Mt Erebus Disaster 40th Anniversary
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Interesting hypothesis. In 1979, with the structure of the Government and it’s ownership of ANZ, combined with the likes of Davies and Muldoon at the helm with Chief Footstool Chippendale firing their loaded bullets, they would’ve definitely blamed the pilots for the ‘near miss’. It’s a no-brainer really because that’s what airlines do - ALWAYS BLAME THE PILOTS. Easy scapegoats so they can say ‘the airline is safe’, ‘the aircraft type is safe’, ‘our robust management are safe’, ‘****, even Mr Erebus is safe’, it was the pilots fault and we are dealing with those pesky Skygods as we speak. Case closed. Profits to protect, bonuses to collect, shareholders to please, etc etc.
Last edited by Paragraph377; 13th Dec 2019 at 00:19.
This thread brings back a lot of memories.
I was 14 years old on that night, and vividly remember TV newsreader Bill McCarthy announcing the plane was overdue.
Years later, a colleague who was a TV reporter at the time spoke of drinking in the Christchurch Media Club with a mate from Air NZ that evening.
The bartender yelled out to his mate that there was a call for him.
The friend came back white as a sheet and said "I've got to go..." and ran out leaving his beer.
As a TV reporter in the 90s, I met some of the news people who were in the pool who went down to the Ice.
Also spoke to Ron Chippendale on many occasions.
In 2004, I sat in a one on one with Ralph Norris in his office as a final step in getting my job with Air NZ.
"Sooner or later, someone will get in your ear about Erebus," he said. He was right.
The pain was still visceral.
Norm Thompson told me that the poor chap who was responsible for the INS programming error was dead - I seem to remember him saying he committed suicide?
Correct me if I'm wrong, but even if Jim Collins was below MSA - how can he be blamed when there was sector whiteout ahead of him - in essence he would have though it was clear - so would have been practising good airmanship?
The INS programming error compounded that assumption.
From what I understand many flights prior had descended below MSA in CAVOK conditions - promotional brochures from Air NZ at the time have photos from aircraft showing terrain through the windows.
Classic example of the holes in the cheese lining up - with a dreadful outcome.
I was 14 years old on that night, and vividly remember TV newsreader Bill McCarthy announcing the plane was overdue.
Years later, a colleague who was a TV reporter at the time spoke of drinking in the Christchurch Media Club with a mate from Air NZ that evening.
The bartender yelled out to his mate that there was a call for him.
The friend came back white as a sheet and said "I've got to go..." and ran out leaving his beer.
As a TV reporter in the 90s, I met some of the news people who were in the pool who went down to the Ice.
Also spoke to Ron Chippendale on many occasions.
In 2004, I sat in a one on one with Ralph Norris in his office as a final step in getting my job with Air NZ.
"Sooner or later, someone will get in your ear about Erebus," he said. He was right.
The pain was still visceral.
Norm Thompson told me that the poor chap who was responsible for the INS programming error was dead - I seem to remember him saying he committed suicide?
Correct me if I'm wrong, but even if Jim Collins was below MSA - how can he be blamed when there was sector whiteout ahead of him - in essence he would have though it was clear - so would have been practising good airmanship?
The INS programming error compounded that assumption.
From what I understand many flights prior had descended below MSA in CAVOK conditions - promotional brochures from Air NZ at the time have photos from aircraft showing terrain through the windows.
Classic example of the holes in the cheese lining up - with a dreadful outcome.
Last edited by tartare; 12th Dec 2019 at 21:55.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but even if Jim Collins was below MSA - how can he be blamed when there was sector whiteout ahead of him - in essence he would have though it was clear - so would have been practising good airmanship?
The INS programming error compounded that assumption.
From what I understand many flights prior had descended below MSA in CAVOK conditions - promotional brochures from Air NZ at the time have photos from aircraft showing terrain through the windows.
Classic example of the holes in the cheese lining up - with a dreadful outcome.
The INS programming error compounded that assumption.
From what I understand many flights prior had descended below MSA in CAVOK conditions - promotional brochures from Air NZ at the time have photos from aircraft showing terrain through the windows.
Classic example of the holes in the cheese lining up - with a dreadful outcome.
he had to descend through cloud that was already below MSA
I want to know why not seeing it (a very nearby, tall mountain) didn’t ring alarm bells
Did the airline have an SOP requiring the plotting of waypoints derived from the AINS? My assumption is maybe no, as it wasn't until the penultimate flight that questions were raised by it's Captain, which set in train the waypoint change for the final flight.
