Jetstar pilots fatigued?
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and now with bated breath we all await the new prognostications of shon7. probably filling his superman undies as we type.
my bated breath smells of beer and popcorn, a lot better than the smell from my undies.
go shon7.
my bated breath smells of beer and popcorn, a lot better than the smell from my undies.
go shon7.
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A friend has reported safety issues to an avenue outside of management, as this friend was concerned management was "possibly" ignoring the issue.
Anyway this external organisation has told my friend to report the issue to Casa, stating that Casa will take care of it if the said issue exists.
And we all know how good Casa are at fixing stuff .
Balance thanking for confirming what I suspected , I know what I am trying to say but nobody else does. Back to proper English classes for me I guess
Anyway this external organisation has told my friend to report the issue to Casa, stating that Casa will take care of it if the said issue exists.
And we all know how good Casa are at fixing stuff .
Balance thanking for confirming what I suspected , I know what I am trying to say but nobody else does. Back to proper English classes for me I guess
Ben is still banging away on his keyboard...
Australian aviation is more lucky than safe | Plane Talking
....but alas no-one is listening or maybe no-one can hear over the noise coming from the trough or the two little piggies rutting next door, TICK TOCK indeed!
"Nothing to see here move along!"
Looks like Ben may have disrupted a least one snout from the trough....
CASA responds to Jetstar txting incident criticism | Plane Talking
....bit of a bristly retort from Albo's circus
Australian aviation is more lucky than safe | Plane Talking
....but alas no-one is listening or maybe no-one can hear over the noise coming from the trough or the two little piggies rutting next door, TICK TOCK indeed!
"Nothing to see here move along!"
Looks like Ben may have disrupted a least one snout from the trough....
CASA responds to Jetstar txting incident criticism | Plane Talking
....bit of a bristly retort from Albo's circus
Last edited by Sarcs; 8th May 2012 at 07:08.
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Sarcs,
I'd say no serious investigative journalist is listening or in fact typing in fear of sitting in economy & failing to secure an "upgrade" on their next booked service on whichever carrier they may chose to fly in the future.
Having been around aviation for near thirty years may I suggest the holes in the swiss cheese are aligning. I have regurgitated the old "tick tock" comment in the past, but James Reason & the latent deficiencies may be the only opportunity the industry has in stopping those holes aligning.
In no way do I cast I wide net amongst the professional airmen & women amongst us, whether it be mainline, subsidiary or otherwise. But I truly believe airline management practices & new "worlds best practice" principles have edged us as an aviation community closer to the unimaginable.
Why?
Ask yourselves, why were the crew on the service to Singapore there?
Not, what lead a crew to find themselves in that situation. But how has an industry, have we allowed or pushed ourselves to find us in this current predicament?
The crew were there in Singapore on that night, not configured, unstable & unaware, because the current direction of airline management allowed it to happen.
IT IS NOT THE CREWS FAULT, IT IS A FAULT BY MANAGEMENT.
Looking at Reasons model of latent deficiencies, lets look at how we got to the current state. This is directed at an industry at large rather than at individuals.
Recruitment:
* There are no Educational requirements as far as attaining a HSC to be an airline pilot.
* The entry requirements to becoming an Airline Pilot have been "dumbed down". Read Bruce Buchanan's comments that "everybody" should have the "opportunity" to be an Airline Pilot.
* There is NO recognition of experience. In days gone by, entry to airlines as direct entry First Officers would require 2500 to 3000 hours of flight time. Now, Airline CEO's actually state that experience is a negative thing.
* Airline employment & entry is not entirely MERIT based. Under a Merit based system, where airlines would recruit the best & brightest then pay for that individuals training. The calibre of entrants would be at the high water mark.
* A non MERIT based system & pay for your own training allows a "small proportion" of people to be in the seat of an airliner that should never had been there!
