Jetstar and Ballina again
it’s time to start asking why.
Infrastructure is expensive, and once you commit, you are stuck with it. Witness closed million dollar TWRs at Gove, Wagga, Port Hedland etc. Airlines are fickle beasts. They demand demand demand, then will drop something without a moments hesitation. That's why airports don't build things until they really really need them. You get burned by airline forecasts and industry promises a lot. Look at TMW, they'd never build a TWR there now, yet they've still got one to keep nothing but small turbo-props and bug smashers apart, and BNA doesn't, with 180 seat jets.
Last edited by Traffic_Is_Er_Was; 10th Apr 2022 at 00:50.
Because it'll be bloody expensive. And don't say "then try paying for an accident". That's a theoretical.
ASA don’t want to build another tower - they want the next one to be remote
However when the first mid-air happens what do you think will occur?
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: Abeam Alice Springs
Posts: 1,110
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Nail on the head there I reckon. They will be waiting for TWR 2.0.
What is needed is an amendment to the Act that would allow contract (private) towers - that may be a cheaper option but is presently not an option.
As for BNA, a full length taxiway would be a good start.
The answer is that there used to be an airspace philosophy at the old DCA, guided as it was by the then requirement to keep fare-paying passengers safe. In a nut-shell, if it was RPT and had jets then controlled airspace (pre ICAO classification) was introduced. Hence, control towers suddenly popped up where FK28s were to operate, and in those days Control Towers had control area steps (no Ds Cs etc, just controlled airspace, of a type which later became Class B). This meant that Ballina would have looked like Coffs Harbour with one Controller controlling the aerodrome and the lower CTA steps (See Launceston, Hobart, Maroochydore, Alice Springs. Karratha, Broome, Hamilton Island and so on). This pretty much continued until the CAA came along and with it cost-recovery. I cannot remember the exact order, but Proserpine Tower was one of the first to go, and Gove and Port Hedland never opened.
Clearly the simplistic DCA philosophy was flawed however it had a basis in the experience of the then legislators. They were well aware of the widening speed gap between jet and non-jet aircraft. They were cognisant of the introduction of ATC in other parts of the world and knew the reasons why. Furthermore, they realised that traffic levels in Australia were constantly increasing, but above all, they were trying to stay ahead of the game. This last, in particular, seems to have disappeared from our airspace planning unless it involves city-based unmanned air taxis!
There was however one thing missing from the DCA philosophy, that was surveillance. I remember when the RAAF asked when DCA was going to introduce radar into Townsville and Darwin aerodromes (mid-70s). They were apparently told that radar was totally unnecessary, Australian controllers could do all that work in their heads with the assistance of a few scraps of cardboard. The rest is history, the RAAF took over all ATC (previously they just had runway controllers) at both joint-user airports and installed radar approach control.
So what is missing from the picture? It is almost certainly surveillance. Airservices wanted to dismantle their en-route radars 20 years ago but were forced to renew them all because they could not get an ADS-B mandate through CASA in the time-frame they wanted. Now that ADS-B is mandated you can guarantee that there will never be a new radar installation by Airservices, and the current J-curve will slowly fade away in much the same way as our navigation aids have disappeared.
The trouble is that the risk factors in Australian airspace are stubbornly staying ahead of the financial requirements of Airservices so "hope" has become the prime safety mitigation.
The warning signs are there but are being resolutely ignored by the organisations that are employed to recognise them. Does anyone seriously think that putting a short range (30NM) surveillance radar and control tower at Ballina is going to break the combined banks of Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin, Rex?
How about our three arms of Government living up to the trust the Australian people have in them? I quote:
- The ATSB's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation.......;
- ........safety must always be CASA's 'most important consideration; and,
- We [Airservices] provide a range of world-class services that allow safe and equitable access to our skies. Our primary focus is ensuring the safety of air travel - both in the air and on the ground
A great question!
The answer is that there used to be an airspace philosophy at the old DCA, guided as it was by the then requirement to keep fare-paying passengers safe. In a nut-shell, if it was RPT and had jets then controlled airspace (pre ICAO classification) was introduced. Hence, control towers suddenly popped up where FK28s were to operate, and in those days Control Towers had control area steps (no Ds Cs etc, just controlled airspace, of a type which later became Class B). This meant that Ballina would have looked like Coffs Harbour with one Controller controlling the aerodrome and the lower CTA steps (See Launceston, Hobart, Maroochydore, Alice Springs. Karratha, Broome, Hamilton Island and so on). This pretty much continued until the CAA came along and with it cost-recovery. I cannot remember the exact order, but Proserpine Tower was one of the first to go, and Gove and Port Hedland never opened.
