Jetstar and Ballina again
the fact the Jabiru into BNA wasn’t making radio calls.
Last edited by Traffic_Is_Er_Was; 9th Apr 2022 at 01:09.
While I love reading the stuff above, if we have a problem in Australia, why don't we fix it?
I don't know why professionals like yourself bother? You know nothing will change in this country. I seriously doubt an accident at this airport would change anything. If the worst were to happen, Joyce will blame excessive numbers of passengers wanting to go to a holiday destination are to blame.
There are accepted world-wide practises that cater for such developments,
The reality is both these balls-ups have been caused by communications. Using CTAF and ATC together (Mangalore) or Ballina where the Jab, A320 and the missing-in-action CAGRO could have done better.
An airport can voluntarily develop runways, taxiways,
I agree with your point regarding a "private" tower. Probably have plenty of takers for ATC in that part of the world. Apart from the rent.
Oh, I forgot, ATSB thinks ADS-B will solve the problem, clearly they are not the solution, just part of the problem.
I don't. You only have to look at this very report to see that. There is not a single skerrick of info about the Jetstar crew having any consideration for anyone other than IFR traffic. CAAP166 says radio calls from IFR aircraft should be in plain english, yet this crew insisted on using IFR and RNAV waypoints. Why? "I'm in a shiny jet and need to prove I can do stuff you can't!"?
Every time I have been into BNA, the threat of VFR traffic is briefed prior to ToD, so again I would be surprised if there was no consideration for ‘other than IFR traffic’.
Respectfully, both of those statements paint a pretty ignorant picture.
I will repeat though, I think it’s totally inappropriate for RPT jets arriving into CTAFs to be referencing IFR waypoints. The JQ crew on this day certainly did not help themselves with this radio call.
I should have stated ‘appropriate radio calls’ in my first post. Had the Jab pilot been aware of the RPT aircrafts position, I would expect them to have made a radio call referencing BNA, especially if they were familiar with the area. In addition to that, the JQ pilots should have started to pay attention when they heard another aircraft east of Lismore at 5000’, which is where that RNP approach takes you. But, unfamiliarity may have played a part in this. BNA Radio is the one who probably should have the most Situational Awareness of local geographic features as well as RNAV points - the operator should have been aware of the potential conflict.
And finally, unless you’ve actually operated under the IFR into a busy CTAF, then you probably don’t realise the workload involved. Im
not trying to turn this into a pissing contest, but some of the more challenging flying I have done is flying into a busy CTAF whilst in cloud, trying to monitor Centre, the CTAF and flying the beginning of an instrument approach to get visual. I have done this in light GA twins, King Airs, Dash 8s and 737s.
I think there is a lot of things that didn’t go right on this day, and everyone was very lucky it didn’t turn out worse.
Ultimately this wouldn’t happen if the guidelines were followed that would trigger the implementation of a Class D tower.
when they heard another aircraft east of Lismore at 5000’
I would expect them
to have made a radio call referencing BNA
Would a Class D tower have prevented this? It wasn't in the BNA circuit. It was IFR-VFR crossing traffic 12 miles out. How big do you want the control zone? If there was overlaying Class E, does that not just add to the frequency conglomeration in that area. What freq are LIS and EVD meant to be on? The only thing that might have happened is the Jab may have avoided the CTA (thus the conflict) , which then brings the howls from the usual suspects of GA being hounded out of airspace.
Last edited by Traffic_Is_Er_Was; 9th Apr 2022 at 01:56.
From the report's precis:
The pilot of 7456 was not even aware there WAS an opposing aircraft, let alone what altitude it was. It didn't matter to old mate in the Jab what type the opposing aircraft was. He hadn't heard any broadcasts, and didn't see the A320 until after they had passed. If not, he'd have landed at EVD none the wiser. VGP advised the other inbound 737 on the CTAF of the traffic heading their way almost immediately after it happened. The report doesn't say whether there was any conflict resolution between them and the Jab, or was there deathly silence there too? Did old mate Jab pipe up and work it out with the next jet, or had he missed that call too?
The vertical separation between the two aircraft was influenced by chance alone as the flight crew of VGP and the pilot of 7456 were not aware of the altitude of the opposing aircraft
Last edited by Traffic_Is_Er_Was; 9th Apr 2022 at 03:49.
BNA Radio is the one who probably should have the most Situational Awareness of local geographic features as well as RNAV points - the operator should have been aware of the potential conflict.
