Nimrod Information
Wader 2
I agree.
But I must say I’m impressed that the MoD could actually produce such statistics, given that the funding necessary to collect, collate, analyse and report was largely pulled from 1991-93, and never resurrected. I’m not saying it wasn’t done thereafter, but it became optional. You’d be unlikely to have similar detail for most avionics. And it certainly wouldn’t be accurate, or have been subjected to a thorough engineering appraisal.
The very existence of the data may indicate concern over the failure rate. A fuel system failure every 12 flying hours (regardless of their definition which, if anything, is likely to tend to make reliability look good) would, in my experience, lead to Engineering Authorities and MoD Technical Agencies begging, stealing or borrowing money to investigate potential safety problems VERY URGENTLY. (Bearing in mind that money to investigate safety problems was also slashed at the same time. I do not mind admitting that I lied through my back teeth on many an occasion to acquire or re-direct funding to investigate safety issues I’d been instructed to ignore).
Assuming such investigations and subsequent product improvement (modifications , changes, SEMs etc) took place, it would be reasonable to assume they were “firefighting” just to keep the failure rate stable over that period. I know nothing of Nimrod (MR) support, so am willing to be put right. But it emphasises your last point that accurate information is required, which requires a properly phrased question.
I agree.
But I must say I’m impressed that the MoD could actually produce such statistics, given that the funding necessary to collect, collate, analyse and report was largely pulled from 1991-93, and never resurrected. I’m not saying it wasn’t done thereafter, but it became optional. You’d be unlikely to have similar detail for most avionics. And it certainly wouldn’t be accurate, or have been subjected to a thorough engineering appraisal.
The very existence of the data may indicate concern over the failure rate. A fuel system failure every 12 flying hours (regardless of their definition which, if anything, is likely to tend to make reliability look good) would, in my experience, lead to Engineering Authorities and MoD Technical Agencies begging, stealing or borrowing money to investigate potential safety problems VERY URGENTLY. (Bearing in mind that money to investigate safety problems was also slashed at the same time. I do not mind admitting that I lied through my back teeth on many an occasion to acquire or re-direct funding to investigate safety issues I’d been instructed to ignore).
Assuming such investigations and subsequent product improvement (modifications , changes, SEMs etc) took place, it would be reasonable to assume they were “firefighting” just to keep the failure rate stable over that period. I know nothing of Nimrod (MR) support, so am willing to be put right. But it emphasises your last point that accurate information is required, which requires a properly phrased question.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
tucumesh, altering the statistics to 1 every 12 hours, given sorties of 6-9 hrs and not counting flight refuelling means either every other flight or, assuming no faults during shorter sorties, one flight on every LROFP or whatever they call them now.
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As a matter of interest, it took MoD just 7 working days to come up with those detailed stats. The question was placed by the MP on 19th April and an answer given in parliament on 1st May. It could indicate that the figures were at hand, at the time the question was placed, in support of a BOI finding that the Nimrod's fuel system is sound and has shown no deterioration over the last decade. But you would have to be of a suspicious mind to think that of MoD.
DV
DV
Its odd as the question was clearly planted - how on earth did the MP know which units to ask the question in? Not exactly household knowledge to ask for defects/50Flight hours is it?
I'm not really sure what it shows - the problem has not got worse, but is a known issue with Nimrods for many years, and is being tracked. Its also clear there have been alot of incidents without serious incident if you see what I mean.
I personally don't suspect any cover up here - its not really part of UK flight safety culture is it? Which, on the whole, I think should still be regarded with respect and integrity, no? (I was last involved in 2003).
Look at the Mk3 Chinooks - left in a shed for years over the faintest whiff of a safety issue (which IMHO is something of a statistical red herring, though I note many a Boscombe purist (with a vested interest mind) would disagree).
On the whole I think its still true that UK engineering culture is one that DOES NOT cut corners on air safety issues and if anything errs on caution and retains a healthly open attitude to understand crashes / human factors issues properly & places correct emphasis on learning from mishaps and not apportioning blame.
(yes, yes noting early Chinook Mk3 architecture decisions etc. - but its STILL in the shed remember, never fully cleared, so the culture persists at the end of the day).
