Attack on Coventry not a surprise?
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Informative thread folks, thanks - I wish I was as well read on the subject but I think the question distils down to the mores and situation prevailing in Wartime Europe. For me, anyone who served is a bloody hero, especially those 19 year olds in the RAF from '39 all the way through. Many of the 19 year olds in Fighter Command didn't see 1941 and many of the others in BC didn't get much past that too.
Harris did his job too.
Harris did his job too.
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Jackinoco
What an illuminating reply.
Your willingness to resort to unpleasantries, and offense requires no further comment, and I am sure that all on here will have made their own judgements.
Your comments on the MOD website say much
The arguments that you propound with regards to losses in Bomber Command totally fail to recognise the increased use of night fighters - comparing pre-1942 losses with losses during ATH period is like comparing a piece of chalk to a lump of cheese.
The abuse of others was uncalled for, especially those who have done such hard work in setting up the U-Boat website.
One of the key qualities of a person entering a debate is the ability to put foward counter arguments in a polite and non-confrontational manner. It also requires the ability to propound reasonable and accurate arguments that are factual. An ability to see when one is faced with a more reasonable counter view is a pre-requisite.
You have consistently tried to force your own view-point on this thread, villifying a man who cannot defend himself, and trying to damage his reputation. You failed in many cases to back up your arguments with facts. When you do quote facts these are necessarily slanted towards your viewpoint.
You have tried (again) to twist my words with regards to Costal Command, which I find offensive.
Finally when you feel that you may be losing your argument you resort to personal abuse.
That I find saddest of all.
In view of the general tone of your response, I believe that no constructive benefit would be gained by continuing the debate with you, although I do look forward to reading one of your 'published works'.
Perhaps you would care to enlighten us all with some details so those of us interested enough can make the effort.
Your willingness to resort to unpleasantries, and offense requires no further comment, and I am sure that all on here will have made their own judgements.
Your comments on the MOD website say much
The arguments that you propound with regards to losses in Bomber Command totally fail to recognise the increased use of night fighters - comparing pre-1942 losses with losses during ATH period is like comparing a piece of chalk to a lump of cheese.
The abuse of others was uncalled for, especially those who have done such hard work in setting up the U-Boat website.
One of the key qualities of a person entering a debate is the ability to put foward counter arguments in a polite and non-confrontational manner. It also requires the ability to propound reasonable and accurate arguments that are factual. An ability to see when one is faced with a more reasonable counter view is a pre-requisite.
You have consistently tried to force your own view-point on this thread, villifying a man who cannot defend himself, and trying to damage his reputation. You failed in many cases to back up your arguments with facts. When you do quote facts these are necessarily slanted towards your viewpoint.
You have tried (again) to twist my words with regards to Costal Command, which I find offensive.
Finally when you feel that you may be losing your argument you resort to personal abuse.
That I find saddest of all.
In view of the general tone of your response, I believe that no constructive benefit would be gained by continuing the debate with you, although I do look forward to reading one of your 'published works'.
Perhaps you would care to enlighten us all with some details so those of us interested enough can make the effort.
Bletch,
You need to grow up.
I make no apology for criticising the RAF (not MoD) website, which is produced by an outside company, to meet a particular requirement, and whose coverage of historic aspects is quite deliberately 'sketchy' and which relies on (often out-dated) secondary sources. It's second-rate (at best) when it comes to historic coverage, as you'd expect.
And if you think that calling the U-boat website an 'amatuer' one is abuse, you need to check out the word amatuer in a dictionary.
You've been given facts on losses and accuracy under Harris' leadership (when you have tended to offer only subjective opinion in support of your hero worship of a very flawed character) and still choose to whine on about other people not backing up their argument with facts.
You deliberately diminished Coastal Command's contribution to victory. I picked you up on it. So did other people. Do stop whining.
Criticising Harris is not the same as villifying him, nor does it amount to trying to damage his reputation. And because I dare to suggest that the evidence does not support your 'rose tinted' view of Harris and his campaign does not mean that I'm trying to force my views on others, I'm just setting out the counter argument and giving an indication of the weight of evidence which suggests that the opposing point of view may be weaker.
You need to grow up.
I make no apology for criticising the RAF (not MoD) website, which is produced by an outside company, to meet a particular requirement, and whose coverage of historic aspects is quite deliberately 'sketchy' and which relies on (often out-dated) secondary sources. It's second-rate (at best) when it comes to historic coverage, as you'd expect.
And if you think that calling the U-boat website an 'amatuer' one is abuse, you need to check out the word amatuer in a dictionary.
You've been given facts on losses and accuracy under Harris' leadership (when you have tended to offer only subjective opinion in support of your hero worship of a very flawed character) and still choose to whine on about other people not backing up their argument with facts.
You deliberately diminished Coastal Command's contribution to victory. I picked you up on it. So did other people. Do stop whining.
Criticising Harris is not the same as villifying him, nor does it amount to trying to damage his reputation. And because I dare to suggest that the evidence does not support your 'rose tinted' view of Harris and his campaign does not mean that I'm trying to force my views on others, I'm just setting out the counter argument and giving an indication of the weight of evidence which suggests that the opposing point of view may be weaker.
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Sincere arguments over the morality etc of the strategic bomber offensive will always be with us. I would just like to shift the emphasis towards capability rather than intent. Back on 3 September 1939, the only target that Bomber Command felt up to hitting was the German port of Wilhelmshaven, just across the North Sea from East Anglia. As it happened, the Blenheims couldn't find it in the cloudy conditions, they couldn't bomb accurately and they were hacked out of the sky by superior Greman air defences.
Fast forward to 1 March 1943, when over 250 four-engined RAF bombers dropped 600tons of bombs on Berlin. Five hundred big fires ranged out of control, 20,000 homes were damaged, 35,000 people were rendered homeless and 700 civilians were killed. The following day, a photo reconnaissance Mosquito circled high over Hitler’s capital taking damage assessment photographs in broad daylight. Neither German fighters nor flak could touch it.
It was Harris, through his time in the Ministry and Bomber Command, who honed the Bomber Command war machine to this peak. The Yanks couldn't do it in 1943, the Germans never hacked it and the Russians never even tried during WW2. For better or worse, it was Harris who, through inspired leadership and bulldog bloodymindedness, set the template that reached its apogee in B-1B ops over Baghdad.
When I read geography at Leeds University in the Sixties, my prof had made his pre-war name writing 'The Towns and Cities of Germany'. During the war, this distinguished academic was asked to identify the parts of the German cities that would burn. Exeunt the old Hanseatic cities made largely of wood.
We can debate the morality of such 'misuse' of academia, but in 1942-43 the sole means of taking the war to Germany was via Bomber Command. When I flew Vulcans out of Lincolnshire in the 70s, aged locals would tell me that the only thing that sustained their morale in the dark days was the sound of massed Lancasters climbing to height.
Which brings me to Dresden. I was born two days afterwards, and my son gave me a copy of the Times for that day. The commentary from the House of Commons reflects growing concern about mounting Transport Command aircrew losses. The sub text was that everyone knew the war was won, and the Brits were very concerned about their menfolk continuing to die for no good purpose. Sledgehammering the Germans into accepting the inevitable might be unpleasant from our perspective, but it was understandable.
