NAS rears its head again

[Jabawocky]

Leadsled,

The simple answer to your "tongue in cheek" but serious comment is this.

You are in the market for a new car, your budget is fixed with a sensible limit, and a Kia is looking about right, until you discover a nice little C180 Mercedes Benz, you find the price is only $500 more and still within budget. You have read all the research on car safety and the crash tests etc and there is a demonstrated benefit in the Benz, and its effectively the same cost. The choice is simple.

J

[mostlytossas]

Except for the on going maintenance cost ofcourse.

[mostlytossas]

For the first 5 years only then may as well throw the euro trash away!
But enough of this, best get back on track

[peuce]

LEADSLED,

In the old days, Dick used to call the "non believers" luddites. Now we have a new name:

But, as I have said several times, the final outcome will be determined by how successful the efforts by the troglodyte lobby

Perhaps to dispell the Nastronaut myth that all Australia aviators and Controllers are just change averse, here are some PPRUNE quotes from a few years back. Note what they are talking about is SURVEILLLANCE Class E:

CrocDundee
4th August 2007, 22:00
Friedrichshafen (EDNY) and also St. Gallen Airport (LSZR) are very close to each other at the opposite shores at Lake Constance, southern Germany and north eastern Switzerland. Both Airports are growing, especially the IFR traffic. Unfortunately the approach airspace around the two CTR's is classified to E. Means a holy bunch of unknown VFR movements, especially on weekends. Numerous encounters of IFR-VFR almost every day... and obviously the hell for an APP ATCO to vector acft for approach thru all this VFR hell... if in any way it is somehow possible... just pure luck nothing serious did happen til today! And the German authority is not willing to change the airspace classification...!!!

Do we really need another accident in order they finally change this airspace classification?


NorthSouth
6th August 2007, 18:30
What separation do you try to apply between your IFR traffic and unknown VFRs in Class E? In the UK there's no requirement for separation, only provision of traffic information. Then again there's very little Class E left in the UK and a substantial chunk of it was re-classified as Class D a couple of years ago as a result of an airprox between a 737 and a microlight.


CrocDundee
6th August 2007, 20:45

There's as well no requirement for applying any separation. IFR arrivals and departures are either being vectored just around the visible VFRs on screen (sometimes that's just a nice try...), or simply to let them fly own nav on SID or STAR (procedural arrival). Of course, trf info will be provided as long as possible. And last but not least: The app atco needs a hard shell! ...and the flight crews good luck!
As I said before, there were numerous reported airproxes, some of them hottest category, and the authority still doin nothing against it.

Bring back Tridents
7th October 2007, 17:00
Sorry for being late to this discussion. Glasgow and Edinburgh have the same problem in the Scottish TMA with the Class E between them . It makes for some interesting moments on Glasgow Radar as several usually launch southwards from Cumbernauld without talking to approach. And then there's Mr Microlight Thankfully something's being done to change the classification to D.

[OZBUSDRIVER]

Leadsled, here's something else for you to ponder...as you are so fond of how things are done overseas...2015 in Europe

Interesting! Neither a concept or idea but a plan for future direction. Flexible Use of Airspace. Flexibility requires capacity and resources. Resources include surveillance. Capacity requires bums on seats to re-configure airspace as required in real time....just need more runways and apron space to take advantage of the airways benefit.

How much of this has been taken into consideration in Australia?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

DNS...that's exactly what the gang of three and a half want us to do..throw our collective hands in the air and surrender

[Capn Bloggs]

DNS,

Keep up the fight, lad. Bad things happen when good men do nothing.

[LeadSled]

Folks,
At the risk of repeating myself:

I continue to support the ICAO Risk Management approach to CNS/ATM resources allocation. For those of you who want to be the only soldier in the battalion in step, march to your own drum, or whatever, be my guest.

I have also said, time and again, that aviation regulatory reform in Australia (and that includes proper risk analysis) has been blunted and reversed time and again, by sectional pressure groups, with the results for all to see.

