From today's Sunday Times:
September 2, 2007
MoD rejected fire safety plan for doomed Nimrod
Michael Smith
THE manufacturers of the RAF's Nimrod aircraft recommended a fire detection and suppression system be fitted to its bomb bay two years before one of the planes exploded over Afghanistan, killing all 14 on board.
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) rejected the proposal on the basis that it was unlikely to be effective. The fire leading to the explosion, a year ago today, started in the bomb bay.
BAE Systems made the recommendation in August 2004 in a "safety case" report commissioned by the MoD to ensure the ageing aircraft was safe to continue flying amid continuing delays to its replacement.
The safety report was needed because the Nimrod aircraft, originally introduced in 1969 and due to go out of service in 1995, had to continue flying on operations over Iraq and Afghanistan. Its replacement will not now be introduced until 2010.
The recommendation was one of two warnings concerning the age of the aircraft and the dangers of a fire in the bomb bay given to the MoD. Three months after BAE Systems urged that the fire suppression system be fitted, a leak of superheated air in one of the Nimrod's bomb bays came close to starting a fire.
In an internal report into the incident, the RAF Kinloss station commander said the incident was "a particular concern as the ageing Nimrod MR2 is extended beyond its original out-of-service date", and warned of similar such failures in the future.
The MoD's admission that it did not act on the BAE Systems recommendation was made in response to a freedom of information request from Graham Knight, whose son Ben died onboard.
The statement comes on the first anniversary of the explosion with the families of the 12 dead airmen attending a private memorial service at RAF Kinloss today. The other two killed were special forces radio operators.
Knight said: "Had a fire detection suppression system been fitted to my son's aircraft, it might have bought them the three minutes they needed in which to land. What price does the MoD put on 14 human lives?"
The pilot of the Nimrod reported a fire in his bomb bay. The aircraft's starboard wing exploded, followed a few seconds later by the rest of the aircraft.
The board of inquiry into the explosion has focused on the bomb bay where a combination of leaks of fuel from the air-to-air refueling system and from other pipes carrying hot air are seen as the most likely causes. The leaking air was superheated to temperatures higher than the automatic ignition point of the aircraft's Avtur fuel.
New documents passed to The Sunday Times show that the pipe carrying the superheated air was isolated after last year's crash. At the same time, the number seven tank, which is next to the bomb bay and at the root of the wing, was taken out of use.
Jimmy Jones, a former RAF flight trials engineer, who worked on the Nimrod, said this "clearly indicates that was considered to be a potential risk following the November 2004 incident and therefore before [the plane] exploded".
Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, chief of the defence staff, has insisted that the Nimrod aircraft are safe to continue flying. But Jones said: "It is not good enough for [him] to say that Nimrod has a good safety record, therefore it is safe. "By the MoD's own safety case standard they have to provide 'compelling, comprehensive and valid' evidence the aircraft is safe. It doesn't exist."
The MoD said the BAE Systems recommendation was "only one" of a number of suggestions made. "We needed to take into account the practicalities of the suggested changes and the operational impact on the aircraft. Based on these, it was not thought appropriate to follow their suggestion."
"Not thought appropriate".........??