Jetstar pilots fatigued?

[framer]

What do you mean by "work with what they inherited"?

[Keg]

the checklists .......Before start Checklist...and the...Decent and Approach.....and...Landing Checklists...........will now include.......

Phones off.......PF/PNF......PHONE OFF-CHECKED

The grape vine suggests that Lufthansa has such an item in their before start check list.

[trashie]

Makes a mockery of telling the pax to turn off their mobile phones due to possible interference with the avionics. Do as I say not as I do!!!

What ever happened to the sterile cockpit policy during safety critical activities. Shouldn't we learn from accidents such as the Buffulo Dash 8?

[Lookleft]

The Before Start Chx now include turning the mobile phone off. As to working with what they inherited I can see the hackles rising on those who are at the top end of the seniority list. The best of that group that I have worked with were the young guys who were enthusiastic and put a lot of effort into getting their command.

Then there are the people who only got to fly a jet because they happened to be in the right place at the right time. The pilots for whom wearing four bars only meant they got paid more and didn't have to put in any effort. Look at the report again and assess where were the command skills demonstrated during this incident.

If you look at the high profile Jetstar incidents look at the background of the Captains. Look at the pilots in the bottom 5% some of whom seem to where it as a badge of honour! Like I said its not the young pilots (although even the youngest of that group are now in their thirties) it tends to be the older one's.

[framer]

Sorry I'm still not sure what you mean. DO you mean that there was quick promotion to command a while back and as a result the company has inherited a group of poor performing Captains? I don't fly for Jetstar so I am not familiar with the demographics you speak of. I have just read the report and agree that there was very little "Command" of the flight during the approach phase.

The FO reported going to sleep at about 0130 on the morning of the occurrence and being woken by a phone call from housekeeping at about 0430. He had dozed until getting up at 0630 to go for a jog and did not get any other sleep prior to crew sign on at 1315.

So he got a call from housekeeping at 0430 resulting in an initial 3hrs of sleep uninterupted, then only dozed for 2 more hours prior to getting up. Five hours total sleep with two hours of that dozing. If that is not enough to then do a Singapore return duty, what options were open to the F/O as far as reporting not fit for duty? How would the company have dealt with it if he had reported unfit to fly due to not being able to get enough sleep during the rest period?

Both pilots reported having attended fatigue risk management training and felt satisfied that they were able to judge their own level of fatigue and fitness in respect of being able to perform their duties.

My bold there. With the wealth of research data available reporting that one of the effects of fatigue is an inability to judge your own level of fatigue, does the ATSB really sanction such statements?

[CaptCloudbuster]

Framer, why the histrionics? I see you are in SYD. Anyone in this game over the last 10 years know what "work with what they inherited" means.

Looks like you do too from your succinct summation

[framer]

I've had a wee look at the jetstar website for flight time and if we assume a one hour sign on period and a one hour turn around time in Singapore, then the F/O would have been awake for 18 hours when approaching to land in Darwin on the second sector. Nine of those hours would have been spent with a cabin altitude of about 7000ft, and 11.6 of those hours working (not including catching the crew bus to and from hotels).
Can we really expect sharp performance in an emergency situation after being awake for 18 hours after 5 hours of broken sleep? I'm not saying we can't, but I'd like to hear what other pilots think keeping in mind that this isn't an operation where the crew can retire to crew rest for a power nap.
Another thought; If 0630 is this guys standard rising time and he did that the day before as well, he would have had a total of five hours sleep in a period of 42 hours. 17.6 of those 42 hours would have been at work.
I think pilots should make every effort to manage their down time in order to be well rested, but if you haven't managed it (wife, kids, bank manager, next door neighbours etc etc etc), how is it recieved by the company if you call unfit for duty?

[framer]

Hi CCloudbuster,
Sadly, I had to look up the definition of histrionics The good news is that now I have a slightly better vocab than I did five minutes ago.
I'm not using exaggerated emotional behavior calculated for effect. Sorry if it came across that way. I am genuinely interested in how a lack of sleep affects a pilots ability to scan the instruments (personal experience) and also how it affects a pilots attitude to situations as they unfold (personal experience).
I am origionally from Sydney but am now in SE Asia (not Jetstar) and do spend quite a bit of time back in Sydney, but I don't know what is meant by "work with what they inherited" . Was I close to the mark?
Cheers, Framer

[FYSTI]

I think pilots should make every effort to manage their down time in order to be well rested, but if you haven't managed it (wife, kids, bank manager, next door neighbours etc etc etc), how is it recieved by the company if you call unfit for duty?