* Industry rumours have circulated that the entry standard required in the past is not the current required standard. If we look at behavioural markers like Situational Awareness, Decision Making & Leadership. It makes sense that if we are recruiting to a lower standard the product we are experiencing is a lower standard.
Training
* There is a lack of focus on real world previous aviation experience.
* No amount of time in a simulator or accelerated course can replace the real world experience attained in real life commercial operations.
* Airlines should never transfer the responsibility of aircrew training to third party providers. The standard, or latent deficiencies will surface at some unexpected time perhaps years in the future.
* Airlines introduce artificial limitations on aircrew to mitigate against lack of experience. In my opinion all checked to line First Officers should be capable of landing an aircraft to the manufacturers crosswind limitations. If they can't they shouldn't be sitting in the right hand seat. Introducing a lower crosswind limit of say 15kts & stating it's an insurance requirement doesn't cut the mustard with me. It's because the FO only has 250 hours that the insurer wont cover them to land in a crosswind greater than 15 kts.
Fatigue:
* If an airline has created an environment, where crew feel pressured or coerced to continue a duty once it is evident fatigue related errors have occurred. That airline has failed to meet the responsibilities of an AOC holder.
* Conversely, if a crew have experienced fatigue related errors (and have discussions of such an occurrence postflight) Then continuing an operation on another sector without holding themselves from service. For whatever reason, they have exposed an operation to a risk & one must question the decision making process of that crew & what commercial pressures have been placed on that crew to get the job done.
* If an airline does have a user friendly FRMS policy, then such policy & management support would allow a crew to with hold themselves from service in order to obtain adequate rest before launching with fare paying passengers again.
Reporting:
* I will be brief here, but a have reservations as to how "open" reporting cultures are within airlines. Management expectations & crew professionalism would dictate that reports are factual and accurate. If a "punitive" management culture is evident crew may be gun shy to report the facts.
Investigation:
How the f&*k could it take two years to investigate a go round? Delaying or introducing new safety based outcomes as a result of such an investigation.
MC
I'd say no serious investigative journalist is listening or in fact typing in fear of sitting in economy & failing to secure an "upgrade" on their next booked service on whichever carrier they may chose to fly in the future.
Having been around aviation for near thirty years may I suggest the holes in the swiss cheese are aligning. I have regurgitated the old "tick tock" comment in the past, but James Reason & the latent deficiencies may be the only opportunity the industry has in stopping those holes aligning.
In no way do I cast I wide net amongst the professional airmen & women amongst us, whether it be mainline, subsidiary or otherwise. But I truly believe airline management practices & new "worlds best practice" principles have edged us as an aviation community closer to the unimaginable.
Why?
Ask yourselves, why were the crew on the service to Singapore there?
Not, what lead a crew to find themselves in that situation. But how has an industry, have we allowed or pushed ourselves to find us in this current predicament?
The crew were there in Singapore on that night, not configured, unstable & unaware, because the current direction of airline management allowed it to happen.
IT IS NOT THE CREWS FAULT, IT IS A FAULT BY MANAGEMENT.
Looking at Reasons model of latent deficiencies, lets look at how we got to the current state. This is directed at an industry at large rather than at individuals.
Recruitment:
* There are no Educational requirements as far as attaining a HSC to be an airline pilot.
* The entry requirements to becoming an Airline Pilot have been "dumbed down". Read Bruce Buchanan's comments that "everybody" should have the "opportunity" to be an Airline Pilot.
* There is NO recognition of experience. In days gone by, entry to airlines as direct entry First Officers would require 2500 to 3000 hours of flight time. Now, Airline CEO's actually state that experience is a negative thing.
* Airline employment & entry is not entirely MERIT based. Under a Merit based system, where airlines would recruit the best & brightest then pay for that individuals training. The calibre of entrants would be at the high water mark.
* A non MERIT based system & pay for your own training allows a "small proportion" of people to be in the seat of an airliner that should never had been there!