Originally Posted by TIEW
Why? He hears (maybe) someone broadcast to LIS traffic that they are just to the east of LIS and descending. That tells him nothing. It wasn't directed at BNA Radio. Is he supposed to jump into any obscure broadcast in a large shared CTAF that has 3 busy aerodromes in it to query everyone?
I contend that the SOLE job of the CAGRO is to know what/where the traffic is and advise if the aircraft don't work out something between themselves. He/she would have no idea what the Jab's intentions were and should have asked. It's not as though the three airports are 1000 miles apart.
But there are half a dozen ‘airports’ within a 20nm radius of BNA, all blabbing on the same CTAF. Good luck any individual trying to keep track of what all that blabbing means on a busy day. Hence another lump on the camel: SAFIS.
Not angry pills. Reality pills. WHo knows what his workload was at the time? IF the Jab were going to BNA. IF the CAGRO heard the broadcast. IF the CAGRO wasn't on the phone talking to the company of any of the RPT's. IF there wasn't someone else talking on the CTAF at the time. IF...If...If. I contend the sole job of the BNA CAGRO is to know what is going on at BNA. Not what is happening at LIS when aircraft are calling "Traffic LIS". Maybe he subconsciously tuned out when he heard that. Maybe the crew of the A320 did too. The ATSB think they might have. BNA Council is not paying him for a CAGRS at LIS or EVD or CAS. His job is 10nm BNA. He'd be listening to random and almost all irrelevant sh*t on the CTAF all day. Everyone else seems to not have heard the Jab's broadcast, why not the CAGRO too?
With respect, Capn, you obviously don’t spend much time in the ‘J curve’ monitoring 126.7 or any BA frequency.
Obviously my point is only valid if the CAGRS heard the jab make his call.
I would suspect that the CAGRS operator would be the expert on the local area (other airfields on CTAF, RPT Jet aircraft arrival tracks, RNP Waypoints, local geographical points). He is the one who should have the SA to think ‘Hey, an aircraft east of Lismore tracking to Evans Head sounds like it’s going to go awfully close to Opami’. I’m not apportioning blame, I’m
simply stating how I think the ‘system’ should have worked on the day:
- Inbound RPT jet makes radio call with basic bearing / distance / intention / ETA details in a way that VFR pilots will understand
- VFR aircraft in the area of BNA have sufficient local knowledge to think ‘Hey, old mate inbound in his 320 might get close to me, I will tell him what I am doing
- The CAGRS is there to make sure everyone is on the right page and pass on or confirm details.
Traffic - what do you think is the solution to all of this, other than leaving separation down to ‘pure chance’?
I would suspect that the CAGRS operator would be the expert on the local area (other airfields on CTAF, RPT Jet aircraft arrival tracks, RNP Waypoints, local geographical points). He is the one who should have the SA to think ‘Hey, an aircraft east of Lismore tracking to Evans Head sounds like it’s going to go awfully close to Opami’. I’m not apportioning blame, I’m
simply stating how I think the ‘system’ should have worked on the day:
- Inbound RPT jet makes radio call with basic bearing / distance / intention / ETA details in a way that VFR pilots will understand
- VFR aircraft in the area of BNA have sufficient local knowledge to think ‘Hey, old mate inbound in his 320 might get close to me, I will tell him what I am doing
- The CAGRS is there to make sure everyone is on the right page and pass on or confirm details.
Traffic - what do you think is the solution to all of this, other than leaving separation down to ‘pure chance’?
And with respect to you, too, Colonel, you obviously don’t spend too much time listening to over-transmitted and garbled CTAF calls.
Solution? Not G or SAFIS or CAGRO.
Solution? Not G or SAFIS or CAGRO.
But the CAGRO didn't know he was going to EVD. No one did. Except the pilot of the Jab, and he didn't tell anybody. And there's the problem. Break one link in a system that needs all the links to work, and it doesn't. Take away every other bandaid added to try and make see and avoid work, and you find see and avoid doesn't work. Even alerted see and avoid often doesn't work. The A320 crew were basically told by TCAS what direction to look and still couldn't see anything.
It's OCTA. The separation standard is that there isn't one. Missing is enough. If you want to apply standards and minimums, it can't be uncontrolled. In ye olde days, when there were only two types of airspace, the rules dictated who could fly in what or who must fly in what, and how you did it. Now there is an alphabet of airspace, where sometimes you're sort of controlled, and sometimes you're sort of uncontrolled, or sometimes you are and the other guy isn't, or sometimes someone's looking out for you, but sometimes they're not because they're busy doing something else. And jets full of mug punters are mixing it up with Jabs and powered hang gliders.
