Attack on Coventry not a surprise?
Bletchley (Park?)
An admirable defence of Harris but it misses one rather vital point; Harris was convinced that by strategic area bombing he and the USAAF 8th AF could win the war alone.
In this he was simply wrong!
He was still pushing this in April 1944 and was reluctant, almost to the point of rank disobedience, to switch his forces to tactical support prior to the landings.
This is the main reason that he was pilloried after the war, he was seen to be blinkered and single minded and attracted the disdain of not only politicians but of the Air Staff.
In common folk lore he is accused of being the murderer of Dresden and not caring about losses amongst his own crews.
This is why most people have a downer on the man, it is incorrect and inaccurate, but he would never have received the praise heaped on other war time leaders for many other accurate and correct reasons.
He was old school "the Bomber is all" in the Trenchard mould, for this, amongst such other decisions such as the campaign against Berlin, he deserves to be criticised.
He was no cold blooded killer, but nor was he any sort of hero or tactical genius.
An admirable defence of Harris but it misses one rather vital point; Harris was convinced that by strategic area bombing he and the USAAF 8th AF could win the war alone.
In this he was simply wrong!
He was still pushing this in April 1944 and was reluctant, almost to the point of rank disobedience, to switch his forces to tactical support prior to the landings.
This is the main reason that he was pilloried after the war, he was seen to be blinkered and single minded and attracted the disdain of not only politicians but of the Air Staff.
In common folk lore he is accused of being the murderer of Dresden and not caring about losses amongst his own crews.
This is why most people have a downer on the man, it is incorrect and inaccurate, but he would never have received the praise heaped on other war time leaders for many other accurate and correct reasons.
He was old school "the Bomber is all" in the Trenchard mould, for this, amongst such other decisions such as the campaign against Berlin, he deserves to be criticised.
He was no cold blooded killer, but nor was he any sort of hero or tactical genius.
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Pr00ne
A well written and reasoned repsonse - but I can't let some of your comments go. As I stated ealrier, I believe Harris was single-minded in his adherence to "getting the job done". Now, whether that was bombing Germany into submission, or tying down both Civil Defence/Whermact or Luftwaffe air defence assets is neither here no there. He prosecuted the war from 1942 onwards with the one aim of winning it with all the forces at his disposal. There is no doubt his offensive materially affected the German capacity to wage war to the extent that transport and manufacturing was severely disrupted at a time when it was most needed.
Sure Albert Speer will say that Me 109 production increased and that there was never a problem after the Dams Raid and that the V-progamme was not materially affected by raids on the Baltic Peenemunde site, etc, etc.
"Progress demands unreasonableness" is an oft quoted business maxim. Harris was unreasonable - he progressed the war-effort, to our eternal benefit, thank goodness.
Sure Albert Speer will say that Me 109 production increased and that there was never a problem after the Dams Raid and that the V-progamme was not materially affected by raids on the Baltic Peenemunde site, etc, etc.
"Progress demands unreasonableness" is an oft quoted business maxim. Harris was unreasonable - he progressed the war-effort, to our eternal benefit, thank goodness.
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I am supposed to be impartial as a moderator. Not putting a point of view into a thread, and I seriously try to do this. In this particular thread, though I have made a few relevant points, I also feel that as I am of the WW2 generation, subjected to bombing, V1's and V2's, I am entitled to offer the foregoing. Indeed, I have written a book for my grandson, that spells out the various factors of the war and its implications as well as my later life.
The fact of the matter is for me very simple.
From 1940 on I, as a young lad, living close to Croydon, was on the receiving end of the visiting fighters and bombers. I also suffered from the so-called "vengeance weapons." We were not bombed directly but several properties close by were. My mother, sister and myself, were nearly killed by a V1 in July 1943, which fell on a hospital. We had to make haste into a nearby shelter, barely making it, suffering cuts brusies and other injuries. The margin was extremely critical.
The result of this made me realise that whatever we could do to exact equal punishment on Germany was entirely justified. It mattered not one iota who got hurt, for we got hurt, who got killed, for some people around us got killed, or who was maimed for we were maimed. The extent of our anger was real, and we needed to hear that Germany was "reaping the whirlwind" of destruction delivered by Bomber Command. Whatever the reason for the terrible Dresden bombing, albeit at the latter end of the war, made no difference to anyone. Anymore than the bombing of Cologne and Hamburg did. We were returning fire with fire. Even hate with hate. It was an essential element of our well being.
After the war people like Arthur Harris, Dowding and such were heroes. It was only later, that some directed wrath at these fine men, which in our view was highly misplaced. It still is, and I have great trouble in giving ANY person the satisfaction of any consideration for an opinion on the subject unless they were of my generation and experienced the bombing, and yes, strafing, which happened to me as a 11 year old.
How bloody dare they give forth their self righteous views about a subject they opinionise on without the knowledge of what it was like on the receiving end, day after day, night after night.
OK. I have made my point and that is it.
The fact of the matter is for me very simple.
From 1940 on I, as a young lad, living close to Croydon, was on the receiving end of the visiting fighters and bombers. I also suffered from the so-called "vengeance weapons." We were not bombed directly but several properties close by were. My mother, sister and myself, were nearly killed by a V1 in July 1943, which fell on a hospital. We had to make haste into a nearby shelter, barely making it, suffering cuts brusies and other injuries. The margin was extremely critical.
The result of this made me realise that whatever we could do to exact equal punishment on Germany was entirely justified. It mattered not one iota who got hurt, for we got hurt, who got killed, for some people around us got killed, or who was maimed for we were maimed. The extent of our anger was real, and we needed to hear that Germany was "reaping the whirlwind" of destruction delivered by Bomber Command. Whatever the reason for the terrible Dresden bombing, albeit at the latter end of the war, made no difference to anyone. Anymore than the bombing of Cologne and Hamburg did. We were returning fire with fire. Even hate with hate. It was an essential element of our well being.
After the war people like Arthur Harris, Dowding and such were heroes. It was only later, that some directed wrath at these fine men, which in our view was highly misplaced. It still is, and I have great trouble in giving ANY person the satisfaction of any consideration for an opinion on the subject unless they were of my generation and experienced the bombing, and yes, strafing, which happened to me as a 11 year old.
How bloody dare they give forth their self righteous views about a subject they opinionise on without the knowledge of what it was like on the receiving end, day after day, night after night.
OK. I have made my point and that is it.
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PPRuNe Pop
Abso-bloody-lutely right!!!
It is a real privilege to hear someone of your generation talk about such things with feeling and none of this bl00dy PC correctness! Thank you.