When was Australia last held up as a shining example of aviation regulatory efficiency. (And please don't quote TAAAAATS, after all, it is only a not very up to date version of Eurocat)

One thing Mick Toller (former CASA DAS/CEO) was right about, was his description of Australia as: "An aviation Galapagos, where all sorts of strange mutation have developed in splendid isolation".

Our rather poor safety record (compared to US), including near hits and collisions, rather does suggest that that such splendid isolation/isolationism doesn't produce the best safety outcomes. All it reflects is our isolationist inability to learn from other, often (ie: the US) with vastly greater ( might I even say: statistically significant) experience.

If any of you understood the background of the modern risk management approach to operation/technical issues you would understand; NOT using risk management analysis can, by definition, ONLY produce less than optimum results, and WILL result in both higher risk and economic waste.

Quite frankly, your continual assertions about "C must be safer than E", in risk analysis terms, are meaningless, if for no other reason than "Safe/Safer" are dimensionless terms, and to use an overworked expression, "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it". It's not as simple as that, of course, but that will do for a start.

Once you have achieved a 5E-9 probability of collision, no additional resources/higher class of airspace is going to make the slightest difference to the likelihood of a collision.

I note that nobody had taken up the point that the design risk criteria for instrument procedure design and losing an aircraft due to CFIT during the departure/approach is several orders of magnitude greater than the probability of a collision, ie: the separation assurance standard.

How many aircraft/lives have we lost, in Australia, during departure or approach phases of flight??

Interesting piece of psychology, that those of you with a window seat happily accept this (much higher) risk, but become as unhinged as the media about a midair.

Why am I not surprised that you don't want to take that one up?? You do understand the (statistical) reasons for the shapes of the current obstacle clearance envelopes in instrument procedure design (compared with the previous shape), don't you ???

Damn, there I go on again about statistics.

Tootle pip!!

Incidentally, the design risk for an unknown volcano pipe destroying a high level nuclear waste repository, with the widespread threat to life and health that would entail, is only 1E-8.

I wonder what that tells us about hysterical media/aviation pressure groups, where aviation is concerned. That a mid air, although tragic for all concerned, should be regarded as more important (ie: greater protection measures must be taken) than for an event likely to cause widespread nuclear fallout.

Ref: <http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2004AGUSM.V14A..06C>

[Capn Bloggs]

Ledsled,

Quite frankly, your continual assertions about "C must be safer than E", in risk analysis terms, are meaningless, if for no other reason than "Safe/Safer" are dimensionless terms, and to use an overworked expression, "if you can't measure it, you can't manage it". It's not as simple as that, of course, but that will do for a start.

"Dimensionless terms"? Rubbish! It was measured, in the three months after NAS 2b was introduced, with two airproxs. Why do you continue to refuse to acknowledge the statistics?

How many aircraft/lives have we lost, in Australia, during departure or approach phases of flight??

Interesting piece of psychology, that those of you with a window seat happily accept this (much higher) risk, but become as unhinged as the media about a midair.

Why am I not surprised that you don't want to take that one up??

What on earth are you on about? No losses (or concern) during App/Dep due robust procedures (which, for NPAs, I might add, we regionals have forgotten more than you and your international experts will ever know; some of us Australians were decades ahead of the rest of the world when it came to CDA NPAs).

On the other hand, I'm worried about a midair in E because THERE ARE NO DEFENCES OR PROCEDURES, only the big sky theory.

Once you have achieved a 5E-9 probability of collision, no additional resources/higher class of airspace is going to make the slightest difference to the likelihood of a collision.

Show me ONE post on Prune where somebody is suggesting we go higher than C. IMO, you and others get a gee-whizz feeling out of C>B>A, when in fact practically speaking there is no difference. YOU mob are the ones who don't have a handle on practicality or reality. It's either CTA or OCTA with the half-pregnant E jammed in the middle. Get rid of it.

