Bletch,
3) I know quite enough about the Halifax without being ‘commended’ to half-@rsed ill-informed, poorly researched, unoriginal and cliched nonsense on a second-rate website. Thanks, though. In return I commend you to ‘Second to None’, probably the best book on the Halifax. Or perhaps you could interview a dozen or so surviving Halifax pilots, as I have done? And for homework I suggest that you calculate the loss rate of the Halifax during 1945 and compare it to the Lanc loss rate.
5) Your complacent view that accuracy was OK after March 1943 is bizarre. I’ve cited examples much later than that when entire Bomber streams failed to hit the city they were directed against.
Just for your interest, some random examples of Bomber Command’s ‘accuracy’ during 1943....
On 8/9 April 1943 only 12 of the 272 aircraft dispatched managed to hit Hamburg, and on 10/11 April six of 254 aircraft managed to hit Essen. On 19/20 May 197 aircraft hit Mannheim, killing two enemy firemen at a cost of eleven RAF bombers. The second 1,000 plan raid against Essen on 1/2 June destroyed 11 houses and killed 15 enemy civilians, and burned out a PoW work camp, though 150 further dangerous enemy civilians perished in Oberhausen, Duisburg and Mülheim. 31 bombers failed to return.
At Wilhelmshaven on 8/9 July, Bomber Command destroyed a Department Store, the Harbourmaster’s office and the bus garage, with 30 valuable buses inside. 25 civilians died, and we only lost five bombers. On 17 August Bomber Command killed a single civilian in Dusseldorf, for the loss of four of the 131 attacking aircraft. On the same night, seven civilians died at Osnabruck, where five RAF aircraft failed to return. On 1/2 September a 231-aircraft force missed Saarbrücken altogether, hitting Saarlouis, 15 miles away, instead.
So much for accuracy.... How about losses?
From the comfort of your armchair, a 4.3% loss rate might sound reasonable, but it meant that the average crew had only an 11% chance of finishing a full tour (30 ops-rest-20 ops) of operations. By comparison a 2.5% rate (the rate before Harris took over) gave a 28.5% chance of survival. The RAF regarded a 4.3% rate as ‘unsustainable’ in the long term, and when the loss rate crept above 6% (as it did in No.4 Group between March and August 1942) squadrons were often rested. Most of the major Berlin raids suffered an 8-10% loss rate. (But of course that didn’t force Harris to abandon the campaign.....)
6) When the basis of your arguments on U-boats is an enthusiast’s website and Bomber Command propaganda I’m not inclined to go overboard in countering such tosh. I would suggest that you might read and inwardly digest Archimedes post. Your dismissal of the VLR Liberator’s part in removing the sanctuary of an ‘Atlantic gap’ is both ignorant and highly offensive to the brave men who fought a tough campaign without the adulation of the Daily Mirror.
Suffice it to say that a mission during which a U-Boat was sunk, after sinking six Allied merchantmen was less successful than a mission in which the U-boat escaped, but without being able to sink any allied ships.
(And in any case, Coastal Command’s record in killing U-boats bears any reasonable scrutiny.)
Your airy belief that the Lancaster Bomber was as unsuitable for marine operations as the Liberator was for Bombing is tosh. The Americans used the Liberator as a bomber with conspicuous success, though its payload was fairly puny, and RAF Liberator bombers did a good job in the Middle East. The Lib may not have been a Lancaster in the bombing role, but it was better than a Wellington or a Stirling. And the Lanc (which formed the backbone of Coastal Command in the immediate post war era) may not have been as useful in the GR/ASW role as the Liberator or the Halifax, the diversion of Lancs to Coastal Command would have been enormously helpful, and the airframes transferred would have done more damage to the German economy than they did in Bomber Command hands.
7) I say that because most of the raids flown during that period were area attacks, often with aim points in residential areas.
8) The Battle of Berlin wasn’t a humiliating defeat, according to you, although:
Harris staked his reputation on bombing Berlin, and promised (in a letter to Churchill) that by bombing Berlin he could win the war by April 1944. He failed.
German industrial production in the city actually increased.
Berlin cost some 500 bombers in only 16 attacks.
German civilian morale did not collapse, and the emergence of a ‘Blitz spirit’ actually had the reverse effect.
The Bomber Command loss rate was so high that Harris had to intersperse attacks on Berlin with attacks against other targets.
The D-Day bombing campaign did not force an end to area attacks, which continued against other targets until 28 April.
Every serious analyst concludes that it was losses (and pressure from Churchill) that forced an end to the campaign.
Your complacent statement that: “My interest lies purely in the German Offensive by Bomber Command hence my admitted lack of knowledge on the U-Boat issue.” Shows breathtaking arrogance and complacency. If you don’t devote time to studying the alternatives to Bomber Command’s strategy, how can you assess it’s relative value and worth?