Clearly the simplistic DCA philosophy was flawed however it had a basis in the experience of the then legislators. They were well aware of the widening speed gap between jet and non-jet aircraft. They were cognisant of the introduction of ATC in other parts of the world and knew the reasons why. Furthermore, they realised that traffic levels in Australia were constantly increasing, but above all, they were trying to stay ahead of the game. This last, in particular, seems to have disappeared from our airspace planning unless it involves city-based unmanned air taxis!
There was however one thing missing from the DCA philosophy, that was surveillance. I remember when the RAAF asked when DCA was going to introduce radar into Townsville and Darwin aerodromes (mid-70s). They were apparently told that radar was totally unnecessary, Australian controllers could do all that work in their heads with the assistance of a few scraps of cardboard. The rest is history, the RAAF took over all ATC (previously they just had runway controllers) at both joint-user airports and installed radar approach control.
So what is missing from the picture? It is almost certainly surveillance. Airservices wanted to dismantle their en-route radars 20 years ago but were forced to renew them all because they could not get an ADS-B mandate through CASA in the time-frame they wanted. Now that ADS-B is mandated you can guarantee that there will never be a new radar installation by Airservices, and the current J-curve will slowly fade away in much the same way as our navigation aids have disappeared.
The trouble is that the risk factors in Australian airspace are stubbornly staying ahead of the financial requirements of Airservices so "hope" has become the prime safety mitigation.
The warning signs are there but are being resolutely ignored by the organisations that are employed to recognise them. Does anyone seriously think that putting a short range (30NM) surveillance radar and control tower at Ballina is going to break the combined banks of Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin, Rex?
How about our three arms of Government living up to the trust the Australian people have in them? I quote:
The answer is that there used to be an airspace philosophy at the old DCA, guided as it was by the then requirement to keep fare-paying passengers safe. In a nut-shell, if it was RPT and had jets then controlled airspace (pre ICAO classification) was introduced. Hence, control towers suddenly popped up where FK28s were to operate, and in those days Control Towers had control area steps (no Ds Cs etc, just controlled airspace, of a type which later became Class B). This meant that Ballina would have looked like Coffs Harbour with one Controller controlling the aerodrome and the lower CTA steps (See Launceston, Hobart, Maroochydore, Alice Springs. Karratha, Broome, Hamilton Island and so on). This pretty much continued until the CAA came along and with it cost-recovery. I cannot remember the exact order, but Proserpine Tower was one of the first to go, and Gove and Port Hedland never opened.
Clearly the simplistic DCA philosophy was flawed however it had a basis in the experience of the then legislators. They were well aware of the widening speed gap between jet and non-jet aircraft. They were cognisant of the introduction of ATC in other parts of the world and knew the reasons why. Furthermore, they realised that traffic levels in Australia were constantly increasing, but above all, they were trying to stay ahead of the game. This last, in particular, seems to have disappeared from our airspace planning unless it involves city-based unmanned air taxis!
There was however one thing missing from the DCA philosophy, that was surveillance. I remember when the RAAF asked when DCA was going to introduce radar into Townsville and Darwin aerodromes (mid-70s). They were apparently told that radar was totally unnecessary, Australian controllers could do all that work in their heads with the assistance of a few scraps of cardboard. The rest is history, the RAAF took over all ATC (previously they just had runway controllers) at both joint-user airports and installed radar approach control.
So what is missing from the picture? It is almost certainly surveillance. Airservices wanted to dismantle their en-route radars 20 years ago but were forced to renew them all because they could not get an ADS-B mandate through CASA in the time-frame they wanted. Now that ADS-B is mandated you can guarantee that there will never be a new radar installation by Airservices, and the current J-curve will slowly fade away in much the same way as our navigation aids have disappeared.
The trouble is that the risk factors in Australian airspace are stubbornly staying ahead of the financial requirements of Airservices so "hope" has become the prime safety mitigation.
The warning signs are there but are being resolutely ignored by the organisations that are employed to recognise them. Does anyone seriously think that putting a short range (30NM) surveillance radar and control tower at Ballina is going to break the combined banks of Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin, Rex?
