Attack on Coventry not a surprise?
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Jackonico
Re your last.
Please will you say your reasons for this and your source(s). Thank you.
From early 1942 it became apparant that the Halifax was not meeting its operational performance, especially in terms of height and speed.
The Lancaster could carry an 8,000lb bombload to Berlin at a speed of 240 mph and was capable of operating between 22,000 and 27,000 feet.
By comparison the Halifax could barely attain 18,000 feet, with a speed of slightly over 200mph. This operating height left the Halifax well within lethal range of the AA fire. The slow speed also made it more vulnerable. Finally it terms of bomb load its range for range was less than half of that of the Lancaster.
Improvements to the Halifax were due largely to ATH's efforts.
That's quite a serious allegation.
Certainly true until 1942. ATH was responsible for great improvements in navigation and target marking after taking over command.
Fact - The use of Bombers to chase U-Boats around the ocean was a toatl misuse of scarce resources. I do have the facts as to the operational hours necessary to make a 'hit', but not with me. More U-Boats were destroyed by 'Gardening' than by any other means and more U-Boats destroyed by the RAF than either Costal Command or the Royal Navy.
Please back up this allegation as I cannot recall anyone else having alleged this?
ATH was not critical of bombing oil targets only critical of the concentration of bombing on those targets to the exclusion of others.
In an earlier post I pointed out that attacks on oil targets accounted for 26.2% of the total tonnage dropped. I would refer you to the period October to December 1944 which was almost exclusively an oil campaign.
Oil targets required precision bombing. When ATH was given this directive the Winter months were approaching, with the resultant deterioration of weather conditions that would call for a need for bombing to be carried out 'blind'. Sky markers were unsuitable for precision targets in such circumstances.
Unfortunately poor old ATH cannot win can he?. Firstly he is criticised for area bombing and then you criticise him for his reluctance to use area bombing of oil targets!
I look forward to learning how.
Please say how.
I believe the statement included the words...'if the Americans will come in with us'....
ATH never claimed that bombing Berlin would end the war. He said it would cost Germany the war. That's a totally different statement.
Oboe was only ever really useful as a target marking system as it only allowed one aircraft to cross the target at a time. Therefore the comment is invalid. H2S was used for the Berlin campaign.
During the period November 1943 to March 1944 it is likely that 5,427 acres of devastation was caused in Berlin.
The loss rate during this period was 4.2%, generally accepted as a 'good' figure.
Albert Speer is quoted as saying of the Berlin campaign that
...'...it was, of course, very serious for us..'... . He also agrees that it contributed to the downfall of Germany. In comparison I place greater weight on Speer's comments made at shortly after the war ended to those of others 60 odd years on.
The Swiss diplomatic and intelligence service prepared detailed reports on the destruction being wrought on Berlin. One of these stated ...'...The war economic significance of the exceptionally disasterous destruction can hardly be overlooked. The Berlin factories have unfinished armaments orders valued at nearly 300 million Reichsmarks...'...
The first six raids against Berlin destroyed 46 factories and damaged 259. By the end of March this figure, as witnessed by Swiss reports had 'risen astronomically'.
The Berlin raids disrupted much of Germany's production, and was of great benefit to both the Russians on the Eastern front and the Allie sin the Mediterranean. It caused Germany to go onto the defensive and resulted in 75% of the most effective anti-tank guns to be used for the protection of the city, together with thousands of soldiers.
Hitler is quoted as saying to Admiral Doenitz in response to a demand for 200,000 extra naval ratings ...'...I haven't got the personnel. The anti-aircraft and night fighter forces must be increased to protect the German cities...'...
Adward Milch, Armaments Chief of the Luftwaffe is quoted as saying on 23rd February 1944 ...'...Everyone should visit Berlin. It would then be realised that experience such as we have undergone in the last few months cannot be endured indefinitely. That is impossible. When the big cities have been demolished it will be the turn of the smaller ones...'... .
A few days later he told representatives of the aircraft industry The British have calculated exactly how many attacks they need to make an end of Berlin. The total may be twenty-five. They have already made fifteen attacks, leaving ten to come. Furthermore they have announced that when they have finished with Berlin it will be the turn of the Central German industrial area...I would like to suggest that you look at Berlin; it will then be obvious that what has happened in the last few months cannot be endured indefinitely...'...
The Berlin campaign a failure?. I rather think not.
West Coast
I am sorry you took offence. None was intended I assure you.
I was merely trying to suggest that it was extremely difficult to make a precision attack of a city whilst being bombarded by Flak. You seem to suggest that I support the attacking of civilians. I don't but please do not try to apply modern day so called 'precision' targetting with what was available in 1942.
He was also a man who had favourites, and allowed his personal feelings to influence his actions to an astonishing degree. He clamoured for publicity and press coverage to an extent which many of his contemporaries found vulgar and unseemly, and to a degree which hindered his prosecution of the war.
Harris was a man who leapt to ‘snap judgements’ but was too arrogant to change his mind. Thus he dismissed the Halifax on the basis of the performance and losses of the Merlin engined versions, and refused to accept or acknowledge that the later radial-engined versions were virtually the equal of the Lanc, as late-war loss figures soon showed.
The Lancaster could carry an 8,000lb bombload to Berlin at a speed of 240 mph and was capable of operating between 22,000 and 27,000 feet.
By comparison the Halifax could barely attain 18,000 feet, with a speed of slightly over 200mph. This operating height left the Halifax well within lethal range of the AA fire. The slow speed also made it more vulnerable. Finally it terms of bomb load its range for range was less than half of that of the Lancaster.
Improvements to the Halifax were due largely to ATH's efforts.
Harris chose to ignore evidence which undermined his favoured approach, and proved surprisingly uncritical of what were clearly exaggerated and inaccurate claims of successful missions, and even tended to further exaggerate results, even when there was plentiful evidence that actual results had been pathetically poor.
During the early years of the campaign, actual evidence shows that on night after night massive numbers of Bomber Command aircrew went to their deaths while achieving no damage to their targets, scattering their bombs harmlessly over the German countryside. Again and again the numbers of German civilian casualties were dwarfed by the numbers of aircrew killed, while tens of bombers would fail to return having managed to damage one or two houses.
And all the while, Harris claimed that he was ‘winning the war’ and fought tooth and nail to prevent the dispatch of four engined heavies to Coastal Command or overseas commands where they could have made a much greater contribution to the war effort. He was similarly blind to the achievements of the medium bombers of No.2 Group.
Harris ..... ignored directives from his superiors.
his failure to prioritise his effort against oil targets reduced Bomber Command’s contribution to the final stage of the War
In an earlier post I pointed out that attacks on oil targets accounted for 26.2% of the total tonnage dropped. I would refer you to the period October to December 1944 which was almost exclusively an oil campaign.
Oil targets required precision bombing. When ATH was given this directive the Winter months were approaching, with the resultant deterioration of weather conditions that would call for a need for bombing to be carried out 'blind'. Sky markers were unsuitable for precision targets in such circumstances.
Unfortunately poor old ATH cannot win can he?. Firstly he is criticised for area bombing and then you criticise him for his reluctance to use area bombing of oil targets!
If anything, Harris worked too assiduously to please the press and public (who wanted bloody revenge) and to please Churchill, and was so single-minded that he refused to make any serious examination of alternative ways of beating the Germans.
the ill-judged Battle of Berlin which he said would end the war actually lengthened it
On 7 December 1943, Harris promised Churchill that he could destroy Berlin, and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. He entirely failed to see that bombing a target so far from his East Anglian and Yorkshire bases would be a hugely different proposition to bombing targets in the Ruhr, and seems to have entirely discounted the unavailability of Oboe when attacking Berlin.
ATH never claimed that bombing Berlin would end the war. He said it would cost Germany the war. That's a totally different statement.
Oboe was only ever really useful as a target marking system as it only allowed one aircraft to cross the target at a time. Therefore the comment is invalid. H2S was used for the Berlin campaign.
During the period November 1943 to March 1944 it is likely that 5,427 acres of devastation was caused in Berlin.
The loss rate during this period was 4.2%, generally accepted as a 'good' figure.
Albert Speer is quoted as saying of the Berlin campaign that
...'...it was, of course, very serious for us..'... . He also agrees that it contributed to the downfall of Germany. In comparison I place greater weight on Speer's comments made at shortly after the war ended to those of others 60 odd years on.
The Swiss diplomatic and intelligence service prepared detailed reports on the destruction being wrought on Berlin. One of these stated ...'...The war economic significance of the exceptionally disasterous destruction can hardly be overlooked. The Berlin factories have unfinished armaments orders valued at nearly 300 million Reichsmarks...'...
The first six raids against Berlin destroyed 46 factories and damaged 259. By the end of March this figure, as witnessed by Swiss reports had 'risen astronomically'.
The Berlin raids disrupted much of Germany's production, and was of great benefit to both the Russians on the Eastern front and the Allie sin the Mediterranean. It caused Germany to go onto the defensive and resulted in 75% of the most effective anti-tank guns to be used for the protection of the city, together with thousands of soldiers.
Hitler is quoted as saying to Admiral Doenitz in response to a demand for 200,000 extra naval ratings ...'...I haven't got the personnel. The anti-aircraft and night fighter forces must be increased to protect the German cities...'...
Adward Milch, Armaments Chief of the Luftwaffe is quoted as saying on 23rd February 1944 ...'...Everyone should visit Berlin. It would then be realised that experience such as we have undergone in the last few months cannot be endured indefinitely. That is impossible. When the big cities have been demolished it will be the turn of the smaller ones...'... .
A few days later he told representatives of the aircraft industry The British have calculated exactly how many attacks they need to make an end of Berlin. The total may be twenty-five. They have already made fifteen attacks, leaving ten to come. Furthermore they have announced that when they have finished with Berlin it will be the turn of the Central German industrial area...I would like to suggest that you look at Berlin; it will then be obvious that what has happened in the last few months cannot be endured indefinitely...'...
