Attack on Coventry not a surprise?
"Whatever the case, I still retain my view as a child what I, my family, neighbours and those in the East End were getting dumped on them night after night were entitled to expect that Bomber Command delivered with interest a ten fold retaliation."
An entirely understandable view. And entirely unsupportable from a moral and legal point of view.
Even in wartime, the natural thirst for revenge has to be contained, otherwise we'd all be supporting the shooting of prisoners of war, the kicking to death downed enemy aircrew, and the murder of enemy civilians.
The problem with Hastings histories is that they are opinionated and shaped by the author's own views. This makes them fantastic entertainment, and useful when read in conjunction with other histories written from an alternative standpoint, but dangerously misleading when read in isolation. (Very much like the one-sided bio of Harris recommended pages ago!).
If you want a really good, straightforward history of exactly what Bomber Command did, day by day, then read:
The Bomber Command War Diaries
Pub: Midland Publishing .....Martin Middlebrook & Chris Everitt ....ISBN 1-85780-033-8
Paperback 808 Pages
Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt cover every operation carried out by Bomber Command during WWII
"Each raid or campaign is covered in detail, along with full details of aircraft sent & lost. Statistics and a brief history of every squadron to serve in Bomber Command, also included are the Operational Training Units and Heavy Conversion Units.
This is the acknowledged standard reference manual of Bomber Command historians."
"Hardly bedtime reading, but absolutely invaluable to anyone interested in Bomber Command's Operational History. Middlebrook and Everitt detail every operation undertaken by Bomber Command, with a breakdown of the aircraft involved, information on the raid and a synopsis of the aircraft lost. End appendices give squadron histories and all the numerical information anyone could possibly require. Cross referenced with the Chorley volumes, it all adds up to a massive databank.
Again I'm staggered by the sheer volume of labour which has gone into these books, as well as being deeply grateful that there are men of such calibre who are prepared to put so much effort into it all."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Essential reference work on Bomber Command,and I thoroughly agree with the two previous reviewers, except to note that Frank's Fighter Command Losses has an entirely different approach and purpose, and should be compared rather to Chorley's monumental work on Bomber Command losses. Incidentally, one should note that all these works are published by Midland.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This extensive and painstakingly researched reference is essential reading for any student of the bomber offensive undertaken by the Royal Air Force over Europe 1939-45. Chris Everitt deserves much credit for his meticulous attention to detail in the primary research fundamental to this book. His co-author, Martin Middlebrook, brings a perceptive insight into the analysis of the hard facts gleaned from the Public Records Office at Kew and his writing style is both economical yet eminently readable. The real value of this work can be found in numerous other studies of Bomber Command 1939-45 which directly quote from, or acknowledge in bibliographies, this seminal study.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
An excellent reference for anybody interested in RAF Bomber Command during WW2. It provides short summaries and background details of all major raids carried out by Bomber Command from Britain, including statistical information on sorties flown, aircraft and aircrew casualties and short analysis of particularly significant operations. Invaluable to anybody interested in the topic as comprehensive reference. Similar to Norman Frank's later work on Fighter Command losses of WW2, except with more comment and analysis. "
With exact details of losses, accuracy and the damage and casualties caused to the enemy, side by side, day by day, it shattered my preconceptions and turned me from someone who shared most of Bletch's views into a Harris-sceptic. It's dry, it's remorseless, it's hard and heavy going. Read it if you dare!
An entirely understandable view. And entirely unsupportable from a moral and legal point of view.
Even in wartime, the natural thirst for revenge has to be contained, otherwise we'd all be supporting the shooting of prisoners of war, the kicking to death downed enemy aircrew, and the murder of enemy civilians.
The problem with Hastings histories is that they are opinionated and shaped by the author's own views. This makes them fantastic entertainment, and useful when read in conjunction with other histories written from an alternative standpoint, but dangerously misleading when read in isolation. (Very much like the one-sided bio of Harris recommended pages ago!).
If you want a really good, straightforward history of exactly what Bomber Command did, day by day, then read:
The Bomber Command War Diaries
Pub: Midland Publishing .....Martin Middlebrook & Chris Everitt ....ISBN 1-85780-033-8
Paperback 808 Pages
Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt cover every operation carried out by Bomber Command during WWII
"Each raid or campaign is covered in detail, along with full details of aircraft sent & lost. Statistics and a brief history of every squadron to serve in Bomber Command, also included are the Operational Training Units and Heavy Conversion Units.