NB Whilst I also believe Mull was a crew issue, not technical, the blot on the above is the decision of the BoI re the crew blame for which I offer no defence - their loss and the knowledge that the Mull incident was down to crew should have been enough to learn from for the wider RAF aircrew community. This incident rather flys in the face of the "no blame" culture which I think still prevails in air accident investigation, or do the learned here think this has really changed?
I'm not really sure what it shows - the problem has not got worse, but is a known issue with Nimrods for many years, and is being tracked. Its also clear there have been alot of incidents without serious incident if you see what I mean.
I personally don't suspect any cover up here - its not really part of UK flight safety culture is it? Which, on the whole, I think should still be regarded with respect and integrity, no? (I was last involved in 2003).
Look at the Mk3 Chinooks - left in a shed for years over the faintest whiff of a safety issue (which IMHO is something of a statistical red herring, though I note many a Boscombe purist (with a vested interest mind) would disagree).
On the whole I think its still true that UK engineering culture is one that DOES NOT cut corners on air safety issues and if anything errs on caution and retains a healthly open attitude to understand crashes / human factors issues properly & places correct emphasis on learning from mishaps and not apportioning blame.
(yes, yes noting early Chinook Mk3 architecture decisions etc. - but its STILL in the shed remember, never fully cleared, so the culture persists at the end of the day).
NB Whilst I also believe Mull was a crew issue, not technical, the blot on the above is the decision of the BoI re the crew blame for which I offer no defence - their loss and the knowledge that the Mull incident was down to crew should have been enough to learn from for the wider RAF aircrew community. This incident rather flys in the face of the "no blame" culture which I think still prevails in air accident investigation, or do the learned here think this has really changed?
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"....Further, on inspection of another ac in theatre a small hole was found in the pipe. The pipe is welded to several brackets which are themselves attached to the supporting rib wall and the hole was close to one of the welds.
It is not uncommon for there to be pressure spikes during the refuelling process as refuel valves are closed elsewhere during the process. It is possible that repeated pressure spikes or repeated applications of normal pressure during either ground refuelling or AAR might have lead to the weakening of the weld and the subsequent hole. Atomised fuel could then escape into the space. What is missing, however, is an ignition source and that is a bit of a stumper.
If we assume that somehow ignition took place it is conceivable that the fire could then heat a fuel tank that is positioned in the wing root area, and this may have led to the explosion.
What is interesting to ponder is that the same airframes are generally being used for the Gulf theatre due to their fit. These few frames would be used in AAR more frequently than the other ac in the fleet. This argument might also be backed up by the fact that the fuel pipe hole was found in another Gulf ac in theatre."
I know the above quote is supposition, but this was known when AOC2Gp ordered nimrod crews to continue AAR sorties 4 days after the tragedy. I have no idea if the BoI has since discovered the source of the ignition which led to the explosion. What I cannot understand is the decision to go ahead with a single skin AAR system which was designed on the back of a piece of paper 25 years ago. Furthermore, to protect the crews from a fuel tank explosion it would be relatively simple and cheap to fit a nitrogen inerting system to the current nimrod fleet and the MRA4 replacement.
Safety does not appear to have been given the highest priority here.
It is not uncommon for there to be pressure spikes during the refuelling process as refuel valves are closed elsewhere during the process. It is possible that repeated pressure spikes or repeated applications of normal pressure during either ground refuelling or AAR might have lead to the weakening of the weld and the subsequent hole. Atomised fuel could then escape into the space. What is missing, however, is an ignition source and that is a bit of a stumper.
If we assume that somehow ignition took place it is conceivable that the fire could then heat a fuel tank that is positioned in the wing root area, and this may have led to the explosion.
What is interesting to ponder is that the same airframes are generally being used for the Gulf theatre due to their fit. These few frames would be used in AAR more frequently than the other ac in the fleet. This argument might also be backed up by the fact that the fuel pipe hole was found in another Gulf ac in theatre."