Framer, I think that's the point. Flight & Duty time limits appear to have absolutely no scientific basis to their construction & they assume the "perfect pilot" who can immediately walk in the door, hang up the uniform & gain 8 hours sleep & then be ready for duty.

However the real world is completely different. FRMS is now a "shared responsibility", where pilots may not have input into pattern & roster construction to minimise fatigue, yet have a joint responsibility to NOT operate when they may be fatigued. This sound like a whole heap of ass covering by management for "business as usual" until something goes wrong, because the ultimate responsibility rests with the pilot.

Shared responsibility is going to require shared input. Until that moment arrives it is just lip service. In answer to your question, fatigue is still a huge problem for this industry. As it currently stands, FRMS is a big free pass to management. When ever you allow someone to avoid losses, yet take claim the profit, ultimately they will abused it to (save)make a buck.

[bigwatch]

Give me a break

I don't post here much, but please, stop the BS.

There are airlines around the world that have been doing back of the clock flying for decades and they manage to get it right. Sure, it may have been a factor, but let's not beat around the bush.

Playing with a phone on finals... elephant in the room.... who was flying and monitoring the aircraft??

This is not general aviation we're talking about here. There are hundreds of people's lives at risk.

If you don't want to be a professional pilot and want to put someone's lives at risk go and fly a light aircraft without any passengers and get a job flipping burgers somewhere. Otherwise step up to the mark and take the responsibility that comes with the gig.

BW.

[framer]

Nice first post Big Watch.

Sure, it may have been a factor, but let's not beat around the bush.

I agree that the elephant in the room was the phone and the way that that distraction was
1/ allowed to happen
2/ dealt with when it did happen

But that doesn't mean we can't learn something from each other by diuscussing other things in the ATSB report;
ie

The first officer’s decision making was probably affected by fatigue

If we never went deeper than "The Captain played with his phone on finals, naughty boy....case closed" we would miss many oportunities to make the industry safer...don't you think?

[Trevor the lover]

Hey Scrubba, I feel you are being a bit naive concerning Lookleft's post.

Lookleft has basically stated that a Captain's responsibilities go beyond collecting the paycheck and aspects of that night's performance were severely flawed.

As pilots we cannot cite fatigue as a reason/excuse for a stuff up on sector 1, and then blast off and fly sector number 2. Doesn't cut it I'm afraid.

The caveat on that though is a VERY BIG caveat. We all know that in JQ, citing fatigue or insufficient rest does not go down well when pulling out of a duty. You may get away with it once or twice - but in the end, companys like this feel that their responsibility ends with "providing opportunity for adequate rest." ie CAO 48 approved rest times. What is ignored totally and what is not accepted, is the reality of disturbed rest or the reality of simply finding it difficult to adjust sleep patterns on rosters that do not consider circadian disrythmia and all the science of sleep studies.

Should never have flown that second sector (or probably even the first).

Jetstar management - start trusting your aircrews, if they say they are are not adequately rested or are fatigued, believe them and make provisions for still getting the passengers safely where they have paid to go. Cut the punitive and childish retribution against crews just trying to take their responsibilities seriously.

[BD1959]

Originally Posted by bigwatch

This is not general aviation we're talking about here.

In my little Warrior, phones are OFF. Even on a 3ME, I will ask the Examining/Instructor if they've turned their phone off. I'm paying them to review my performance - I'm not paying them to distract me by texting on final.

Passengers are far easier to deal with than some "professionals".

Regards,

BD

[Lookleft]

Framer this sector had been operated many times by pilots who would have experienced similar disrupted sleep patterns yet managed to get to and from Singapore. This was not an emergency situation but a routine operation which became a problem when the PIC did not do his job or accept his responsibility. There is no mention of the PIC being fatigued. In fact if he was doing his job properly he would have been monitoring the F/Os performance throughout the flight. It was not suggested in the report that the F/O felt pressured to fly home but that he took two controlled rest breaks.

As to my statement regarding "what they inherited" you answered your own question earlier in the thread.

[Ex Douglas Driver]

There seems to be quite a disconnect between the ATSB's summary (and what is subsequently reported to the press), and the "contributing safety factors" within the report.

Summary
The aircraft was not in the correct landing configuration by 500 ft height above the aerodrome and, as required by the operator's procedures in the case of an unstable approach, the crew carried out a missed approach.

Report
The flight crew continued the approach despite not being able to satisfy the operator’s stabilised approach criteria prior to the stipulated 500 ft in visual meteorological conditions.

...commencement of the go-around, at 392 ft. Both crew stated that they were unaware of the minimum height reached before the aircraft climbed, but believed that they initiated the go-around just below 800 ft RADALT.

