coast of Scotland?
5. Have you been to Scotland?
6. Have you been in a Scotland during Winter?
I could go on but having followed this thread for 18 months your rantings offer NOTHING to what Brian and others are trying to achieve.
Reasoned debate by all means but get a life and if you truly believe spooks, conspiracy, and whatever else this helicopter was in your eyes carrying, set up your own website and go for it. I happen to think they got caught out and screwed up. Not the first and they will not be the last.
RIP
1. Have you served in a military force?
2. Was it the Royal Air Force?
3. What did you fly?
4. Have you flown a helicopter around the west coast of Scotland?
5. Have you been to Scotland?
6. Have you been in a Scotland during Winter?
I could go on but having followed this thread for 18 months your rantings offer NOTHING to what Brian and others are trying to achieve.
Reasoned debate by all means but get a life and if you truly believe spooks, conspiracy, and whatever else this helicopter was in your eyes carrying, set up your own website and go for it. I happen to think they got caught out and screwed up. Not the first and they will not be the last.
RIP
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JP
2331 - Since absence of evidence cannot be regarded as evidence of absence, this is a pointless question.
2338 - Answered admirably by Brian Dixon.
Maybe I'm just thick-skinned, but I can detect no hint of an insult towards you in ABIW's post.
2331 - Since absence of evidence cannot be regarded as evidence of absence, this is a pointless question.
2338 - Answered admirably by Brian Dixon.
Maybe I'm just thick-skinned, but I can detect no hint of an insult towards you in ABIW's post.
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John Blakely,
My apologies for a tardy reply, but I am having to make constant trips to a house we are trying to sell and, at the same time, try to bring some order out of the chaos caused by last weeks storms which brought down 4 Oaks in our Garden alone. It took some time to clear the roads in and out of the Hamlet of fallen trees (I am getting to be quite a dab hand with a chainsaw). One thing I did learn in the process was, however, that this tiny Hamlet was the furthest outpost of the English enclave in France during the 100 years War. Just a few miles from the Town whose Scion fired the arrow that killed Richard the Lionheart.
I can lay no claim to match your knowledge on engineering matters in general or in the case of the Chinook. I would, however, lay a modest claim to some knowledge of the aspects of "AIRMANSHIP" which, in my humble opinion, are at the heart of this contentious matter.
Air Staff Instructions laid down quite clearly that ALL Aircrew ARE to partake of Breakfast before flying. The BOI found that the Co-Pilot and ALM's had Breakfast but were unable to establish whether the Captain did. This may seem a minor point; but it is, in my opinion, just the starting block for the series of errors which led to the crash.
I would suggest that it would be natural for both Pilots to meet at Breakfast and then go to the Met Office together to get a briefing: however only Flt Lt Tapper went to Met. He then proceeded to the crewroom to brief the rest of the crew - (at least it was assumed that is what happened as I do not recall any witnesses to that event). I would suggest that, apart from local training sorties, it is imperative that all Flight Deck crew, apart from Air Engineers,attend Met Briefing and that ASI's reflected that at the time.
You will have noted that the photocopy of the chart left behind in Ops showed that it was not in the handwriting of either of the Pilot's on the fatal flight; it was prepared by the RN Exchange Officer who was the Captain of the other crew because he assumed that "Crew Duty" constraints would require the use of BOTH crews.
We now come to the aspect of "Crew Duty Time". They had requested,and received, 2 extensions of Crew Duty Time: but as time passed and the PAX were not arriving it must have become obvious that they had a major problem. They would require another, exceptionnel, extension or permission to nightstop outside Theatre.
This was the starting point scenario for the sortie - way behind scheduled departure time - for a crew that had been on the go, without food, since early morning. It is little wonder to me that they made such basic errors on this final sortie as having disparate altimeter sub-scale settings. The first thing that is taught to Pilots who engage in low level flight is the imperative of having the regional pressure setting on all flight deck Altimeters so that there is NO confusion when executing an emergency climb to Safety Altitude.
I understand that the average groundspeed from the ATC fix leaving the Aldergrove CTZ boundary to impact was 158 kts.
I would suggest that anything approaching that speed would have been decidedly high given the forecast, and potentially suicidal in the actual, weather conditions.
I remember an accident report in "Air Clues" some 40 years ago where the headline was "Nibbled to death by ducks". A series of seemingly innocuous and trivial incidents led to a mass abandonment of 6 Hunter aircraft. In that scenario however, they all survived.
My apologies for a tardy reply, but I am having to make constant trips to a house we are trying to sell and, at the same time, try to bring some order out of the chaos caused by last weeks storms which brought down 4 Oaks in our Garden alone. It took some time to clear the roads in and out of the Hamlet of fallen trees (I am getting to be quite a dab hand with a chainsaw). One thing I did learn in the process was, however, that this tiny Hamlet was the furthest outpost of the English enclave in France during the 100 years War. Just a few miles from the Town whose Scion fired the arrow that killed Richard the Lionheart.