One thing Mick Toller (former CASA DAS/CEO) was right about, was his description of Australia as: "An aviation Galapagos, where all sorts of strange mutation have developed in splendid isolation".

Typical Septic Tank attitude. Following on from my comments above, without the help of anybody, we developed a first-class airspace system that both protected and facilitated development. Fair enough, the need for mandatory VFR full-reporting had passed it's use-by date, but on virtually all other aspects of aviation in the last 15 years, most of the changes have been unnecessary and costly, and have turned pilots off aviation. Yes, you and your ICAO "nuts" have done the job, as well as unnecessarily endangering fare-paying pax with your Free In G (I'm glad that failed) and now Free in E campaigns.

[Jabawocky]

I note that nobody had taken up the point that the design risk criteria for instrument procedure design and losing an aircraft due to CFIT during the departure/approach is several orders of magnitude greater than the probability of a collision, ie: the separation assurance standard.

How many aircraft/lives have we lost, in Australia, during departure or approach phases of flight??

Interesting piece of psychology, that those of you with a window seat happily accept this (much higher) risk, but become as unhinged as the media about a midair.

Why am I not surprised that you don't want to take that one up?? You do understand the (statistical) reasons for the shapes of the current obstacle clearance envelopes in instrument procedure design (compared with the previous shape), don't you ???

Damn, there I go on again about statistics.

OKAY

I will bite. the reason is that humans are prepared to accept higher risks when they are in control of themselves and their surroundings. An RNAV into some rather hilly areas for example Lockhart River or even the RNAV or ILSinto Hobart for that matter is possibly a good example of what you are talking about?

Now when you are in control of your destiny, you are prepared to take on managing and mitigating against those risks. You know where you are, you know there is a surveyed approach, you know where the nasty bits are, and you know what to do in the MA. You also know if you cock it badly, you die!

On the other hand Captain Bloggs and co....(just to coin a phrase ) he is happy no doubt dealling with those risks, its the ones he has no idea about, no control over and are not consistently in the same spot and he can't see that has him a little less than happy.

So yes I can see why he is happy dealling with some approaches Vs unknowns. this is not unique to the world of aviation either Mr Leadsled, have a look around industrial safety, sports such as motor racing etc.

Cheers

J

[Howabout]

Lead of the Sled,

I get it now. At the subsequent class action, the relatives of the deceased will be told that:

Once you have achieved a 5E-9 probability of collision, no additional resources/higher class of airspace is going to make the slightest difference to the likelihood of a collision.

The lawyer(s) - read stacks - for the plaintiffs will ask a relatively simple question:

"So Mr Lead, you achieved 5E-9, 'whatever that means M'Lud' (as a well directed aside to the jury), yet we had a fatal mid-air collision.

"Would you mind explaining how this came to pass when my information, from current and competent air traffic controllers and pilots (I'd like to enter these affidavits for the record M'Lud), suggest such a tragedy could have been avoided with Class C airspace. Class C airspace at no, or minimal, extra cost, would have guaranteed separation between this aircraft and the light aircraft that collided with it. Wouldn't it have Mt Lead? Wouldn't it have?"

"Not necessarily; you see 5E-9 is a theoretical metric beyond which.."

"Excuse me, you are telling me that this is theoretical, that you actually based your decision on theory, that people died because of theory?

"But, but, we achieved 5E-9"

Etc, etc.

Lead, it just wont wash when it's revealed that passenger carrying RPTs are playing dodgems with unknown VFRs. Any proponent that signs off will be toast in the event of a (God forbid) mid-air that was avoidable.

But I suppose you are safe because your signature won't be on the paperwork.

You might label us troglodytes, but self -interest (as alluded to) doesn't come into it. We are genuinely sh*t-scared that people are being put at unnecessary and, avoidable, risk.