The Berlin campaign a failure?. I rather think not.
West Coast
I am sorry you took offence. None was intended I assure you.
I was merely trying to suggest that it was extremely difficult to make a precision attack of a city whilst being bombarded by Flak. You seem to suggest that I support the attacking of civilians. I don't but please do not try to apply modern day so called 'precision' targetting with what was available in 1942.
In order to avoid hacking everybody off with another horrifyingly long post, I’ll tackle your points in note form. IF you’re open minded you can go off and read up further.
1) Harris and favourites: He did certainly have them. I draw your attention to his treatment of Gibson, for example, and of 106 Squadron, or, if you prefer, his very different treatment of his Group Commanders. (Especially Coryton).
2) Harris the publicity hound: Read Portal’s papers, or Tedder’s! I was also lucky enough to interview a number of officers, including Group Commanders John Whitley, Hugh Constantine, Edward Addison, and Percy Maitland, and more recently interviewed some of the more junior ‘senior officers’ from the Groups. A surprising number clearly thought that Harris was ‘not quite the right sort of chap!’ and obviously disapproved of his relentless pursuit of personal publicity. Even more surprisingly, many expressed misgivings about the strategy which Harris had followed.
3) Harris and the Halifax: He radically over-stated the aircraft’s weaknesses (“One Lancaster is to be preferred over four Halifaxes...”) mainly because the Lanc carried a heavier bombload over the course of its average operational career, paying no heed to survival rates or accuracy. Nor did Harris revise his snap judgement when the Mk III arrived – let alone the superb Mk.VI and Mk.VII.
11% of Lanc aircrew survived being shot down, compared to 29% of Halifax aircrew. Though they flew lower, the Halifax’s capacious fuselage afforded greater comfort, and anecdotally it does seem that their navigators and bomb aimers were more accurate. I accept that the only evidence for this is anecdotal.
4) Harris exaggerated results. The evidence is plentiful and easy to find, mate.
5) The poor accuracy and ineffectiveness of the Bomber campaign lasted long after 1942. Even at Nuremberg in 1944, the bulk of bombs fell on Lauf, ten miles East of the city, and on Schweinfurt! Night after night in 1943 and before, tens of aircraft were lost while achieving no more than the destruction of the odd enemy cow.
6) You state “Fact - The use of Bombers to chase U-Boats around the ocean was a total misuse of scarce resources.”
Nonsense. The success of Coastal Command’s heavies cannot be measured solely in terms of the number of U-Boats sunk (though this was impressive, and probably represented a better return rate per aircraft than achieved by Bomber Command aircraft). What was important was the effective blockade imposed on Germany, and the number of allied ships which ‘got through’ unmolested. It has been said that a four-engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command had 20 times greater economic impact on Germany than a similar aircraft allocated to Bomber Command.
7) Harris ignored directives from his superiors. For existence Portal’s directive to attack oil targets, rather than making area attacks against cities which contained such targets..... You characterise Oct-Dec 44 as an oil campaign, when it was a standard area bombing campaign to all intents and purposes, however Harris described it. To say that oil targets could only be attacked by area bombing cities is nonsense.
8) Berlin. Harris absolutely promised to end the war by April 1944 by ‘tearing the heart out of the Reich’. He failed to do so, and losses forced him to abandon the offensive. Had the same weight of effort been applied to easier, more significant targets, the war would have been over much sooner. While the loss rate never reached the 13.6% suffered at Nuremberg attacks against Berlin routinely suffered 8.5-9.5% losses, though the overall loss rate for the period was reduced by the low-loss raids made against other, easier targets during the Battle of Berlin period. In 14 raids against Berlin up to the end of January, Bomber Command lost 384 aircraft, and 115 more fell in the two major raids in February and March.
9) Oboe was of crucial importance to the PFF, and the PFF were crucial to the successes which Bomber Command did enjoy. To claim that: “Oboe was only ever really useful as a target marking system as it only allowed one aircraft to cross the target at a time. Therefore the comment is invalid” is a red herring.
10) You, like most fans of Harris, choose to quote Speer. Others treat his evidence with more caution. Industrial output from Berlin’s factories INCREASED during the Battle of Berlin, though 20% of Berliners were ‘bombed out’. Berlin showed it’s own ‘Blitz spirit’ though the absentee rate soared to 23.5 days per year per worker. Bomber Command succeeded in making Kraut workers take more ‘sickies’. Wow! It did divert resources to the defence of Berlin, and to Hitler’s V-weapons programme and some industrial effort had to go to supplying bombed out workers with replacement goods, etc. But to rate the Battle of Berlin as being anything other than an outright failure is at best foolish.
Finally, while the techniques and equipment of the day meant that heavy collateral damage and civilian casualties were inevitable even in precision attacks, the only way of killing 50,000 civilians was by deliberately targeting them, and that was exactly what Harris did at Dresden.
1) Harris and favourites: He did certainly have them. I draw your attention to his treatment of Gibson, for example, and of 106 Squadron, or, if you prefer, his very different treatment of his Group Commanders. (Especially Coryton).
2) Harris the publicity hound: Read Portal’s papers, or Tedder’s! I was also lucky enough to interview a number of officers, including Group Commanders John Whitley, Hugh Constantine, Edward Addison, and Percy Maitland, and more recently interviewed some of the more junior ‘senior officers’ from the Groups. A surprising number clearly thought that Harris was ‘not quite the right sort of chap!’ and obviously disapproved of his relentless pursuit of personal publicity. Even more surprisingly, many expressed misgivings about the strategy which Harris had followed.
3) Harris and the Halifax: He radically over-stated the aircraft’s weaknesses (“One Lancaster is to be preferred over four Halifaxes...”) mainly because the Lanc carried a heavier bombload over the course of its average operational career, paying no heed to survival rates or accuracy. Nor did Harris revise his snap judgement when the Mk III arrived – let alone the superb Mk.VI and Mk.VII.
11% of Lanc aircrew survived being shot down, compared to 29% of Halifax aircrew. Though they flew lower, the Halifax’s capacious fuselage afforded greater comfort, and anecdotally it does seem that their navigators and bomb aimers were more accurate. I accept that the only evidence for this is anecdotal.
4) Harris exaggerated results. The evidence is plentiful and easy to find, mate.
5) The poor accuracy and ineffectiveness of the Bomber campaign lasted long after 1942. Even at Nuremberg in 1944, the bulk of bombs fell on Lauf, ten miles East of the city, and on Schweinfurt! Night after night in 1943 and before, tens of aircraft were lost while achieving no more than the destruction of the odd enemy cow.
6) You state “Fact - The use of Bombers to chase U-Boats around the ocean was a total misuse of scarce resources.”
Nonsense. The success of Coastal Command’s heavies cannot be measured solely in terms of the number of U-Boats sunk (though this was impressive, and probably represented a better return rate per aircraft than achieved by Bomber Command aircraft). What was important was the effective blockade imposed on Germany, and the number of allied ships which ‘got through’ unmolested. It has been said that a four-engined bomber allocated to Coastal Command had 20 times greater economic impact on Germany than a similar aircraft allocated to Bomber Command.
7) Harris ignored directives from his superiors. For existence Portal’s directive to attack oil targets, rather than making area attacks against cities which contained such targets..... You characterise Oct-Dec 44 as an oil campaign, when it was a standard area bombing campaign to all intents and purposes, however Harris described it. To say that oil targets could only be attacked by area bombing cities is nonsense.
8) Berlin. Harris absolutely promised to end the war by April 1944 by ‘tearing the heart out of the Reich’. He failed to do so, and losses forced him to abandon the offensive. Had the same weight of effort been applied to easier, more significant targets, the war would have been over much sooner. While the loss rate never reached the 13.6% suffered at Nuremberg attacks against Berlin routinely suffered 8.5-9.5% losses, though the overall loss rate for the period was reduced by the low-loss raids made against other, easier targets during the Battle of Berlin period. In 14 raids against Berlin up to the end of January, Bomber Command lost 384 aircraft, and 115 more fell in the two major raids in February and March.
9) Oboe was of crucial importance to the PFF, and the PFF were crucial to the successes which Bomber Command did enjoy. To claim that: “Oboe was only ever really useful as a target marking system as it only allowed one aircraft to cross the target at a time. Therefore the comment is invalid” is a red herring.
10) You, like most fans of Harris, choose to quote Speer. Others treat his evidence with more caution. Industrial output from Berlin’s factories INCREASED during the Battle of Berlin, though 20% of Berliners were ‘bombed out’. Berlin showed it’s own ‘Blitz spirit’ though the absentee rate soared to 23.5 days per year per worker. Bomber Command succeeded in making Kraut workers take more ‘sickies’. Wow! It did divert resources to the defence of Berlin, and to Hitler’s V-weapons programme and some industrial effort had to go to supplying bombed out workers with replacement goods, etc. But to rate the Battle of Berlin as being anything other than an outright failure is at best foolish.
Finally, while the techniques and equipment of the day meant that heavy collateral damage and civilian casualties were inevitable even in precision attacks, the only way of killing 50,000 civilians was by deliberately targeting them, and that was exactly what Harris did at Dresden.
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Sorry Bletchly,I am in Jacko's corner! I feel you are getting a little too strident in your defence of a campaign that in all reality never achieved what Harris wanted to! And it is quite obvious that he knew this but carried on!
I agree with everyone else that Bomber Command has been grossly unfairly treated by history and that for a long period of the war BC was the only way to take the fight to the enemy!
I have nothing but admiration for all those who fought in BC at that time and although I am from a generation too far removed to know nothing about but what I read and hear on a sandbag! I will be forever gratefull to our fathers and grandfathers who had no choice.