I can lay no claim to match your knowledge on engineering matters in general or in the case of the Chinook. I would, however, lay a modest claim to some knowledge of the aspects of "AIRMANSHIP" which, in my humble opinion, are at the heart of this contentious matter.
Air Staff Instructions laid down quite clearly that ALL Aircrew ARE to partake of Breakfast before flying. The BOI found that the Co-Pilot and ALM's had Breakfast but were unable to establish whether the Captain did. This may seem a minor point; but it is, in my opinion, just the starting block for the series of errors which led to the crash.
I would suggest that it would be natural for both Pilots to meet at Breakfast and then go to the Met Office together to get a briefing: however only Flt Lt Tapper went to Met. He then proceeded to the crewroom to brief the rest of the crew - (at least it was assumed that is what happened as I do not recall any witnesses to that event). I would suggest that, apart from local training sorties, it is imperative that all Flight Deck crew, apart from Air Engineers,attend Met Briefing and that ASI's reflected that at the time.
You will have noted that the photocopy of the chart left behind in Ops showed that it was not in the handwriting of either of the Pilot's on the fatal flight; it was prepared by the RN Exchange Officer who was the Captain of the other crew because he assumed that "Crew Duty" constraints would require the use of BOTH crews.
We now come to the aspect of "Crew Duty Time". They had requested,and received, 2 extensions of Crew Duty Time: but as time passed and the PAX were not arriving it must have become obvious that they had a major problem. They would require another, exceptionnel, extension or permission to nightstop outside Theatre.
This was the starting point scenario for the sortie - way behind scheduled departure time - for a crew that had been on the go, without food, since early morning. It is little wonder to me that they made such basic errors on this final sortie as having disparate altimeter sub-scale settings. The first thing that is taught to Pilots who engage in low level flight is the imperative of having the regional pressure setting on all flight deck Altimeters so that there is NO confusion when executing an emergency climb to Safety Altitude.
I understand that the average groundspeed from the ATC fix leaving the Aldergrove CTZ boundary to impact was 158 kts.
I would suggest that anything approaching that speed would have been decidedly high given the forecast, and potentially suicidal in the actual, weather conditions.
I remember an accident report in "Air Clues" some 40 years ago where the headline was "Nibbled to death by ducks". A series of seemingly innocuous and trivial incidents led to a mass abandonment of 6 Hunter aircraft. In that scenario however, they all survived.
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So now hunger is a major contributor to this incident
Good grief just when you think you have heard it all another little gem pops up. Your ignorence of of all matters SH wise has often been referred to by others on here and again manifests itself with your latest missive.
For your information there would have been more food, of all shapes and sizes in the cupboards of the 72/230 crewrooms than you could shake a stick at. The crew as a whole could have devoured their own body weight from a whole host of high carb/energy items like chocolate, a vast array of canned goods, bread etc etc and not made a dent on the stock held so your supposition that the crew were hungry is total bolleaux. It was common practice for guys to eat in the tea bar rather than the mess for a variety of reasons, like maybe to get a lie in before an expected LONG DAY and anyone with even a smidgen of SH nouse would know this.
I am sure others will address your further suppositions but I will tell you that your theory "This was the starting point scenario for the sortie - way behind scheduled departure time - for a crew that had been on the go, without food, since early morning" is rubbish
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Good grief just when you think you have heard it all another little gem pops up. Your ignorence of of all matters SH wise has often been referred to by others on here and again manifests itself with your latest missive.
For your information there would have been more food, of all shapes and sizes in the cupboards of the 72/230 crewrooms than you could shake a stick at. The crew as a whole could have devoured their own body weight from a whole host of high carb/energy items like chocolate, a vast array of canned goods, bread etc etc and not made a dent on the stock held so your supposition that the crew were hungry is total bolleaux. It was common practice for guys to eat in the tea bar rather than the mess for a variety of reasons, like maybe to get a lie in before an expected LONG DAY
and anyone with even a smidgen of SH nouse would know this.I am sure others will address your further suppositions but I will tell you that your theory "This was the starting point scenario for the sortie - way behind scheduled departure time - for a crew that had been on the go, without food, since early morning" is rubbish
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Last edited by Always_broken_in_wilts; 11th Jul 2006 at 07:41.
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The first thing that is taught to Pilots who engage in low level flight is the imperative of having the regional pressure setting on all flight deck Altimeters so that there is NO confusion when executing an emergency climb to Safety Altitude
That maybe the case for overland Low flying but having the regional set when you are low level over the Sea is pretty pointless. The QFF would have been more appropriate
vincit veritas
Originally Posted by cazatou
..... I would, however, lay a modest claim to some knowledge of the aspects of "AIRMANSHIP" which, in my humble opinion, are at the heart of this contentious matter......