Outstanding, and I think I lived in one of the houses in the remains of the Croydon V-1 deluge, although it was known then as Beckenham and has since morphed into South Penge.....
It is a real privilege to hear someone of your generation talk about such things with feeling and none of this bl00dy PC correctness! Thank you.
Outstanding, and I think I lived in one of the houses in the remains of the Croydon V-1 deluge, although it was known then as Beckenham and has since morphed into South Penge.....
pr00ne, I concur.
However, I doubt that Bomber Command would have been as successful without a leader of Harris' character. The issue is that he was perhaps too fixed in his ideas and not open to change - had he explored the advice of Bufton rather than rejected it almost out of hand, then things may have been different.
Bletchley:
I disagree that Harris was done a gross dis-service by the Official History. There were undoubtedly some areas of inaccuracy and contention that have come to light, but by and large it is not an unfair picture. Harris's obstinacy is brought out well.
Don't forget that (as a for instance) Harris was occasionally dogmatic to a ridiculous extent: he claimed that his crews weren't good enough (in essence) to hit transport target sets - and they proved him very wrong.
However, that said, I agree with the main thrust of your argument. To brand Harris as a war criminal is simplistic.
It is also disgraceful that the men of Bomber Command did not receive a campaign medal, and it is a disgrace that some sections of society regard them as being almost war criminals, without bothering to understand the context of the campaign, the deliniation between enacting policy in a war of national survival and, frankly, the stark terror of going out night after night, knowing that you were in with a damn good chance of dying, yet cracking on a doing your job to the best of your abilities.
I very much doubt that many of those critics would have the 'moral fibre' to do what our forefathers did.
However, I doubt that Bomber Command would have been as successful without a leader of Harris' character. The issue is that he was perhaps too fixed in his ideas and not open to change - had he explored the advice of Bufton rather than rejected it almost out of hand, then things may have been different.
Bletchley:
I disagree that Harris was done a gross dis-service by the Official History. There were undoubtedly some areas of inaccuracy and contention that have come to light, but by and large it is not an unfair picture. Harris's obstinacy is brought out well.
Don't forget that (as a for instance) Harris was occasionally dogmatic to a ridiculous extent: he claimed that his crews weren't good enough (in essence) to hit transport target sets - and they proved him very wrong.
However, that said, I agree with the main thrust of your argument. To brand Harris as a war criminal is simplistic.
It is also disgraceful that the men of Bomber Command did not receive a campaign medal, and it is a disgrace that some sections of society regard them as being almost war criminals, without bothering to understand the context of the campaign, the deliniation between enacting policy in a war of national survival and, frankly, the stark terror of going out night after night, knowing that you were in with a damn good chance of dying, yet cracking on a doing your job to the best of your abilities.
I very much doubt that many of those critics would have the 'moral fibre' to do what our forefathers did.
JF
That lump of coal didn't stop Hitler from invading the USA. That somehow infers the lump of coal was some hughly offensive machine in the early 40's. Hitler showed no serious desire that I am aware of to invade the US. There is a big difference between U boats off New Jersey and dreams of tactical strikes by mod'ed Condors to holding territory. Can you show me some credible sources that he had planned a land invasion? By extension of your logic, Mexico was spared invasion by the UK's strategic position also. Even if Hitler did, the logistics would have been prohibitive. It damn near was going the other way also. If the US mainland was going to be invaded, it would come from the other coast.
Bletchley
I appreciate your post. I have a hard time understanding the tactical advantage gained by Dresden. The strategic sense I appreciate, it scared the bejesus out of civilian population. If they knew about what happened there. No more I understand Dresden than I do burning Tokyo to the ground except as vengence. I am willing to listen however with an open mind.
That lump of coal didn't stop Hitler from invading the USA. That somehow infers the lump of coal was some hughly offensive machine in the early 40's. Hitler showed no serious desire that I am aware of to invade the US. There is a big difference between U boats off New Jersey and dreams of tactical strikes by mod'ed Condors to holding territory. Can you show me some credible sources that he had planned a land invasion? By extension of your logic, Mexico was spared invasion by the UK's strategic position also. Even if Hitler did, the logistics would have been prohibitive. It damn near was going the other way also. If the US mainland was going to be invaded, it would come from the other coast.
Bletchley
I appreciate your post. I have a hard time understanding the tactical advantage gained by Dresden. The strategic sense I appreciate, it scared the bejesus out of civilian population. If they knew about what happened there. No more I understand Dresden than I do burning Tokyo to the ground except as vengence. I am willing to listen however with an open mind.
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prOOne
I really must disagree with your post.
A couple of points if I may.
Until 1944 the UK had no other way of taking the war to Germany.
Really quite inaccurate I am sorry to say.
The point that many missed at the time, and many subsequently, in respect of the easing up on air attacks on Germany, was that this would give the Germans time to re-group their Industry.
This is what did indeed happen during the period when Bomber command was acting under the control of Eisenhower, and something that Eisenhower himself realised by releasing control of BC back to ATH .
A detailed analysis of the situation in Germany during 1943/44, and comments made by senior German officials clearly indicate that had a number of further 1,000 bomber raids been carried out thet the war would not have continued. I can support this with documentary evidence but not immediately.
To quote Albert Speer - ...'...The real importance of the air war consisted of the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion of Europe. That front line was the skies over Germany...every square metre of the territory we controlled was a kind of front line. Defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous qunatities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time...'...
In addition Speer noted that the 20, 000 odd AA guns ...'...could almost have doubled the anti-tank defences on the Eastern front...'...
You criticise ATH for the Berlin campaign. Please will you say why?.
The total % of RAF bombs dropped on Germany is along these lines:-
Area bombing 36.6%
Attacks on troops and defences 14.4%
Attacks on Transportation 15.4%
Attacks on Oil targets 26.2%
Put simply the total % dropped on German targets immediately before D-Day, and in subsequent support of ground forces amounts to 56.2% of the total dropped.
ATH was vehement in voicing his opinions, however once he had made his point he whole-heartedly applied himself to the task asked of him.
Please can you give the basis for this suggestion please.
By what standards do you define a hero or a tactical genius please?
Please say on what basis.
My research has not revealed this to be the case. This suggests a serious gap in my knowledge. Would you kindly say what your source(s) is/are in order that I can follow up. I am anxious to read all aspects both critical and complimentary.
According to my records ATH was very well respected by Churchill, Eisenhower and senior military figures.
Portal wrote to Harris to thank him for his efforts and said in that letter ...'...For the support you have always given me, and for your tremendous personal contribution to the achievement of the RAF in this war I can never adequately thank you...'... . Hardly the actions of a man who held ATH in disdain.