* Industry rumours have circulated that the entry standard required in the past is not the current required standard. If we look at behavioural markers like Situational Awareness, Decision Making & Leadership. It makes sense that if we are recruiting to a lower standard the product we are experiencing is a lower standard.
Training
* There is a lack of focus on real world previous aviation experience.
* No amount of time in a simulator or accelerated course can replace the real world experience attained in real life commercial operations.
* Airlines should never transfer the responsibility of aircrew training to third party providers. The standard, or latent deficiencies will surface at some unexpected time perhaps years in the future.
* Airlines introduce artificial limitations on aircrew to mitigate against lack of experience. In my opinion all checked to line First Officers should be capable of landing an aircraft to the manufacturers crosswind limitations. If they can't they shouldn't be sitting in the right hand seat. Introducing a lower crosswind limit of say 15kts & stating it's an insurance requirement doesn't cut the mustard with me. It's because the FO only has 250 hours that the insurer wont cover them to land in a crosswind greater than 15 kts.
Fatigue:
* If an airline has created an environment, where crew feel pressured or coerced to continue a duty once it is evident fatigue related errors have occurred. That airline has failed to meet the responsibilities of an AOC holder.
* Conversely, if a crew have experienced fatigue related errors (and have discussions of such an occurrence postflight) Then continuing an operation on another sector without holding themselves from service. For whatever reason, they have exposed an operation to a risk & one must question the decision making process of that crew & what commercial pressures have been placed on that crew to get the job done.
* If an airline does have a user friendly FRMS policy, then such policy & management support would allow a crew to with hold themselves from service in order to obtain adequate rest before launching with fare paying passengers again.
Reporting:
* I will be brief here, but a have reservations as to how "open" reporting cultures are within airlines. Management expectations & crew professionalism would dictate that reports are factual and accurate. If a "punitive" management culture is evident crew may be gun shy to report the facts.
Investigation:
How the f&*k could it take two years to investigate a go round? Delaying or introducing new safety based outcomes as a result of such an investigation.
MC
Last edited by Mstr Caution; 8th May 2012 at 11:38.
Yes great post Captain K!
Sums it up nicely, so why do you think.......
........it took that long and where was the regulator's 'duty of care' in all that time if, as PG (minus the i ) says in his reply to Ben, "We are a proactive regulator?"
Sums it up nicely, so why do you think.......
How the f&*k could it take two years to investigate a go round? Delaying or introducing new safety based outcomes as a result of such an investigation.
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CASA statement:
The CASA response is both predictable & underwhelming.
As pilots we are all use to the "Challenge & Response" philosophy.
It seems CASA aren't challenging airlines to ensure the highest level of safety, but only respond to their deficiencies.
CASA should not be spoon feeding poorly performing entities.
How could an airline holding an Australian AOC identify 16 "action items" as a result of an unstable approach and go around?How could they have not discovered these deficiencies earlier?
Could they elaborate on what these 16 deficiencies were?
Why weren't any of these deficiencies identified earlier by either internal audit or CASA oversight?
"They learnt lessons" is a cop out !
Where is the proactive management of safety by either party. After an event, we can look back in hindsight & identify areas for concern. However hindsight may be too little too late.
If this isn't another example of an "airlines safety management system not working efficiently" could CASA please tell us what the hell is?
Jetstar responded appropriately to the May 2010 incident by undertaking their own investigation, identifying areas for improvement and developing 16 action items. They learnt lessons.
This is what CASA expects from an airline – a proactive response and a plan of action to incidents and unplanned events.
CASA has carefully reviewed the Jetstar investigation and the actions taken. We believe they were an appropriate response. CASA continues to monitor these issues to make sure the improvements have been put in place and are effective.
CASA takes action against an airline when responses to incidents or events are not appropriate – especially when there is evidence an airline’s safety systems are not working effectively.
This is what CASA expects from an airline – a proactive response and a plan of action to incidents and unplanned events.
