Mt Erebus Disaster 40th Anniversary
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And who were the captains who were disregarding SOP"s. Could it be that they were all NZALPA members? and who was it that Mahon was using for his technical expertise and knowledge of what went on down there?? Could it have been these same NZALPA members, Gordon Vette comes to mind.
Once again from John King publication.
"Everybody involved, including the aircrew who practised their McMurdo approach and let down procedures in the simulator, was aware that the flight path to the final destination lay close to the mountain, but separated from it because the minimum flying height at that point was 16,000ft, more that 3,000ft or about 1000 metres higher than the volcano summit.
It is more than mere semantics. An IFR (Instrument flight rules) flight plan does not mention any descent procedures, which are a separate issue altogether and operated in accordance with WEATHER!!!!!! and other traffic at the destination at the time of arrival, factors impossible to foresee at the time of planning."
It is very obvious that many in this forum are well aware of these facts, but equally obvious many are not.
Once again from John King publication.
"Everybody involved, including the aircrew who practised their McMurdo approach and let down procedures in the simulator, was aware that the flight path to the final destination lay close to the mountain, but separated from it because the minimum flying height at that point was 16,000ft, more that 3,000ft or about 1000 metres higher than the volcano summit.
It is more than mere semantics. An IFR (Instrument flight rules) flight plan does not mention any descent procedures, which are a separate issue altogether and operated in accordance with WEATHER!!!!!! and other traffic at the destination at the time of arrival, factors impossible to foresee at the time of planning."
It is very obvious that many in this forum are well aware of these facts, but equally obvious many are not.
Last edited by prospector; 11th Dec 2019 at 00:59. Reason: addition
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They were all NZALPA members back then, It was compulsory.
As regards Megan, she has disqualified herself with her VMC answer. Would Compressor Stall care to join her?
And will one of the Believers please tell me which way Collins turned.
As regards Megan, she has disqualified herself with her VMC answer. Would Compressor Stall care to join her?
And will one of the Believers please tell me which way Collins turned.
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Once again from the John King publication "Various unidentified people started to voice unease at the situation, but discussion about the direction to climb away was interrupted by the GPWS and its very disembodied but very loud and authoritive, "Woop-woop! Pull Up, Pull Up.
Everybody reacted promptly. Gordon Brookes read out the rapidly decreasing heights on the radio altimeter and Jim Collins pulled back on the control column as he called for Go Round Power Please. The engines were responding and the DC10's nose was raised towards the climbing attitude, but the inertia of 200 tonnes of aircraft was not overcome in time and FL TE901 hit the ice, still in level flight, with unimaginable violence and completely disintegrated, six and a half seconds after the first warning."
So the question of which way they were going to climb out was not finalised, apparently,and they hit in level flight.
Everybody reacted promptly. Gordon Brookes read out the rapidly decreasing heights on the radio altimeter and Jim Collins pulled back on the control column as he called for Go Round Power Please. The engines were responding and the DC10's nose was raised towards the climbing attitude, but the inertia of 200 tonnes of aircraft was not overcome in time and FL TE901 hit the ice, still in level flight, with unimaginable violence and completely disintegrated, six and a half seconds after the first warning."
So the question of which way they were going to climb out was not finalised, apparently,and they hit in level flight.
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Just before the automated warning sounded, when Collins had finally decided to get out, Cassin told him it was clear to the right. Remember that Collins, according to Jacinda Ardern and Mahon, believed the high ground to be to his left, because he has locked the aircraft back onto the wonderful nav track. So you would turn right, would you not? Especially if your co-pilot, sitting on the right with a better view, says it's clear to the right. in response, Collins said "No negative". What did he mean by that? We know exactly what he meant, because he then pulled out the Heading Select knob and initiated a turn, to the right. To the right. Towards where the high ground was supposed to be. So much for Mahon's nonsense about him be sure of his position.
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EXACTLY megan. Or, as Collins himself put it "very hard to tell the difference between cloud and ice".
You don't need to resort to some dastardly optical illusion to understand if you're flying at 500' below a cloud layer above ice covered terrain that if there's a mountain ahead of you you just won't see it.
You don't need to resort to some dastardly optical illusion to understand if you're flying at 500' below a cloud layer above ice covered terrain that if there's a mountain ahead of you you just won't see it.
More reversing of the truth truck.
Well Ampman, I suggest you go back and read the Chippendale report again.
15 seconds prior to impact, the Copilot says he can see Ross Island.
12 Seconds prior Copilot says clear to turn right, there's no high ground
8 seconds prior to impact the heading knob is pulled out that commands a turn to the right.
It's not time stamped to the second but between 12 seconds and 6 seconds before impact, after some chatter, Collins says "No, negative" and initiates a turn to the left. That is what the aircraft was about to start doing when it hit (it had reversed the roll and was roughly wings level). It is highly likely that this "No - negative" was in response to a decision not to go right, and coincided with commencing a turn to the left.