For those who play the blame game, who would you blame here? We lost an F-111 which crashed into an island on a low level night flight, many parallels to Erebus in my eyes.
https://static1.squarespace.com/stat...ward+Short.pdf
RIP Flt Lt Anthony "Shorty" Short (pilot) and Sqn Ldr Stephen "Nige" Hobbs (navigator)
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Para 377 "Chief Footstool Chippendale during their loaded bullets"
Cannot really decipher that one, but if the intent is what I think it is, then it is utter garbage, Ron Chippindale was nobodies "Footstool", And he produced a very good Accident Report.
You can have your exceedingly cynical, bitter twisted views of Airline management and ancillary establishments, if that is your want, but I doubt many would agree with you. Some, like all people, make mistakes at times, but it certainly makes one wonder what they did to you for those views to surface. on a public forum.
Cannot really decipher that one, but if the intent is what I think it is, then it is utter garbage, Ron Chippindale was nobodies "Footstool", And he produced a very good Accident Report.
You can have your exceedingly cynical, bitter twisted views of Airline management and ancillary establishments, if that is your want, but I doubt many would agree with you. Some, like all people, make mistakes at times, but it certainly makes one wonder what they did to you for those views to surface. on a public forum.
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" There is no evidence that he descended through cloud, in fact there is no evidence that he didn't maintain VMC at all times"
And there is no evidence that he did. I use he rather than they because there was no consultation with the rest of the crew as to his intentions on descent.
There is the weather report from McMurdo, with very well qualified met observers that advised the crew the area was no good for sightseeing due weather, even stating that the tops of local hills were above the cloud base, there are the reports from the USAF aircraft that followed a little while behind about the layers of cloud they descended through..
From John King publication.
From 1978 until the disaster all those pilots had cheerfully flown down McMurdo Sound more or less on the approach path used by the military pilots, instead of over Ross Island. The former might have seemed the more logical route, keeping clear of high ground, but the airline preferred it's DC10's to stay well away from any conflicting local traffic.In any case it was largely academic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.
The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziells's flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic Pole, diverting even before reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallett.
So obviously the weather was the deciding factor, and on his first venture down to the ice, the captain took it upon himself to completely disregard advice from seasoned Antarctic weather observers as to the advisability of proceeding to McMurdo Base.
But this decision, according to Justice Mahon, was not the deciding factor that ended up with the aircraft impacting Ross Island at slightly under 1,500ft.
.
And there is no evidence that he did. I use he rather than they because there was no consultation with the rest of the crew as to his intentions on descent.
There is the weather report from McMurdo, with very well qualified met observers that advised the crew the area was no good for sightseeing due weather, even stating that the tops of local hills were above the cloud base, there are the reports from the USAF aircraft that followed a little while behind about the layers of cloud they descended through..
From John King publication.
From 1978 until the disaster all those pilots had cheerfully flown down McMurdo Sound more or less on the approach path used by the military pilots, instead of over Ross Island. The former might have seemed the more logical route, keeping clear of high ground, but the airline preferred it's DC10's to stay well away from any conflicting local traffic.In any case it was largely academic as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.
The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziells's flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic Pole, diverting even before reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallett.
So obviously the weather was the deciding factor, and on his first venture down to the ice, the captain took it upon himself to completely disregard advice from seasoned Antarctic weather observers as to the advisability of proceeding to McMurdo Base.
But this decision, according to Justice Mahon, was not the deciding factor that ended up with the aircraft impacting Ross Island at slightly under 1,500ft.
.
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Maybe it is just my view. I apologise to the majority of pilots out there who believe that if there is an accident or incident their employer will stick by them and not try to hang the blame on them, even if they are faultless. Obviously since I retired, airlines have changed dramatically and are now totally loyal to their highly valued pilots. That’s great to hear. I’m surprised there aren’t more people entering aviation. Great place to work.
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What prune DOES do is illustrate the major bias carried by quite a few
Bollocks.
There’s an emotive, knee-jerk reaction to defend a fellow pilot who was clearly set-up, but equally made the enabling decision in the accident. You may not like the Ampan-style delivery but if you view this accident objectively you WILL end up deciding the crew were a factor. There is no shame in that, it’s not apportioning “blame”, it just IS. The dogmatic amongst us seem to sit on just one side of the debate...
emotive, knee-jerk reaction to defend a fellow pilot
P.S. ampan's delivery doesn't bother me in the slightest. Nor does anyone else's.