I interviewed Sir Arthur before he died. He was a remarkable man who entertained no self doubt about what he was asked to do. And of all his bombers crews I have talked to over the years, I have never met any who did not admire and respect him. Which is more than can be said of some RAF Air Marshals since!
Fast forward to 1 March 1943, when over 250 four-engined RAF bombers dropped 600tons of bombs on Berlin. Five hundred big fires ranged out of control, 20,000 homes were damaged, 35,000 people were rendered homeless and 700 civilians were killed. The following day, a photo reconnaissance Mosquito circled high over Hitler’s capital taking damage assessment photographs in broad daylight. Neither German fighters nor flak could touch it.
It was Harris, through his time in the Ministry and Bomber Command, who honed the Bomber Command war machine to this peak. The Yanks couldn't do it in 1943, the Germans never hacked it and the Russians never even tried during WW2. For better or worse, it was Harris who, through inspired leadership and bulldog bloodymindedness, set the template that reached its apogee in B-1B ops over Baghdad.
When I read geography at Leeds University in the Sixties, my prof had made his pre-war name writing 'The Towns and Cities of Germany'. During the war, this distinguished academic was asked to identify the parts of the German cities that would burn. Exeunt the old Hanseatic cities made largely of wood.
We can debate the morality of such 'misuse' of academia, but in 1942-43 the sole means of taking the war to Germany was via Bomber Command. When I flew Vulcans out of Lincolnshire in the 70s, aged locals would tell me that the only thing that sustained their morale in the dark days was the sound of massed Lancasters climbing to height.
Which brings me to Dresden. I was born two days afterwards, and my son gave me a copy of the Times for that day. The commentary from the House of Commons reflects growing concern about mounting Transport Command aircrew losses. The sub text was that everyone knew the war was won, and the Brits were very concerned about their menfolk continuing to die for no good purpose. Sledgehammering the Germans into accepting the inevitable might be unpleasant from our perspective, but it was understandable.
I interviewed Sir Arthur before he died. He was a remarkable man who entertained no self doubt about what he was asked to do. And of all his bombers crews I have talked to over the years, I have never met any who did not admire and respect him. Which is more than can be said of some RAF Air Marshals since!
I have to say that I still feel something of a sense of guilt whenever I'm over in Dresden.....
From a 1945 RAF memo:
"Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester, is also far the largest unbombed built-up the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westwards and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium. The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance, and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."
And the words of Churchill afterwards?
"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing material out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction."
Flatiron, presumably the sqn on which you and I both served had been involved as in the PF role on the night in question?
From a 1945 RAF memo:
"Dresden, the seventh largest city in Germany and not much smaller than Manchester, is also far the largest unbombed built-up the enemy has got. In the midst of winter with refugees pouring westwards and troops to be rested, roofs are at a premium. The intentions of the attack are to hit the enemy where he will feel it most, behind an already partially collapsed front, to prevent the use of the city in the way of further advance, and incidentally to show the Russians when they arrive what Bomber Command can do."
And the words of Churchill afterwards?
"It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing material out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction."
Flatiron, presumably the sqn on which you and I both served had been involved as in the PF role on the night in question?
Last edited by BEagle; 4th May 2004 at 10:42.
Pilgrim:
"For me, anyone who served is a bloody hero, especially those 19 year olds in the RAF from '39 all the way through. Many of the 19 year olds in Fighter Command didn't see 1941 and many of the others in BC didn't get much past that too." I absolutely agree with you. Criticising Harris is entirely consistent with such a belief, however, since he was quite happy to write off and dismiss whole swathes of the RAF as 'irrelevant' and a 'sideshow'. It's more controversial to say so, but I feel that one of the biggest points against Harris lies in his willingness to squander (not just sacrifice, that's a different matter) and waste the lives of these very heroes to whom you refer.
Flat,
The raid against Berlin which you cite is interesting - though you omit what was almost it's greatest achievement - destruction of the Telefunken factory where the German's sole example of H2S was being examined! I say almost because one of the 302 aircraft attacking provided another when it was shot down (near-intact) in Holland. And while bombing accuracy was unusually good, the loss of 17 aircraft came close to the unsustainable level, and the Air Staff insisted that subsequent efforts should be concentrated against the Ruhr.
The two examples you give are like two points on a very complicated graph - it's tempting but fundamentally mistaken to join both in a straight line and infer that accuaracy and effectiveness simply improved in a linear way during the period. But to do so would be to ignore the evidence which 'plotting' further points would provide.
While Berlin on 1/2 March was accurate, effective and suffered a 5.6% loss rate, plenty of later missions achieved less, were routinely less accurate, and were even more costly. To present the attack as being broadly representative of what 'Harris had achieved' by March 1942 is fundamentally flawed.
(It's equally inaccurate to suggest that the Germans and Americans were never able to achieve similar effectiveness. The Yanks did so on numerous occasions, while the effectiveness of the German attack on Coventry has already been alluded to in this thread.)
Nor is your description of Wilhelmshaven sufficiently accurate or rigorous. Losses were appalling, and the Blenheims and Wellingtons (which you seem to have ignored) involved were hideously vulnerable. But to characterise the target as the only one which 'Bomber Command felt up to hitting' is gratuitously unfair and offensive. There were huge political constraints on Bomber Command, which effectively limited it to attacking military port facilities and ships. The Op Order insisted that "The Greatest Care is to be taken not to injure the civilian population. The intention is to destroy the German fleet. There is no alternative target." It's hardly surprising that eight Blenheims and 14 Wellingtons (five turned back) did meagre damage, though putting three UXBs into the Admiral Scheer was pretty good work (especially in view of the cloud which supposedly meant that they couldn't find the target), and reflects a degree of accuracy which your sneering opener does not acknowledge.
To put the record straight:
Five Blenheims of No.139 Squadron turned back. This left two waves. Five Blenheim's from No.110 Squadron attacked successfully, though their bombs let them down (just like those Argie Skyhawks, I guess!). The second wave fared badly. Four of five Blenheims from No.107 Squadron were shot down, one deliberately crashing into the forecastle of the Emden.
Five Wellingtons turned back. Two more were shot down. The Wellingtons did not make effective attacks.
But to claim superb efficiency and accuracy for the post-1943 Bomber Command solely on the basis of the Mar 1 Berlin raid is as misleading as it would be to claim the same for the Blenheim on the basis of Paddy Dunlap's U-Boat kill in March 1940, or the attack (again by a single No.82 Squadron Blenheim) on Haamstede on 7 August which so devastated 5./JG 27 that it had to be withdrawn from operations for a whole month!
Had the 1/2 March attack on Berlin represented 'Bomber Command at its peak' as you suggest, then the examples I quoted earlier would not have happened, Nuremberg would have been a singular success, and the Battle of Berlin would not have sputtered to a halt after routinely encountering loss rates of almost 10%, and having failed to dent industrial production or worker morale in the city.
I would suggest to you that the raid on Berlin on 29/30 March may have been more representative of Bomber Command efforts against more distant targets in early 1943. 21 aircraft were lost and Berlin suffered negligible damage, though the Gestapo assumed that a single special squadron had attacked the stores depot at Teltow, eleven miles from the city, which was utterly destroyed. There were successes, of course - against Wuppertal, Hamburg, and the like, and against Peenemunde, of course.