The summary and reporting in the press seems to suggest that they had sufficient situational awareness to realise that the approach was unstable and had anticipated the go around. It would seem to me that the trigger to initiate the missed approach was the GPWS warning.

[bigwatch]

Hi Framer - I'm glad you you liked my first post. I've been a lurker here for years, but have never bothered posting.

I understand the Reason Model/swiss cheese model, factors that occur in incidents/accidents, and all the other stuff that goes with it. I understand that we can make the industry safer by looking at the whole incident, company health, and commercial pressures. I understand threat and error management and risk assessment. I've spent long enough in this industry in a number of roles to have a pretty good understanding of all those things.

But that does not excuse poor airmanship or unprofessional behaviour. If I ever have a FO on my flight pull out a mobile phone on descent and use it then he'll be paxing the next sector home.

If, as a crewmember, you are fatigued, then part of our professional duty is to not go flying. Similarly, getting sufficient rest before you go flying is part of that responsibility.

Can we change systems to provide some form of protection against fatigue? Certainly, but the onus will always come back to a crewmembers decision to not go flying if they are fatigued as everyone has different ways of dealing with fatigue (there is not a one size fits all solution).

It is up to us as professional aviators to set the standards that we will accept and not accept, and that is an issue here that is often lost. We, as aircrew, are one of the final filters in the safety of flight, and there will always be unintentional errors made, with consequences that occur, but to shy away from the basic premise of flying the aircraft is and the responsibilities that entails is, to put it bluntly, a cop out.

BD: I did not mean to degrade general aviation, and I hope you did not take it that way. In many respects, it is a harder and more dangerous job than flying a RPT jet. My point was more to say, if you can't do the job professionally, then don't; or at least don't take up passengers that have placed their trust in you or paid for you to do your job. It is obvious from your post that you understand and accept the responsibility of holding a pilot's licence, but unfortunately it would seem that not everyone else does.

Cheers,
BW

[framer]

Framer this sector had been operated many times by pilots who would have experienced similar disrupted sleep patterns yet managed to get to and from Singapore.

The fact that many crews have done it before doesn't mean the next flight will also end well. It actually has no bearing on it whatsoever.
I'm not suggesting that the duty is inherently unsafe or fatiguing if the individuals operating it have success in managing their sleep leading up to the duty and on the overnight itself. I am more angling towards how the situation is dealt with by operations/management when someone isn't successful in getting the required sleep.

This was not an emergency situation

I understand that also, I didn't mean to give the impression that I thought it was. What I was getting at is that by the time they were on approach into Darwin at the end of the second sector the F/O had been awake for 18 hours. If they had had an emergency at that stage (ie unreliable airspeed or engine fire or similar), would he have been in good enough shape to deal with it given that he had been up for 18 hours on 5 hours disrupted sleep?
An 11.6 hour duty can be very taxing, are we doing enough to ensure the pilots starting these duties will be ok at the end of them?

[2p!ssed2drive]

My take on it is that there is a stigma in the industry these days with the advent of the low cost carrier.
As what was already stated - I agree that nothing takes away the PIC's responsibility to the hundreds of pax sitting in the back (it could be my wife and kids?) - however.. In my time what I've seen is captains taking on the attitude that management has towards them, and applying it to their flying.
It shouldn't happen but it does

[framer]

It is up to us as professional aviators to set the standards that we will accept and not accept, and that is an issue here that is often lost.

Spot on Big W That is why I am asking questions of my fellow aviators such as

are we doing enough to ensure the pilots starting these duties will be ok at the end of them?

and

Can we really expect sharp performance in an emergency situation after being awake for 18 hours after 5 hours of broken sleep?

and

With the wealth of research data available reporting that one of the effects of fatigue is an inability to judge your own level of fatigue, does the ATSB really sanction such statements?

But that does not excuse poor airmanship or unprofessional behaviour. If I ever have a FO on my flight pull out a mobile phone on descent and use it then he'll be paxing the next sector home.

I agree. And I imagine that the command vacuum that existed during the last 3000ft of the incident flight wouldn't occur if you were in the left seat. However,just because there are salient causes doen't mean fatigue and rostering practices played no role. I can see the other causes clearly but that doesn't mean it is folly (or BS to use your terminology) to chip away publicly at the idea that FRMS is doing it's job.
Cheers.

[theheadmaster]

There are airlines around the world that have been doing back of the clock flying for decades and they manage to get it right. Sure, it may have been a factor, but let's not beat around the bush.

Would these be the 'legacy carriers', who's crew enjoy 'unsustainable conditions'?