Last edited by The name is Porter; 13th Dec 2019 at 02:53.
And he produced a very good Accident Report
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I would think because as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures.
There was report from the ice about low flying commercial aircraft, why nothing was done about it is probably because, even though they broke rules or regulations, one would expect senior captains to not do anything that would endanger the flight.
The critical part of the observation Brilliantly clear conditions.
There was report from the ice about low flying commercial aircraft, why nothing was done about it is probably because, even though they broke rules or regulations, one would expect senior captains to not do anything that would endanger the flight.
The critical part of the observation Brilliantly clear conditions.
I would think because as all but one flight had approached Antarctica in brilliantly clear conditions and the final letdown was entirely VFR with no need for instrument cloud break procedures
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Yes, granted, but who would NZC AA . discipline? the Company or the captains, who were all senior members of NZALPA? and remember a very senior member of ALPA, who orchestrated a lot of the findings of Justice Mahon justified his descent by saying he was invited down by the controller at McMurdo, from 6,000ft minimum to 1,500ft, and after that it became the norm., weather permitting., which for the most part it did.
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Who cares about altitude? You could go down to 500 feet in DC10, quite safely: Look at what the 10s have been doing in California putting out fires.
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/califor...ing-wildfires/
I
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/califor...ing-wildfires/
I
Last edited by ampan; 13th Dec 2019 at 05:09.
This is really becoming ridiculous. Not content with rehashing rehashed history and going round and round in circles, now we are comparing passenger carrying operations with firefighting aircraft operations.
Clutching at straws springs to mind.
CC.
Clutching at straws springs to mind.
CC.
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Clutching at straws? The Believers should rewind. Think about things for a week, or in your case, two weeks.
justified his descent by saying he was invited down by the controller at McMurdo, from 6,000ft minimum to 1,500ft
With reference to the gin clear days, you can suffer whiteout in those conditions as well.
You could go down to 500 feet in DC10, quite safely
.Report,
https://www.safecom.gov/searchone_new.asp?ID=23587
Not unlike whiteout in some respects.
that video looks to me like a nasty example of ‘hidden ridge’, a known illusion where terrain in the foreground has a similar appearance to that in the background and ‘disappears’ until it starts to bloom rapidly at short range
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As to altitude, yes, they went down very low. And yes, they said otherwise. You can call that "perjury" if you want. I call it "regrettable" and "understandable", when some lawyer shoves a statement under your nose and tells you to sign it. But if you want to get technical, then "perjury" is the right word.
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And at NO STAGE have I said you did. But there is a bunch of what I consider to be learned contributors that do. That is truely incongruous to me...
I understand the social more not to speak ill of the dead, and to defend those can't defend themselves, and not to heap more misery on the families but those serve no purpose in uncovering all the factors that contributed to the accident.
I have read ALL of your comments, and ALL of the 25 year anniversary thread because I was part of it - don't let the new handle throw you off, my prune start date is out by about 20 years - nothing I've seen since I left has made me regret missing the better part of two decades of mostly crap that turns up on here. But I just can't let this rest - it is inconceivable that otherwise profession aviators can defend the crew action on the basis of "well everybody else did it"! I mean WTF? are 5 year olds? My observing that they played a part DOES NOT mean that I disregard the company antics, the lack of training, the corporate arrogance, the changing of the waypoint, whiteout, Collins was an alleged meticulist (It's a word - really!) etc - it just means that saying everybody else did it is no defence. I'm truely sorry for them that this is the case, they were absolutely handed a loaded gun and that sucks, but it was not preordained that they would hit the hill when they left Auckland. It just wasn't. If any one of the myriad factors in Megan's swiss cheddar were removed, then the accident wouldn't have happened as it did. One of those factors was the crew descending below MSA in "unlimited" visibility that prevented them somehow from seeing a very tall mountain that was just 27nm to their left (so they thought). I know why the didn't SEE it, but why did NOT SEEING it (either left OR right) not lead them to question what they were seeing, and by extension, where they were? If that factor (read decision) was removed, again, there would be no accident - ergo, it WAS a factor. It can't not be! All the rest of this fluff is just trying to obfuscate the facts. As is all the recent bandwagoners that "contribute" to the thread by saying "..its becoming ridiculous", "rehashing history" and "going round and round in circles". Thanks guys
You'd be enlightening on the flight deck too I bet....
For those who play the blame game, who would you blame here? We lost an F-111 which crashed into an island on a low level night flight, many parallels to Erebus in my eyes.