CASA has carefully reviewed the Jetstar investigation and the actions taken. We believe they were an appropriate response. CASA continues to monitor these issues to make sure the improvements have been put in place and are effective.
CASA takes action against an airline when responses to incidents or events are not appropriate – especially when there is evidence an airline’s safety systems are not working effectively.
As pilots we are all use to the "Challenge & Response" philosophy.
It seems CASA aren't challenging airlines to ensure the highest level of safety, but only respond to their deficiencies.
CASA should not be spoon feeding poorly performing entities.
How could an airline holding an Australian AOC identify 16 "action items" as a result of an unstable approach and go around?How could they have not discovered these deficiencies earlier?
Could they elaborate on what these 16 deficiencies were?
Why weren't any of these deficiencies identified earlier by either internal audit or CASA oversight?
"They learnt lessons" is a cop out !
Where is the proactive management of safety by either party. After an event, we can look back in hindsight & identify areas for concern. However hindsight may be too little too late.
If this isn't another example of an "airlines safety management system not working efficiently" could CASA please tell us what the hell is?
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Sarcs,
I have concern as to the CASA logic here.
The Jetstar text messages & go around event at Singapore was in May 2010.
The Tiger Airlines go around event at Avalon happened on 30th Jun 2011.
Using CASA's logic & I quote their response:
Reading CASA's response, one would (incorrectly) believe the grounding of Tiger Airlines was BEFORE the Jetstar event in Singapore.
My issue remains with the statement "the safety systems were not effective"
Four issues remain outstanding:
1. At the time of the Jetstar go around in Singapore, the Tiger go around in Avalon was not to occur until another some 13 months later.
2.If CASA identified 16 Jetstar safety deficiencies, wouldn't this be considered as "safety systems were not effective" as they found in Tiger 13 months later.
3. Is the sticking point with CASA the "proactive response" component?
Can you commit unsafe acts & continue to operate as long as the later response is proactive?
4. At the time of Tiger Airlines grounding, CASA's quoted Tiger as not having adequate Fatigue Management.
Tiger Airways Grounded | CASA lost confidence in airline
Quote: "The authority imposed a number of conditions on Tiger air operator certificate, requiring actions to improve pilot proficiency and training and checking processes as well as changes to fatigue management".
If Jetstar had exhibited the same deficiencies in pilot proficiencies & fatigue management 13 months earlier, why the "apples & oranges response to Tiger 13 months later?
MC
I have concern as to the CASA logic here.
The Jetstar text messages & go around event at Singapore was in May 2010.
The Tiger Airlines go around event at Avalon happened on 30th Jun 2011.
Using CASA's logic & I quote their response:
Comparing Jetstar to Tiger is like apples and oranges – Tiger did not respond proactively to issues identified over a period of time and the safety systems were not effective.
My issue remains with the statement "the safety systems were not effective"
Four issues remain outstanding:
1. At the time of the Jetstar go around in Singapore, the Tiger go around in Avalon was not to occur until another some 13 months later.
2.If CASA identified 16 Jetstar safety deficiencies, wouldn't this be considered as "safety systems were not effective" as they found in Tiger 13 months later.
3. Is the sticking point with CASA the "proactive response" component?
Can you commit unsafe acts & continue to operate as long as the later response is proactive?
4. At the time of Tiger Airlines grounding, CASA's quoted Tiger as not having adequate Fatigue Management.
Tiger Airways Grounded | CASA lost confidence in airline
Quote: "The authority imposed a number of conditions on Tiger air operator certificate, requiring actions to improve pilot proficiency and training and checking processes as well as changes to fatigue management".
If Jetstar had exhibited the same deficiencies in pilot proficiencies & fatigue management 13 months earlier, why the "apples & oranges response to Tiger 13 months later?
MC
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Go get 'em, MC. Your analysis is spot on. Give it to Ben, and Senator X. They are the only ones outside the Pprune forums (and of course those in the industry...) that are listening.