This is the acknowledged standard reference manual of Bomber Command historians."
"Hardly bedtime reading, but absolutely invaluable to anyone interested in Bomber Command's Operational History. Middlebrook and Everitt detail every operation undertaken by Bomber Command, with a breakdown of the aircraft involved, information on the raid and a synopsis of the aircraft lost. End appendices give squadron histories and all the numerical information anyone could possibly require. Cross referenced with the Chorley volumes, it all adds up to a massive databank.
Again I'm staggered by the sheer volume of labour which has gone into these books, as well as being deeply grateful that there are men of such calibre who are prepared to put so much effort into it all."
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Essential reference work on Bomber Command,and I thoroughly agree with the two previous reviewers, except to note that Frank's Fighter Command Losses has an entirely different approach and purpose, and should be compared rather to Chorley's monumental work on Bomber Command losses. Incidentally, one should note that all these works are published by Midland.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This extensive and painstakingly researched reference is essential reading for any student of the bomber offensive undertaken by the Royal Air Force over Europe 1939-45. Chris Everitt deserves much credit for his meticulous attention to detail in the primary research fundamental to this book. His co-author, Martin Middlebrook, brings a perceptive insight into the analysis of the hard facts gleaned from the Public Records Office at Kew and his writing style is both economical yet eminently readable. The real value of this work can be found in numerous other studies of Bomber Command 1939-45 which directly quote from, or acknowledge in bibliographies, this seminal study.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
An excellent reference for anybody interested in RAF Bomber Command during WW2. It provides short summaries and background details of all major raids carried out by Bomber Command from Britain, including statistical information on sorties flown, aircraft and aircrew casualties and short analysis of particularly significant operations. Invaluable to anybody interested in the topic as comprehensive reference. Similar to Norman Frank's later work on Fighter Command losses of WW2, except with more comment and analysis. "
With exact details of losses, accuracy and the damage and casualties caused to the enemy, side by side, day by day, it shattered my preconceptions and turned me from someone who shared most of Bletch's views into a Harris-sceptic. It's dry, it's remorseless, it's hard and heavy going. Read it if you dare!
Thread Starter
PPrune Pop-thanks.
Believe it was Bletchley who pointed out contradictions of the Norden bombsight, especially in the context of many carpet-bombing missions. It would be interesting to tactfully ask them about, or read any memoirs of American crewmembers on the attacks on Dresden- especially those in the second and third waves.
It is hard to imagine what it was like as a young kid in London (or other targeted cities) at the time. We plan to visit Churchill's 'Command Center' and the Imperial War Museum this summer, among other sights.
Believe it was Bletchley who pointed out contradictions of the Norden bombsight, especially in the context of many carpet-bombing missions. It would be interesting to tactfully ask them about, or read any memoirs of American crewmembers on the attacks on Dresden- especially those in the second and third waves.
It is hard to imagine what it was like as a young kid in London (or other targeted cities) at the time. We plan to visit Churchill's 'Command Center' and the Imperial War Museum this summer, among other sights.
To be fair, the USAAF weren't half bad at precision bombing on those rare cloudless days in Europe, when the Norden sight worked better than Bletch gives it credit for. Where they fell down is when the weather was more 'iffy', especially when relying on H2X for blind bombing, when they were markedly less accurate than the RAF, for many reasons.
The principal reason, though, was the different ways in which RAF H2S operators and USAAF H2X operators were trained, the USAAF blokes being expected to 'pick it up' in theatre, on the job, and without combat-experienced instructors.
As a kid, some 20-25 years after the event, East London was still surprisingly scarred by bombsights, and once you looked more closely, noticing the gaps in old building, the extent of the damage caused in the Blitz soon became easy to imagine. There is no doubt that London (and Coventry, and Portsmouth, etc.) took a real pounding.
But with the greatest respect to those who died or suffered as a result of German bombing, there is no real comparison with the degree of damage inflicted on cities like Köln, Hamburg, and Dresden.