Archimedes
Please demonstrate by example where ATH was not open to change please.
I can demonstrate that with the bombing of the Dams, the formation of the Pathfinders, the provision of the PFF badge, and the prosecution of precision bombing, that ATH did in fact change his mind.
What ultimately does a disservice to ATH is the fact that once he went out to achieve something, , he put 100% (and more) into it, even if it proved him wrong
Perhaps you could say what advice of Bufton (a relatively junior officer) ATH ignored?
West Coast
Dresden was no different than any other target at that stage in the war.
Dresden was considered to be of the first importance by the both the Allied/Russian High Command, as well as Political leaders who were very anxious to demonstrate their commitment to supporting Russia. Dresden really was an attack called for by Stalin.
In February 1945 Dresden was the main centre for communication for the defence of Germany on the southern half of the Eastern front. It was considered that a heavy attack would render Dresden useless for this purpose.
It was also the by far the largest city in Germany (Pre-war population was 630,000) which had been left intact by virtue of its distance from the UK.
ATH in his own biography states ..\'Here I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself....\' . Remember that ATH actually queried if Dresden should be attacked prior to the raid and was told to go ahead
I cannot possibly comment on Japan. That was in the American theatre and I have no interest or knowledge in American operations.
I really must disagree with your post.
A couple of points if I may.
Until 1944 the UK had no other way of taking the war to Germany.
Harris was convinced that by strategic area bombing he and the USAAF 8th AF could win the war alone.
The point that many missed at the time, and many subsequently, in respect of the easing up on air attacks on Germany, was that this would give the Germans time to re-group their Industry.
This is what did indeed happen during the period when Bomber command was acting under the control of Eisenhower, and something that Eisenhower himself realised by releasing control of BC back to ATH .
A detailed analysis of the situation in Germany during 1943/44, and comments made by senior German officials clearly indicate that had a number of further 1,000 bomber raids been carried out thet the war would not have continued. I can support this with documentary evidence but not immediately.
To quote Albert Speer - ...'...The real importance of the air war consisted of the fact that it opened a second front long before the invasion of Europe. That front line was the skies over Germany...every square metre of the territory we controlled was a kind of front line. Defence against air attacks required the production of thousands of anti-aircraft guns, the stockpiling of tremendous qunatities of ammunition all over the country, and holding in readiness hundreds of thousands of soldiers, who in addition had to stay in position by their guns, often totally inactive, for months at a time...'...
In addition Speer noted that the 20, 000 odd AA guns ...'...could almost have doubled the anti-tank defences on the Eastern front...'...
You criticise ATH for the Berlin campaign. Please will you say why?.
He was still pushing this in April 1944 and was reluctant, almost to the point of rank disobedience, to switch his forces to tactical support prior to the landings.
Area bombing 36.6%
Attacks on troops and defences 14.4%
Attacks on Transportation 15.4%
Attacks on Oil targets 26.2%
Put simply the total % dropped on German targets immediately before D-Day, and in subsequent support of ground forces amounts to 56.2% of the total dropped.
ATH was vehement in voicing his opinions, however once he had made his point he whole-heartedly applied himself to the task asked of him.
but he would never have received the praise heaped on other war time leaders for many other accurate and correct reasons.
By what standards do you define a hero or a tactical genius please?
he was seen to be blinkered and single minded and attracted the disdain of not only politicians but of the Air Staff.
My research has not revealed this to be the case. This suggests a serious gap in my knowledge. Would you kindly say what your source(s) is/are in order that I can follow up. I am anxious to read all aspects both critical and complimentary.
According to my records ATH was very well respected by Churchill, Eisenhower and senior military figures.
Portal wrote to Harris to thank him for his efforts and said in that letter ...'...For the support you have always given me, and for your tremendous personal contribution to the achievement of the RAF in this war I can never adequately thank you...'... . Hardly the actions of a man who held ATH in disdain.
Archimedes
The issue is that he was perhaps too fixed in his ideas and not open to change - had he explored the advice of Bufton rather than rejected it almost out of hand, then things may have been different.
I can demonstrate that with the bombing of the Dams, the formation of the Pathfinders, the provision of the PFF badge, and the prosecution of precision bombing, that ATH did in fact change his mind.
What ultimately does a disservice to ATH is the fact that once he went out to achieve something, , he put 100% (and more) into it, even if it proved him wrong
Perhaps you could say what advice of Bufton (a relatively junior officer) ATH ignored?
West Coast
Dresden was no different than any other target at that stage in the war.
Dresden was considered to be of the first importance by the both the Allied/Russian High Command, as well as Political leaders who were very anxious to demonstrate their commitment to supporting Russia. Dresden really was an attack called for by Stalin.
In February 1945 Dresden was the main centre for communication for the defence of Germany on the southern half of the Eastern front. It was considered that a heavy attack would render Dresden useless for this purpose.
It was also the by far the largest city in Germany (Pre-war population was 630,000) which had been left intact by virtue of its distance from the UK.
ATH in his own biography states ..\'Here I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself....\' . Remember that ATH actually queried if Dresden should be attacked prior to the raid and was told to go ahead
I cannot possibly comment on Japan. That was in the American theatre and I have no interest or knowledge in American operations.
Last edited by Bletchley; 27th Apr 2004 at 23:21.
Bletchley,
forgive me, but imprecise expression on my part.
My point is that Harris often had to be driven into these changes: e.g. the targeting of oil, for instance - he resisted and resisted Portal's requests, was finally forced to acede and then admitted his error in a letter to Portal 'a faith to which I am not only a convert...' The same is true of the pressure for creating the PFF; for the move to supporting the invasion; bombing submarine pens; describing Coastal Command as an obstacle to victory at the height of the Battle of the Atlantic.
It is my view that had he been more willing to accept ideas from the air ministry rather than regarding it as containing junior staff officers with little knowledge of what went on (Bufton) and a damned nuisance (based, it could be argued [as it was by Portal] on an outdated conception the of intelligence gathering that informed AM directives), and more willing to accept the capabilities of his men, Bomber Command might - but it is hard to tell - have made an even greater contribution to the war than it did.
As I say in my posting, without Harris, Bomber Command would not have been as successful as it was. I think our differences lie in interpretation of events - but given the continuing production of literature interpreting the campaign and the primary sources available, this sort of difference of emphasis is perhaps only to be expected.
forgive me, but imprecise expression on my part.
My point is that Harris often had to be driven into these changes: e.g. the targeting of oil, for instance - he resisted and resisted Portal's requests, was finally forced to acede and then admitted his error in a letter to Portal 'a faith to which I am not only a convert...' The same is true of the pressure for creating the PFF; for the move to supporting the invasion; bombing submarine pens; describing Coastal Command as an obstacle to victory at the height of the Battle of the Atlantic.