How about our three arms of Government living up to the trust the Australian people have in them? I quote:
- The ATSB's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation.......;
- ........safety must always be CASA's 'most important consideration; and,
- We [Airservices] provide a range of world-class services that allow safe and equitable access to our skies. Our primary focus is ensuring the safety of air travel - both in the air and on the ground
Airservices Australia (Airservices) have proposed a change to the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) to introduce a surveillance flight information service (SFIS) around Mangalore Airport…
The airspace safety regulator (CASA OAR) sits, apparently staring into the middle distance, until a commercially-focussed monopoly Air Navigation Service Provider submits a proposal to the airspace safety regulator. And the supposed independent safety investigator regurgitates the nonsense, uncritically. (Of course, what’s really happening is that a mixture of mates and incompetents in Air Services, CASA OAR and ATSB scramble to work out WTF knee jerk will sweep each manifestation of fundamental problems in air space go away, at the least cost for the commercial ANSP).
Australians are very lucky that the diameter of the roulette wheel is very large. Air Services and CASA and ATSB are gambling on it, every day.
A great question!
The answer is that there used to be an airspace philosophy at the old DCA, guided as it was by the then requirement to keep fare-paying passengers safe. In a nut-shell, if it was RPT and had jets then controlled airspace (pre ICAO classification) was introduced. Hence, control towers suddenly popped up where FK28s were to operate, and in those days Control Towers had control area steps (no Ds Cs etc, just controlled airspace, of a type which later became Class B). This meant that Ballina would have looked like Coffs Harbour with one Controller controlling the aerodrome and the lower CTA steps (See Launceston, Hobart, Maroochydore, Alice Springs. Karratha, Broome, Hamilton Island and so on). This pretty much continued until the CAA came along and with it cost-recovery. I cannot remember the exact order, but Proserpine Tower was one of the first to go, and Gove and Port Hedland never opened.
Clearly the simplistic DCA philosophy was flawed however it had a basis in the experience of the then legislators. They were well aware of the widening speed gap between jet and non-jet aircraft. They were cognisant of the introduction of ATC in other parts of the world and knew the reasons why. Furthermore, they realised that traffic levels in Australia were constantly increasing, but above all, they were trying to stay ahead of the game. This last, in particular, seems to have disappeared from our airspace planning unless it involves city-based unmanned air taxis!
There was however one thing missing from the DCA philosophy, that was surveillance. I remember when the RAAF asked when DCA was going to introduce radar into Townsville and Darwin aerodromes (mid-70s). They were apparently told that radar was totally unnecessary, Australian controllers could do all that work in their heads with the assistance of a few scraps of cardboard. The rest is history, the RAAF took over all ATC (previously they just had runway controllers) at both joint-user airports and installed radar approach control.
So what is missing from the picture? It is almost certainly surveillance. Airservices wanted to dismantle their en-route radars 20 years ago but were forced to renew them all because they could not get an ADS-B mandate through CASA in the time-frame they wanted. Now that ADS-B is mandated you can guarantee that there will never be a new radar installation by Airservices, and the current J-curve will slowly fade away in much the same way as our navigation aids have disappeared.
The trouble is that the risk factors in Australian airspace are stubbornly staying ahead of the financial requirements of Airservices so "hope" has become the prime safety mitigation.
The warning signs are there but are being resolutely ignored by the organisations that are employed to recognise them. Does anyone seriously think that putting a short range (30NM) surveillance radar and control tower at Ballina is going to break the combined banks of Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin, Rex?
How about our three arms of Government living up to the trust the Australian people have in them? I quote:
The answer is that there used to be an airspace philosophy at the old DCA, guided as it was by the then requirement to keep fare-paying passengers safe. In a nut-shell, if it was RPT and had jets then controlled airspace (pre ICAO classification) was introduced. Hence, control towers suddenly popped up where FK28s were to operate, and in those days Control Towers had control area steps (no Ds Cs etc, just controlled airspace, of a type which later became Class B). This meant that Ballina would have looked like Coffs Harbour with one Controller controlling the aerodrome and the lower CTA steps (See Launceston, Hobart, Maroochydore, Alice Springs. Karratha, Broome, Hamilton Island and so on). This pretty much continued until the CAA came along and with it cost-recovery. I cannot remember the exact order, but Proserpine Tower was one of the first to go, and Gove and Port Hedland never opened.
Clearly the simplistic DCA philosophy was flawed however it had a basis in the experience of the then legislators. They were well aware of the widening speed gap between jet and non-jet aircraft. They were cognisant of the introduction of ATC in other parts of the world and knew the reasons why. Furthermore, they realised that traffic levels in Australia were constantly increasing, but above all, they were trying to stay ahead of the game. This last, in particular, seems to have disappeared from our airspace planning unless it involves city-based unmanned air taxis!
