NAS rears its head again
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Chimbu Chuckles
Is this why you don't want to classify the airway corridors into Orange and the Canberra terminal area after hours as class E?
You controllers can rest easy about these RPT near misses can't you, as they happened in class G. Not your responsibility is it?
What public position will you Class E deniers take had these RPT incidents resulted in fair paying passengers deaths especially when families are told it could have been avoided by implementing Class E back in 1995?
If two aircraft come together in controlled airspace there has been serious, most probably serial/multiple, human failings but its not a system design fault.
You controllers can rest easy about these RPT near misses can't you, as they happened in class G. Not your responsibility is it?
What public position will you Class E deniers take had these RPT incidents resulted in fair paying passengers deaths especially when families are told it could have been avoided by implementing Class E back in 1995?
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mj - do you have any idea of what you speak? If an IFR aircraft is collected/collects another aircraft in G airspace the controller could find themselves in front of the coroner for failing to pass a traffic alert and suggested avoiding action to the IFR.
For you to say that G absolves the controller shows that you have no idea of the rules that ATC operate under in Australia.
For you to say that G absolves the controller shows that you have no idea of the rules that ATC operate under in Australia.
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More misinformation from the NAStronauts
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1361820...604222_001.pdf
So now you are baggin' the NAS you NAStronauts want?
Make your minds up
And anyway, the relevance to busy airspace above class D would be????????????
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/1361820...604222_001.pdf
In response, the pilot of the Baron turned his aircraft to the right and off the published missed approach procedure, reaching 5,200 ft shortly thereafter. The pilot of the Baron indicated that the right turn was as a result of his previous training, including the conduct of a right turn in order to avoid conflicting traffic. That was also consistent with the collision avoidance requirements of Civil Aviation Regulation 162 (2). The pilot in command of the SAAB reported that:
• the minimum distance between the two aircraft that was displayed on the TCAS was between 500 and 1,200 ft vertically, and 3 to 4 NM horizontally
• neither a TCAS TA nor RA was received on the Baron.
The SAAB continued the runway 29 straight-in RNAV GNSS approach and landed. The pilot of the Baron conducted an NDB approach procedure and landed on runway 29.
The crews of both aircraft reported that neither had considered their self-separation requirements if they or the other aircraft were required to conduct a missed approach.
• the minimum distance between the two aircraft that was displayed on the TCAS was between 500 and 1,200 ft vertically, and 3 to 4 NM horizontally
• neither a TCAS TA nor RA was received on the Baron.
The SAAB continued the runway 29 straight-in RNAV GNSS approach and landed. The pilot of the Baron conducted an NDB approach procedure and landed on runway 29.
The crews of both aircraft reported that neither had considered their self-separation requirements if they or the other aircraft were required to conduct a missed approach.
The airspace in the vicinity of Orange Aerodrome was structured in accordance with the National Airspace System (NAS). In addition, the provision of mutual traffic information by air traffic control to the pilots of both aircraft was in accordance with the requirements of the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS).
Contributing safety factors
• Neither flight crew considered their self-separation requirements if they or the other aircraft were required to conduct a missed approach.
Other key findings
• The airspace in the vicinity of Orange was structured in accordance with the National Airspace System (NAS).
• The provision of mutual traffic information by air traffic control to the pilots of both aircraft was in accordance with the requirements of the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS).
• The flight crews of both aircraft complied with the published common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) communication procedures.
• Neither flight crew considered their self-separation requirements if they or the other aircraft were required to conduct a missed approach.
Other key findings
• The airspace in the vicinity of Orange was structured in accordance with the National Airspace System (NAS).
• The provision of mutual traffic information by air traffic control to the pilots of both aircraft was in accordance with the requirements of the Manual of Air Traffic Services (MATS).
• The flight crews of both aircraft complied with the published common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) communication procedures.
Make your minds up
And anyway, the relevance to busy airspace above class D would be????????????
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From a purely utilitarian and rational perspective, would anybody care to elucidate, in a clear and unequivocal fashion, the precise benefits that class E airspace, as opposed to class C airspace, would afford the vast majority of Australian airspace users, i.e. the fare paying public?
Accordingly, could it also be explained how this majority is therefore being disadvantaged by the maintenance of the status quo.
Accordingly, could it also be explained how this majority is therefore being disadvantaged by the maintenance of the status quo.
Last edited by jaded boiler; 19th Apr 2010 at 14:16.
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Now, now, OS, we have our frustrations.
JB, great question.