I agree with everyone else that Bomber Command has been grossly unfairly treated by history and that for a long period of the war BC was the only way to take the fight to the enemy!
I have nothing but admiration for all those who fought in BC at that time and although I am from a generation too far removed to know nothing about but what I read and hear on a sandbag! I will be forever gratefull to our fathers and grandfathers who had no choice.
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Jackonico
Unfortunately I don't have access to the records that I feel I need to tackle your points, but I would make the following points in response to yours.
1 I am unable to comment on this.
2 You have the benefit of me.
3 The Lancaster could carry in excess of twice the bomb load that a Halifax could. That means you half the crews exposed to the risk. I fully accept that the loss rate in a Lancaster was higher than a Halifax. Put simplistically a 29% loss rate can be equated to a 14.5% loss rate if a Lancaster replaces two Halifaxes.
Statistically therefore it was better to use a Lancaster than a Halifax. This is further born out by the fact that the Halifax flew lower and was thus subject to greater risk from Flak than the higher flying Lancaster.
4 A personal view?, or one that you can back up with evidence? I would certainly be interested in seeing this. PM me if you wish.
5 Selective use of fact. I could use others to demonstrate concentrated bombing.
6 The U-Boats went for the convoys in mid-atlantic. They would always attempt to operate out of range of aircraft.
ATH's view was that they were best destroyed at their bases. I folow that theory even if others do not. It is hard to see what benefit could be gained from aircraft stooging around the Oceans looking for U-Boats.
You talk about 'blockades' and the economic benefit of a Costal Command aircraft compared to a Bomber Command aircraft. Can you say what your source is for this please?
I think that if you asked anyone who lived through WW2 whether their preference was for an aircraft searching the seas or bombing Germany I don't think there would be much debate as to what they would have preferred.
Official statistics on U-Boat Losses in Atlantic and North West European waters are as follows:-
Sunk by air attack = 1
Destroyed by bombing in Port = 21
Sunk by air-laid mines = 17
Trying to find a U-Boat on the surface in the Atlantic was like trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack, hopefully as the above statistics demonstrate.
A total of 645 U-Boats were sunk in the Atlantic and North West European waters during WW2. Bomber Command accounted for 31.2%
7 Oil. How can you possibly say what you have. In October oil plants in Duisburg, Homborg, and Bottrop were attacked as was the Leverkusen chemical works.
In November oil plants in Wanne Eickel, Dortmund, Castrop Rauxel, Gelsenkirchen/Nordstern, Kamen, Homberg-Meerbeck, Sterkrade, Bottrop, Wessling, Harburg and Schloven-Buer were attacked.
By the end of November attacks against synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr were temporarily suspended as all of them had been rendered inactive!.
In December attacks were made against oil plants and Benzol plants outside of the Ruhr area. On the night of 6/7 December at attack was made against Merseburg/Leuna (one of the two largest synthetic oil plants in Germany). This was subsequently out of action until Mid-January 1945 and then it only returned to 25% of its previous production level. Equal in size to Leuna was Politz, which was heavily damaged on the night of 21/22 December.
8 Again I don't have access to documents that I would need, however I would point out that you quote the well used and totally incorrect adage that heavy losses caused ATH to suspend the Berlin campaign. This must almost certainly have come from the official history.
The reason for the cessation was two-fold, first by the end of March the nights were becoming shorter and thus too short for operations against such long distance targets. Secondly the requirements for the preparation for the invasion of France (Operation Overlord), took precedence over the strategic bombing offensive which had been dictated by the Casablanca and Pointblank directives.
I believe that I have already proved factually that the Berlin campaign was succesful. You choose to disagree, that is your right. I leave others to make up their own minds.
9 I disagree. Your comment was the 'red herring'. Time over target at Berlin was at a premium. You cannot have literally hundreds of aircraft stooging around waiting for a one by one bomb run.
10 Presumably I shouldn't quote Speer then? I also quoted official Swiss sources. I quoted Hitler. I could quote Goebbels.
Who do you quote?
Your final comment on Dresden needs no comment from me.
We clearly will never be in agreement on this subject and it is wrong of me to continue to hog this thread. I wish you well in your endeavours.
Maybe you would do me the courtesy of sending me a PM with details of your work so that I can read it some time. I don't think you accept the fact that I do read both sides of the story. You have to take my word that I do. There are some areas where I think that ATH was wrong. My personal view for what it is worth is that the balance is in his favour.
I was lucky_B
How can I be strident if all I have done is to support all my arguements with published and publicly available facts?. I am happy to debate quoted facts with others, however the only continued use of factual information seems to be coming from me.
People make all sorts of statements and quote all sorts of 'facts and figures' in their arguments. I just try to back mine up.
I have never said that ATH was not a difficult and perhaps dogmatic man. That he had flaws is self evident but then don't we all.
It is surely poor form however to attempt to put down the man's achievements by the spurious use of 'facts' and commentary on his personal life. Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
In any war situation, normal standards are sometimes put to one side as of necessity. That is an unfortunate fact.
No leader is without some form of defect. That is life. In a total war situation one requires single minded leaders who can prosecute the best use of scarce resources to achieve victory.
I wish everyone a pleasant Bank Holiday
1 I am unable to comment on this.
2 You have the benefit of me.
3 The Lancaster could carry in excess of twice the bomb load that a Halifax could. That means you half the crews exposed to the risk. I fully accept that the loss rate in a Lancaster was higher than a Halifax. Put simplistically a 29% loss rate can be equated to a 14.5% loss rate if a Lancaster replaces two Halifaxes.
Statistically therefore it was better to use a Lancaster than a Halifax. This is further born out by the fact that the Halifax flew lower and was thus subject to greater risk from Flak than the higher flying Lancaster.
4 A personal view?, or one that you can back up with evidence? I would certainly be interested in seeing this. PM me if you wish.
5 Selective use of fact. I could use others to demonstrate concentrated bombing.
6 The U-Boats went for the convoys in mid-atlantic. They would always attempt to operate out of range of aircraft.
ATH's view was that they were best destroyed at their bases. I folow that theory even if others do not. It is hard to see what benefit could be gained from aircraft stooging around the Oceans looking for U-Boats.
You talk about 'blockades' and the economic benefit of a Costal Command aircraft compared to a Bomber Command aircraft. Can you say what your source is for this please?
I think that if you asked anyone who lived through WW2 whether their preference was for an aircraft searching the seas or bombing Germany I don't think there would be much debate as to what they would have preferred.
Official statistics on U-Boat Losses in Atlantic and North West European waters are as follows:-
Sunk by air attack = 1
Destroyed by bombing in Port = 21
Sunk by air-laid mines = 17
Trying to find a U-Boat on the surface in the Atlantic was like trying to find the proverbial needle in a haystack, hopefully as the above statistics demonstrate.
A total of 645 U-Boats were sunk in the Atlantic and North West European waters during WW2. Bomber Command accounted for 31.2%
7 Oil. How can you possibly say what you have. In October oil plants in Duisburg, Homborg, and Bottrop were attacked as was the Leverkusen chemical works.
In November oil plants in Wanne Eickel, Dortmund, Castrop Rauxel, Gelsenkirchen/Nordstern, Kamen, Homberg-Meerbeck, Sterkrade, Bottrop, Wessling, Harburg and Schloven-Buer were attacked.
By the end of November attacks against synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr were temporarily suspended as all of them had been rendered inactive!.
In December attacks were made against oil plants and Benzol plants outside of the Ruhr area. On the night of 6/7 December at attack was made against Merseburg/Leuna (one of the two largest synthetic oil plants in Germany). This was subsequently out of action until Mid-January 1945 and then it only returned to 25% of its previous production level. Equal in size to Leuna was Politz, which was heavily damaged on the night of 21/22 December.
8 Again I don't have access to documents that I would need, however I would point out that you quote the well used and totally incorrect adage that heavy losses caused ATH to suspend the Berlin campaign. This must almost certainly have come from the official history.
The reason for the cessation was two-fold, first by the end of March the nights were becoming shorter and thus too short for operations against such long distance targets. Secondly the requirements for the preparation for the invasion of France (Operation Overlord), took precedence over the strategic bombing offensive which had been dictated by the Casablanca and Pointblank directives.
I believe that I have already proved factually that the Berlin campaign was succesful. You choose to disagree, that is your right. I leave others to make up their own minds.
9 I disagree. Your comment was the 'red herring'. Time over target at Berlin was at a premium. You cannot have literally hundreds of aircraft stooging around waiting for a one by one bomb run.
10 Presumably I shouldn't quote Speer then? I also quoted official Swiss sources. I quoted Hitler. I could quote Goebbels.
Who do you quote?
Your final comment on Dresden needs no comment from me.
We clearly will never be in agreement on this subject and it is wrong of me to continue to hog this thread. I wish you well in your endeavours.
Maybe you would do me the courtesy of sending me a PM with details of your work so that I can read it some time. I don't think you accept the fact that I do read both sides of the story. You have to take my word that I do. There are some areas where I think that ATH was wrong. My personal view for what it is worth is that the balance is in his favour.
I was lucky_B
How can I be strident if all I have done is to support all my arguements with published and publicly available facts?. I am happy to debate quoted facts with others, however the only continued use of factual information seems to be coming from me.
People make all sorts of statements and quote all sorts of 'facts and figures' in their arguments. I just try to back mine up.
I have never said that ATH was not a difficult and perhaps dogmatic man. That he had flaws is self evident but then don't we all.
It is surely poor form however to attempt to put down the man's achievements by the spurious use of 'facts' and commentary on his personal life. Let him who is without sin cast the first stone.
In any war situation, normal standards are sometimes put to one side as of necessity. That is an unfortunate fact.