It is my view that had he been more willing to accept ideas from the air ministry rather than regarding it as containing junior staff officers with little knowledge of what went on (Bufton) and a damned nuisance (based, it could be argued [as it was by Portal] on an outdated conception the of intelligence gathering that informed AM directives), and more willing to accept the capabilities of his men, Bomber Command might - but it is hard to tell - have made an even greater contribution to the war than it did.
As I say in my posting, without Harris, Bomber Command would not have been as successful as it was. I think our differences lie in interpretation of events - but given the continuing production of literature interpreting the campaign and the primary sources available, this sort of difference of emphasis is perhaps only to be expected.
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Archimedes
To quote Lord Percy Percy from Blackadder series 3 - "I like the cut of your jib, Sir"
I think you and I could have an excellent debate over a pint (or two) and remain friends!
May be sometime, eh?
Its very nice to be able to have a decent exchange of views without a post descending into the usual name calling.
Thank you everyone for that
I think you and I could have an excellent debate over a pint (or two) and remain friends!
May be sometime, eh?
Its very nice to be able to have a decent exchange of views without a post descending into the usual name calling.
Thank you everyone for that
It’s difficult to criticise Harris, since his loyalty to his men (especially after the war) made them inordionately fond of him, and loyal to him, and making any criticism of his policies seem like an attack on the brave men of Bomber Command. This is unfortunate, since while he was in no way a War Criminal, Harris was a deeply flawed man, whose actions caused massive damage to his own men, and whose contribution to victory was very much less, in real terms, than he always claimed. The heroes of Bomber Command deserved a much better leader. To say so is in no way showing anything less than great respect “for the people who gave their lives so that some people would enjoy the luxury of freedom of speech in a free society.” Nor is it ‘slandering’ Harris, nor does criticism of Harris in any way attack the ‘courage and selflessness of our forefathers’.
Dudley Saward’s book on Harris was written in the 1970s although it was not published until Harris' death in 1984. As such it was written according to 70’s standards, and was written relatively soon after the events it described. And while some may view ‘modern standards’ of history and historiography as being based on ‘revisionism for revisionism’s sake’ or being based on the inappropriate application of liberalism or political correctness, modern standards actually stress MUCH greater emphasis on finding real evidence, and on considering evidence from all sides, while rejecting the highly partial and often propagandist approach which ‘passed muster’ in days gone by.
Moreover, Saward was far from being a disinterested or independent observer, as his own CV would indicate!
His book presented a highly favourable and heavily sanitised view of Harris, and relied heavily on Harris' own views of his life and the events in which he was involved, and excluded everything Harris wanted left out.
A very much more balanced view of Harris has been presented by many historians and authors, some of whom have quite rightly questioned some of Harris' goals and methods, as well as the accuracy of Harris' recollections. There have also been unfair demolition jobs.
In my view, probably the best ‘sympathetic’ book about Harris is: Bomber Harris: His Life and Times by Air Cdre Henry Probert, former head of the AHB (RAF).
A careful examination of Harris’ career might lead one to conclude that he was something of a bounder – playing around with ‘other women’ while in Egypt (for which his first wife divorced him) – something which was very much more serious, and which represented much more of a character black mark in the 1930s than it would today.
He was also a man who had favourites, and allowed his personal feelings to influence his actions to an astonishing degree. He clamoured for publicity and press coverage to an extent which many of his contemporaries found vulgar and unseemly, and to a degree which hindered his prosecution of the war.
Harris was a man who leapt to ‘snap judgements’ but was too arrogant to change his mind. Thus he dismissed the Halifax on the basis of the performance and losses of the Merlin engined versions, and refused to accept or acknowledge that the later radial-engined versions were virtually the equal of the Lanc, as late-war loss figures soon showed.
Harris chose to ignore evidence which undermined his favoured approach, and proved surprisingly uncritical of what were clearly exaggerated and inaccurate claims of successful missions, and even tended to further exaggerate results, even when there was plentiful evidence that actual results had been pathetically poor.
During the early years of the campaign, actual evidence shows that on night after night massive numbers of Bomber Command aircrew went to their deaths while achieving no damage to their targets, scattering their bombs harmlessly over the German countryside. Again and again the numbers of German civilian casualties were dwarfed by the numbers of aircrew killed, while tens of bombers would fail to return having managed to damage one or two houses.
And all the while, Harris claimed that he was ‘winning the war’ and fought tooth and nail to prevent the dispatch of four engined heavies to Coastal Command or overseas commands where they could have made a much greater contribution to the war effort. He was similarly blind to the achievements of the medium bombers of No.2 Group.
Harris famously resented the diversion of ‘his’ bombers against panacea targets, did not believe in precision bombing, and ignored directives from his superiors. Arguably Bomber Command’s greatest successes came in spite of Harris (the magnificent effort in support of D-Day showed what the Command was capable of), while the biggest mistakes were largely his – the ill-judged Battle of Berlin which he said would end the war actually lengthened it, and his failure to prioritise his effort against oil targets reduced Bomber Command’s contribution to the final stage of the War. Far from “single-handedly, graspingwhat modern warfare was all about in those days, ie no cigar for coming second” Harris seems to have been more concerned with fighting the war ‘his way’ than he was with actually winning.
But to be fair, it must be pointed out that:
1) The area bombing offensive for which Harris is usually blamed was not, in fact, his own, although he embraced it with enthusiasm. It was Portal and Churchill’s though Harris clung to it with pig-headed stubbornness even when evidence began to show that it was ineffective and criminally wasteful in terms of aircraft and crews.
2) Dresden was not Harris’ choice (indeed he expressed misgivings before the raid) though his comments afterwards were unfortunate. If anything was ‘disgraceful’ it was, surely, the way in which Churchill sought to distance himself afterwards. (“What is absolutely disgraceful about the whole matter is the way in which the American press treated the story, and the subsequent public reaction of the USA in seeking to distance themselves from something that they had been actively involved in.”)
After the war, Harris became somewhat eccentric - “caught up in letter-writing battles in The Times and repeatedly threatening legal action against enemies real or imagined, including those responsible for the official history of Bomber Command. Having refused to review the drafts before publication and having never read it afterwards, Harris nonetheless attacked the work, its authors, and their conclusions. Probert points out that most historians today consider those volumes to be remarkably fair and judicious.” (please note, Bletchley!)