Lets get your message out there, hopefully before Jetstar lose an aircraft.
Lets get your message out there, hopefully before Jetstar lose an aircraft.
MC absolutely spot on mate!
I agree with balance's sentiment too, go get them Tiger....ahh MC!
Could this also constitute a breach (or two) of the Model Litigant rules Appendix B:
Legal Services Directions 2005
I agree with balance's sentiment too, go get them Tiger....ahh MC!Could this also constitute a breach (or two) of the Model Litigant rules Appendix B:
From Appendix B
The obligation:
(1) Consistently with the Attorney-General’s responsibility for the maintenance of proper standards in litigation, the Commonwealth and its agencies are to behave as model litigants in the conduct of litigation.
Nature of the obligation:
(2) The obligation to act as a model litigant requires that the Commonwealth and its agencies act honestly and fairly in handling claims and litigation brought by or against the Commonwealth or an agency by:
(a) dealing with claims promptly and not causing unnecessary delay in the handling of claims and litigation
(aa) making an early assessment of:
(i) the Commonwealth’s prospects of success in legal proceedings that may be brought against the Commonwealth; and
(ii) the Commonwealth’s potential liability in claims against the Commonwealth
(b) paying legitimate claims without litigation, including making partial settlements of claims or interim payments, where it is clear that liability is at least as much as the amount to be paid
(c) acting consistently in the handling of claims and litigation
(d) endeavouring to avoid, prevent and limit the scope of legal proceedings wherever possible, including by giving consideration in all cases to alternative dispute resolution before initiating legal proceedings and by participating in alternative dispute resolution processes where appropriate
(e) where it is not possible to avoid litigation, keeping the costs of litigation to a minimum, including by:
(i) not requiring the other party to prove a matter which the Commonwealth or the agency knows to be true
(ii) not contesting liability if the Commonwealth or the agency knows that the dispute is really about quantum (iii) monitoring the progress of the litigation and using methods that it considers appropriate to resolve the litigation, including settlement offers, payments into court or alternative dispute resolution, and (iv) ensuring that arrangements are made so that a person participating in any settlement negotiations on behalf of the Commonwealth or an agency can enter into a settlement of the claim or legal proceedings in the course of the negotiations (f) not taking advantage of a claimant who lacks the resources to litigate a legitimate claim (g) not relying on technical defences unless the Commonwealth’s or the agency’s interests would be prejudiced by the failure to comply with a particular requirement (h) not undertaking and pursuing appeals unless the Commonwealth or the agency believes that it has reasonable prospects for success or the appeal is otherwise justified in the public interest, and (i) apologising where the Commonwealth or the agency is aware that it or its lawyers have acted wrongfully or improperly.
The obligation:
(1) Consistently with the Attorney-General’s responsibility for the maintenance of proper standards in litigation, the Commonwealth and its agencies are to behave as model litigants in the conduct of litigation.
Nature of the obligation:
(2) The obligation to act as a model litigant requires that the Commonwealth and its agencies act honestly and fairly in handling claims and litigation brought by or against the Commonwealth or an agency by:
(a) dealing with claims promptly and not causing unnecessary delay in the handling of claims and litigation
(aa) making an early assessment of:
(i) the Commonwealth’s prospects of success in legal proceedings that may be brought against the Commonwealth; and
(ii) the Commonwealth’s potential liability in claims against the Commonwealth
(b) paying legitimate claims without litigation, including making partial settlements of claims or interim payments, where it is clear that liability is at least as much as the amount to be paid
(c) acting consistently in the handling of claims and litigation
(d) endeavouring to avoid, prevent and limit the scope of legal proceedings wherever possible, including by giving consideration in all cases to alternative dispute resolution before initiating legal proceedings and by participating in alternative dispute resolution processes where appropriate
(e) where it is not possible to avoid litigation, keeping the costs of litigation to a minimum, including by:
(i) not requiring the other party to prove a matter which the Commonwealth or the agency knows to be true
(ii) not contesting liability if the Commonwealth or the agency knows that the dispute is really about quantum (iii) monitoring the progress of the litigation and using methods that it considers appropriate to resolve the litigation, including settlement offers, payments into court or alternative dispute resolution, and (iv) ensuring that arrangements are made so that a person participating in any settlement negotiations on behalf of the Commonwealth or an agency can enter into a settlement of the claim or legal proceedings in the course of the negotiations (f) not taking advantage of a claimant who lacks the resources to litigate a legitimate claim (g) not relying on technical defences unless the Commonwealth’s or the agency’s interests would be prejudiced by the failure to comply with a particular requirement (h) not undertaking and pursuing appeals unless the Commonwealth or the agency believes that it has reasonable prospects for success or the appeal is otherwise justified in the public interest, and (i) apologising where the Commonwealth or the agency is aware that it or its lawyers have acted wrongfully or improperly.