No leader is without some form of defect. That is life. In a total war situation one requires single minded leaders who can prosecute the best use of scarce resources to achieve victory.
I wish everyone a pleasant Bank Holiday
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Jacko
Do you really have to villify Harris over the attack on Dresden? Didn't he follow orders? And when it comes to casualties did not Hamburg have a fire storm that killed some 30,000(?) people? Not to mention other large German cities. Why don't you blame Harris for all the civilians killed by ALL our bombers while you are at it. Why pick? It was total war and he was the leader of Bomber Command and together with my mother and sister we thanked him and the crews day on day for three years. Just as we did the fighter pilots who flew from Croydon. I will not accept that Harris deliberately targeted civilians - almost as if he enjoyed it! Sorry, but your tone comes across a little like that. But then you also said the civilian deaths were "inevitable."
As I said earlier, when you are being bombed you want it returned with interest, most people like me who lived through it did. They said so the morning after being in shelters all night!
However, civilians are simply the people who happen to be in the way when a war is on - or haven't you noticed that lately? Not a flippant remark, just a factual one.
Well it is over and we all get along now. I am just glad I am here to say so.
Finally, while the techniques and equipment of the day meant that heavy collateral damage and civilian casualties were inevitable even in precision attacks, the only way of killing 50,000 civilians was by deliberately targeting them, and that was exactly what Harris did at Dresden.
As I said earlier, when you are being bombed you want it returned with interest, most people like me who lived through it did. They said so the morning after being in shelters all night!
However, civilians are simply the people who happen to be in the way when a war is on - or haven't you noticed that lately? Not a flippant remark, just a factual one.
Well it is over and we all get along now. I am just glad I am here to say so.
Bletch,
3) In it’s life the average Lanc would carry 154 tons of bombs to Germany, a Halifax only 100 tons. This stat is distorted because it includes Merlin Halifaxes, which dragged down the average number of sorties survived.
A Halifax crew were marginally more likely to be shot down (because of their lower operating height, perhaps), but on being shot down were significantly more likely to survive. “But live aircrew in the Oflags and Stalags were of little interest to Harris...”
Some have suggested that the Halifax was more likely to put a higher tonnage of bombs ‘on target’.
4) Honestly. Just go and read the books.
5) The fact is that until 1944 the bombing effort was generally inaccurate, and that losses of aircrew and aircraft usually exceeded the value of damage on the ground. Inaccuracy and raids which achieved little (and at huge cost) continued throughout the war, but were not the norm in 1944 or 1945.
6) Your ‘facts and figures’ and theories about Coastal Command are risible and insulting to the brave men of that Command, whose contribution to victory was vast, but whose recognition was limited, partly due to the blinkered ignorance of people like Harris. Suffice it to say that aircraft “stooging around looking for U-Boats” frequently found them! Even when they didn’t they forced the U-Boats to remain submerged and helped ensure that the convoys ‘got through’. Coastal Command aircraft also attacked and sank enemy shipping and prevented German industry from obtaining many vital raw materials. Coastal Command Liberators alone killed 74 U-Boats (nine squadrons), while the Catalina, Sunderland, Wellington and Hudson units accounted for 125 more. The Fort, Halifax and Whitley units accounted for another 26.
“If you asked anyone who lived through WW2 whether their preference was for an aircraft searching the seas or bombing Germany I don't think there would be much debate as to what they would have preferred.” Should I ask my Dad, then, as an ex-Lib man? Or should I ask an ex-Merchant seaman? Or anyone who thought that rationing was quite bad enough as it was? Just because Coastal Command’s real achievements are not widely understood doesn’t mean that Bomber Command’s (inflated and exaggerated) achievements were in some sense ‘superior’.
7) The attacks during the Winter of ’44 may have often been against cities which included oil targets, and Harris presented them as evidence that he was doing what Portal told him to do. Portal himself did not agree, and the resulting argument only ended when Harris threatened to resign.
8) Heavy losses and poor results absolutely forced an end to the Berlin campaign. Don’t be swayed by the overall loss rate for the period, look at the loss rates on those 16 major raids. Early returns and ‘dumping’ were also a real problem on the Berlin raids. How exactly was the Berlin campaign successful? German industrial production in the city actually increased and it cost some 500 bombers in 16 attacks. German civilian morale did not collapse, and a ‘Blitz spirit’ actually had the reverse effect. The Bomber Command loss rate was so high that Harris had to intersperse attacks on Berlin with attacks against other targets. The D-Day bombing campaign did not force an end to area attacks until 28 April.
9) Depends whether you want to hit a military target. Using Oboe to ensure accurate marking ensures that you obtain accuracy and maximise the weight of the attack. If all you want to do is to terrify the populace by scattering bombs randomly over a wide area....
10) You quote opinion, I detail the facts.
PPPop
If a simple statement of fact (that Harris deliberately targeted civilians) is villifying Harris, then yes, I do, in your terms, have to villify him. I actually don’t condemn Harris for targeting civilians, because in 1942, when he took over as AOC-in-C, there was nothing unusual, or wrong, in hating the ‘Boche’ and in wishing to do unto them as they had so recently been doing unto us....
I do, however, admire those who did not want to descend into total war, and who wished to attack military targets, accepting civilian deaths as inevitable collateral damage. People who believed (as you and I do!) that: “civilians are simply the people who happen to be in the way when a war is on.”
Though it may be uncomfortable to anyone with 21st Century views and sensibilities, not everyone believed that in the War. You yourself express the real ‘thirst for revenge’ which many harboured. (“When you are being bombed you want it returned with interest”).
Harris did want total war, and, with his background and as an adherent of Trenchard’s doctrine, really believed in bombing for ‘moral effect’. He therefore wanted to target the enemy population. You may “not accept that Harris deliberately targeted civilians”, but that was the root of his tactics and strategy, and he resented every diversion from this – from the Dams Raid, Augsburg, the D-Day support operations, directives to attack oil targets, the diversion of Bomber Command squadrons to bolster the U-Boat campaign, even the attacks against German capital ships and the Tallboy and Grand Slam missions.
Harris targeted civilians. What do you think he meant when he said: "The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire-raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the boche, to kill the boche and to terrify the boche." That's an authentic quote from the man himself.
It was, however, an inefficient way of winning the war, and was so costly as to divert resources away from areas which might have made a real contribution to a swifter victory. (Greater investment in Tac Air might well have made the assault on Germany following D-Day far less costly, I've already pointed out the efficiency of four engined bombers used by Coastal Command....). And it was also unlikely to succeed. The London Blitz never ‘broke’ the morale of British civilians, and nor did the combined efforts of the USAAF and RAF have much chance of breaking German civilian morale. Some believe that it may even have made resistance fiercer, and may have ‘buoyed’ support for Hitler and his regime. (I don’t incline to that view, but cannot disprove it).
The tragedy is that Le Creusot (operation Robinson, would you believe? Robinson Creusot....), Peenemunde, the D-Day support sorties, the Tirpitz attacks and the Grand Slam and Tallboy operations all showed what the imaginative use of heavy bombers could achieve, and did so at minimal cost. But such ops were an anathema to the stubborn and blinkered AOC-in-C, and have clearly passed by dear old Bletch, too!
3) In it’s life the average Lanc would carry 154 tons of bombs to Germany, a Halifax only 100 tons. This stat is distorted because it includes Merlin Halifaxes, which dragged down the average number of sorties survived.
A Halifax crew were marginally more likely to be shot down (because of their lower operating height, perhaps), but on being shot down were significantly more likely to survive. “But live aircrew in the Oflags and Stalags were of little interest to Harris...”
Some have suggested that the Halifax was more likely to put a higher tonnage of bombs ‘on target’.
4) Honestly. Just go and read the books.
5) The fact is that until 1944 the bombing effort was generally inaccurate, and that losses of aircrew and aircraft usually exceeded the value of damage on the ground. Inaccuracy and raids which achieved little (and at huge cost) continued throughout the war, but were not the norm in 1944 or 1945.
6) Your ‘facts and figures’ and theories about Coastal Command are risible and insulting to the brave men of that Command, whose contribution to victory was vast, but whose recognition was limited, partly due to the blinkered ignorance of people like Harris. Suffice it to say that aircraft “stooging around looking for U-Boats” frequently found them! Even when they didn’t they forced the U-Boats to remain submerged and helped ensure that the convoys ‘got through’. Coastal Command aircraft also attacked and sank enemy shipping and prevented German industry from obtaining many vital raw materials. Coastal Command Liberators alone killed 74 U-Boats (nine squadrons), while the Catalina, Sunderland, Wellington and Hudson units accounted for 125 more. The Fort, Halifax and Whitley units accounted for another 26.
“If you asked anyone who lived through WW2 whether their preference was for an aircraft searching the seas or bombing Germany I don't think there would be much debate as to what they would have preferred.” Should I ask my Dad, then, as an ex-Lib man? Or should I ask an ex-Merchant seaman? Or anyone who thought that rationing was quite bad enough as it was? Just because Coastal Command’s real achievements are not widely understood doesn’t mean that Bomber Command’s (inflated and exaggerated) achievements were in some sense ‘superior’.
7) The attacks during the Winter of ’44 may have often been against cities which included oil targets, and Harris presented them as evidence that he was doing what Portal told him to do. Portal himself did not agree, and the resulting argument only ended when Harris threatened to resign.
8) Heavy losses and poor results absolutely forced an end to the Berlin campaign. Don’t be swayed by the overall loss rate for the period, look at the loss rates on those 16 major raids. Early returns and ‘dumping’ were also a real problem on the Berlin raids. How exactly was the Berlin campaign successful? German industrial production in the city actually increased and it cost some 500 bombers in 16 attacks. German civilian morale did not collapse, and a ‘Blitz spirit’ actually had the reverse effect. The Bomber Command loss rate was so high that Harris had to intersperse attacks on Berlin with attacks against other targets. The D-Day bombing campaign did not force an end to area attacks until 28 April.