Before you leap on me demanding examples, Bletchley, I’d say that you’ve either made your mind up already, and have already read the books I’d point you at, or you’d refuse to accept the evidence anyway. But accurate summaries of damage to German targets, on a night by night basis, are given alongside detailed summaries of Bomber Command sorties and losses in the book published by Midland Counties, and offer the starkest possible illustration of exactly what the Command did and did not achieve, and at exactly what cost.
Dudley Saward’s book on Harris was written in the 1970s although it was not published until Harris' death in 1984. As such it was written according to 70’s standards, and was written relatively soon after the events it described. And while some may view ‘modern standards’ of history and historiography as being based on ‘revisionism for revisionism’s sake’ or being based on the inappropriate application of liberalism or political correctness, modern standards actually stress MUCH greater emphasis on finding real evidence, and on considering evidence from all sides, while rejecting the highly partial and often propagandist approach which ‘passed muster’ in days gone by.
Moreover, Saward was far from being a disinterested or independent observer, as his own CV would indicate!
His book presented a highly favourable and heavily sanitised view of Harris, and relied heavily on Harris' own views of his life and the events in which he was involved, and excluded everything Harris wanted left out.
A very much more balanced view of Harris has been presented by many historians and authors, some of whom have quite rightly questioned some of Harris' goals and methods, as well as the accuracy of Harris' recollections. There have also been unfair demolition jobs.
In my view, probably the best ‘sympathetic’ book about Harris is: Bomber Harris: His Life and Times by Air Cdre Henry Probert, former head of the AHB (RAF).
A careful examination of Harris’ career might lead one to conclude that he was something of a bounder – playing around with ‘other women’ while in Egypt (for which his first wife divorced him) – something which was very much more serious, and which represented much more of a character black mark in the 1930s than it would today.
He was also a man who had favourites, and allowed his personal feelings to influence his actions to an astonishing degree. He clamoured for publicity and press coverage to an extent which many of his contemporaries found vulgar and unseemly, and to a degree which hindered his prosecution of the war.
Harris was a man who leapt to ‘snap judgements’ but was too arrogant to change his mind. Thus he dismissed the Halifax on the basis of the performance and losses of the Merlin engined versions, and refused to accept or acknowledge that the later radial-engined versions were virtually the equal of the Lanc, as late-war loss figures soon showed.
Harris chose to ignore evidence which undermined his favoured approach, and proved surprisingly uncritical of what were clearly exaggerated and inaccurate claims of successful missions, and even tended to further exaggerate results, even when there was plentiful evidence that actual results had been pathetically poor.
During the early years of the campaign, actual evidence shows that on night after night massive numbers of Bomber Command aircrew went to their deaths while achieving no damage to their targets, scattering their bombs harmlessly over the German countryside. Again and again the numbers of German civilian casualties were dwarfed by the numbers of aircrew killed, while tens of bombers would fail to return having managed to damage one or two houses.
And all the while, Harris claimed that he was ‘winning the war’ and fought tooth and nail to prevent the dispatch of four engined heavies to Coastal Command or overseas commands where they could have made a much greater contribution to the war effort. He was similarly blind to the achievements of the medium bombers of No.2 Group.
Harris famously resented the diversion of ‘his’ bombers against panacea targets, did not believe in precision bombing, and ignored directives from his superiors. Arguably Bomber Command’s greatest successes came in spite of Harris (the magnificent effort in support of D-Day showed what the Command was capable of), while the biggest mistakes were largely his – the ill-judged Battle of Berlin which he said would end the war actually lengthened it, and his failure to prioritise his effort against oil targets reduced Bomber Command’s contribution to the final stage of the War. Far from “single-handedly, graspingwhat modern warfare was all about in those days, ie no cigar for coming second” Harris seems to have been more concerned with fighting the war ‘his way’ than he was with actually winning.
But to be fair, it must be pointed out that:
1) The area bombing offensive for which Harris is usually blamed was not, in fact, his own, although he embraced it with enthusiasm. It was Portal and Churchill’s though Harris clung to it with pig-headed stubbornness even when evidence began to show that it was ineffective and criminally wasteful in terms of aircraft and crews.
2) Dresden was not Harris’ choice (indeed he expressed misgivings before the raid) though his comments afterwards were unfortunate. If anything was ‘disgraceful’ it was, surely, the way in which Churchill sought to distance himself afterwards. (“What is absolutely disgraceful about the whole matter is the way in which the American press treated the story, and the subsequent public reaction of the USA in seeking to distance themselves from something that they had been actively involved in.”)
After the war, Harris became somewhat eccentric - “caught up in letter-writing battles in The Times and repeatedly threatening legal action against enemies real or imagined, including those responsible for the official history of Bomber Command. Having refused to review the drafts before publication and having never read it afterwards, Harris nonetheless attacked the work, its authors, and their conclusions. Probert points out that most historians today consider those volumes to be remarkably fair and judicious.” (please note, Bletchley!)
Before you leap on me demanding examples, Bletchley, I’d say that you’ve either made your mind up already, and have already read the books I’d point you at, or you’d refuse to accept the evidence anyway. But accurate summaries of damage to German targets, on a night by night basis, are given alongside detailed summaries of Bomber Command sorties and losses in the book published by Midland Counties, and offer the starkest possible illustration of exactly what the Command did and did not achieve, and at exactly what cost.
Bletchly
I accept that there were legit targets in Dresden as you infer. I simply don't understand why upwards of 135,000 (one estimate) died in pursuit of their destruction. Can you provide some supporting material as to why the civilian population was targeted along with military targets as it clear that was an aim of the mission?
Jacko
One thing you posted make me think. It was about Harris's indiscretions. I think the press of past tended to overlook things outside of the scope of their assignment. How would a President now be looked at if he had polio? It was never really a factor for Roosevelt. The same of Clinton's indiscretions with a cigar and the plump one, would it have received the same play by you and your colleagues 50 years ago?
I accept that there were legit targets in Dresden as you infer. I simply don't understand why upwards of 135,000 (one estimate) died in pursuit of their destruction. Can you provide some supporting material as to why the civilian population was targeted along with military targets as it clear that was an aim of the mission?
Jacko
One thing you posted make me think. It was about Harris's indiscretions. I think the press of past tended to overlook things outside of the scope of their assignment. How would a President now be looked at if he had polio? It was never really a factor for Roosevelt. The same of Clinton's indiscretions with a cigar and the plump one, would it have received the same play by you and your colleagues 50 years ago?
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West Coast, is that figure of 135,000 from David Irving's 1963 book ?
If so he admitted his error about 3 years later and quoted a report from the Dresden area police chief giving a death toll of 25,000 and 35,000 missing.