Leaving aside moral concerns, I'd question whether burning 40,000 civilians to death (or suffocating them, or poisoning them with carbon monoxide) at Hamburg was as effective a use of resources as it might have been, however, even had similar results been achieved at the other cities visited by Bomber Command that summer, where the death toll was, mercifully, in the thousands rather than the tens of thousands.
If we're to talk about capability, then we have to recognise that Bomber Command's capability was limited by weather, luck, and target proximity. Against Ruhr targets, Bomber Command was capable of wreaking great destruction in 1943, though it was also capable of missing its target city (or indeed any built up area) altogether.
Moreover, while 'shifting the emphasis back to capability' you have effectively blackened Bomber Command and its leaders from before Butch Harris took over, as those seeking to deify Harris so often do.
At the beginning of the War, the Air Staff elaborated three general principles, insisting that the intentional bombing of civilians was "illegal", that identifying and distinguishing a target prior to attack was a prerequisite, and that:
"Bombardment must be carried out in such a way that there is a reasonable expectation that damage will be confined to the objective.... civilian populations in the neighbourhood will not be bombarded through negligence."
Bomber Command's performance in the first two years of the war must therefore be weighed against the restrictions it operated under, and against the elderly and inadequate equipment it was forced to use. There were, of course, improvements in efficiency as the war drew on, but to credit these to Harris is to repeat the under-researched over-simplification which permeated much of the work produced by so-called historians about the Bomber Offensive during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. It fails to give due prominence to the organisational and equipment improvements begun when Portal was AOC-in-C, and which continued under the brilliant Sir Richard Peirse. Harris himself may have thought that Bomber Command won the war single-handed, and that anything else was a 'sideshow' or a panacea, but that doesn't mean we have to agree with him! To dismiss Coastal Command, Fighter Command, No.2 Group, the Eighth Army, the Russian Front, the invasion, etc. etc. etc. (and Bomber Command's achievements before he took over) would be imbecilic and highly offensive.
All Harris did was to continue the offensive using the new four engined bombers which his predecessors had ensured would be available (and because of this was soon able to do so without the hopeless Manchesters, ancient Whitleys, and inadequate Hampdens), although he did so with a single-mindedness and a flair for publicity which led many (up to this day) to assume that the campaign was his and his alone.
Even his concentration on civilian targets was (initially, at least) merely carrying out the directive (drafted by Bottomley but stemming from Churchill and Portal) which gave a new primary objective - 'The morale of the enemy civil population, and in particular its industrial workers' and Portal's famous order that: 'henceforth... aiming points are to be built up areas and not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories.'
I'm sure that Harris was good for the morale of Bomber Command.
I'm sure that Harris' idea of warfare was good for the morale of the British population during the darkest days of the War.
I don't regard him as a war criminal, though aspects of the Bomber War make me uneasy, and I don't think it represented our 'finest hour'.
But equally, I don't think that Bomber Command's area bombing strategy made anything like the contribution to victory that Harris did, and do believe that the resources devoted to the offensive (all those aircraft, all that explosive dropped on German farmland, and 55,000 aircrew) MIGHT have been better used in a different, more intelligent way, and that there is plenty of evidence to suggest how Bombers could have been used more efficiently and more cost-effectively. I think that Harris was a very real obstacle to such efficiencies, and I think that he was both wrong and wrong-headed to pursue his strategy so single-mindedly, and in the face of plentiful evidence that it was not working (to say nothing about doing so in the face of opposition from his CAS!).
If that's maligning, villifying or demolishing Harris then I'll plead guilty. But to disagree with Harris-worshipping and to counter some of the spurious arguments put forward is neither sniping, nor bickering.
"For me, anyone who served is a bloody hero, especially those 19 year olds in the RAF from '39 all the way through. Many of the 19 year olds in Fighter Command didn't see 1941 and many of the others in BC didn't get much past that too." I absolutely agree with you. Criticising Harris is entirely consistent with such a belief, however, since he was quite happy to write off and dismiss whole swathes of the RAF as 'irrelevant' and a 'sideshow'. It's more controversial to say so, but I feel that one of the biggest points against Harris lies in his willingness to squander (not just sacrifice, that's a different matter) and waste the lives of these very heroes to whom you refer.
Flat,
The raid against Berlin which you cite is interesting - though you omit what was almost it's greatest achievement - destruction of the Telefunken factory where the German's sole example of H2S was being examined! I say almost because one of the 302 aircraft attacking provided another when it was shot down (near-intact) in Holland. And while bombing accuracy was unusually good, the loss of 17 aircraft came close to the unsustainable level, and the Air Staff insisted that subsequent efforts should be concentrated against the Ruhr.
The two examples you give are like two points on a very complicated graph - it's tempting but fundamentally mistaken to join both in a straight line and infer that accuaracy and effectiveness simply improved in a linear way during the period. But to do so would be to ignore the evidence which 'plotting' further points would provide.
While Berlin on 1/2 March was accurate, effective and suffered a 5.6% loss rate, plenty of later missions achieved less, were routinely less accurate, and were even more costly. To present the attack as being broadly representative of what 'Harris had achieved' by March 1942 is fundamentally flawed.
(It's equally inaccurate to suggest that the Germans and Americans were never able to achieve similar effectiveness. The Yanks did so on numerous occasions, while the effectiveness of the German attack on Coventry has already been alluded to in this thread.)
Nor is your description of Wilhelmshaven sufficiently accurate or rigorous. Losses were appalling, and the Blenheims and Wellingtons (which you seem to have ignored) involved were hideously vulnerable. But to characterise the target as the only one which 'Bomber Command felt up to hitting' is gratuitously unfair and offensive. There were huge political constraints on Bomber Command, which effectively limited it to attacking military port facilities and ships. The Op Order insisted that "The Greatest Care is to be taken not to injure the civilian population. The intention is to destroy the German fleet. There is no alternative target." It's hardly surprising that eight Blenheims and 14 Wellingtons (five turned back) did meagre damage, though putting three UXBs into the Admiral Scheer was pretty good work (especially in view of the cloud which supposedly meant that they couldn't find the target), and reflects a degree of accuracy which your sneering opener does not acknowledge.
To put the record straight:
Five Blenheims of No.139 Squadron turned back. This left two waves. Five Blenheim's from No.110 Squadron attacked successfully, though their bombs let them down (just like those Argie Skyhawks, I guess!). The second wave fared badly. Four of five Blenheims from No.107 Squadron were shot down, one deliberately crashing into the forecastle of the Emden.
Five Wellingtons turned back. Two more were shot down. The Wellingtons did not make effective attacks.
But to claim superb efficiency and accuracy for the post-1943 Bomber Command solely on the basis of the Mar 1 Berlin raid is as misleading as it would be to claim the same for the Blenheim on the basis of Paddy Dunlap's U-Boat kill in March 1940, or the attack (again by a single No.82 Squadron Blenheim) on Haamstede on 7 August which so devastated 5./JG 27 that it had to be withdrawn from operations for a whole month!
Had the 1/2 March attack on Berlin represented 'Bomber Command at its peak' as you suggest, then the examples I quoted earlier would not have happened, Nuremberg would have been a singular success, and the Battle of Berlin would not have sputtered to a halt after routinely encountering loss rates of almost 10%, and having failed to dent industrial production or worker morale in the city.
I would suggest to you that the raid on Berlin on 29/30 March may have been more representative of Bomber Command efforts against more distant targets in early 1943. 21 aircraft were lost and Berlin suffered negligible damage, though the Gestapo assumed that a single special squadron had attacked the stores depot at Teltow, eleven miles from the city, which was utterly destroyed. There were successes, of course - against Wuppertal, Hamburg, and the like, and against Peenemunde, of course.
Leaving aside moral concerns, I'd question whether burning 40,000 civilians to death (or suffocating them, or poisoning them with carbon monoxide) at Hamburg was as effective a use of resources as it might have been, however, even had similar results been achieved at the other cities visited by Bomber Command that summer, where the death toll was, mercifully, in the thousands rather than the tens of thousands.
If we're to talk about capability, then we have to recognise that Bomber Command's capability was limited by weather, luck, and target proximity. Against Ruhr targets, Bomber Command was capable of wreaking great destruction in 1943, though it was also capable of missing its target city (or indeed any built up area) altogether.
Moreover, while 'shifting the emphasis back to capability' you have effectively blackened Bomber Command and its leaders from before Butch Harris took over, as those seeking to deify Harris so often do.
At the beginning of the War, the Air Staff elaborated three general principles, insisting that the intentional bombing of civilians was "illegal", that identifying and distinguishing a target prior to attack was a prerequisite, and that:
"Bombardment must be carried out in such a way that there is a reasonable expectation that damage will be confined to the objective.... civilian populations in the neighbourhood will not be bombarded through negligence."
Bomber Command's performance in the first two years of the war must therefore be weighed against the restrictions it operated under, and against the elderly and inadequate equipment it was forced to use. There were, of course, improvements in efficiency as the war drew on, but to credit these to Harris is to repeat the under-researched over-simplification which permeated much of the work produced by so-called historians about the Bomber Offensive during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. It fails to give due prominence to the organisational and equipment improvements begun when Portal was AOC-in-C, and which continued under the brilliant Sir Richard Peirse. Harris himself may have thought that Bomber Command won the war single-handed, and that anything else was a 'sideshow' or a panacea, but that doesn't mean we have to agree with him! To dismiss Coastal Command, Fighter Command, No.2 Group, the Eighth Army, the Russian Front, the invasion, etc. etc. etc. (and Bomber Command's achievements before he took over) would be imbecilic and highly offensive.
All Harris did was to continue the offensive using the new four engined bombers which his predecessors had ensured would be available (and because of this was soon able to do so without the hopeless Manchesters, ancient Whitleys, and inadequate Hampdens), although he did so with a single-mindedness and a flair for publicity which led many (up to this day) to assume that the campaign was his and his alone.
Even his concentration on civilian targets was (initially, at least) merely carrying out the directive (drafted by Bottomley but stemming from Churchill and Portal) which gave a new primary objective - 'The morale of the enemy civil population, and in particular its industrial workers' and Portal's famous order that: 'henceforth... aiming points are to be built up areas and not, for instance, the dockyards or aircraft factories.'
I'm sure that Harris was good for the morale of Bomber Command.
I'm sure that Harris' idea of warfare was good for the morale of the British population during the darkest days of the War.
I don't regard him as a war criminal, though aspects of the Bomber War make me uneasy, and I don't think it represented our 'finest hour'.
But equally, I don't think that Bomber Command's area bombing strategy made anything like the contribution to victory that Harris did, and do believe that the resources devoted to the offensive (all those aircraft, all that explosive dropped on German farmland, and 55,000 aircrew) MIGHT have been better used in a different, more intelligent way, and that there is plenty of evidence to suggest how Bombers could have been used more efficiently and more cost-effectively. I think that Harris was a very real obstacle to such efficiencies, and I think that he was both wrong and wrong-headed to pursue his strategy so single-mindedly, and in the face of plentiful evidence that it was not working (to say nothing about doing so in the face of opposition from his CAS!).
If that's maligning, villifying or demolishing Harris then I'll plead guilty. But to disagree with Harris-worshipping and to counter some of the spurious arguments put forward is neither sniping, nor bickering.
Last edited by Jackonicko; 4th May 2004 at 11:51.
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BEagle
Thank you for the quote from the 145 RAF Memo.
I have previously read that the Dresden raid owed more to trying to show the Russians the capablility of Western strategic air power than any other reason. I believe the comment was in the book, "Freedoms Battles: The Air War" (think that was the title) edited by Gavin Lyall.
It is now many years since I read it but it was a collection of first hand accounts compiled into the one book in a loose chronological order. One of the exercpts was an account by a pathfinder crew on the Dresden raid. If my memory is correct I believe the aiming points non-military targets but I stand to be corrected.
I also dimly remember (it may have been in Lyall's introduction to the excerpt on the raid) that the crews were distinctly unhappy about the raid. Perhaps it was the recognition that it owed more to politics than strategy.
Now heads to bunker and pulls lid over top.
Thank you for the quote from the 145 RAF Memo.
I have previously read that the Dresden raid owed more to trying to show the Russians the capablility of Western strategic air power than any other reason. I believe the comment was in the book, "Freedoms Battles: The Air War" (think that was the title) edited by Gavin Lyall.
It is now many years since I read it but it was a collection of first hand accounts compiled into the one book in a loose chronological order. One of the exercpts was an account by a pathfinder crew on the Dresden raid. If my memory is correct I believe the aiming points non-military targets but I stand to be corrected.
I also dimly remember (it may have been in Lyall's introduction to the excerpt on the raid) that the crews were distinctly unhappy about the raid. Perhaps it was the recognition that it owed more to politics than strategy.
Now heads to bunker and pulls lid over top.
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If my memory is correct I believe the aiming points non-military targets but I stand to be corrected.
Regards
-Nick
[edit: That was the American AP, though one eliment missed it by 22 miles so 'in the general direction of']
The following quotes are of relevance:
From Roy Akehurst, a wireless operator who took part in the raid:
It struck me at the time, the thought of the women and children down there. We seemed to fly for hours over a sheet of fire - a terrific red glow with thin haze over it. I found myself making comments to the crew: "Oh God, those poor people." It was completely uncalled for. You can't justify it.
And from David Pedlow in a letter to The Guardian, 14 Feb 04:
My father was one of the "anonymous RAF meteorological officers (who) finally sealed Dresden's fate". A chronically short-sighted school teacher, he went into the Meteorological Office at the beginning of a war that he had hoped would not happen, but that he felt was utterly necessary. He knew he would be part of a process that sent young men out to risk their lives, and that inevitably - given the inadequacies of bomb-aiming and weather-forecasting techniques - would lead to a considerable number of civilian casualties.
The Dresden briefing was only one of many that he routinely attended, and even before the crews left the ground he was troubled because of one notable omission from the routine.
Normally, crews were given a strategic aiming point - anything from a major factory in the middle of nowhere to a small but significant railway junction within a built-up area. The smaller the aiming point and the heavier the concentration of housing around it, the greater would be the civilian casualties - but given that the strike was at a strategic aiming point those casualties could be justified.
Only at the Dresden briefing, my father told me, were the crews given no strategic aiming point. They were simply told that anywhere within the built-up area of the city would serve.
He felt that Dresden and its civilian population had been the prime target of the raid and that its destruction and their deaths served no strategic purpose, even in the widest terms; that this was a significant departure from accepting civilian deaths as a regrettable but inevitable consequence of the bomber war; and that he had been complicit in what was, at best, a very dubious operation.
From Roy Akehurst, a wireless operator who took part in the raid:
It struck me at the time, the thought of the women and children down there. We seemed to fly for hours over a sheet of fire - a terrific red glow with thin haze over it. I found myself making comments to the crew: "Oh God, those poor people." It was completely uncalled for. You can't justify it.
And from David Pedlow in a letter to The Guardian, 14 Feb 04:
My father was one of the "anonymous RAF meteorological officers (who) finally sealed Dresden's fate". A chronically short-sighted school teacher, he went into the Meteorological Office at the beginning of a war that he had hoped would not happen, but that he felt was utterly necessary. He knew he would be part of a process that sent young men out to risk their lives, and that inevitably - given the inadequacies of bomb-aiming and weather-forecasting techniques - would lead to a considerable number of civilian casualties.
The Dresden briefing was only one of many that he routinely attended, and even before the crews left the ground he was troubled because of one notable omission from the routine.
Normally, crews were given a strategic aiming point - anything from a major factory in the middle of nowhere to a small but significant railway junction within a built-up area. The smaller the aiming point and the heavier the concentration of housing around it, the greater would be the civilian casualties - but given that the strike was at a strategic aiming point those casualties could be justified.
Only at the Dresden briefing, my father told me, were the crews given no strategic aiming point. They were simply told that anywhere within the built-up area of the city would serve.
He felt that Dresden and its civilian population had been the prime target of the raid and that its destruction and their deaths served no strategic purpose, even in the widest terms; that this was a significant departure from accepting civilian deaths as a regrettable but inevitable consequence of the bomber war; and that he had been complicit in what was, at best, a very dubious operation.
Nice to see a well-reasoned and extended debate on PPrune (although the petty sniping that has crept in does the parties involved no credit)
As someone with very limited knowlege of the Bomber Offensive, I have always been of the (I believe widespread) view that, although regrettable, the nature of the campaign was dictated by the technology of the time.
Consequently, Jackonicko, I would be grateful if you would elaborate on alternative proposals for the use of the assets available at the time. What would have been a better option? Bin the investment in building a strategic bomber fleet in favour of, say, more support for the North Africa campaign, or more ships in the Atlantic? Or else keep the bombers and use them against the Atlantic wall?
I honestly have no agenda here - just facinated in what options MIGHT have been better.
As someone with very limited knowlege of the Bomber Offensive, I have always been of the (I believe widespread) view that, although regrettable, the nature of the campaign was dictated by the technology of the time.
Consequently, Jackonicko, I would be grateful if you would elaborate on alternative proposals for the use of the assets available at the time. What would have been a better option? Bin the investment in building a strategic bomber fleet in favour of, say, more support for the North Africa campaign, or more ships in the Atlantic? Or else keep the bombers and use them against the Atlantic wall?
I honestly have no agenda here - just facinated in what options MIGHT have been better.
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I have read all the posts with interest and will post a final paragraph to a personal account of the Dresden Raid. The account lasts for 12 pages and describes the raid as just another trip. I suppose it didn't matter if you were shot down over the Channel or deepest Germany! The SNCO pilot, who is still alive, flew over 30 missions with Bomber Command:
"A number of people have expressed surprise that the actual attack on Dresden as described seem to be a non-event. During the intervening years a great number of books, all written by so called historians (none of them participants) have embroidered the facts to a degree that made me wonder if they were writing about the same Operation. To all of us who participated, it was just another trip except for the fact that it was highly successful and we certainly burned the place. This was due to well-planned tactics coupled with the meteorological situation being on our side and above all the perfect Marking by 5 Group during the first phase of the attack. The night after the Dresden raid we went back to bomb Chemnitz as a continuation of ‘Operation Thunderclap’. This attack was marked by 8 Group, the attack was not as successful. On the Dresden Raid we had two aircraft abort:- Koder in ‘K’ NN798 (Rear Turret unserviceable could not fire guns), Connor in ‘B’ PD200 (Engine trouble). Bomber Command lost 6 Lancasters plus two crashing in France and one in the UK."
"A number of people have expressed surprise that the actual attack on Dresden as described seem to be a non-event. During the intervening years a great number of books, all written by so called historians (none of them participants) have embroidered the facts to a degree that made me wonder if they were writing about the same Operation. To all of us who participated, it was just another trip except for the fact that it was highly successful and we certainly burned the place. This was due to well-planned tactics coupled with the meteorological situation being on our side and above all the perfect Marking by 5 Group during the first phase of the attack. The night after the Dresden raid we went back to bomb Chemnitz as a continuation of ‘Operation Thunderclap’. This attack was marked by 8 Group, the attack was not as successful. On the Dresden Raid we had two aircraft abort:- Koder in ‘K’ NN798 (Rear Turret unserviceable could not fire guns), Connor in ‘B’ PD200 (Engine trouble). Bomber Command lost 6 Lancasters plus two crashing in France and one in the UK."
Red Line,
I personally think that Bomber Command doctrine was mistaken from the off. The Trenchardian enthusiasm for strategic bombing (which tended to mean 'bombing for moral effect' because accuracy was judged to be inadequate for anything else) was based on Independent Force experience from 1918.
But even if one accepts the need for an area bombing offensive (and there are plenty of examples showing the precision which the Command was capable of) it should perhaps have avoided missions against targets outside Oboe range, or too far within Germany, which attracted a disproportionately high loss rate.
It would have been better to use the Heavies against the type of targets Harris believed were 'panaceas' and 'diversions' - much more could have been done in preparation for the invasion, and in softening up the defences ahead of the advancing allied ground forces, and, indeed, in mounting the kind of focused attacks which it made against Peenemunde and Le Creusot. These attacks showed quite clearly that 'the technology of the time' need not limit Bomber Command to indiscriminate attacks on the enemy civilian population.
During the 1930s, the Command had no interest in light or medium bombers whatsoever, except for Colonial Policing overseas, Army Co-operation, and to quickly build up squadrons which would later fly the Lancs, Stirlings and Halifaxes.
On the whole, and certainly during the first four years of the war, the light and medium bombers made a greater contribution than the heavies, and did more damage to the enemy. The Blenheims did so at horrifying cost, while the Bostons, Venturas and Mitchells did so more economically. And then there is the Mosquito. Playing 'what if' is pretty pointless, but one cannot help but wonder 'what if' the balance between Heavies and Mossies within Bomber Command had been reversed? With a primarily Mosquito equipped force (with a handful of Lancs for special operations which needed their capacity) I suspect that casualties would have been very much lower, and that accuracy would have been considerably better. I believe that the average Bomber Command Mosquito delivered a higher tonnage during its life than the average Lanc (which lasted far fewer sorties) and my suspicion is that the difference in tonnage actually falling on target would have been even more marked.