Never mind the excellent analysis of the facts on the ground, what we are talking here is CORPORATE CULTURE.
I am sure that Jetstar has miles of glossy manuals regarding the procedures and systems that guarantee (on paper) that its operations are worlds best practice regarding safety.
However if the corporate culture is to selectively apply and interpret those procedures for its own profit, then they are worse than useless.
That leaves the Crew in the classic "Double Bind" dilemma. - a formal legal requirement to apply company fatigue procedures and standards to their operations - but an informal management practice (or even threatened practice) of penalising or discriminating against anyone who avails themselves of the personal protections of the formal system
I had this one tried on me by Exxon as a young engineer in charge of Twenty one million litres of petrol and avtur - with Two feet thick of manuals that I was supposed to follow, but without sufficient money or staff to allow me to comply. Complaint simply resulted in a query about whether I was a "company man" and did I want to keep working here? The choice was obvious, shut up and remain personally exposed until my next promotion or leave. I left after that. The Longford gas plant explosion subsequently showed Exxon's procedure at its finest - the blamed the dead for "not following company procedures" and it took a royal commission to sheet home the blame to Exxon and exonerate its overworked and undertrained victims.
I don't expect CASA to hold Jetstar to account. It would take balls of steel, and exceptionally ironclad committment to safety, from the top of CASA all the way down to effectively face off Jetstar, stand up to them and say "Yes, I know what your procedures SAY Mother*&*er, but I can tell that this is what your managers are really doing!". There are no public servants in Australia anymore who could or would do that.
What will happen is highly predictable. There will be a fatigue or maintenance related accident and Jetstar will blame the pilots for "not following company procedures" even though those procedures are now honoured in the breach.
I am sure that Jetstar has miles of glossy manuals regarding the procedures and systems that guarantee (on paper) that its operations are worlds best practice regarding safety.
However if the corporate culture is to selectively apply and interpret those procedures for its own profit, then they are worse than useless.
That leaves the Crew in the classic "Double Bind" dilemma. - a formal legal requirement to apply company fatigue procedures and standards to their operations - but an informal management practice (or even threatened practice) of penalising or discriminating against anyone who avails themselves of the personal protections of the formal system
I had this one tried on me by Exxon as a young engineer in charge of Twenty one million litres of petrol and avtur - with Two feet thick of manuals that I was supposed to follow, but without sufficient money or staff to allow me to comply. Complaint simply resulted in a query about whether I was a "company man" and did I want to keep working here? The choice was obvious, shut up and remain personally exposed until my next promotion or leave. I left after that. The Longford gas plant explosion subsequently showed Exxon's procedure at its finest - the blamed the dead for "not following company procedures" and it took a royal commission to sheet home the blame to Exxon and exonerate its overworked and undertrained victims.
I don't expect CASA to hold Jetstar to account. It would take balls of steel, and exceptionally ironclad committment to safety, from the top of CASA all the way down to effectively face off Jetstar, stand up to them and say "Yes, I know what your procedures SAY Mother*&*er, but I can tell that this is what your managers are really doing!". There are no public servants in Australia anymore who could or would do that.