If so he admitted his error about 3 years later and quoted a report from the Dresden area police chief giving a death toll of 25,000 and 35,000 missing.
Thread Starter
Woah horse!-I had only read about the supposed warning by Ultra in Berlitz' book-this is why the silly question was posted. That book has fascinating tidbits about languages, and that is where the focus is. It was not my intention to imply any deep understanding of the chronology of WW2 events. Had hoped for maybe two or three replies...
Posted during a mild illness for a few days, but even when feeling healthy I forget sometimes which battles had direct connections to other battles, other than Pearl Harbor-Midway, Luftwaffe bombing London (accidentally, at first)-counterattacks on Berlin-London, thereby mostly sparing the critical RAF airfields etc. And pretty much leaving the coastal radars alone! Admittedly my reading about WW2 has been mostly very general or fragmented, never mind History Int'l or the Discovery/ D. Wings Channels.
As to when the attack on Coventry took place had escaped me, but had read or seen tv shows about the connection between Dresden and some attacks "over there". My ignorance can be embarassing, and look forward to various sights in several weeks, i.e. Imperial War Museum.
Posted during a mild illness for a few days, but even when feeling healthy I forget sometimes which battles had direct connections to other battles, other than Pearl Harbor-Midway, Luftwaffe bombing London (accidentally, at first)-counterattacks on Berlin-London, thereby mostly sparing the critical RAF airfields etc. And pretty much leaving the coastal radars alone! Admittedly my reading about WW2 has been mostly very general or fragmented, never mind History Int'l or the Discovery/ D. Wings Channels.
As to when the attack on Coventry took place had escaped me, but had read or seen tv shows about the connection between Dresden and some attacks "over there". My ignorance can be embarassing, and look forward to various sights in several weeks, i.e. Imperial War Museum.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 28th Apr 2004 at 06:33.
Westie,
Good question. I think the British press then would have reported the facts you put forward, because what a President or PM or Royal got up to could be justified as being 'in the public interest' - though they might not have reported similar indiscretions by 'private individuals'. The way in which the US press colluded with covering up Roosevelt's illness amazes me!
It's a shame that the Press today seems to have lost its ability to differentiate between what's of interest to the public, and what is in the public interest.
But the point with Harris is that his behaviour all indicated that he was unusually egotistical and selfish.
Henry,
German records suggest a death toll of 'more than 50,000'. Most of them civilians. That may be a significantly lower figure than Irving's, but it's still shocking, and pretty disgraceful.
And lest there be any confusion, let's not forget that the civilian population were specifically and explicitely targeted, and not hit while what Westie refers to as 'military targets' were bombed. Dresden was a legitimate military target, and was a vital communications hub for Eastern front reinforcement, but Bomber Command was pursuing Harris' aim of targeting the enemy population and morale.
Good question. I think the British press then would have reported the facts you put forward, because what a President or PM or Royal got up to could be justified as being 'in the public interest' - though they might not have reported similar indiscretions by 'private individuals'. The way in which the US press colluded with covering up Roosevelt's illness amazes me!
It's a shame that the Press today seems to have lost its ability to differentiate between what's of interest to the public, and what is in the public interest.
But the point with Harris is that his behaviour all indicated that he was unusually egotistical and selfish.
Henry,
German records suggest a death toll of 'more than 50,000'. Most of them civilians. That may be a significantly lower figure than Irving's, but it's still shocking, and pretty disgraceful.
And lest there be any confusion, let's not forget that the civilian population were specifically and explicitely targeted, and not hit while what Westie refers to as 'military targets' were bombed. Dresden was a legitimate military target, and was a vital communications hub for Eastern front reinforcement, but Bomber Command was pursuing Harris' aim of targeting the enemy population and morale.
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Jackonico
I dispute practically everything you have written.
You have done an excellent character assassination on ATH in my opinion.
Your facts are mostly inaccurate or are slanted, and at this time would appear to me at least to indicate a serious lack of wider research.
Whilst I could do a very detailed destruction of your arguments, this would be extremely long winded and no doubt unwelcome to the other parties involved on here.
I have researched over some years and have read both pro and anti Harris books. On the balance of judgement, and by virtue of historical records I have reached the conclusion that I have, This is diametrically opposed to yours in just about every respect.
As to ATH's personality, you need to remember that in a total war (which WW2 was), there are no prizes for second place. This country was fortunate that in ATH it had a leader in the RAF who applied himself single mindedly to the task in hand rather than with a weather eye on the press and public opinion.
I cannot recall anyone I have personally met of his era who have been critical of ATH or Bomber Command, and I think that is the nub of the matter. I don't say they don't or didn't exist however they anti-Harris group were very much in the minority.
I have however met many who are openly critical of ATH from later generations and whose opinions have been based on the historical inaccurcies and misconceptions preached by other people, usually at school from what I can establish.
The people who lived during those years and experienced it are a better barometer than those who from the comfort of their armchairs choose to criticise the people who made such freedom to criticise a reality.
West Coast
You ask why civilians were targetted in Dresden. Are you seriously asking this question or are you tonque in cheek here?
I would have thought the difficulties of bombing a large city in total darkness, whilst under attack both from Flak and Night Fighters, would have meant that any 'clinical' attack could never be a serious option. I consider that to be self evident truth.
You only have to look at todays modern weapons, and in particular the American use of so called 'intelligent' missiles which have caused much embarassment when they have hit the wrong target (for whatever reason).
I am not of WW2 and I can only comment on how I feel having spent many years looking at the subject.
I hope that maybe someone with authority or experience can contribute in this respect.
For the sake of clarity it is fine for people to make statements but these should always be based upon established facts, which is why I tend to question and am prepared to state my sources.
It would be a bad show if this subject contiunes on the basis of half truths and inaccuracies which have in recent years been promoted by people with dubious agendas.
Please note that I do not include any of those who have posted so far you in this.
You have done an excellent character assassination on ATH in my opinion.
Your facts are mostly inaccurate or are slanted, and at this time would appear to me at least to indicate a serious lack of wider research.
Whilst I could do a very detailed destruction of your arguments, this would be extremely long winded and no doubt unwelcome to the other parties involved on here.
I have researched over some years and have read both pro and anti Harris books. On the balance of judgement, and by virtue of historical records I have reached the conclusion that I have, This is diametrically opposed to yours in just about every respect.
As to ATH's personality, you need to remember that in a total war (which WW2 was), there are no prizes for second place. This country was fortunate that in ATH it had a leader in the RAF who applied himself single mindedly to the task in hand rather than with a weather eye on the press and public opinion.