9) Depends whether you want to hit a military target. Using Oboe to ensure accurate marking ensures that you obtain accuracy and maximise the weight of the attack. If all you want to do is to terrify the populace by scattering bombs randomly over a wide area....
10) You quote opinion, I detail the facts.
PPPop
If a simple statement of fact (that Harris deliberately targeted civilians) is villifying Harris, then yes, I do, in your terms, have to villify him. I actually don’t condemn Harris for targeting civilians, because in 1942, when he took over as AOC-in-C, there was nothing unusual, or wrong, in hating the ‘Boche’ and in wishing to do unto them as they had so recently been doing unto us....
I do, however, admire those who did not want to descend into total war, and who wished to attack military targets, accepting civilian deaths as inevitable collateral damage. People who believed (as you and I do!) that: “civilians are simply the people who happen to be in the way when a war is on.”
Though it may be uncomfortable to anyone with 21st Century views and sensibilities, not everyone believed that in the War. You yourself express the real ‘thirst for revenge’ which many harboured. (“When you are being bombed you want it returned with interest”).
Harris did want total war, and, with his background and as an adherent of Trenchard’s doctrine, really believed in bombing for ‘moral effect’. He therefore wanted to target the enemy population. You may “not accept that Harris deliberately targeted civilians”, but that was the root of his tactics and strategy, and he resented every diversion from this – from the Dams Raid, Augsburg, the D-Day support operations, directives to attack oil targets, the diversion of Bomber Command squadrons to bolster the U-Boat campaign, even the attacks against German capital ships and the Tallboy and Grand Slam missions.
Harris targeted civilians. What do you think he meant when he said: "The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire-raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the boche, to kill the boche and to terrify the boche." That's an authentic quote from the man himself.
It was, however, an inefficient way of winning the war, and was so costly as to divert resources away from areas which might have made a real contribution to a swifter victory. (Greater investment in Tac Air might well have made the assault on Germany following D-Day far less costly, I've already pointed out the efficiency of four engined bombers used by Coastal Command....). And it was also unlikely to succeed. The London Blitz never ‘broke’ the morale of British civilians, and nor did the combined efforts of the USAAF and RAF have much chance of breaking German civilian morale. Some believe that it may even have made resistance fiercer, and may have ‘buoyed’ support for Hitler and his regime. (I don’t incline to that view, but cannot disprove it).
The tragedy is that Le Creusot (operation Robinson, would you believe? Robinson Creusot....), Peenemunde, the D-Day support sorties, the Tirpitz attacks and the Grand Slam and Tallboy operations all showed what the imaginative use of heavy bombers could achieve, and did so at minimal cost. But such ops were an anathema to the stubborn and blinkered AOC-in-C, and have clearly passed by dear old Bletch, too!
I don't understand Bletch's logic when he declares that it was a misuse of bombers "stooging around looking for U-boats" when in the same sentence he boasts of the RAF's U-boat kills. U-boat kills were by definition the result of looking for U-boats - much better looking for them around the convoys than under 25 feet of reinforced concrete in the Lorient pens. Although a relative of mine won the DFM over Lorient, I suspect much of the attack on the U-ports was an exercise in battering the bombproof fortifications. And - Coastal Command was part of the RAF! This is a shocker! BTW, where do you get the idea that only 1 was sunk by air attack?
Indeed, U-boats tried to operate outside aircraft range in "The Gap" half-way across. But Bomber was resistant to allowing Coastal to get their hands on the types that could operate into the Gap - specifically the Liberator. Once the VLR Liberators were available in numbers, the convoy loss rates plunged. The U-boats of WW2 attacked primarily on the surface at night - aircraft with centimetric radar, the Leigh Light and sufficient range could effectively remove this as a possibility all round a convoy. The real index of success in the Atlantic was the loss rate of merchant shipping - this was an offensive task strategically because it permitted the build-up of UK, US deployed and Soviet power that would do Germany in.
Indeed, U-boats tried to operate outside aircraft range in "The Gap" half-way across. But Bomber was resistant to allowing Coastal to get their hands on the types that could operate into the Gap - specifically the Liberator. Once the VLR Liberators were available in numbers, the convoy loss rates plunged. The U-boats of WW2 attacked primarily on the surface at night - aircraft with centimetric radar, the Leigh Light and sufficient range could effectively remove this as a possibility all round a convoy. The real index of success in the Atlantic was the loss rate of merchant shipping - this was an offensive task strategically because it permitted the build-up of UK, US deployed and Soviet power that would do Germany in.
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Jackonico
In response to your comments.
3 In respect of the performance of the Hailfax I commend you this web site - http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/...t/halifax.html
I would also comend the web site uboat.net to you both in respect of the Halifax and also the U-Boat war. - http://uboat.net/allies/aircraft/halifax.htm
5 Various target finding aids were introduced from early 1943.
The night of 5th/6th March 1943 can be regarded as the start of the Air Battle of the Ruhr. I commend the book of that name by Alan Cooper. This together with 'The Right of The Line' by John Terraine will go a long way towards demonstrating that target accuracy started to improve immensely from then on.
The longer range targets in the East of Germany and in Poland would continue to be a massive challenge right until well towards the end of the war when transmitting stations could be set up in continental Europe.
6 Please do not be offensive and try to distort my words. That you resort to these tactics I find depressing. Facts and figures are quoted fom Air Ministry figures for the Atlantic and North Western European waters as stated.
You have yet to demonstrate how an aircraft would be able to fly to the exact spot where a U-Boat was and bomb it. This would then have to be repeated day after day. Just think about it for a while and when you have done so tell me how this can be achieved.
7 You just won't give credit will you? Even when Bomber Command wiped out oil plants you still allege that this was area bombing.
8 Little point in progressing this one as we clearly disagree. I have quote facts and figures and yet again you don't. I have quoted from stated sources and you dispute the validity of this. I can do no more.
9 I agree that Oboe enabled one to mark a target but you don't recognise that the Berlin campaign was carried out during the Winter period when Berlin was almost perpetually covered in cloud/fog and the aerial markers just disappeared into the murk within too short a while, or were blown off course by winds.
10 Thank you for accepting my facts. No-one disputes that production actually rose through 1943 and early 1944. That was inevitable as German Industrial output never really reached its peak capability. What Berlin did was to slow down the rate of increase.
I did quote facts incidentally, those from people involved, and from the Swiss Governnment.
Steam Chicken
I refer you to (6) above. The figure of one comes from published sources. Note I do not include the Mediteranean figures as we are looking at the situation with Bomber Command and the German offensive.
If your assertion is true, then taking into account the diversion of Bomber Command aircraft and aircrew to Costal Command then knocking out the U-Boats should have been quite an easy job. Both you and Jackinoco seem to think that all you had to do was fly to a pre-determined spot and there would be your U-Boat. Both of you fail to actually think about the logic of this.
There was also a limited area of operation. An aircraft had a maximum range. You either fly to it and back or you fly to a shorter range and fly around looking for your U-Boat. Do you really think that a U-Boat Captain would wander around an area within the reach of an aircraft when he could do a totally un-contested job in Mid Atlantic. That they did go to the Atlantic Gap is accepted history, which I hope you will accept as well.
I think you will find that the Navy types will be seriously miffed about what you say. My understanding of the U-Boat war is that the U-Boat threat was damaged partially by the destruction of U-Boats in their pens, by sinking after striking mines on the sea routes outward bound, and by Navy ships. This is based upon various sources of research by different historians.
Now for some statistics:-
Taking for example the period January 1st and June 30th 1942 only 21 U-Boats were lost. One was destroyed by a mine, and one for unknown reasons.
Of the 21 lost, only six were attributed to air action, one was jointly attributed to joint air/sea action. Of the six sunk by air action three were attributable to the Americans.
Air action therefore only accounted for 30.9 % of U-Boat losses. Costal Command was involved in none of those losses.
In fairness the following period between July and December 1942 was much better but Costal Command still only accounted for 23%.
Another statistic is that Costal Command lost six aircraft for every ship lost during WW2.
Before either you or Jackinoco start slandering me, these figures are not meant to decry Coastal Command, its aircrew, or its contribution. I am merely attempting to make you see the difficulty of attacking U-Boats by air.
This situation improved somewhat by the introduction of the Liberators, although a number of Historians argue strong cases that the real reason for U-Boat losses was the breaking of the Enigma code machine which enabled the Navy to put ships practically on top of U-Boats, and certainly to ensure that the positioning was known in advance.
I have insufficient knowledge on this particular area to wish to make a personal comment on that.
Finally the view seems to be that ATH should have diverted precious aircraft towards Costal Command. The Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing.
3 In respect of the performance of the Hailfax I commend you this web site - http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/...t/halifax.html
I would also comend the web site uboat.net to you both in respect of the Halifax and also the U-Boat war. - http://uboat.net/allies/aircraft/halifax.htm
5 Various target finding aids were introduced from early 1943.
The night of 5th/6th March 1943 can be regarded as the start of the Air Battle of the Ruhr. I commend the book of that name by Alan Cooper. This together with 'The Right of The Line' by John Terraine will go a long way towards demonstrating that target accuracy started to improve immensely from then on.
The longer range targets in the East of Germany and in Poland would continue to be a massive challenge right until well towards the end of the war when transmitting stations could be set up in continental Europe.
6 Please do not be offensive and try to distort my words. That you resort to these tactics I find depressing. Facts and figures are quoted fom Air Ministry figures for the Atlantic and North Western European waters as stated.
You have yet to demonstrate how an aircraft would be able to fly to the exact spot where a U-Boat was and bomb it. This would then have to be repeated day after day. Just think about it for a while and when you have done so tell me how this can be achieved.