He did NOT say "No negative" then turn right. The timestamps outline that he started a right turn, then changed his mind. Possibly - although we will never know - the penny might have dropped as to the position and he realised Mt Bird was to the right. but sadly all too late.
. So you would turn right, would you not? Especially if your co-pilot, sitting on the right with a better view, says it's clear to the right. in response, Collins said "No negative". What did he mean by that? We know exactly what he meant, because he then pulled out the Heading Select knob and initiated a turn, to the right. To the right. Towards where the high ground was supposed to be.
15 seconds prior to impact, the Copilot says he can see Ross Island.
12 Seconds prior Copilot says clear to turn right, there's no high ground
8 seconds prior to impact the heading knob is pulled out that commands a turn to the right.
It's not time stamped to the second but between 12 seconds and 6 seconds before impact, after some chatter, Collins says "No, negative" and initiates a turn to the left. That is what the aircraft was about to start doing when it hit (it had reversed the roll and was roughly wings level). It is highly likely that this "No - negative" was in response to a decision not to go right, and coincided with commencing a turn to the left.
He did NOT say "No negative" then turn right. The timestamps outline that he started a right turn, then changed his mind. Possibly - although we will never know - the penny might have dropped as to the position and he realised Mt Bird was to the right. but sadly all too late.
Last edited by compressor stall; 11th Dec 2019 at 02:25.
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I typed "right" instead of "left". Collins turned left, using the auto-pilot. He pulled out the knob and initiated a left turn, towards where he was supposed to believe the mountain was,
I finally agree with something you have said: The penny finally dropped. He realised the situation. He remembered what he had been told at the briefing, that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station. He remembered the night before, when he plotted the course from an old flightplan which had the waypoint somewhere else. He remembered that a track to McMurdo Station would go over Erebus, but he also remembered plotting a track to the different waypoint which would not go over Erebus. He remembered that the never bothered checking. He reaiised why he could not get radio contact. Then he died,
I finally agree with something you have said: The penny finally dropped. He realised the situation. He remembered what he had been told at the briefing, that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station. He remembered the night before, when he plotted the course from an old flightplan which had the waypoint somewhere else. He remembered that a track to McMurdo Station would go over Erebus, but he also remembered plotting a track to the different waypoint which would not go over Erebus. He remembered that the never bothered checking. He reaiised why he could not get radio contact. Then he died,
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From Chippindale report "Had the crew followed their stated intention to descend on a heading of 180° grid they would have increased their safety margin from the high ground, but without further advice to “McMurdo Centre” the pilot in command reversed the aircraft’s descent track and from 5800 feet the descent to 2000 feet was completed on a heading of 357° grid back toward the cloud covered high ground. This inbound track had a minimum safe altitude of 16000 feet. After reaching 2000 feet the aircraft captain announced he would descend a further 500 feet to obtain a better view below the continuous cloud layer and the first officer supported this by say “Yeah O.K. – probably see further in anyway”.
This was where the obvious error was commenced, turning back onto 357 grid and not relating that to the required MSA for that heading. That is of course after not taking the advice of the Met People on the ground at McMurdo, in my opinion. Which is worth very little, but still interesting to see other folks take on the repercussions of this tragedy.
This was where the obvious error was commenced, turning back onto 357 grid and not relating that to the required MSA for that heading. That is of course after not taking the advice of the Met People on the ground at McMurdo, in my opinion. Which is worth very little, but still interesting to see other folks take on the repercussions of this tragedy.
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The current NZ regulations just say 5000m. Australia the same. The "all directions" requirement, however, is implicit.
But I have just twigged as to what your argument might be. Is it that when they levelled out at 2000/1500 feet, they could see well over 5000m ahead? So when they were miles away from the mountain and if a black helicopter came around from the base, they would have seen it easily? Is that it?
But I have just twigged as to what your argument might be. Is it that when they levelled out at 2000/1500 feet, they could see well over 5000m ahead? So when they were miles away from the mountain and if a black helicopter came around from the base, they would have seen it easily? Is that it?
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I finally agree with something you have said: The penny finally dropped. He realised the situation. He remembered what he had been told at the briefing, that the waypoint was at McMurdo Station. He remembered the night before, when he plotted the course from an old flightplan which had the waypoint somewhere else. He remembered that a track to McMurdo Station would go over Erebus, but he also remembered plotting a track to the different waypoint which would not go over Erebus. He remembered that the never bothered checking. He reaiised why he could not get radio contact. Then he died,
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Compressor Stall and Megan fancy themselves as lawyers. Their VMC argument is similar to something a lawyer might put forward to get someone off a drink-drive charge.
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With regards the decision wether to turn left or right, Collins is sitting in the left and can see better around to the left, Cassins is sitting in the right and can see better around to the right. Collins can see what he believes is Cape Royds/Ross Island, in actual fact he is looking at Cape Tennyson, and observes he can do a left hand turn having done one 10miles further north on the same orbit.