[LeadSled]

"Dimensionless terms"? Rubbish! It was measured, in the three months after NAS 2b was introduced, with two airproxs. Why do you continue to refuse to acknowledge the statistics?

Bloggs,

All that statement illustrates is how little you understand risk management ----- perhaps you would like to tell us all about numerical values of "safe" ----- in fact, why don't you start by defining something called "safe" ---- what is "safe".***

Perhaps you could point me tho the Australian/New Zealand Standards for "safe" management ( as opposed to AS/NZ 4360).

As to the two NAS 2b incidents, they didn't measure anything, but clearly you don't understand that. As I have said in a previous post, and if you were capable, re-read the whole reports, not just the reports of the RPT Captains involved --- you might just find alternative interpretations ----- but I don't expect you will.

In particular, the NAS 2b incident north of Brisbane, have a very close look at the actions of the RPT crew, and I mean a very close look, and ask yourself, if you are, in fact, an RPT pilot: Would that have been your response to a TA followed by an RA, or would you, perhaps, have done something different, and perhaps avoided the RA.

As to accepting the "risks" during departure/approach phases, there is certainly something of the acceptance of risk when a person thinks

"they are in control"

unjustified self confidence, and lack of knowledge of what might be out of your control.

It doesn't, however, have anything to do with the system design risk for procedure design, which is all about assessing the reliability of the components of the system (including the pilot) ---- and arriving at a final set of criteria which are nothing more than a compromise ------ with the pilot flying having little or no knowledge of compromises.

The number of approach or departure phase accidents, versus mid-airs, tends to illustrate the point.

Once again, it is revealing of Australian attitudes that the implicit assumption is that the "professional" will always behave in an appropriate manner, and in the case of the dreaded VFR "Terry Towling Brigade Bug Smasher", it will always be that pilot who is the collision risk threat. That it is always "the other pilot" who is the threat.

However, the record doesn't support such a proposition, see the various reports available, Ambidjii being only the latest. Indeed, the "might is right" attitude is not limited to "professional" v. "private", we have several very interesting incidents where pilots of larger turbo-props have attempted to assume priority over smaller turbo-props -----

Tootle pip!!

*** There is a very useful High Court definition of "safe", which does absolutely nothing for your desired/assumed definition of safe.

[Capn Bloggs]

Sled,

In particular, the NAS 2b incident north of Brisbane, have a very close look at the actions of the RPT crew, and I mean a very close look, and ask yourself, if you are, in fact, an RPT pilot: Would that have been your response to a TA followed by an RA, or would you, perhaps, have done something different, and perhaps avoided the RA.

Red herring. The fact is that these two aircraft came as close as they did because of the airspace that you and Dick claim has a vanishingly small chance of a MAC. That claim is obviously rubbish, or are you going to trot out the "well, they missed, didn't they?".

And yes, I have read both ATSB reports and I see no problem with the behaviour of the RPT crews. All I see is that these two incidents demonstrate the fundamental failings of E airspace. Take the blinkers off and get out from behind your risk analysis spreadsheet.

Once again, it is revealing of Australian attitudes that the implicit assumption is that the "professional" will always behave in an appropriate manner, and in the case of the dreaded VFR "Terry Towling Brigade Bug Smasher", it will always be that pilot who is the collision risk threat. That it is always "the other pilot" who is the threat.

However, the record doesn't support such a proposition, see the various reports available, Ambidjii being only the latest. Indeed, the "might is right" attitude is not limited to "professional" v. "private", we have several very interesting incidents where pilots of larger turbo-props have attempted to assume priority over smaller turbo-props -----

Please stop peddling this nonsense. 1/I have a healthy regard for my inability to constantly be looking out the window from FL245 down (why do we have E above FL200 when CARs prohibit it? ) to the top of the zone and 2/I am very aware of the inability of a VFR pilot to see and avoid an aircraft such as mine, especially when I am rapidly closing on him from behind his wingline. Unalerted See and Avoid DOES NOT WORK.