7 You just won't give credit will you? Even when Bomber Command wiped out oil plants you still allege that this was area bombing.
8 Little point in progressing this one as we clearly disagree. I have quote facts and figures and yet again you don't. I have quoted from stated sources and you dispute the validity of this. I can do no more.
9 I agree that Oboe enabled one to mark a target but you don't recognise that the Berlin campaign was carried out during the Winter period when Berlin was almost perpetually covered in cloud/fog and the aerial markers just disappeared into the murk within too short a while, or were blown off course by winds.
10 Thank you for accepting my facts. No-one disputes that production actually rose through 1943 and early 1944. That was inevitable as German Industrial output never really reached its peak capability. What Berlin did was to slow down the rate of increase.
I did quote facts incidentally, those from people involved, and from the Swiss Governnment.
Steam Chicken
I refer you to (6) above. The figure of one comes from published sources. Note I do not include the Mediteranean figures as we are looking at the situation with Bomber Command and the German offensive.
If your assertion is true, then taking into account the diversion of Bomber Command aircraft and aircrew to Costal Command then knocking out the U-Boats should have been quite an easy job. Both you and Jackinoco seem to think that all you had to do was fly to a pre-determined spot and there would be your U-Boat. Both of you fail to actually think about the logic of this.
There was also a limited area of operation. An aircraft had a maximum range. You either fly to it and back or you fly to a shorter range and fly around looking for your U-Boat. Do you really think that a U-Boat Captain would wander around an area within the reach of an aircraft when he could do a totally un-contested job in Mid Atlantic. That they did go to the Atlantic Gap is accepted history, which I hope you will accept as well.
I think you will find that the Navy types will be seriously miffed about what you say. My understanding of the U-Boat war is that the U-Boat threat was damaged partially by the destruction of U-Boats in their pens, by sinking after striking mines on the sea routes outward bound, and by Navy ships. This is based upon various sources of research by different historians.
Now for some statistics:-
Taking for example the period January 1st and June 30th 1942 only 21 U-Boats were lost. One was destroyed by a mine, and one for unknown reasons.
Of the 21 lost, only six were attributed to air action, one was jointly attributed to joint air/sea action. Of the six sunk by air action three were attributable to the Americans.
Air action therefore only accounted for 30.9 % of U-Boat losses. Costal Command was involved in none of those losses.
In fairness the following period between July and December 1942 was much better but Costal Command still only accounted for 23%.
Another statistic is that Costal Command lost six aircraft for every ship lost during WW2.
Before either you or Jackinoco start slandering me, these figures are not meant to decry Coastal Command, its aircrew, or its contribution. I am merely attempting to make you see the difficulty of attacking U-Boats by air.
This situation improved somewhat by the introduction of the Liberators, although a number of Historians argue strong cases that the real reason for U-Boat losses was the breaking of the Enigma code machine which enabled the Navy to put ships practically on top of U-Boats, and certainly to ensure that the positioning was known in advance.
I have insufficient knowledge on this particular area to wish to make a personal comment on that.
Finally the view seems to be that ATH should have diverted precious aircraft towards Costal Command. The Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing.
Last edited by Bletchley; 29th Apr 2004 at 20:58.
Bletchley,
If you'll forgive me, you seem to be operating under a slight misapprehension about the U-boats. Finding them and sinking them wasn't actually that important.
As SC says, the nature of submarines of the time was such that they spent a great deal of their time operating on the surface. They would only submerge when absolutely necessary - to avoid being spotted by a convoy when sneaking up on it, for instance. A not untypical pattern would be for a Wolfpack to converge on a convoy, move in close (or, if possible into the middle of it) underwater, then attack on the surface, diving to get out of the way of the escorts.
If the U-boat was forced to remain submerged for any great length of time, its endurance (and thus its potential for causing havoc) was dramatically reduced. The point, therefore, was that when long range air cover was available (or when aircraft were operating in the U-boat transit area across the Bay of Biscay), the submarine commanders had to stay submerged, since they were very vulnerable to air attack. Also, staying submerged rapidly turned the air inside the U-boat stale, making life deeply unpleasant and having an effect on crew efficiency.
In many ways, what we see with Coastal Command is an early form of effects-based operations (I apologise for being doctrinally anachronistic and impure - may the JWP Gods strike me down at the end of the post). The effect desired was not to destroy the sub (which was a bonus) but to keep it underwater.
The Germans tried operating at night to overcome this problem, but the use of ASV and the Leigh Light stopped that. Fitting the U-boats with flak batteries helped in one respect, but their effect on underwater performance was dramatic.
Thus although we can say 'only' a certain number of U-boats were sunk, the real question is 'how many were kept under the water and thus couldn't attack, or had to reduce their time on patrol by several hours/days, preventing them from finding a convoy'? And we don't really know... What we do know is that once Liberators were in use (supported by Halifaxes and Wellingtons and Sunderlands) and working closely with the RN and RCN, the Battle of the Atlantic was won. This also ties in with SC's point that the real figure we need to look at is not that of U-boat losses but merchant shipping losses.
The figures here (I don't have them to hand, but they are, IIRC, in Walters' 'The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping') seem to support the point of view that once Coastal Command had the aircraft to do the job, the U-boat threat to shipping was dramatically reduced. The presence of air cover wasn't the sole factor, but it was utterly vital.
ATH's contribution here, sadly, seems to have been to brand Coastal Command as an obstacle to victory, and to make their job more difficult by not bombing submarine pens while they were being built - and when persuaded that he should, the roofs were on, impervious to air attack until Barnes Wallis' big bombs arrived on the scene (by which point the Battle was won). A case can be made for saying that the Battle of the Atlantic could've been made much simpler had those pens never been completed - and regular visits from Bomber Command could've ensured that.
If you'll forgive me, you seem to be operating under a slight misapprehension about the U-boats. Finding them and sinking them wasn't actually that important.
As SC says, the nature of submarines of the time was such that they spent a great deal of their time operating on the surface. They would only submerge when absolutely necessary - to avoid being spotted by a convoy when sneaking up on it, for instance. A not untypical pattern would be for a Wolfpack to converge on a convoy, move in close (or, if possible into the middle of it) underwater, then attack on the surface, diving to get out of the way of the escorts.
If the U-boat was forced to remain submerged for any great length of time, its endurance (and thus its potential for causing havoc) was dramatically reduced. The point, therefore, was that when long range air cover was available (or when aircraft were operating in the U-boat transit area across the Bay of Biscay), the submarine commanders had to stay submerged, since they were very vulnerable to air attack. Also, staying submerged rapidly turned the air inside the U-boat stale, making life deeply unpleasant and having an effect on crew efficiency.
In many ways, what we see with Coastal Command is an early form of effects-based operations (I apologise for being doctrinally anachronistic and impure - may the JWP Gods strike me down at the end of the post). The effect desired was not to destroy the sub (which was a bonus) but to keep it underwater.
The Germans tried operating at night to overcome this problem, but the use of ASV and the Leigh Light stopped that. Fitting the U-boats with flak batteries helped in one respect, but their effect on underwater performance was dramatic.
Thus although we can say 'only' a certain number of U-boats were sunk, the real question is 'how many were kept under the water and thus couldn't attack, or had to reduce their time on patrol by several hours/days, preventing them from finding a convoy'? And we don't really know... What we do know is that once Liberators were in use (supported by Halifaxes and Wellingtons and Sunderlands) and working closely with the RN and RCN, the Battle of the Atlantic was won. This also ties in with SC's point that the real figure we need to look at is not that of U-boat losses but merchant shipping losses.
The figures here (I don't have them to hand, but they are, IIRC, in Walters' 'The Defeat of the Enemy Attack on Shipping') seem to support the point of view that once Coastal Command had the aircraft to do the job, the U-boat threat to shipping was dramatically reduced. The presence of air cover wasn't the sole factor, but it was utterly vital.
ATH's contribution here, sadly, seems to have been to brand Coastal Command as an obstacle to victory, and to make their job more difficult by not bombing submarine pens while they were being built - and when persuaded that he should, the roofs were on, impervious to air attack until Barnes Wallis' big bombs arrived on the scene (by which point the Battle was won). A case can be made for saying that the Battle of the Atlantic could've been made much simpler had those pens never been completed - and regular visits from Bomber Command could've ensured that.
Last edited by Archimedes; 29th Apr 2004 at 22:04.
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Archimedes
Thank you, for an excellent reply.
I am genuinely grateful for that contribution.
My interest lies purely in the German Offensive by Bomber Command hence my admitted lack of knowledge on the U-Boat issue.
You haven't posted for a while. On the basis of your earlier post I would value your views on the debate.
I am away now until after the Bank Holiday.
May I wish you a pleasant break
I am genuinely grateful for that contribution.
My interest lies purely in the German Offensive by Bomber Command hence my admitted lack of knowledge on the U-Boat issue.
You haven't posted for a while. On the basis of your earlier post I would value your views on the debate.
I am away now until after the Bank Holiday.
May I wish you a pleasant break
TAC Int Bloke
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The Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing.
Several sources state that the B-24 was actually a better bomber than the B-17 - unfortunately it didn't have 'filmstar looks'
Regards
-Nick
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Maple 01
Yes you are absolutely right.
My point was that in a war situation the Lancaster was the best aircraft for the specific operational requirements of the German Offensive and the Liberator was the best one for the anti-submarine role.
I cannot comment on the B17 V B24
My point was that in a war situation the Lancaster was the best aircraft for the specific operational requirements of the German Offensive and the Liberator was the best one for the anti-submarine role.