The principal reason, though, was the different ways in which RAF H2S operators and USAAF H2X operators were trained, the USAAF blokes being expected to 'pick it up' in theatre, on the job, and without combat-experienced instructors.
As a kid, some 20-25 years after the event, East London was still surprisingly scarred by bombsights, and once you looked more closely, noticing the gaps in old building, the extent of the damage caused in the Blitz soon became easy to imagine. There is no doubt that London (and Coventry, and Portsmouth, etc.) took a real pounding.
But with the greatest respect to those who died or suffered as a result of German bombing, there is no real comparison with the degree of damage inflicted on cities like Köln, Hamburg, and Dresden.
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BOMBING POLICY
It is tempting to blame senior RAF officers such as Harris for the strategic bomber offensive, but Allied military leaders did not act independently.
British wartime grand strategy was thrashed out at Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings. There could be fiery debate between Churchill and his military chiefs, but if the Chiefs were united on a course of action, the Prime Minister never overruled them throughout the entire war.
The Chiefs of Staff issued directives on prosecuting the war, and after Pearl Harbor, this mechanism expanded into the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The famous Casablanca directive of January 1943, which authorised a strategic bomber offensive ‘to bring about the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where the capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened,’ came from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We can argue all day about the enthusiasm with which Harris and the USAAF Eighth AF implemented this directive, but the policy was not of their making.
British wartime grand strategy was thrashed out at Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings. There could be fiery debate between Churchill and his military chiefs, but if the Chiefs were united on a course of action, the Prime Minister never overruled them throughout the entire war.
The Chiefs of Staff issued directives on prosecuting the war, and after Pearl Harbor, this mechanism expanded into the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The famous Casablanca directive of January 1943, which authorised a strategic bomber offensive ‘to bring about the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where the capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened,’ came from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We can argue all day about the enthusiasm with which Harris and the USAAF Eighth AF implemented this directive, but the policy was not of their making.
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Dear all,
Lets see if it is possible to summarise where we are with respect to ATH. (the following is in no particular order)
1) He was a stubborn man
2) He followed orders from above
3) He was well respected by the bomber crews
4) He was not particularly liked by those who had to work with him day to day
5) He was resistant to change
6) He regularly ignored data that did not fit his conclusions or beliefs
Please forgive me if I have missed any salient points it is not a deliberate omission.
So moving forward from this it seems to me that he was neither a hero nor a villain. Both of which he has been portrayed as in the past and present.
To me it seems he was a solely unremarkable man whose main claim to fame seems to be that the men on the tip of the spear liked him. This is not a bad thing. However it does not make him that special either. It is perhaps time to lay to rest the extremes of portrayal of ATH and say he was simply the man in the chair at the time.
I have the feeling that any number of other men around at the time could have done the job to the same degree. I hesitate to say they could have done the job better for two reasons, one, the constraints from above on the role, and secondly, I do not want Bletcheley to come after me as well.
Cheers
BHR
Lets see if it is possible to summarise where we are with respect to ATH. (the following is in no particular order)
1) He was a stubborn man
2) He followed orders from above
3) He was well respected by the bomber crews
4) He was not particularly liked by those who had to work with him day to day
5) He was resistant to change
6) He regularly ignored data that did not fit his conclusions or beliefs
Please forgive me if I have missed any salient points it is not a deliberate omission.
So moving forward from this it seems to me that he was neither a hero nor a villain. Both of which he has been portrayed as in the past and present.
To me it seems he was a solely unremarkable man whose main claim to fame seems to be that the men on the tip of the spear liked him. This is not a bad thing. However it does not make him that special either. It is perhaps time to lay to rest the extremes of portrayal of ATH and say he was simply the man in the chair at the time.
I have the feeling that any number of other men around at the time could have done the job to the same degree. I hesitate to say they could have done the job better for two reasons, one, the constraints from above on the role, and secondly, I do not want Bletcheley to come after me as well.
Cheers
BHR
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BHR
Nice post, but really...as if I would come after your good self ! ?
Nicely summarised I would say.
Irrespective of my own personal beliefs as to ATH's character, what I find irritating is the number of people who believe that ATH was SOLELY responsible for the policy of Area Bombing. He was not.
That he was deeply wedded to the application of this is beyond dispute, that is another issue.
