In response to your comments.
3 In respect of the performance of the Hailfax I commend you this web site -
http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/...t/halifax.html
I would also comend the web site uboat.net to you both in respect of the Halifax and also the U-Boat war. -
http://uboat.net/allies/aircraft/halifax.htm
5 Various target finding aids were introduced from early 1943.
The night of 5th/6th March 1943 can be regarded as the start of the Air Battle of the Ruhr. I commend the book of that name by Alan Cooper. This together with 'The Right of The Line' by John Terraine will go a long way towards demonstrating that target accuracy started to improve immensely from then on.
The longer range targets in the East of Germany and in Poland would continue to be a massive challenge right until well towards the end of the war when transmitting stations could be set up in continental Europe.
6 Please do not be offensive and try to distort my words. That you resort to these tactics I find depressing. Facts and figures are quoted fom Air Ministry figures for the Atlantic and North Western European waters as stated.
You have yet to demonstrate how an aircraft would be able to fly to the exact spot where a U-Boat was and bomb it. This would then have to be repeated day after day. Just think about it for a while and when you have done so tell me how this can be achieved.
7 You just won't give credit will you? Even when Bomber Command wiped out oil plants you still allege that this was area bombing.
8 Little point in progressing this one as we clearly disagree. I have quote facts and figures and yet again you don't. I have quoted from stated sources and you dispute the validity of this. I can do no more.
9 I agree that Oboe enabled one to mark a target but you don't recognise that the Berlin campaign was carried out during the Winter period when Berlin was almost perpetually covered in cloud/fog and the aerial markers just disappeared into the murk within too short a while, or were blown off course by winds.
10 Thank you for accepting my facts. No-one disputes that production actually rose through 1943 and early 1944. That was inevitable as German Industrial output never really reached its peak capability. What Berlin did was to slow down the rate of increase.
I did quote facts incidentally, those from people involved, and from the Swiss Governnment.
Steam Chicken
I refer you to (6) above. The figure of one comes from published sources. Note I do not include the Mediteranean figures as we are looking at the situation with Bomber Command and the German offensive.
If your assertion is true, then taking into account the diversion of Bomber Command aircraft and aircrew to Costal Command then knocking out the U-Boats should have been quite an easy job. Both you and Jackinoco seem to think that all you had to do was fly to a pre-determined spot and there would be your U-Boat. Both of you fail to actually think about the logic of this.
There was also a limited area of operation. An aircraft had a maximum range. You either fly to it and back or you fly to a shorter range and fly around looking for your U-Boat. Do you really think that a U-Boat Captain would wander around an area within the reach of an aircraft when he could do a totally un-contested job in Mid Atlantic. That they did go to the Atlantic Gap is accepted history, which I hope you will accept as well.
I think you will find that the Navy types will be seriously miffed about what you say. My understanding of the U-Boat war is that the U-Boat threat was damaged partially by the destruction of U-Boats in their pens, by sinking after striking mines on the sea routes outward bound, and by Navy ships. This is based upon various sources of research by different historians.
Now for some statistics:-
Taking for example the period January 1st and June 30th 1942 only 21 U-Boats were lost. One was destroyed by a mine, and one for unknown reasons.
Of the 21 lost, only six were attributed to air action, one was jointly attributed to joint air/sea action. Of the six sunk by air action three were attributable to the Americans.
Air action therefore only accounted for 30.9 % of U-Boat losses. Costal Command was involved in none of those losses.
In fairness the following period between July and December 1942 was much better but Costal Command still only accounted for 23%.
Another statistic is that Costal Command lost six aircraft for every ship lost during WW2.
Before either you or Jackinoco start slandering me, these figures are not meant to decry Coastal Command, its aircrew, or its contribution. I am merely attempting to make you see the difficulty of attacking U-Boats by air.
This situation improved somewhat by the introduction of the Liberators, although a number of Historians argue strong cases that the real reason for U-Boat losses was the breaking of the Enigma code machine which enabled the Navy to put ships practically on top of U-Boats, and certainly to ensure that the positioning was known in advance.
I have insufficient knowledge on this particular area to wish to make a personal comment on that.
Finally the view seems to be that ATH should have diverted precious aircraft towards Costal Command. The Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing.