Re your last.
He was also a man who had favourites, and allowed his personal feelings to influence his actions to an astonishing degree. He clamoured for publicity and press coverage to an extent which many of his contemporaries found vulgar and unseemly, and to a degree which hindered his prosecution of the war.
Please will you say your reasons for this and your source(s). Thank you.
Harris was a man who leapt to ‘snap judgements’ but was too arrogant to change his mind. Thus he dismissed the Halifax on the basis of the performance and losses of the Merlin engined versions, and refused to accept or acknowledge that the later radial-engined versions were virtually the equal of the Lanc, as late-war loss figures soon showed.
From early 1942 it became apparant that the Halifax was not meeting its operational performance, especially in terms of height and speed.
The Lancaster could carry an 8,000lb bombload to Berlin at a speed of 240 mph and was capable of operating between 22,000 and 27,000 feet.
By comparison the Halifax could barely attain 18,000 feet, with a speed of slightly over 200mph. This operating height left the Halifax well within lethal range of the AA fire. The slow speed also made it more vulnerable. Finally it terms of bomb load its range for range was less than half of that of the Lancaster.
Improvements to the Halifax were due largely to ATH's efforts.
Harris chose to ignore evidence which undermined his favoured approach, and proved surprisingly uncritical of what were clearly exaggerated and inaccurate claims of successful missions, and even tended to further exaggerate results, even when there was plentiful evidence that actual results had been pathetically poor.
That's quite a serious allegation.
During the early years of the campaign, actual evidence shows that on night after night massive numbers of Bomber Command aircrew went to their deaths while achieving no damage to their targets, scattering their bombs harmlessly over the German countryside. Again and again the numbers of German civilian casualties were dwarfed by the numbers of aircrew killed, while tens of bombers would fail to return having managed to damage one or two houses.
Certainly true until 1942. ATH was responsible for great improvements in navigation and target marking after taking over command.
And all the while, Harris claimed that he was ‘winning the war’ and fought tooth and nail to prevent the dispatch of four engined heavies to Coastal Command or overseas commands where they could have made a much greater contribution to the war effort. He was similarly blind to the achievements of the medium bombers of No.2 Group.
Fact - The use of Bombers to chase U-Boats around the ocean was a toatl misuse of scarce resources. I do have the facts as to the operational hours necessary to make a 'hit', but not with me. More U-Boats were destroyed by 'Gardening' than by any other means and more U-Boats destroyed by the RAF than either Costal Command or the Royal Navy.
Harris ..... ignored directives from his superiors.
Please back up this allegation as I cannot recall anyone else having alleged this?
his failure to prioritise his effort against oil targets reduced Bomber Command’s contribution to the final stage of the War
ATH was not critical of bombing oil targets only critical of the concentration of bombing on those targets to the exclusion of others.
In an earlier post I pointed out that attacks on oil targets accounted for 26.2% of the total tonnage dropped. I would refer you to the period October to December 1944 which was almost exclusively an oil campaign.
Oil targets required precision bombing. When ATH was given this directive the Winter months were approaching, with the resultant deterioration of weather conditions that would call for a need for bombing to be carried out 'blind'. Sky markers were unsuitable for precision targets in such circumstances.
Unfortunately poor old ATH cannot win can he?. Firstly he is criticised for area bombing and then you criticise him for his reluctance to use area bombing of oil targets!
If anything, Harris worked too assiduously to please the press and public (who wanted bloody revenge) and to please Churchill, and was so single-minded that he refused to make any serious examination of alternative ways of beating the Germans.
I look forward to learning how.
the ill-judged Battle of Berlin which he said would end the war actually lengthened it
Please say how.
On 7 December 1943, Harris promised Churchill that he could destroy Berlin, and bring the war to an end by 1 April 1944. He entirely failed to see that bombing a target so far from his East Anglian and Yorkshire bases would be a hugely different proposition to bombing targets in the Ruhr, and seems to have entirely discounted the unavailability of Oboe when attacking Berlin.
I believe the statement included the words...'if the Americans will come in with us'....
ATH never claimed that bombing Berlin would end the war. He said it would cost Germany the war. That's a totally different statement.
Oboe was only ever really useful as a target marking system as it only allowed one aircraft to cross the target at a time. Therefore the comment is invalid. H2S was used for the Berlin campaign.
During the period November 1943 to March 1944 it is likely that 5,427 acres of devastation was caused in Berlin.
The loss rate during this period was 4.2%, generally accepted as a 'good' figure.
Albert Speer is quoted as saying of the Berlin campaign that
...'...it was, of course, very serious for us..'... . He also agrees that it contributed to the downfall of Germany. In comparison I place greater weight on Speer's comments made at shortly after the war ended to those of others 60 odd years on.
The Swiss diplomatic and intelligence service prepared detailed reports on the destruction being wrought on Berlin. One of these stated
...'...The war economic significance of the exceptionally disasterous destruction can hardly be overlooked. The Berlin factories have unfinished armaments orders valued at nearly 300 million Reichsmarks...'...
The first six raids against Berlin destroyed 46 factories and damaged 259. By the end of March this figure, as witnessed by Swiss reports had 'risen astronomically'.
The Berlin raids disrupted much of Germany's production, and was of great benefit to both the Russians on the Eastern front and the Allie sin the Mediterranean. It caused Germany to go onto the defensive and resulted in 75% of the most effective anti-tank guns to be used for the protection of the city, together with thousands of soldiers.
Hitler is quoted as saying to Admiral Doenitz in response to a demand for 200,000 extra naval ratings
...'...I haven't got the personnel. The anti-aircraft and night fighter forces must be increased to protect the German cities...'...
Adward Milch, Armaments Chief of the Luftwaffe is quoted as saying on 23rd February 1944
...'...Everyone should visit Berlin. It would then be realised that experience such as we have undergone in the last few months cannot be endured indefinitely. That is impossible. When the big cities have been demolished it will be the turn of the smaller ones...'... .
A few days later he told representatives of the aircraft industry
The British have calculated exactly how many attacks they need to make an end of Berlin. The total may be twenty-five. They have already made fifteen attacks, leaving ten to come. Furthermore they have announced that when they have finished with Berlin it will be the turn of the Central German industrial area...I would like to suggest that you look at Berlin; it will then be obvious that what has happened in the last few months cannot be endured indefinitely...'...
The Berlin campaign a failure?. I rather think not.
West Coast
I am sorry you took offence. None was intended I assure you.
I was merely trying to suggest that it was extremely difficult to make a precision attack of a city whilst being bombarded by Flak. You seem to suggest that I support the attacking of civilians. I don't but please do not try to apply modern day so called 'precision' targetting with what was available in 1942.