I cannot comment on the B17 V B24
Bletch,
3) I know quite enough about the Halifax without being ‘commended’ to half-@rsed ill-informed, poorly researched, unoriginal and cliched nonsense on a second-rate website. Thanks, though. In return I commend you to ‘Second to None’, probably the best book on the Halifax. Or perhaps you could interview a dozen or so surviving Halifax pilots, as I have done? And for homework I suggest that you calculate the loss rate of the Halifax during 1945 and compare it to the Lanc loss rate.
5) Your complacent view that accuracy was OK after March 1943 is bizarre. I’ve cited examples much later than that when entire Bomber streams failed to hit the city they were directed against.
Just for your interest, some random examples of Bomber Command’s ‘accuracy’ during 1943....
On 8/9 April 1943 only 12 of the 272 aircraft dispatched managed to hit Hamburg, and on 10/11 April six of 254 aircraft managed to hit Essen. On 19/20 May 197 aircraft hit Mannheim, killing two enemy firemen at a cost of eleven RAF bombers. The second 1,000 plan raid against Essen on 1/2 June destroyed 11 houses and killed 15 enemy civilians, and burned out a PoW work camp, though 150 further dangerous enemy civilians perished in Oberhausen, Duisburg and Mülheim. 31 bombers failed to return.
At Wilhelmshaven on 8/9 July, Bomber Command destroyed a Department Store, the Harbourmaster’s office and the bus garage, with 30 valuable buses inside. 25 civilians died, and we only lost five bombers. On 17 August Bomber Command killed a single civilian in Dusseldorf, for the loss of four of the 131 attacking aircraft. On the same night, seven civilians died at Osnabruck, where five RAF aircraft failed to return. On 1/2 September a 231-aircraft force missed Saarbrücken altogether, hitting Saarlouis, 15 miles away, instead.
So much for accuracy.... How about losses?
From the comfort of your armchair, a 4.3% loss rate might sound reasonable, but it meant that the average crew had only an 11% chance of finishing a full tour (30 ops-rest-20 ops) of operations. By comparison a 2.5% rate (the rate before Harris took over) gave a 28.5% chance of survival. The RAF regarded a 4.3% rate as ‘unsustainable’ in the long term, and when the loss rate crept above 6% (as it did in No.4 Group between March and August 1942) squadrons were often rested. Most of the major Berlin raids suffered an 8-10% loss rate. (But of course that didn’t force Harris to abandon the campaign.....)
6) When the basis of your arguments on U-boats is an enthusiast’s website and Bomber Command propaganda I’m not inclined to go overboard in countering such tosh. I would suggest that you might read and inwardly digest Archimedes post. Your dismissal of the VLR Liberator’s part in removing the sanctuary of an ‘Atlantic gap’ is both ignorant and highly offensive to the brave men who fought a tough campaign without the adulation of the Daily Mirror.
Suffice it to say that a mission during which a U-Boat was sunk, after sinking six Allied merchantmen was less successful than a mission in which the U-boat escaped, but without being able to sink any allied ships.
(And in any case, Coastal Command’s record in killing U-boats bears any reasonable scrutiny.)
Your airy belief that the Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing is tosh. The Americans used the Liberator as a bomber with conspicuous success, though its payload was fairly puny, and RAF Liberator bombers did a good job in the Middle East. The Lib may not have been a Lancaster in the bombing role, but it was better than a Wellington or a Stirling. And the Lanc (which formed the backbone of Coastal Command in the immediate post war era) may not have been as useful in the GR/ASW role as the Liberator or the Halifax, the diversion of Lancs to Coastal Command would have been enormously helpful, and the airframes transferred would have done more damage to the German economy than they did in Bomber Command hands.
7) I say that because most of the raids flown during that period were area attacks, often with aim points in residential areas.
8) The Battle of Berlin wasn’t a humiliating defeat, according to you, although:
Harris staked his reputation on bombing Berlin, and promised (in a letter to Churchill) that by bombing Berlin he could win the war by April 1944. He failed.
German industrial production in the city actually increased.
Berlin cost some 500 bombers in only 16 attacks.
German civilian morale did not collapse, and the emergence of a ‘Blitz spirit’ actually had the reverse effect.
The Bomber Command loss rate was so high that Harris had to intersperse attacks on Berlin with attacks against other targets.
The D-Day bombing campaign did not force an end to area attacks, which continued against other targets until 28 April.
Every serious analyst concludes that it was losses (and pressure from Churchill) that forced an end to the campaign.
Your complacent statement that: “My interest lies purely in the German Offensive by Bomber Command hence my admitted lack of knowledge on the U-Boat issue.” Shows breathtaking arrogance and complacency. If you don’t devote time to studying the alternatives to Bomber Command’s strategy, how can you assess it’s relative value and worth?
3) I know quite enough about the Halifax without being ‘commended’ to half-@rsed ill-informed, poorly researched, unoriginal and cliched nonsense on a second-rate website. Thanks, though. In return I commend you to ‘Second to None’, probably the best book on the Halifax. Or perhaps you could interview a dozen or so surviving Halifax pilots, as I have done? And for homework I suggest that you calculate the loss rate of the Halifax during 1945 and compare it to the Lanc loss rate.
5) Your complacent view that accuracy was OK after March 1943 is bizarre. I’ve cited examples much later than that when entire Bomber streams failed to hit the city they were directed against.
Just for your interest, some random examples of Bomber Command’s ‘accuracy’ during 1943....
On 8/9 April 1943 only 12 of the 272 aircraft dispatched managed to hit Hamburg, and on 10/11 April six of 254 aircraft managed to hit Essen. On 19/20 May 197 aircraft hit Mannheim, killing two enemy firemen at a cost of eleven RAF bombers. The second 1,000 plan raid against Essen on 1/2 June destroyed 11 houses and killed 15 enemy civilians, and burned out a PoW work camp, though 150 further dangerous enemy civilians perished in Oberhausen, Duisburg and Mülheim. 31 bombers failed to return.
At Wilhelmshaven on 8/9 July, Bomber Command destroyed a Department Store, the Harbourmaster’s office and the bus garage, with 30 valuable buses inside. 25 civilians died, and we only lost five bombers. On 17 August Bomber Command killed a single civilian in Dusseldorf, for the loss of four of the 131 attacking aircraft. On the same night, seven civilians died at Osnabruck, where five RAF aircraft failed to return. On 1/2 September a 231-aircraft force missed Saarbrücken altogether, hitting Saarlouis, 15 miles away, instead.
So much for accuracy.... How about losses?
From the comfort of your armchair, a 4.3% loss rate might sound reasonable, but it meant that the average crew had only an 11% chance of finishing a full tour (30 ops-rest-20 ops) of operations. By comparison a 2.5% rate (the rate before Harris took over) gave a 28.5% chance of survival. The RAF regarded a 4.3% rate as ‘unsustainable’ in the long term, and when the loss rate crept above 6% (as it did in No.4 Group between March and August 1942) squadrons were often rested. Most of the major Berlin raids suffered an 8-10% loss rate. (But of course that didn’t force Harris to abandon the campaign.....)
6) When the basis of your arguments on U-boats is an enthusiast’s website and Bomber Command propaganda I’m not inclined to go overboard in countering such tosh. I would suggest that you might read and inwardly digest Archimedes post. Your dismissal of the VLR Liberator’s part in removing the sanctuary of an ‘Atlantic gap’ is both ignorant and highly offensive to the brave men who fought a tough campaign without the adulation of the Daily Mirror.
Suffice it to say that a mission during which a U-Boat was sunk, after sinking six Allied merchantmen was less successful than a mission in which the U-boat escaped, but without being able to sink any allied ships.
(And in any case, Coastal Command’s record in killing U-boats bears any reasonable scrutiny.)
Your airy belief that the Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing is tosh. The Americans used the Liberator as a bomber with conspicuous success, though its payload was fairly puny, and RAF Liberator bombers did a good job in the Middle East. The Lib may not have been a Lancaster in the bombing role, but it was better than a Wellington or a Stirling. And the Lanc (which formed the backbone of Coastal Command in the immediate post war era) may not have been as useful in the GR/ASW role as the Liberator or the Halifax, the diversion of Lancs to Coastal Command would have been enormously helpful, and the airframes transferred would have done more damage to the German economy than they did in Bomber Command hands.
7) I say that because most of the raids flown during that period were area attacks, often with aim points in residential areas.
8) The Battle of Berlin wasn’t a humiliating defeat, according to you, although:
Harris staked his reputation on bombing Berlin, and promised (in a letter to Churchill) that by bombing Berlin he could win the war by April 1944. He failed.
German industrial production in the city actually increased.
Berlin cost some 500 bombers in only 16 attacks.
German civilian morale did not collapse, and the emergence of a ‘Blitz spirit’ actually had the reverse effect.
The Bomber Command loss rate was so high that Harris had to intersperse attacks on Berlin with attacks against other targets.
The D-Day bombing campaign did not force an end to area attacks, which continued against other targets until 28 April.
Every serious analyst concludes that it was losses (and pressure from Churchill) that forced an end to the campaign.
Your complacent statement that: “My interest lies purely in the German Offensive by Bomber Command hence my admitted lack of knowledge on the U-Boat issue.” Shows breathtaking arrogance and complacency. If you don’t devote time to studying the alternatives to Bomber Command’s strategy, how can you assess it’s relative value and worth?
TAC Int Bloke
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Just a 'quickie' Jacko,
As you know, the early Halifaxes with Merlin engines and the original fins weren’t that great, things improved greatly with the III - so not all Halifaxes were born equal perhaps some of Harris' scathing comments could be down to early models being compared to Lancs, which were pretty much the finished article - it would be fairer to compare the I/IIs with the Manchester rather than the Lanc and we all know what problems the Manchester had.
Also don’t forget crew tend to defend their type regardless– hence 60 years of banter between ex Lancaster and Halifax crews
Regards
-Nick
As you know, the early Halifaxes with Merlin engines and the original fins weren’t that great, things improved greatly with the III - so not all Halifaxes were born equal perhaps some of Harris' scathing comments could be down to early models being compared to Lancs, which were pretty much the finished article - it would be fairer to compare the I/IIs with the Manchester rather than the Lanc and we all know what problems the Manchester had.