But resources could have been diverted away from Bomber Command altogether - one could get fanciful and say that they could have been diverted towards (say) better defences for Singapore, or be more sensible and point to the success of the Boston/Havoc night intruders, the Whirlwind fighter bombers, and the Typhoon and Tempest. You allude to the inadequacy of the air support given to the Eighth Army in North Africa, to which one could add a comment about the ageing and often inadequate equipment used in the Far East.
The value of Coastal Command has been elaborated earlier on this thread. Coastal Command gained its war-winning Liberators and Catalinas only because Harris did not want them, and he always opposed any spending on the Command, which, disgracefully, he described as an obstacle to victory. Anyone who will not condemn that sort of language is a charlatan. Coastal was always short of Libs and Catalinas, and was forced to rely on less suitable and less adequate aircraft to back them up. The case for diverting resources to give the Command an adequate VLR force is, in my view, proven.
I personally think that Bomber Command doctrine was mistaken from the off. The Trenchardian enthusiasm for strategic bombing (which tended to mean 'bombing for moral effect' because accuracy was judged to be inadequate for anything else) was based on Independent Force experience from 1918.
But even if one accepts the need for an area bombing offensive (and there are plenty of examples showing the precision which the Command was capable of) it should perhaps have avoided missions against targets outside Oboe range, or too far within Germany, which attracted a disproportionately high loss rate.
It would have been better to use the Heavies against the type of targets Harris believed were 'panaceas' and 'diversions' - much more could have been done in preparation for the invasion, and in softening up the defences ahead of the advancing allied ground forces, and, indeed, in mounting the kind of focused attacks which it made against Peenemunde and Le Creusot. These attacks showed quite clearly that 'the technology of the time' need not limit Bomber Command to indiscriminate attacks on the enemy civilian population.
During the 1930s, the Command had no interest in light or medium bombers whatsoever, except for Colonial Policing overseas, Army Co-operation, and to quickly build up squadrons which would later fly the Lancs, Stirlings and Halifaxes.
On the whole, and certainly during the first four years of the war, the light and medium bombers made a greater contribution than the heavies, and did more damage to the enemy. The Blenheims did so at horrifying cost, while the Bostons, Venturas and Mitchells did so more economically. And then there is the Mosquito. Playing 'what if' is pretty pointless, but one cannot help but wonder 'what if' the balance between Heavies and Mossies within Bomber Command had been reversed? With a primarily Mosquito equipped force (with a handful of Lancs for special operations which needed their capacity) I suspect that casualties would have been very much lower, and that accuracy would have been considerably better. I believe that the average Bomber Command Mosquito delivered a higher tonnage during its life than the average Lanc (which lasted far fewer sorties) and my suspicion is that the difference in tonnage actually falling on target would have been even more marked.
But resources could have been diverted away from Bomber Command altogether - one could get fanciful and say that they could have been diverted towards (say) better defences for Singapore, or be more sensible and point to the success of the Boston/Havoc night intruders, the Whirlwind fighter bombers, and the Typhoon and Tempest. You allude to the inadequacy of the air support given to the Eighth Army in North Africa, to which one could add a comment about the ageing and often inadequate equipment used in the Far East.
The value of Coastal Command has been elaborated earlier on this thread. Coastal Command gained its war-winning Liberators and Catalinas only because Harris did not want them, and he always opposed any spending on the Command, which, disgracefully, he described as an obstacle to victory. Anyone who will not condemn that sort of language is a charlatan. Coastal was always short of Libs and Catalinas, and was forced to rely on less suitable and less adequate aircraft to back them up. The case for diverting resources to give the Command an adequate VLR force is, in my view, proven.
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Flatiron
An extremely good post, and nice that someone who actually interviewed Arthur Harris has been willing to contribute.
PLovett
The Dresden aiming points for Bomber Command were the general city area, including industrial plants, communications, military installations.
Beagle
In response to one of your early posts, perhaps you will permit me to add the following points in respect of the Dresden Raid:-
At the outbreak of World War II, Dresden was the seventh largest city in Germany proper. With a population of 642,143 in 1939, Dresden was exceeded in size only by Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Leipzig, and Essen, in that order.
Situated 71 miles E.S.E. from Leipzig and 111 miles S. of Berlin, by rail, Dresden was one of the greatest commercial and transportation centres of Germany.
Dresden was the junction of three great trunk routes in the German railway system: (1) Berlin-Prague-Vienna, (2) Munich-Breslau, and (3) Hamburg-Leipzig. This is why it was regarded as a primary communications centre, and why it assumed major significance as a military target in February 1945.
By February 1945, Dresden was known to contain at least 110 factories and industrial enterprises that were legitimate military targets, and were reported to have employed 50,000 workers in arms plants alone.
Among these were dispersed aircraft components factories; a poison gas factory (Chemische Fabric Goye and Company); an anti-aircraft and field gun factory (Lehman); the great Zeiss Ikon A.G., Germany’s most important optical goods manufactory; and, among others, factories engaged in the production of electrical and X-ray apparatus (Koch and Sterzel A.G.), gears and differentials (Saxoniswerke), and electric gauges (Gebruder Bassler).
Specific military installations in Dresden in February 1945 included barracks and hutted camps and at least one munitions storage depot.
It was a specific Russian request (made at the ARGONAUT Conference between the Allies and the Russians on 4th February 1945 in Yalta) for bombing communications, coupled with the emphasis on forcing troops to shift from west to east through communications centers, that led to the Allied bombings of Dresden.
The particular wording used was:-
As a key centre in the dense Berlin-Leipzig railway complex, Dresden was connected to both cities by two main lines.
The structure of the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex required that Dresden, as well as Berlin and Leipzig, be bombed. Therefore Allied air authorities concluded that the bombing of Dresden would have to be undertaken (1) in order to implement strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, and now agreed upon at the highest levels of governmental authority, and (2) to respond to the specific Russian request presented to the Allies by General Antonov to “paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.”
On 8 February 1945 SHAEF (Air) informed both RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces that Dresden was among a number of targets that had been selected for bombing because of their importance in relation to the movements of military forces to the Eastern Front.
This action, based upon the authoritative recommendation of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, SHAEF (Air), and in turn based upon the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was in keeping with the procedural structure and authority set up in SHAEF for the conduct of aerial operations by Allied forces.
On the night of 14/15th February 1945 Dresden was attacked by the RAF.
The USAAF made THREE raids on Dresden- on the morning of the 14th, again on the 15th, and yet again on the morning of 2nd March.
PLovett
The Dresden aiming points for Bomber Command were the general city area, including industrial plants, communications, military installations.
Beagle
In response to one of your early posts, perhaps you will permit me to add the following points in respect of the Dresden Raid:-
At the outbreak of World War II, Dresden was the seventh largest city in Germany proper. With a population of 642,143 in 1939, Dresden was exceeded in size only by Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Cologne, Leipzig, and Essen, in that order.
Situated 71 miles E.S.E. from Leipzig and 111 miles S. of Berlin, by rail, Dresden was one of the greatest commercial and transportation centres of Germany.