What will happen is highly predictable. There will be a fatigue or maintenance related accident and Jetstar will blame the pilots for "not following company procedures" even though those procedures are now honoured in the breach.
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Balls of Brass more like
.
Oh ho, just a bit of it – spot on posting.
Don't know about J* but corporate aviation is currently suffering from severe AOCM policyitis. That is 'go along to get along'; some of the SOP bollocks being inflicted, by stealth not written directive should be a subject for Senate enquiry as soon as possible. (i.e. before rather than after).
CAR 138 is clear, specific and should be the end of any discussion related to SOP or home made modification of procedure. If this procedural ethos has been foisted onto J*, it will be more than a fatigue or maintenance issue, add clear breech of the AFM combined with risible SOP. The risk of unwritten "in real life SOP" operating in conflict with the CAA fairy story version is real, measurable and poses a significant, sinister threat.
The micro management crap will be crystal clear, but completely deniable.
Arses covered – you bet.
MC- I have concern as to the CASA logic here.
SF - It would take balls of steel, and exceptionally ironclad commitment to safety, from the top of CASA all the way down to effectively face off Jetstar, stand up to them and say "Yes, I know what your procedures SAY Mother*&*er, but I can tell that this is what your managers are really doing!".
CAR 138 is clear, specific and should be the end of any discussion related to SOP or home made modification of procedure. If this procedural ethos has been foisted onto J*, it will be more than a fatigue or maintenance issue, add clear breech of the AFM combined with risible SOP. The risk of unwritten "in real life SOP" operating in conflict with the CAA fairy story version is real, measurable and poses a significant, sinister threat.
The micro management crap will be crystal clear, but completely deniable.
Arses covered – you bet.
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Jetstar statement 19.4.2012
The ATSB report made no findings against Jetstar, nor did it find any fault with Jetstar's policies or procedures. The safety of the aircraft was never compromised."
The ATSB report made no findings against Jetstar, nor did it find any fault with Jetstar's policies or procedures. The safety of the aircraft was never compromised."
Phearless Phelan is onto the orange cancer dirt file bandwagon..I pity all Jetstar crew they won't be able to fart upfront now without someone reporting it!
Jetstar in another safety flap – aviationadvertiser.com.au
Maybe we could do a Girrard and create a dirt file for all suspect airlines, could help those journos do their job!
Jetstar in another safety flap – aviationadvertiser.com.au
Maybe we could do a Girrard and create a dirt file for all suspect airlines, could help those journos do their job!
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I heard about a JQ A320 recently going OOL-PER that diverted in BNE due to quote "inadvertantly entering G/A mode and being unable to get out of it."
Doesn't sound right to me unless there was some sort of system malfunction.
Doesn't sound right to me unless there was some sort of system malfunction.
Doesn't have to be a malfunction, you could inadvertently go into Go Around mode due to re-selecting TOGA on departure after entering CLB mode. You have a few options , either activate the approach and return to land or to continue, enable the ALTN or select a new destination and enter a new CRZ altitude in the PROG page. This will put you back into the appropriate phase of flight being the CLB phase.
So in the above case (if it actually happened!!!), I guess that they ended up in Go Around mode due to selecting TOGA due to weather / windshear for example. It would then appear that neither pilot knew how to get the FMGS out of GA mode so ended up going to BNE. This is always a question I ask in training, as it is a common piece of knowledge that slips through the net and can lead to a lot of embarrassment.
So in the above case (if it actually happened!!!), I guess that they ended up in Go Around mode due to selecting TOGA due to weather / windshear for example. It would then appear that neither pilot knew how to get the FMGS out of GA mode so ended up going to BNE. This is always a question I ask in training, as it is a common piece of knowledge that slips through the net and can lead to a lot of embarrassment.