Also don’t forget crew tend to defend their type regardless– hence 60 years of banter between ex Lancaster and Halifax crews
Regards
-Nick
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Lots of opinion and moral argument here, but its no use trying to judge the events of 60 years ago by today's standards. The German Luftwaffe initiated the black art of strategic bombing in Spain, took it further in eastern europe and refined it over Britain. Coventry actually seems to have been an experiment to measure the accuracy of their blind bombing techniques.
Later on Bomber Command and the US Army Air Force went on to write the handbook of strategic bombing and they were breaking new ground. Its no use wringing our hands over it 60 years later. In the sixties I was proud to serve in Bomber Command and I recall that we and the USAF seriously expected to convert vast areas of the USSR into glass if the Russian army put even so much as a single private's toe over an invisible line drawn in West Germany. I'm not ashamed of that at all, its just the way it was.
Leave Arthur Harris alone and lets all go down the pub for a pint together.
Later on Bomber Command and the US Army Air Force went on to write the handbook of strategic bombing and they were breaking new ground. Its no use wringing our hands over it 60 years later. In the sixties I was proud to serve in Bomber Command and I recall that we and the USAF seriously expected to convert vast areas of the USSR into glass if the Russian army put even so much as a single private's toe over an invisible line drawn in West Germany. I'm not ashamed of that at all, its just the way it was.
Leave Arthur Harris alone and lets all go down the pub for a pint together.
Blacksheep,
The Luftwaffe did not "initiate the black art of strategic bombing in Spain"
The one thing that the Luftwaffe NEVER was in WW2 was a strategic force, it was a highly developed tactical support force. Guernica was an attack on a bridge, Rotterdam was an attack on a town that had been declared a defended fortress by it's defenders.
Coventry was an extremely accurate attack on a city that was unique in it's industrial development, basically you had a medieval town centre that had major industrial development right at it's heart without the usual mix of industrial and residential areas. When the Nov 1940 attack went in, just like the later and much ignored April 1941 attack, the Luftwaffe had individual factories as targets. The technology of the day meant that collateral damage was inevitable. Those individual factories were hit and hit hard, the devastation surrounding them was a consequence not an end in itself.
There is much confusion here between the term "strategic bombing" and "area bombing".
Both the RAF and the USAAF indulged in strategic bombing of German cities. Where they differed is that the USAAF would have a factory or installatio as the aim point whereas the RAF, after 1942, would have an aim point calculated to produce the maximum dehousing and destruction of built up urban areas.
Again, due to the technology of the time, both techniques resulted in devastation of large swathes of urban housing, the difference is that one was deliberate, the other was not.
Harris was not interested in any form of panacea target and even less in individual installations as targets.
He opposed the Dams raid, the formation of the Pathfinders, anything that would distract him from his avowed goal of area bombing of German cities.
The reason there was never a Bomber Command Campaign medal? Look closely at the tactics involved, you would be giving a medal for those that participated in a campaign whose declared target was the German working population of men, women and children.
The 55,000 who died and all those who flew in Bomber Command were brave men and deserve respect and admiration for what they endured. They were not war criminals, neither was Harris, but it would have been a moral disgrace to reward such a campaign with a dedicated medal.
The Luftwaffe did not "initiate the black art of strategic bombing in Spain"
The one thing that the Luftwaffe NEVER was in WW2 was a strategic force, it was a highly developed tactical support force. Guernica was an attack on a bridge, Rotterdam was an attack on a town that had been declared a defended fortress by it's defenders.
Coventry was an extremely accurate attack on a city that was unique in it's industrial development, basically you had a medieval town centre that had major industrial development right at it's heart without the usual mix of industrial and residential areas. When the Nov 1940 attack went in, just like the later and much ignored April 1941 attack, the Luftwaffe had individual factories as targets. The technology of the day meant that collateral damage was inevitable. Those individual factories were hit and hit hard, the devastation surrounding them was a consequence not an end in itself.
There is much confusion here between the term "strategic bombing" and "area bombing".
Both the RAF and the USAAF indulged in strategic bombing of German cities. Where they differed is that the USAAF would have a factory or installatio as the aim point whereas the RAF, after 1942, would have an aim point calculated to produce the maximum dehousing and destruction of built up urban areas.
Again, due to the technology of the time, both techniques resulted in devastation of large swathes of urban housing, the difference is that one was deliberate, the other was not.
Harris was not interested in any form of panacea target and even less in individual installations as targets.
He opposed the Dams raid, the formation of the Pathfinders, anything that would distract him from his avowed goal of area bombing of German cities.
The reason there was never a Bomber Command Campaign medal? Look closely at the tactics involved, you would be giving a medal for those that participated in a campaign whose declared target was the German working population of men, women and children.
The 55,000 who died and all those who flew in Bomber Command were brave men and deserve respect and admiration for what they endured. They were not war criminals, neither was Harris, but it would have been a moral disgrace to reward such a campaign with a dedicated medal.
Pr00ne,
There was also already the Air Crew Europe medal, which rendered a dedicated Bomber Command medal superfluous (and potentially divisive). Perhaps a bar or a rosette (like the 8th Army bar on the Africa Star or the Battle of Britain addition to whichever medal) would have been appropriate.
Maple 01,
You're absolutely right. The record of the Merlin Halifax (in service for a year before the Lanc arrived) was poor, and drags down overall statistics. Harris absolutely based his opinions on these early aircraft, and then entirely failed to revise his views when the III (and the even better VI and VII) came along. But that was perhaps because all that mattered to him was the tonnage of bombs delivered per £ spent on aircraft manufactured, regardless of the cost to his own aircrew.
Blacksheep,
The morality of the nuclear deterrent is a complex subject. One could argue about it all day, I suspect, though I always believed in it during the Cold War (as a necessary and proportionate evil) and incline to the view that history showed that there was no alternative and that it worked. Some would suggest that because it was intended as a deterrent (rather than to be used) it was the most moral 'weapon' of all. Others might say that the massive civilian deaths it would have caused would at least have been collateral to the main purpose of the attack.....
But the unique feature of Harris' strategy in WWII was that it was not just indiscriminate (like the appalling and equally immoral German V-weapons) but was specifically intended and then carefully refined to maximise civilian casualties. And there were alternatives available, that would have worked better.
There was also already the Air Crew Europe medal, which rendered a dedicated Bomber Command medal superfluous (and potentially divisive). Perhaps a bar or a rosette (like the 8th Army bar on the Africa Star or the Battle of Britain addition to whichever medal) would have been appropriate.
Maple 01,
You're absolutely right. The record of the Merlin Halifax (in service for a year before the Lanc arrived) was poor, and drags down overall statistics. Harris absolutely based his opinions on these early aircraft, and then entirely failed to revise his views when the III (and the even better VI and VII) came along. But that was perhaps because all that mattered to him was the tonnage of bombs delivered per £ spent on aircraft manufactured, regardless of the cost to his own aircrew.
Blacksheep,
The morality of the nuclear deterrent is a complex subject. One could argue about it all day, I suspect, though I always believed in it during the Cold War (as a necessary and proportionate evil) and incline to the view that history showed that there was no alternative and that it worked. Some would suggest that because it was intended as a deterrent (rather than to be used) it was the most moral 'weapon' of all. Others might say that the massive civilian deaths it would have caused would at least have been collateral to the main purpose of the attack.....
But the unique feature of Harris' strategy in WWII was that it was not just indiscriminate (like the appalling and equally immoral German V-weapons) but was specifically intended and then carefully refined to maximise civilian casualties. And there were alternatives available, that would have worked better.
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Harris absolutely based his opinions on these early aircraft, and then entirely failed to revise his views when the III
.........And they keep telling me the key to airpower is flexibility)-nick
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Hooray Blacksheep for getting back to basics. A simple conspiracy theory question has exploded into a critique or otherwise of Bomber Harris and his ideas, moral questions judged with the benefit of 40,50,60 years hindsight, and arguments on the relative capabilities of the Lanc, Halifax and B24.
Like PprunePop, I was at the receiving end during the war, though not in as close proximity as he was, so have memories of how thing were as a youngster at the time. Also, my father was a squadron commander on Wellingtons early in the war, and though he had moved on by the time the real bomber offensive began, I do remember being extremely proud of him, and what he was doing. I don't remember ever talking to him about his views on Bomber Harris, and wish I had. But since he later became CinC of Bomber Command in cold war confrontation times, I think he had a pretty shrewd idea of the real big picture.
Like Blacksheep, I was part of the deterrent force, and naturally hoped that we would not be needed, but prepared to go if required to. Had we had to, if there was anyone left to judge us, no doubt the same old arguments would have emerged in due course.
Wouldn't it be nice if we actually learned from history.
Would love to put the world to rights in a suitable pub, but Pprune is not bad!
Like PprunePop, I was at the receiving end during the war, though not in as close proximity as he was, so have memories of how thing were as a youngster at the time. Also, my father was a squadron commander on Wellingtons early in the war, and though he had moved on by the time the real bomber offensive began, I do remember being extremely proud of him, and what he was doing. I don't remember ever talking to him about his views on Bomber Harris, and wish I had. But since he later became CinC of Bomber Command in cold war confrontation times, I think he had a pretty shrewd idea of the real big picture.
Like Blacksheep, I was part of the deterrent force, and naturally hoped that we would not be needed, but prepared to go if required to. Had we had to, if there was anyone left to judge us, no doubt the same old arguments would have emerged in due course.
Wouldn't it be nice if we actually learned from history.
Would love to put the world to rights in a suitable pub, but Pprune is not bad!