Dresden was the junction of three great trunk routes in the German railway system: (1) Berlin-Prague-Vienna, (2) Munich-Breslau, and (3) Hamburg-Leipzig. This is why it was regarded as a primary communications centre, and why it assumed major significance as a military target in February 1945.
By February 1945, Dresden was known to contain at least 110 factories and industrial enterprises that were legitimate military targets, and were reported to have employed 50,000 workers in arms plants alone.
Among these were dispersed aircraft components factories; a poison gas factory (Chemische Fabric Goye and Company); an anti-aircraft and field gun factory (Lehman); the great Zeiss Ikon A.G., Germany’s most important optical goods manufactory; and, among others, factories engaged in the production of electrical and X-ray apparatus (Koch and Sterzel A.G.), gears and differentials (Saxoniswerke), and electric gauges (Gebruder Bassler).
Specific military installations in Dresden in February 1945 included barracks and hutted camps and at least one munitions storage depot.
It was a specific Russian request (made at the ARGONAUT Conference between the Allies and the Russians on 4th February 1945 in Yalta) for bombing communications, coupled with the emphasis on forcing troops to shift from west to east through communications centers, that led to the Allied bombings of Dresden.
The particular wording used was:-
Our wishes are:
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable: (1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front. (2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes. (3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East (It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February).
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy (In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig).
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.
a. To speed up the advance of the Allied troops on the Western Front, for which the present situation is very favorable: (1) To defeat the Germans on the Eastern Front. (2) To defeat the German groupings which have advanced into the Ardennes. (3) The weakening of the German forces in the West in connection with the shifting of their reserves to the East (It is desirable to begin the advance during the first half of February).
b. By air action on communications hinder the enemy from carrying out the shifting of his troops to the East from the Western Front, from Norway, and from Italy (In particular, to paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig).
c. Not permit the enemy to remove his forces from Italy.
The structure of the Berlin-Leipzig-Dresden railway complex required that Dresden, as well as Berlin and Leipzig, be bombed. Therefore Allied air authorities concluded that the bombing of Dresden would have to be undertaken (1) in order to implement strategic objectives, of mutual importance to the Allies and the Russians, and now agreed upon at the highest levels of governmental authority, and (2) to respond to the specific Russian request presented to the Allies by General Antonov to “paralyze the junctions of Berlin and Leipzig.”
On 8 February 1945 SHAEF (Air) informed both RAF Bomber Command and the United States Strategic Air Forces that Dresden was among a number of targets that had been selected for bombing because of their importance in relation to the movements of military forces to the Eastern Front.
This action, based upon the authoritative recommendation of the Combined Strategic Targets Committee, SHAEF (Air), and in turn based upon the recommendations of the Joint Intelligence Committee, was in keeping with the procedural structure and authority set up in SHAEF for the conduct of aerial operations by Allied forces.
On the night of 14/15th February 1945 Dresden was attacked by the RAF.
The USAAF made THREE raids on Dresden- on the morning of the 14th, again on the 15th, and yet again on the morning of 2nd March.
Thread Starter
Ppune Pop- You can blame me for asking the original ignorant questions about Coventry and Dresden, but the information here has been very educational. Again, I did not realize how many complex issues are associated with the topics, and feel awkward about certain debaters getting a bit personal with each other. I hope that they can somehow 'shake hands' and still get along on Pprune.
Just the night before flying to AMS and on to Prague a few years ago, with a stay in Meissen, on the Elbe River just west of Dresden, my wife and I were amazed to see a tv show on the Dresden attacks, probably on the "History Channel". What weird timing! It was dreadful to hear the descriptions of the three seperate bombings, and about the thousands of refugees staying in the city, but then war is always the most terrible situation of all.
Just the night before flying to AMS and on to Prague a few years ago, with a stay in Meissen, on the Elbe River just west of Dresden, my wife and I were amazed to see a tv show on the Dresden attacks, probably on the "History Channel". What weird timing! It was dreadful to hear the descriptions of the three seperate bombings, and about the thousands of refugees staying in the city, but then war is always the most terrible situation of all.
Bletch,
You present an accurate and interesting account as to how the decision to attack Dresden was taken - by essentially regurgitating exactly what was said at the time. But in doing so you entirely fail to answer the point as to whether it was the right thing to do, and whether the decision taken was morally (or even militarily) the right one.
Even if one uncritically accepts the official justification for the attack on Dresden (preventing the flow of reinforcements to the Eastern Front, preventing the return of forces from Italy, etc.) it does not follow that an area attack against the city was the best, the only, or the morally right way to go about it.
And in February 1945, there is little doubt that a much more tightly focused attack could have been mounted, and that Dresden's rail yards could have been 'pasted' without killing 50,000 people. (That's nearly equivalent to Bomber Command's losses over the entire war, and it's more than died at Hiroshima, if memory serves!).
The Churchill quote offered by BEagle
("It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing material out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction.")
Would suggest that even Churchill would not have been as happy to justify Dresden as you are, Bletch. It doesn't take much imagination to see the words as being a tacit acknowledgment that the attack had been a mistake...
You present an accurate and interesting account as to how the decision to attack Dresden was taken - by essentially regurgitating exactly what was said at the time. But in doing so you entirely fail to answer the point as to whether it was the right thing to do, and whether the decision taken was morally (or even militarily) the right one.
Even if one uncritically accepts the official justification for the attack on Dresden (preventing the flow of reinforcements to the Eastern Front, preventing the return of forces from Italy, etc.) it does not follow that an area attack against the city was the best, the only, or the morally right way to go about it.
And in February 1945, there is little doubt that a much more tightly focused attack could have been mounted, and that Dresden's rail yards could have been 'pasted' without killing 50,000 people. (That's nearly equivalent to Bomber Command's losses over the entire war, and it's more than died at Hiroshima, if memory serves!).
The Churchill quote offered by BEagle
("It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing material out of Germany for our own needs because some temporary provision would have to be made for the Germans themselves. I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction.")
Would suggest that even Churchill would not have been as happy to justify Dresden as you are, Bletch. It doesn't take much imagination to see the words as being a tacit acknowledgment that the attack had been a mistake...
Put simply, my guess is that the military target potential of Dresden was initially quite legitimate. Then Churchill decided that he could make a very positive demonstration to the Sovs by totally annihilating the place almost within earshot of their frontline. Harris did what air commanders have to do - follow orders from above.
But when the devastation was all too plain for everyone to see, Churchill dashed out his rather peculiar memo. "We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing material out of Germany for our own needs.." seems a selfish and odd thing to say. And not one shred of remorse expressed for the innocent civilian population of Dresden.
I cannot view Harris as being the villain of the piece. If anyone should take the blame, then it'd be Churchill for ordering an attack which was clearly disproportionate for the actual military objective.
But who was going to offer criticism of WSC at such a time in the war?
But when the devastation was all too plain for everyone to see, Churchill dashed out his rather peculiar memo. "We shall not, for instance, be able to get housing material out of Germany for our own needs.." seems a selfish and odd thing to say. And not one shred of remorse expressed for the innocent civilian population of Dresden.
I cannot view Harris as being the villain of the piece. If anyone should take the blame, then it'd be Churchill for ordering an attack which was clearly disproportionate for the actual military objective.
But who was going to offer criticism of WSC at such a time in the war?