There has been an increasing perception, generated in part by those who are operating to their own agenda that ATH was responsible for policies which he was clearly not.
Comments such as 'Harris ordered the bombing of Dresden' which I saw on a Government schools site very recently, and which is totally inaccurate do nothing to dispel such concerns.
The whole of the bombing campaign in Germany is a complex matter that cannot be reduced to a simple he was/was not responsible sound-bite.
As I said in an earlier post, and as you point out in yours, ATH was not an easy man to work with or to have as a subordinate. That should not be the precursor for inaccurate attacks on the man.
In making these comments I make no connection with those who have posted on here earlier.
I think that the debate has been useful and interesting.
If we wish to talk about true area bombing why don't those on the Left ever talk about Nagasaki or Hiroshima?
Nicely summarised I would say.
Irrespective of my own personal beliefs as to ATH's character, what I find irritating is the number of people who believe that ATH was SOLELY responsible for the policy of Area Bombing. He was not.
That he was deeply wedded to the application of this is beyond dispute, that is another issue.
There has been an increasing perception, generated in part by those who are operating to their own agenda that ATH was responsible for policies which he was clearly not.
Comments such as 'Harris ordered the bombing of Dresden' which I saw on a Government schools site very recently, and which is totally inaccurate do nothing to dispel such concerns.
The whole of the bombing campaign in Germany is a complex matter that cannot be reduced to a simple he was/was not responsible sound-bite.
As I said in an earlier post, and as you point out in yours, ATH was not an easy man to work with or to have as a subordinate. That should not be the precursor for inaccurate attacks on the man.
In making these comments I make no connection with those who have posted on here earlier.
I think that the debate has been useful and interesting.
If we wish to talk about true area bombing why don't those on the Left ever talk about Nagasaki or Hiroshima?
Slightly off-topic I know, but I watched a most interesting TV programme recently concerning the development of smart weaponry, in particular by the US.
An example was the AZON bomb which, even in 1944 "....had, with a 12-15% direct hit rate on railway bridges, a 2900% better precision than the usual free-falling bombs in combination with the Norden bombsight." However, those involved in the programme were viewed as being rather boffin-like and the AZON, an azimuth-only GBU, wasn't used much although it was highly successful against the infamous Thai railway bridges. Had the programme been given greater emphasis, accurate pin-point attacks might have been more common than area attacks.
A later development, the RAZON which included range and azimuth steering, would have been used in considerable numbers from the B-29; however, the atomic bomb ended the war before it could be used in WW2. They were, however, used in Korea in the early stages of the war and were highly effective against targets such as railway bridges. A later version, the TRAZON, used the RAZON steering system attached to a 12000lb Tallboy bomb. But the 'atomic era' gathered pace and the TRAZON was never to be used in anger.
Why am I rabbitting on? Well, because even the US didn't have the weaponry to enable pin-point bombing towards the end of WW2 on a large scale, hence the only alternative if you wanted to guarantee killing a target was conventional dumb bombs dropped in large numbers.
An example was the AZON bomb which, even in 1944 "....had, with a 12-15% direct hit rate on railway bridges, a 2900% better precision than the usual free-falling bombs in combination with the Norden bombsight." However, those involved in the programme were viewed as being rather boffin-like and the AZON, an azimuth-only GBU, wasn't used much although it was highly successful against the infamous Thai railway bridges. Had the programme been given greater emphasis, accurate pin-point attacks might have been more common than area attacks.
A later development, the RAZON which included range and azimuth steering, would have been used in considerable numbers from the B-29; however, the atomic bomb ended the war before it could be used in WW2. They were, however, used in Korea in the early stages of the war and were highly effective against targets such as railway bridges. A later version, the TRAZON, used the RAZON steering system attached to a 12000lb Tallboy bomb. But the 'atomic era' gathered pace and the TRAZON was never to be used in anger.
Why am I rabbitting on? Well, because even the US didn't have the weaponry to enable pin-point bombing towards the end of WW2 on a large scale, hence the only alternative if you wanted to guarantee killing a target was conventional dumb bombs dropped in large numbers.
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BHR
Succinctly put - I don't know enough about the War Policy of the day but the buck rests where it rests and Harris did his job. The destruction of Nazis was (and sadly again today is) not a job for the purists and altruists among us - Heroes all !