I know the above quote is supposition, but this was known when AOC2Gp ordered nimrod crews to continue AAR sorties 4 days after the tragedy. I have no idea if the BoI has since discovered the source of the ignition which led to the explosion. What I cannot understand is the decision to go ahead with a single skin AAR system which was designed on the back of a piece of paper 25 years ago. Furthermore, to protect the crews from a fuel tank explosion it would be relatively simple and cheap to fit a nitrogen inerting system to the current nimrod fleet and the MRA4 replacement.
Safety does not appear to have been given the highest priority here.
"Safety does not appear to have been given the highest priority here."
Do you know that to be true, or is this speculation? Can you draw these conclusions from the info above - not sure you can.
Do you know that to be true, or is this speculation? Can you draw these conclusions from the info above - not sure you can.
“On the whole I think its still true that UK engineering culture is one that DOES NOT cut corners on air safety issues and if anything errs on caution and retains a healthly open attitude to understand crashes / human factors issues properly & places correct emphasis on learning from mishaps and not apportioning blame”.
Correct, but note key word – engineering.
As I said, I’ve been INSTRUCTED to ignore safety problems, but ALWAYS by non-engineers who have authority but no commensurate responsibility, precisely because they are not engineers and therefore do not (cannot) sign for airworthiness, type approval and have no delegated Financial & Technical approval powers. (One hell of a list of limitations which means, by definition, they are of limited value to MoD and the real responsibility in these domains rests with lower grades/ranks). The problem is they are now the majority in an organisation whose job is to – acquire technology.
Don’t agree –re Mull. The aircraft was not airworthy. Full stop. MoD can’t answer the key questions on airworthiness and safety. There is no seamless audit trail. I strongly suspect this is one of the reasons why they are better prepared on this one, so think you are right linking Nimrod and Chinook. Look at the MoD family tree. Look at the common denominators. Look at their benchmark decisions. Maintaining safety is a waste of money. Airworthiness is optional. Wasting money is of no concern to them. Heads above the parapet are to be lopped off.
Correct, but note key word – engineering.
As I said, I’ve been INSTRUCTED to ignore safety problems, but ALWAYS by non-engineers who have authority but no commensurate responsibility, precisely because they are not engineers and therefore do not (cannot) sign for airworthiness, type approval and have no delegated Financial & Technical approval powers. (One hell of a list of limitations which means, by definition, they are of limited value to MoD and the real responsibility in these domains rests with lower grades/ranks). The problem is they are now the majority in an organisation whose job is to – acquire technology.
Don’t agree –re Mull. The aircraft was not airworthy. Full stop. MoD can’t answer the key questions on airworthiness and safety. There is no seamless audit trail. I strongly suspect this is one of the reasons why they are better prepared on this one, so think you are right linking Nimrod and Chinook. Look at the MoD family tree. Look at the common denominators. Look at their benchmark decisions. Maintaining safety is a waste of money. Airworthiness is optional. Wasting money is of no concern to them. Heads above the parapet are to be lopped off.
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I made that statement on the basis of detailed contact with nimrod crew and engineers. I did not make that statement lightly. The contacts made it clear that they were not happy with the continuation of the original AAR system on the MRA4, they also made it clear that there is no current plan to fit fuel tank protection to the nimrod. Both of these statements contradict your argument that air safety considerations are not being compromised.
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Until the BOI report is given then it will be just speculation as to what happened and why.
I'd say that safety is a high priority, especially to those who work with the Nims. Precautions have been made and are being followed.
I'd say that safety is a high priority, especially to those who work with the Nims. Precautions have been made and are being followed.
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JFZ90: This wasn't a planted question, it was a PQ raised by a member of the general public (Nimrod experienced) through an MP. The MP responded in a very efficient way. You can do the same, through the same MP if you wish.
DV
DV
"I made that statement on the basis of detailed contact with nimrod crew and engineers. I did not make that statement lightly. The contacts made it clear that they were not happy with the continuation of the original AAR system on the MRA4
WHY - without sustance this is just personal opinion, not a valid robust technical judgement on its safety
they also made it clear that there is no current plan to fit fuel tank protection to the nimrod.
SO WHAT - fitting system X does not automatically a safe aircaft make. Assumption & speculation.