There was however one thing missing from the DCA philosophy, that was surveillance. I remember when the RAAF asked when DCA was going to introduce radar into Townsville and Darwin aerodromes (mid-70s). They were apparently told that radar was totally unnecessary, Australian controllers could do all that work in their heads with the assistance of a few scraps of cardboard. The rest is history, the RAAF took over all ATC (previously they just had runway controllers) at both joint-user airports and installed radar approach control.
So what is missing from the picture? It is almost certainly surveillance. Airservices wanted to dismantle their en-route radars 20 years ago but were forced to renew them all because they could not get an ADS-B mandate through CASA in the time-frame they wanted. Now that ADS-B is mandated you can guarantee that there will never be a new radar installation by Airservices, and the current J-curve will slowly fade away in much the same way as our navigation aids have disappeared.
The trouble is that the risk factors in Australian airspace are stubbornly staying ahead of the financial requirements of Airservices so "hope" has become the prime safety mitigation.
The warning signs are there but are being resolutely ignored by the organisations that are employed to recognise them. Does anyone seriously think that putting a short range (30NM) surveillance radar and control tower at Ballina is going to break the combined banks of Qantas, Jetstar, Virgin, Rex?
How about our three arms of Government living up to the trust the Australian people have in them? I quote:
- The ATSB's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation.......;
- ........safety must always be CASA's 'most important consideration; and,
- We [Airservices] provide a range of world-class services that allow safe and equitable access to our skies. Our primary focus is ensuring the safety of air travel - both in the air and on the ground
News just in!!... AirServices release photo of futuristic new TWR proposal for BNA! AirServices CEO quoted as saying "Air Services is proud to once again demonstrate it is the leading provider of ATC services in the world".

Just released this afternoon: https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-i...ere-sfis-place
Separation incident highlights importance of communication over CTAF where a SFIS is in place
A Cessna Caravan pilot’s incorrect mental model was one of number of contributing factors that led to their aircraft taking off from Ballina Airport directly towards a Boeing 737 airliner that was on approach to land there, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation details.
The incident occurred on the afternoon of 16 September 2021, when a Virgin Australia 737-800 was conducting a scheduled passenger service from Sydney to Ballina, and the Caravan was commencing a repositioning flight from Ballina to the Sunshine Coast.
The Caravan had commenced its take-off roll from Ballina’s runway 06 to the east when the B737 was on final approach to land on the reciprocal runway 24 from the east.
Separation incident highlights importance of communication over CTAF where a SFIS is in place
A Cessna Caravan pilot’s incorrect mental model was one of number of contributing factors that led to their aircraft taking off from Ballina Airport directly towards a Boeing 737 airliner that was on approach to land there, an Australian Transport Safety Bureau investigation details.
The incident occurred on the afternoon of 16 September 2021, when a Virgin Australia 737-800 was conducting a scheduled passenger service from Sydney to Ballina, and the Caravan was commencing a repositioning flight from Ballina to the Sunshine Coast.
The Caravan had commenced its take-off roll from Ballina’s runway 06 to the east when the B737 was on final approach to land on the reciprocal runway 24 from the east.
A year and a half to release a simple report confirming the system that is in place since then doesn’t work or even have the equipment to make it work. High water mark, even for the ATSB.
SkyLibrary has recently highlighted the A320 / JAB4 near miss in the vicinity of Ballina NSW Australia (November 2020)
A320/JAB4
One of the tags (amongst many) is "Ineffective Regulatory Oversight". The world is watching.
A320/JAB4
One of the tags (amongst many) is "Ineffective Regulatory Oversight". The world is watching.
“The Caravan pilot had been provided with traffic information by the Ballina Airport surveillance flight information service controller, but the controller had not specified the landing direction of the 737 and the pilot had not sought this information."
Why? Seems like a pretty crucial information and pretty much the only thing the SFISC would be good for
This too seems a big issue (if it's under not just arse covering)
"The report also notes that the SFIS controller did not issue a safety alert as they were concerned that doing so would result in over transmitting communications between the 737 and Caravan."
Why? Seems like a pretty crucial information and pretty much the only thing the SFISC would be good for
This too seems a big issue (if it's under not just arse covering)
"The report also notes that the SFIS controller did not issue a safety alert as they were concerned that doing so would result in over transmitting communications between the 737 and Caravan."
It is surreal. Might as well punt the SFIS.
Partial information can be more dangerous than no information, because partial information can be misleading.
Partial information can be more dangerous than no information, because partial information can be misleading.
Yes, the problem with half the info is that some pilots close their eyes and procede as though they have everything. When you have only been passed known traffic, not all traffic.