I cannot recall anyone I have personally met of his era who have been critical of ATH or Bomber Command, and I think that is the nub of the matter. I don't say they don't or didn't exist however they anti-Harris group were very much in the minority.
I have however met many who are openly critical of ATH from later generations and whose opinions have been based on the historical inaccurcies and misconceptions preached by other people, usually at school from what I can establish.
The people who lived during those years and experienced it are a better barometer than those who from the comfort of their armchairs choose to criticise the people who made such freedom to criticise a reality.
West Coast
You ask why civilians were targetted in Dresden. Are you seriously asking this question or are you tonque in cheek here?
I would have thought the difficulties of bombing a large city in total darkness, whilst under attack both from Flak and Night Fighters, would have meant that any 'clinical' attack could never be a serious option. I consider that to be self evident truth.
You only have to look at todays modern weapons, and in particular the American use of so called 'intelligent' missiles which have caused much embarassment when they have hit the wrong target (for whatever reason).
I am not of WW2 and I can only comment on how I feel having spent many years looking at the subject.
I hope that maybe someone with authority or experience can contribute in this respect.
For the sake of clarity it is fine for people to make statements but these should always be based upon established facts, which is why I tend to question and am prepared to state my sources.
It would be a bad show if this subject contiunes on the basis of half truths and inaccuracies which have in recent years been promoted by people with dubious agendas.
Please note that I do not include any of those who have posted so far you in this.
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Bletchely,
I would be interested in your providing proof that Harris was the best man for the job as you seem to be saying. I am not doubting he did a reasonable enough job but by looking through all the other posts here it is plain to see that he made many major mistakes.
It is a fine line between tenacity and pig headed stubborness and you have not proved your case that he was the former and not the latter.
Your attempts to deify Harris are as counter to the truth as those that try to villify him.
He was just a man. He had many flaws like us all. He is not a hero and not a villian.
Cheers
BHR
I would be interested in your providing proof that Harris was the best man for the job as you seem to be saying. I am not doubting he did a reasonable enough job but by looking through all the other posts here it is plain to see that he made many major mistakes.
It is a fine line between tenacity and pig headed stubborness and you have not proved your case that he was the former and not the latter.
Your attempts to deify Harris are as counter to the truth as those that try to villify him.
He was just a man. He had many flaws like us all. He is not a hero and not a villian.
Cheers
BHR
Bletch,
Most of my facts are inaccurate? Which ones? How are they inaccurate?
You aver that: "This country was fortunate that in ATH it had a leader in the RAF who applied himself single mindedly to the task in hand rather than with a weather eye on the press and public opinion."
If anything, Harris worked too assiduously to please the press and public (who wanted bloody revenge) and to please Churchill, and was so single-minded that he refused to make any serious examination of alternative ways of beating the Germans. Many believe that he preferred to fight 'His war' than to win the wider war.
Having written fairly extensively about Bomber Command in WW2 (though I would not claim any great expertise on the subject) I have met an interviewed many people from all levels of Bomber Command. Many aircrew loved 'Butch', sure, but few of the Squadron-, and Station commanders I interviewed were anything other than 'constructively critical', while those I interviewed who worked at the Groups, and at High Wycombe were even less enthusiastic. It struck me that those who had the closest and deepest knowledge of Harris and of the conduct of the overall Bomber War were the most critical of their erstwhile boss.
Probert (far more of a historian than I'll ever be, and far more of a specialist than I am, and someone who has undertaken far more in-depth and wide-ranging research) has written what is widely accepted as being the best book so far on Harris, albeit one which errs on the side of being generous to Sir Arthur, and he is far more critical of Harris than you are. It's clear to me that you hero worship this flawed genius, so arguing with you seems particularly pointless.
Moreover, what people thought of Harris is only one side of the equation, - you cannot ignore the effectiveness of Bomber Command's assault against the German cities, nor can you ignore the relative success of the Command when targeted more specifically, and nor can you ignore the cost of the campaign. I would recommend that any admirer of Harris should go through the Bomber Command war diaries and see how many aircraft were lost, how many aircrew were killed, night by night, and to compare these figures 'side by side' with the German reports of casualties and damage. Until 1944 the balance was generally unfavourable.
You also have to judge Harris against his own stated aims.
On 7 December 1943, Harris promised Churchill that he could destroy Berlin, and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. He entirely failed to see that bombing a target so far from his East Anglian and Yorkshire bases would be a hugely different proposition to bombing targets in the Ruhr, and seems to have entirely discounted the unavailability of Oboe when attacking Berlin.
Moreover, while the inability of heavy bombing to cause a real collapse in civilian morale had been shown during the Blitz, Harris still believed that:
"The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire-raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the boche, to kill the boche and to terrify the boche."
He didn't care that much about the effect on German industry - otherwise he'd have made more effort to target it. He believed, 'heart and soul' in the Trenchardian belief in the 'moral effect' of bombing. (Did you know that Trenchard used the term moral because he couldn't confidently spell psychological?)
You asked Westie why he asked: "why civilians were targetted in Dresden. Are you seriously asking this question or are you tonque in cheek here? I would have thought the difficulties of bombing a large city in total darkness, whilst under attack both from Flak and Night Fighters, would have meant that any 'clinical' attack could never be a serious option. I consider that to be self evident truth."
You need to read more widely, old boy! It's far from a 'self evident truth'. By the time of Dresden, Bomber Command was capable of impressive precision, by day and by night, and was able to concentrate a significant weight of its attack on the selected aim point. In fact, all the evidence is that Bomber Command achieved greater accuracy by night than the USAAF achieved by day in normal European weather. The problem was that Bomber Command's aim points were too often residential areas rather than military or industrial targets. There is little doubt that Dresden could have been attacked in a way which would have concentrated the attack on the railway yards, stations and important road junctions and while the civilian death toll would still have been considerable, it would have been significantly lower than it actually was.
Bomber Command's accuracy against heavily defended targets, by night, was demonstrated on 23 March 1945, when Bomber Command attacked enemy positions in Wesel only a few hundred yards ahead of the lead elements of the 1st Commando Brigade and the 51st Highland Division. It was routinely demonstrated during the all-too-rare dedicated attacks against oil targets, during the Overlord period (when the command hit, for example, German night fighter airfields, gun batteries and V-weapon launch sites) and during the attack on Peenemunde. To suggest that in 1945 the Command could do no better than hit area targets is foolish.
Civilians were targeted at Dresden because that was Harris' chosen strategy, and in adopting that strategy, he was doing no more than adopting Trenchardian orthodoxy - an orthodoxy which itself developed in an era when bombing had been so inaccurate that no other end result was credible.