Both of these statements contradict your argument that air safety considerations are not being compromised."
I didn't say this - you are implying that these statements PROVE that air safety considerations are being compromised - seems to me THEY DO NOT.
Must stress I have no direct knowledge here, but until BoI is out we should not speculate or feed the MP with "potentially suspect but unproven either way" motives with potentially misleading facts.
WHY - without sustance this is just personal opinion, not a valid robust technical judgement on its safety
they also made it clear that there is no current plan to fit fuel tank protection to the nimrod.
SO WHAT - fitting system X does not automatically a safe aircaft make. Assumption & speculation.
Both of these statements contradict your argument that air safety considerations are not being compromised."
I didn't say this - you are implying that these statements PROVE that air safety considerations are being compromised - seems to me THEY DO NOT.
Must stress I have no direct knowledge here, but until BoI is out we should not speculate or feed the MP with "potentially suspect but unproven either way" motives with potentially misleading facts.
"This wasn't a planted question, it was a PQ raised by a member of the general public (Nimrod experienced) through an MP. The MP responded in a very efficient way. You can do the same, through the same MP if you wish."
Errr - thats what I meant - it was planted by someone with inside Nimrod knowledge to try and create a certain effect with its answer. I assume the "planter" knew the answer, so not really sure what they thought this would achieve as its not really damning as far as I can see (noting that the incident rate has been consistently high per FH, but as stated above this proves little).
Errr - thats what I meant - it was planted by someone with inside Nimrod knowledge to try and create a certain effect with its answer. I assume the "planter" knew the answer, so not really sure what they thought this would achieve as its not really damning as far as I can see (noting that the incident rate has been consistently high per FH, but as stated above this proves little).
"Correct, but note key word – engineering.
As I said, I’ve been INSTRUCTED to ignore safety problems, but ALWAYS by non-engineers who have authority but no commensurate responsibility, precisely because they are not engineers and therefore do not (cannot) sign for airworthiness, type approval and have no delegated Financial & Technical approval powers. (One hell of a list of limitations which means, by definition, they are of limited value to MoD and the real responsibility in these domains rests with lower grades/ranks). The problem is they are now the majority in an organisation whose job is to – acquire technology.
Don’t agree –re Mull. The aircraft was not airworthy. Full stop. MoD can’t answer the key questions on airworthiness and safety. There is no seamless audit trail. I strongly suspect this is one of the reasons why they are better prepared on this one, so think you are right linking Nimrod and Chinook. Look at the MoD family tree. Look at the common denominators. Look at their benchmark decisions. Maintaining safety is a waste of money. Airworthiness is optional. Wasting money is of no concern to them. Heads above the parapet are to be lopped off."
I'm surprised by this. Have you REALLY been instructed to ACTUALLY ignore real safety problems? Find this hard to believe, but if true worrying. My experience in these kind of areas has been one of universal caution in the UK when it comes to managing real airworthiness risks. I've never observed the "non-engineers" overrule engineers in cases where there is tangible risk of loss/incident. I have seen alot of pressure applied to FIX problems (i.e. restore safety), and weak/unsubstantiated safety concerns challenged - but this is quite different to ignoring valid safety issues.
As I said, I’ve been INSTRUCTED to ignore safety problems, but ALWAYS by non-engineers who have authority but no commensurate responsibility, precisely because they are not engineers and therefore do not (cannot) sign for airworthiness, type approval and have no delegated Financial & Technical approval powers. (One hell of a list of limitations which means, by definition, they are of limited value to MoD and the real responsibility in these domains rests with lower grades/ranks). The problem is they are now the majority in an organisation whose job is to – acquire technology.
Don’t agree –re Mull. The aircraft was not airworthy. Full stop. MoD can’t answer the key questions on airworthiness and safety. There is no seamless audit trail. I strongly suspect this is one of the reasons why they are better prepared on this one, so think you are right linking Nimrod and Chinook. Look at the MoD family tree. Look at the common denominators. Look at their benchmark decisions. Maintaining safety is a waste of money. Airworthiness is optional. Wasting money is of no concern to them. Heads above the parapet are to be lopped off."