The solution? We need what the yanks have. It seems to work. BUT, we need the infrastructure the yanks have to support it, which we don't have, because it costs a fortune. Someone thought it would be a good idea to have what the yanks have, without the corresponding infrastructure, thinking it would come for free. It doesn't, and that's why we have the mess.
It's OCTA. The separation standard is that there isn't one. Missing is enough. If you want to apply standards and minimums, it can't be uncontrolled. In ye olde days, when there were only two types of airspace, the rules dictated who could fly in what or who must fly in what, and how you did it. Now there is an alphabet of airspace, where sometimes you're sort of controlled, and sometimes you're sort of uncontrolled, or sometimes you are and the other guy isn't, or sometimes someone's looking out for you, but sometimes they're not because they're busy doing something else. And jets full of mug punters are mixing it up with Jabs and powered hang gliders.
The solution? We need what the yanks have. It seems to work. BUT, we need the infrastructure the yanks have to support it, which we don't have, because it costs a fortune. Someone thought it would be a good idea to have what the yanks have, without the corresponding infrastructure, thinking it would come for free. It doesn't, and that's why we have the mess.
So: What did Australia use to have at places that are like BNA now, and who and what are stopping that happening now at BNA?
AFAIK the PPL syllabus and the RAA syllabus contain not one word about the characteristics of RPT heavy jets let alone their operations IFR or VFR. I trained at YMMB and did my controlled airspace work into YMEN. I am not proud to say I know nothing about your procedures, STARS, waypoints, etc. I was taught to obey ATC and that was it. I still don't know what or why you RPT jets are doing something. All I know is to keep out of the way.
Observation 1: If VFR pilots don't know what you are doing or what to expect, then how can we be expected to detect a dangerous situation developing and manouver to maintain separation? We can have a stab at it but we are guessing. Hence there may be a need to train and educate VFR pilots as one line of defence.
Observation 2: Building on #1, are there standard avoidance procedures VFR pilots could adopt? if STARS are routine, then for example how about developing VFR matching equivalents that keep us clear?
I am not trying to make more work for RPT pilots but suggesting that if you use standard procedures at uncontrolled airports, then it would be logical to expect VFR pilots to use matching defensive procedures. That might require VFR pilots to call ATC and be told what to expect and to plan accordingly.
Observation 1: If VFR pilots don't know what you are doing or what to expect, then how can we be expected to detect a dangerous situation developing and manouver to maintain separation? We can have a stab at it but we are guessing. Hence there may be a need to train and educate VFR pilots as one line of defence.
Observation 2: Building on #1, are there standard avoidance procedures VFR pilots could adopt? if STARS are routine, then for example how about developing VFR matching equivalents that keep us clear?
I am not trying to make more work for RPT pilots but suggesting that if you use standard procedures at uncontrolled airports, then it would be logical to expect VFR pilots to use matching defensive procedures. That might require VFR pilots to call ATC and be told what to expect and to plan accordingly.
Australia just expanded CTA to suit especially if jets were involved. Why doesn't that happen now? I think they forgot how to. Ever since someone slapped them on the wrist for putting those expensive Control Towers in everywhere, they've avoided them like the plague.
So I actually think I am rather in tune to the issue.
It is still my firm belief that the BNA are should have Class D. But there are a few here that I am expecting will disagree with that too
Australia just expanded CTA to suit especially if jets were involved. Why doesn't that happen now? I think they forgot how to. Ever since someone slapped them on the wrist for putting those expensive Control Towers in everywhere, they've avoided them like the plague.
I am going to do some pure speculation here: ASA don’t want to build another tower - they want the next one to be remote. Whilst the regs allow it, they and CASA don’t have the ability to make it happen in the medium term. Everything possible is being done to avoid actually putting a control zone around BNA - it’s time to start asking why.
Well Lead, within the last 2 years I’ve operated numerous Rpt jet flights into BNA, and into MNG during lockdown when I picked up some part time work do the odd piece of IFR instructing.
So I actually think I am rather in tune to the issue.
It is still my firm belief that the BNA are should have Class D. But there are a few here that I am expecting will disagree with that too
So I actually think I am rather in tune to the issue.
It is still my firm belief that the BNA are should have Class D. But there are a few here that I am expecting will disagree with that too
If during those operations you’ve not heard an over-transmitted or garbled broadcast, and you’ve always been confident that you’ve an accurate mind picture of all traffic in the BA, you’ve been very lucky IMO.