As to VFR doing the right thing, the ONLY reason you guys want E is so you don't have to participate; I am therefore not holding my breath for VFR to hop onto the ATC freq announcing where he is or whether he will be a confliction to me (as he is required to currently do in G above 5000ft).

[ozineurope]

This just goes on and on doesn't it?

Lead - why do you want E if C is available at the same cost?

[peuce]

Leadsled,

As Bloggs said, it doesn't matter if it's the Nitro's fault or the Glycerine's fault ... once you put them together in the right situation .... KABOOM!

As we've continually said .. no matter what your analyses, statistics or theories produce, nor despite how correct they may be, there always has to be the final "common sense" test.

At the moment, your product fails the common sense test ... and that, I believe, is how 12 ordinary men and women would see it.

[Chimbu chuckles]

Leadsled is matters not one wit whether the mistake is made by the RPT pilot or the GA pilot. Humans make mistakes hence we design systems that mitigate those mistakes, ergo, controlled airspace.

If two aircraft come together in controlled airspace there has been serious, most probably serial/multiple, human failings but its not a system design fault.

You're touting a system that can produce aluminium rain without human error. The GA pilot may have assiduously turned the transponder to mode C and in good faith believe its working properly - that doesn't mean it is.

[le Pingouin]

Precisely CC. E is specifically designed to allow aircraft to come within close proximity in an uncontrolled manner.

And Leadie old fruit, it doesn't matter whether pilots do something stupid or not in any airprox - the pilots are human & will handle things less than optimally at times. That has to be allowed for in any modelling.

E airspace is specifically designed to allow them to get into that position in the first place, allowing the mistakes to have serious consequences.

Apply your vast statistical skills to analysing the actual data around Launceston when they had E over D. Probably closer to 1e-4 than 5e-9. Strikes me as a severe failure of the modelling. It is totally nonsensical to apply average risk figures to a specific locale - it assumes an homogeneous environment with minimal variations. A very large & unjustified assumption.

[Capn Bloggs]

The fundamental differences here were demonstrated to me recently. On the new Perth to Bunbury highway, a major intersection was built, no doubt using all the appropriate risk-management and design principles ie "world's best practice". It was, in my view, a very easy intersection to negotiate from all directions.

However, serious accidents quickly started occurring at this intersection, probably causing some gnashing of designer's teeth. The result? The speed limit was in one direction on the highway was quickly reduced from 110kph to 80kph. No doubt there were some "Dick Smiths" on the road who said "WTF are we doing 80?! bla bla bla". The rest of us said "fair enough".

That's what we're saying to you, Ledsled and fellow Nastronauts. There's a problem, regardless of what your studies show, and for you to ignore it when there is no major benefit to be lost by implementing C instead of E, you will be negligent. But then again, as has been said before, you're not signing the paperwork, are you?

[ferris]

Baffle them with bull$hit. Lawyering 101, right Leadsled?

What is your agenda? You must have one, because your stated reasons thus far are not reasonable. Continually demanding a certain level of service, because that is what the risk modeling demands, even though a higher level of service (and thus, safety) is available at the same cost, is not reasonable. No matter how obfuscation and smokescreen is used.

Imagine if all this effort was used for good instead of evil? "The charging regime", for example. Imagine AsA being directed to use a tried system- worlds best practice etc. etc. on........moving to The US charging regime.

Do you/Dick ever look at the big picture and wonder what actually needs fixing? Instead of the platitudes/weasil words etc being used for this E crap?

[Howabout]

Lead,

Given your influence and your profile as a B744 captain, and as a risk management expert, I'd say there's a pretty good chance that you'd be asked to explain why 'risk management' didn't work.

We came with in a poof-teenth of serious prangs under that atrocity called 2b. The history is there, and you want to repeat that episode?

I'd start compiling my explanatory brief now - like tonight.