I'm surprised by this. Have you REALLY been instructed to ACTUALLY ignore real safety problems? Find this hard to believe, but if true worrying. My experience in these kind of areas has been one of universal caution in the UK when it comes to managing real airworthiness risks. I've never observed the "non-engineers" overrule engineers in cases where there is tangible risk of loss/incident. I have seen alot of pressure applied to FIX problems (i.e. restore safety), and weak/unsubstantiated safety concerns challenged - but this is quite different to ignoring valid safety issues.
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The design for the MRA4 was frozen as of December. It is perfectly relevant to challenge the thinking behind bringing into service a multi million pound military ac with no fuel tank protection, which, if built in the US would have been given state of art protection as a matter of course. Instead, it is being provided with a flawed AAR system, subject to scores of emergency engineering measures, which has not been designed to a civil standard, when there is a much safer design already in service.
Nobody can talk in absolutes here, it is in everyone's interest that the BoI report is published ASAP.
Nobody can talk in absolutes here, it is in everyone's interest that the BoI report is published ASAP.
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Nobody has said finding the truth is wrong, we all want the truth, what is wrong is speculating about events. The BOI report is being given next month to the families, so until then, there can be no absolute truths. Once the BOI report is then published, any questions can and should be brought up then, as how can they answered before that point.
I'm not MOD, I'm not RAF, but I's obvious to me that until the BOI report is made, then anything which it states is pure and simple guess work.
Speculation on what happened can and does have serious consequences on those involved
I'm not MOD, I'm not RAF, but I's obvious to me that until the BOI report is made, then anything which it states is pure and simple guess work.
Speculation on what happened can and does have serious consequences on those involved
JZF90: The planter did not know the answer. WHAT IS WRONG WITH TRYING TO FIND THE TRUTH? ARE YOU A MEMBER OF MOD?
Hey calm down. Just curious about the obviously set up question, so thanks for the inside info. Nothing wrong with the truth - it is probably out there. I'm surprised that the "insider" felt compelled to use his MP to find out - much easier ways for an "insider" to get the info, though it is an excellent way to get the info out in public and discussed / speculated about in an inappropriate way - which is why I'm going to follow LabQueens senitments and stop debating pre BoI.
Hey calm down. Just curious about the obviously set up question, so thanks for the inside info. Nothing wrong with the truth - it is probably out there. I'm surprised that the "insider" felt compelled to use his MP to find out - much easier ways for an "insider" to get the info, though it is an excellent way to get the info out in public and discussed / speculated about in an inappropriate way - which is why I'm going to follow LabQueens senitments and stop debating pre BoI.
JFZ90
“I'm surprised by this. Have you REALLY been instructed to ACTUALLY ignore real safety problems?”
Yes.
“and weak/unsubstantiated safety concerns challenged”
An example? I wouldn’t call “smoke in cockpit”, “crash landings” and “aircrew injured”, in the same sentence, in the same serious incident signal, weak. The supplier, who controlled funding (!) and refused to release funds to investigate and fix, obviously disagreed. Many more, but that’s the one I always remember. Ignored him, transferred money, fixed in 48 hours. Got bollocked. Aircrew safe. Next?
“I'm surprised by this. Have you REALLY been instructed to ACTUALLY ignore real safety problems?”
Yes.
“and weak/unsubstantiated safety concerns challenged”
An example? I wouldn’t call “smoke in cockpit”, “crash landings” and “aircrew injured”, in the same sentence, in the same serious incident signal, weak. The supplier, who controlled funding (!) and refused to release funds to investigate and fix, obviously disagreed. Many more, but that’s the one I always remember. Ignored him, transferred money, fixed in 48 hours. Got bollocked. Aircrew safe. Next?
" I wouldn’t call “smoke in cockpit”, “crash landings” and “aircrew injured”, in the same sentence, in the same serious incident signal, weak."
No I wouldn't either. Not quite what I meant. I would have thought the above would fall into the (at least consider) "grounding fleet" category.
No I wouldn't either. Not quite what I meant. I would have thought the above would fall into the (at least consider) "grounding fleet" category.