Succinctly put - I don't know enough about the War Policy of the day but the buck rests where it rests and Harris did his job. The destruction of Nazis was (and sadly again today is) not a job for the purists and altruists among us - Heroes all !
BHR
You'd have to add:
1) Not a team player.
2) Dripped his anti-Coastal Command, anti-tactical, and other prejudice and poison into the ear of Churchill and did enormous damage to those efforts which he wrongly saw as panaceas and sideshows.
3) Displayed poor judgement on numerous occasions (Pathfinders, the merits of the radial Halifax, etc. etc.)
4) His interpretation of his orders maximised the killing of enemy civilians and the loss of his own crews, while failing to maximise damage to the enemy's economy and war machine.
But then Bletch would come after you. I think he's ATH's illegitimate love grand-child......
You'd have to add:
1) Not a team player.
2) Dripped his anti-Coastal Command, anti-tactical, and other prejudice and poison into the ear of Churchill and did enormous damage to those efforts which he wrongly saw as panaceas and sideshows.
3) Displayed poor judgement on numerous occasions (Pathfinders, the merits of the radial Halifax, etc. etc.)
4) His interpretation of his orders maximised the killing of enemy civilians and the loss of his own crews, while failing to maximise damage to the enemy's economy and war machine.
But then Bletch would come after you. I think he's ATH's illegitimate love grand-child......
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PPRuNe Pop
Excellent post, and a worthy contribution of common sense to a thread that seems to be diverging from its orignal route.
On that basis may I take the liberty of inserting a little poetry into the thread, on this the day in 1945 when the German High Command surrendered unconditionally.
For those of you that may have read this elsewhere I apologise for the repetition.
The following was composed in 1943 by Sgt. Maurice Dudley Chasmer, wireless operator - Air Gunner with 434 Squadron RAF.
"I would not have you grieve when I am gone,
I have no sorrow that my life is spent,
As happy a man as ever sun shone on,
My life has been a joy, and I'm content.
I have known the glory of an English day,
The soft whisper of rain on grateful trees,
The happy song of birds at break of day,
The drifting wood-smoke on the evening breeze.
No regrets that all these things are fled,
I shall find joy whatever lies ahead."
On the night of 27/28 September 1943, 73 Halifaxes from 419, 427, 428, 429, and 434 Squadrons were joined by 9 Wellingtons from 432 Squadron for an attack at Hanover.
Halifax V LK-917 coded WL-X, of 434 squadron of which Sgt Chasmar was a member failed to return from this operation.
The crew of WL-X were:-
P/O O. Lytle RCAF
Sgt E. Elder RAF
Sgt H. Lindsay RAF
W/O2 R. Pedlar RCAF
F/Sgt J. Monteith RCAF
Sgt M. Chasmar RAF
F/Sgt H. Hansell RCAF
F/Sgt J. Leach RCAF
RIP
On that basis may I take the liberty of inserting a little poetry into the thread, on this the day in 1945 when the German High Command surrendered unconditionally.
For those of you that may have read this elsewhere I apologise for the repetition.
The following was composed in 1943 by Sgt. Maurice Dudley Chasmer, wireless operator - Air Gunner with 434 Squadron RAF.
"I would not have you grieve when I am gone,
I have no sorrow that my life is spent,
As happy a man as ever sun shone on,
My life has been a joy, and I'm content.
I have known the glory of an English day,
The soft whisper of rain on grateful trees,
The happy song of birds at break of day,
The drifting wood-smoke on the evening breeze.
No regrets that all these things are fled,
I shall find joy whatever lies ahead."
On the night of 27/28 September 1943, 73 Halifaxes from 419, 427, 428, 429, and 434 Squadrons were joined by 9 Wellingtons from 432 Squadron for an attack at Hanover.
Halifax V LK-917 coded WL-X, of 434 squadron of which Sgt Chasmar was a member failed to return from this operation.
The crew of WL-X were:-
P/O O. Lytle RCAF
Sgt E. Elder RAF
Sgt H. Lindsay RAF
W/O2 R. Pedlar RCAF
F/Sgt J. Monteith RCAF
Sgt M. Chasmar RAF
F/Sgt H. Hansell RCAF
F/Sgt J. Leach RCAF
RIP