It would certainly be unfair to brand Harris as being the only villain of the piece - especially insofar as Dresden is concerned, though my hat's off to you for daring to think the unthinkable about 'Saint Winston'.
Nor can Harris take the blame or the credit for the area bombing campaign as a whole, or for specifically targeting enemy civilian morale. It is quite clear that Portal and Churchill (via Bottomley) specifically ordered the change in targeting, and in doing so were merely following Trenchard's doctrine through to its logical conclusion.
But it would be equally mistaken to suggest that Harris was 'only obeying orders' - as the relationship with his CAS (Portal) shows only too clearly, especially after D-day.
Although, in the specific instance of Dresden, the contention that Harris was merely carrying out orders from above seems entirely fair, though it is probable that he could have done much more to minimise civilian casualties, and that he was neither ordered nor expected to wreak quite such heavy casualties.
Nor can Harris take the blame or the credit for the area bombing campaign as a whole, or for specifically targeting enemy civilian morale. It is quite clear that Portal and Churchill (via Bottomley) specifically ordered the change in targeting, and in doing so were merely following Trenchard's doctrine through to its logical conclusion.
But it would be equally mistaken to suggest that Harris was 'only obeying orders' - as the relationship with his CAS (Portal) shows only too clearly, especially after D-day.
Although, in the specific instance of Dresden, the contention that Harris was merely carrying out orders from above seems entirely fair, though it is probable that he could have done much more to minimise civilian casualties, and that he was neither ordered nor expected to wreak quite such heavy casualties.
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Jackinoco
Re your first. Thank you for your compliment.
I don't seek to justify Dresden, just to set out the reasons why it was attacked.
ATH actually queried whether it was necessary to attack Dresden, and in his autbiography staes that :- ..'Here I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself....' .
I believe that ATH probably thought Dresden was a target too far but if ordered then he would do his utmost to make it be a success.
Therein probably lies the problem with regards to people's perception of ATH. He was primarily a military man who once tasked with a job would do his utmost to make it succeed. We see this time and time again where he disagreed with a course of action but when he put it into operation he strove hard to make it successful.
That he was a man driven by a sole purpose is again I believe without question.
Mostly I agree with your last post. Maybe if ATH had been a little less single-minded and more Politically aware he would have avoided the criticism which has tarnished his name ever since.
With regards to Churchill, I believe that it was reprehensible of Churchill to act as he did in an attempt to distance himself from a policy that he was personally responsible for directing in 1940.
More reprehensible was the American response, particularly as they returned on two subsequent occasions to bomb an effectively already destroyed city. One never hears of this only because the actions of the Americans in the days following.
Comment has been made as to the Americans 'Precision' bombing. This is a fallacy put out (successfully) by the Americans. They used the Norden bombsight in the early stages of the war, which whilst being excellent when used against daylight targets over California, was totally useless in the War situation against Germany whilst being pounded by Flak and Fighters.
Also the American approach was that the Bomb leader was the only one who targetted the objective. Everyone else dropped their bombs when he did. This in itself removed any possibility of a precision attack if the leader misjudged. Also I believe that the Americans coined the phrase 'Carpet Bombing' which gives lie to their claims for precision bombing.
I don't seek to justify Dresden, just to set out the reasons why it was attacked.
ATH actually queried whether it was necessary to attack Dresden, and in his autbiography staes that :- ..'Here I will only say that the attack on Dresden was at the time considered a military necessity by much more important people than myself....' .
I believe that ATH probably thought Dresden was a target too far but if ordered then he would do his utmost to make it be a success.
Therein probably lies the problem with regards to people's perception of ATH. He was primarily a military man who once tasked with a job would do his utmost to make it succeed. We see this time and time again where he disagreed with a course of action but when he put it into operation he strove hard to make it successful.
That he was a man driven by a sole purpose is again I believe without question.
Mostly I agree with your last post. Maybe if ATH had been a little less single-minded and more Politically aware he would have avoided the criticism which has tarnished his name ever since.
With regards to Churchill, I believe that it was reprehensible of Churchill to act as he did in an attempt to distance himself from a policy that he was personally responsible for directing in 1940.
More reprehensible was the American response, particularly as they returned on two subsequent occasions to bomb an effectively already destroyed city. One never hears of this only because the actions of the Americans in the days following.
Comment has been made as to the Americans 'Precision' bombing. This is a fallacy put out (successfully) by the Americans. They used the Norden bombsight in the early stages of the war, which whilst being excellent when used against daylight targets over California, was totally useless in the War situation against Germany whilst being pounded by Flak and Fighters.
Also the American approach was that the Bomb leader was the only one who targetted the objective. Everyone else dropped their bombs when he did. This in itself removed any possibility of a precision attack if the leader misjudged. Also I believe that the Americans coined the phrase 'Carpet Bombing' which gives lie to their claims for precision bombing.
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Ignition Override
No-one blames you for starting the thread. It has been, and still is, an entertaining thread - if entertaining is the right word! It has bought out some pettiness but we almost always come to expect that, it is usually pretty harmles unless it becomes personal.
As a final comment, I think Harris was right on the matter of Dresden, if indeed he decided, but then he didn't - Churchill did. And do not forget that it was understood later that the German military gathered in Dresden in March, so we are told, and then it became a military target, though I have no way of knowing if this turned out be true. It is likely that no-one else does either.
Whatever the case, I still retain my view as a child what I, my family, neighbours and those in the East End were getting dumped on them night after night were entitled to expect that Bomber Command delivered with interest a ten fold retaliation.
Btw, I don't think I have noticed references to Max Hasting's splendid book 'Bomber' which was very clear on the misses, hits and destruction throughout the war. Ralph Barker's book Strike Hard Strike Sure is a good reference too.
One thing I am sure of is that we owe a debt of immense gratitude to the Bomber Command crews, especially in the early years when the bombers were sitting ducks. Those guys, importantly the many many thousands who were killed, sacrificed themselves with odds that were stacked high against them. God bless them all. I will never forget.
Still more of this to come I suspect. And why not.
No-one blames you for starting the thread. It has been, and still is, an entertaining thread - if entertaining is the right word! It has bought out some pettiness but we almost always come to expect that, it is usually pretty harmles unless it becomes personal.
As a final comment, I think Harris was right on the matter of Dresden, if indeed he decided, but then he didn't - Churchill did. And do not forget that it was understood later that the German military gathered in Dresden in March, so we are told, and then it became a military target, though I have no way of knowing if this turned out be true. It is likely that no-one else does either.
Whatever the case, I still retain my view as a child what I, my family, neighbours and those in the East End were getting dumped on them night after night were entitled to expect that Bomber Command delivered with interest a ten fold retaliation.
Btw, I don't think I have noticed references to Max Hasting's splendid book 'Bomber' which was very clear on the misses, hits and destruction throughout the war. Ralph Barker's book Strike Hard Strike Sure is a good reference too.
One thing I am sure of is that we owe a debt of immense gratitude to the Bomber Command crews, especially in the early years when the bombers were sitting ducks. Those guys, importantly the many many thousands who were killed, sacrificed themselves with odds that were stacked high against them. God bless them all. I will never forget.
Still more of this to come I suspect. And why not.