Moreover, as an aside, I think you over-estimate the efficacy of the German defences, which had declined from their peak effectiveness as the Reich's perimeter shrank, as fuel shortages hit home, and as No.100 Group went about its deadly business.
There are two fascinating essays in 'Air Power in Theory and Practise' by John Gooch. You should read both - 'Precision and Area Bombing - who did which, when?' by W Hays Park, and 'British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing' by Tami Davis Biddle.
Most of my facts are inaccurate? Which ones? How are they inaccurate?
You aver that: "This country was fortunate that in ATH it had a leader in the RAF who applied himself single mindedly to the task in hand rather than with a weather eye on the press and public opinion."
If anything, Harris worked too assiduously to please the press and public (who wanted bloody revenge) and to please Churchill, and was so single-minded that he refused to make any serious examination of alternative ways of beating the Germans. Many believe that he preferred to fight 'His war' than to win the wider war.
Having written fairly extensively about Bomber Command in WW2 (though I would not claim any great expertise on the subject) I have met an interviewed many people from all levels of Bomber Command. Many aircrew loved 'Butch', sure, but few of the Squadron-, and Station commanders I interviewed were anything other than 'constructively critical', while those I interviewed who worked at the Groups, and at High Wycombe were even less enthusiastic. It struck me that those who had the closest and deepest knowledge of Harris and of the conduct of the overall Bomber War were the most critical of their erstwhile boss.
Probert (far more of a historian than I'll ever be, and far more of a specialist than I am, and someone who has undertaken far more in-depth and wide-ranging research) has written what is widely accepted as being the best book so far on Harris, albeit one which errs on the side of being generous to Sir Arthur, and he is far more critical of Harris than you are. It's clear to me that you hero worship this flawed genius, so arguing with you seems particularly pointless.
Moreover, what people thought of Harris is only one side of the equation, - you cannot ignore the effectiveness of Bomber Command's assault against the German cities, nor can you ignore the relative success of the Command when targeted more specifically, and nor can you ignore the cost of the campaign. I would recommend that any admirer of Harris should go through the Bomber Command war diaries and see how many aircraft were lost, how many aircrew were killed, night by night, and to compare these figures 'side by side' with the German reports of casualties and damage. Until 1944 the balance was generally unfavourable.
You also have to judge Harris against his own stated aims.
On 7 December 1943, Harris promised Churchill that he could destroy Berlin, and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. He entirely failed to see that bombing a target so far from his East Anglian and Yorkshire bases would be a hugely different proposition to bombing targets in the Ruhr, and seems to have entirely discounted the unavailability of Oboe when attacking Berlin.
Moreover, while the inability of heavy bombing to cause a real collapse in civilian morale had been shown during the Blitz, Harris still believed that:
"The moral effect of HE is vast. People can escape from fires, and the casualties on a solely fire-raising raid would be as nothing. What we want to do in addition to the horrors of fire is to bring the masonry crashing down on top of the boche, to kill the boche and to terrify the boche."
He didn't care that much about the effect on German industry - otherwise he'd have made more effort to target it. He believed, 'heart and soul' in the Trenchardian belief in the 'moral effect' of bombing. (Did you know that Trenchard used the term moral because he couldn't confidently spell psychological?)
You asked Westie why he asked: "why civilians were targetted in Dresden. Are you seriously asking this question or are you tonque in cheek here? I would have thought the difficulties of bombing a large city in total darkness, whilst under attack both from Flak and Night Fighters, would have meant that any 'clinical' attack could never be a serious option. I consider that to be self evident truth."
You need to read more widely, old boy! It's far from a 'self evident truth'. By the time of Dresden, Bomber Command was capable of impressive precision, by day and by night, and was able to concentrate a significant weight of its attack on the selected aim point. In fact, all the evidence is that Bomber Command achieved greater accuracy by night than the USAAF achieved by day in normal European weather. The problem was that Bomber Command's aim points were too often residential areas rather than military or industrial targets. There is little doubt that Dresden could have been attacked in a way which would have concentrated the attack on the railway yards, stations and important road junctions and while the civilian death toll would still have been considerable, it would have been significantly lower than it actually was.
Bomber Command's accuracy against heavily defended targets, by night, was demonstrated on 23 March 1945, when Bomber Command attacked enemy positions in Wesel only a few hundred yards ahead of the lead elements of the 1st Commando Brigade and the 51st Highland Division. It was routinely demonstrated during the all-too-rare dedicated attacks against oil targets, during the Overlord period (when the command hit, for example, German night fighter airfields, gun batteries and V-weapon launch sites) and during the attack on Peenemunde. To suggest that in 1945 the Command could do no better than hit area targets is foolish.
Civilians were targeted at Dresden because that was Harris' chosen strategy, and in adopting that strategy, he was doing no more than adopting Trenchardian orthodoxy - an orthodoxy which itself developed in an era when bombing had been so inaccurate that no other end result was credible.
Moreover, as an aside, I think you over-estimate the efficacy of the German defences, which had declined from their peak effectiveness as the Reich's perimeter shrank, as fuel shortages hit home, and as No.100 Group went about its deadly business.
There are two fascinating essays in 'Air Power in Theory and Practise' by John Gooch. You should read both - 'Precision and Area Bombing - who did which, when?' by W Hays Park, and 'British and American Approaches to Strategic Bombing' by Tami Davis Biddle.
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Jacko
A fascinating thread. I've always been on the hero-worship side of the fence - and I say that having been part of a Staff College exercise in which we analysed the subject from all angles. That said I'm still open-minded and I'd be interested in reading some of your 'writings'- can you point me in the right direction?
BTW, the skies around here are now alive with the jet.
A fascinating thread. I've always been on the hero-worship side of the fence - and I say that having been part of a Staff College exercise in which we analysed the subject from all angles. That said I'm still open-minded and I'd be interested in reading some of your 'writings'- can you point me in the right direction?
BTW, the skies around here are now alive with the jet.
Bletchly
Even given the level (or lack thereof) of precision delivery in WWII the amount of civilian deaths in Dresden can only be explained as an intentional targeting of civilians.
Just so its clear to me, you believe that the massive number of civilian deaths was simply a result of targeting military targets?
You're slowly losing the civil tongue you had earlier in the thread, you can disagree without being disagreeable.
Even given the level (or lack thereof) of precision delivery in WWII the amount of civilian deaths in Dresden can only be explained as an intentional targeting of civilians.
Just so its clear to me, you believe that the massive number of civilian deaths was simply a result of targeting military targets?
You're slowly losing the civil tongue you had earlier in the thread, you can disagree without being disagreeable.