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ABIW
Sadly I have to disagree that cazatou (K52)'s post contains anything new. He has said all of this before. We are of course simply going over the same old ground once again!
All of his 'allegations' (if they can be called that) were dealt with by the original BOI. His is simply an attempt to 'smear' the crew, in an insidious way, because he cannot produce any evidence to satisfy the absolute standard of proof required.
It is the only line of attack available to him!
He said:
'Matters of opinion' are not 'matters of fact'
When there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever, it is not possible to have differing opinions!
Good grief just when you think you have heard it all another little gem pops up.
All of his 'allegations' (if they can be called that) were dealt with by the original BOI. His is simply an attempt to 'smear' the crew, in an insidious way, because he cannot produce any evidence to satisfy the absolute standard of proof required.
It is the only line of attack available to him!
He said:
in my humble opinion,
When there is absolutely no doubt whatsoever, it is not possible to have differing opinions!
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ABIW & Tandemrotor,
As you are well aware ASI's stated that Aircrew are to have breakfast before flying. The Co-Pilot and the ALM's had breakfast in their respective Messes. It may be that the Captain had something to eat in the crewroom; but the BOI were unable to establish whether he had or not. What is certain is that the Captain attended the Met Office by himself. Why did the Captain @ Co-Pilot not breakfast together and attend Met together?
VecVec
I take your point re QFF but RAF norm would be Regional QNH for low flying and their route did take them towards cloud covered high ground. The salient point is that there was a major difference between the 2 Pilots altimeter settings. The BOI postulated that the Captains altimeter was set to Aldergrove QFE.
As you are well aware ASI's stated that Aircrew are to have breakfast before flying. The Co-Pilot and the ALM's had breakfast in their respective Messes. It may be that the Captain had something to eat in the crewroom; but the BOI were unable to establish whether he had or not. What is certain is that the Captain attended the Met Office by himself. Why did the Captain @ Co-Pilot not breakfast together and attend Met together?
VecVec
I take your point re QFF but RAF norm would be Regional QNH for low flying and their route did take them towards cloud covered high ground. The salient point is that there was a major difference between the 2 Pilots altimeter settings. The BOI postulated that the Captains altimeter was set to Aldergrove QFE.
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Cat,
Your arrogance seems to know no bounds, where in the ASI's you refer to does it state WHERE or with WHOM breakfast or any other meal for that fact is to be taken Where in the document does it state what breakfast is to consist of, is it kippers and kedgeri or cereal and toast or bangers bacon eggs etc or simply a bowl of cereal. To say you must have breakfast and then not quantify it is a nonsense that all professional aviators have known of for years and deal with in there own manner, but as you clearly do not fall into this category it's just another FACT you seem unaware of.
"It may be that the Captain had something to eat in the crewroom; but the BOI were unable to establish whether he had or not".........is supposed to mean what exactly, bearing in mind you categorically state in your post yesterday that hunger was a factor in this accident,... do tell as to me it casts some DOUBT over your assertions
Have you even the tiniest smidgen of an idea as to how experianced, or even inexperianced SH crews prepare themselves for flight, how the various tasks prior to "walking" like met, int, nvg collection, survival eqpt etc etc are divided up between crew members.........
Instead of reguritating the BOI from your standpoint of TOTAL IGNORANCE why not ask some of those informed folks in here what actually happens on a day to day basis before you post your next load of tripe
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Your arrogance seems to know no bounds, where in the ASI's you refer to does it state WHERE or with WHOM breakfast or any other meal for that fact is to be taken
Where in the document does it state what breakfast is to consist of, is it kippers and kedgeri or cereal and toast or bangers bacon eggs etc or simply a bowl of cereal. To say you must have breakfast and then not quantify it is a nonsense that all professional aviators have known of for years and deal with in there own manner, but as you clearly do not fall into this category it's just another FACT you seem unaware of."It may be that the Captain had something to eat in the crewroom; but the BOI were unable to establish whether he had or not".........is supposed to mean what exactly, bearing in mind you categorically state in your post yesterday that hunger was a factor in this accident,... do tell as to me it casts some DOUBT over your assertions
Have you even the tiniest smidgen of an idea as to how experianced, or even inexperianced SH crews prepare themselves for flight, how the various tasks prior to "walking" like met, int, nvg collection, survival eqpt etc etc are divided up between crew members.........
Instead of reguritating the BOI from your standpoint of TOTAL IGNORANCE why not ask some of those informed folks in here what actually happens on a day to day basis before you post your next load of tripe
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Last edited by Always_broken_in_wilts; 11th Jul 2006 at 15:18.
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Sometimes you have to shout to make some people hear JP
but I very much doubt it will change a couple of tunes in this case
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
but I very much doubt it will change a couple of tunes in this case all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Last edited by Always_broken_in_wilts; 11th Jul 2006 at 16:40.