NONE.
From a purely utilitarian and rational perspective, would anybody care to elucidate, in a clear and unequivocal fashion, the precise benefits that E airspace, as opposed to C airspace would entail to the vast majority of Australian airspace users, i.e. the fare paying public.
NONE.
mjbow2...you ARE Dick Smith's pilot!...unreal, a real busdriver that hasn't got a clue.
As for you Mr sled...what's safer, an ILS or an NDB approach? Now, nobody will ever say the NDB is safer. Yet, what you are asking the bureaucrats to sign off on is the NDB approach when the ILS is safer and for the same money...that IS the comparison you are asking us to believe.
Jaba is on the money...those obstacles are SURVEYED, within that MSA is a known quantity....how many accidents on approach or departured are due to the DESIGN of those approaches or departures....answers please!
As for you Mr sled...what's safer, an ILS or an NDB approach? Now, nobody will ever say the NDB is safer. Yet, what you are asking the bureaucrats to sign off on is the NDB approach when the ILS is safer and for the same money...that IS the comparison you are asking us to believe.
Jaba is on the money...those obstacles are SURVEYED, within that MSA is a known quantity....how many accidents on approach or departured are due to the DESIGN of those approaches or departures....answers please!
jaded boiler A good question. I asked a similar question of Dick a few pages back and did not receive a reply. He appears to have gone quiet.
What is the BIG advantage of E of D rather than C over D? What is the difference in cost? Where is the analysis?
Without KNOWING these things we are just talking in circles.
The buying a car analogy is useful, follow it through, would you buy either car without being told the price first, whilst STILL making the decision which one to buy?
What is the BIG advantage of E of D rather than C over D? What is the difference in cost? Where is the analysis?
Without KNOWING these things we are just talking in circles.
The buying a car analogy is useful, follow it through, would you buy either car without being told the price first, whilst STILL making the decision which one to buy?
The Chaser,
Very interesting that you should bring this incident up, although its only relation to E airspace is that E airspace would have prevented to incident, because ATC would have provided separation.
Of far more interest is the reason why the Baron pilots turned off the GA path in IMC, and what circumstances resulted him having to make the turn, or put another way, what activities of the SAAB contributed to the (a seen by the Baron pilot) need to make a turn to avoid the potential of a collision.
What could/should the SAAB (above LSA) have done, so that the Baron didn't have to deviate from the published GA below LSA.
Please try and read the whole report with an open mind (unless your mind is open at both ends) and then consider some of the guidelines in the CAAPs for the revised CAR 166.
The are some serious lessons to be learned from this incident, but from my filed observations, I doubt they have.
As to the main topic in hand, I didn't expect any of you to really understand the significance of the NAS2b incident north of Brisbane, and to repeat again that I accept the principles of risk management in all aviation decision making, but particularly in the case of ICAO CNS/ATM airspace classification or aircraft certification standards.
I love the references to ILS v. NDB and "safer", just another example of lack of knowledge of procedure design parameters, and the part played by probabilities.
Needless to say, "pilot technical error" is a significant consideration in the overall risk assessment that resulted in the design criteria.
For just one example, would any of you like to quote the probability of an NDB being available, when an aircraft diverts to a filed served by a single NDB. Or an ILS failing to transfer to backup power in the event of a failure of the primary power source ---- and so it goes on.
And by the way, there is nothing "theoretical" about "risk management", its veracity is long since proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the High Court of Australia has found.
Tootle pip!!
Very interesting that you should bring this incident up, although its only relation to E airspace is that E airspace would have prevented to incident, because ATC would have provided separation.
Of far more interest is the reason why the Baron pilots turned off the GA path in IMC, and what circumstances resulted him having to make the turn, or put another way, what activities of the SAAB contributed to the (a seen by the Baron pilot) need to make a turn to avoid the potential of a collision.
What could/should the SAAB (above LSA) have done, so that the Baron didn't have to deviate from the published GA below LSA.
Please try and read the whole report with an open mind (unless your mind is open at both ends) and then consider some of the guidelines in the CAAPs for the revised CAR 166.
The are some serious lessons to be learned from this incident, but from my filed observations, I doubt they have.
As to the main topic in hand, I didn't expect any of you to really understand the significance of the NAS2b incident north of Brisbane, and to repeat again that I accept the principles of risk management in all aviation decision making, but particularly in the case of ICAO CNS/ATM airspace classification or aircraft certification standards.
I love the references to ILS v. NDB and "safer", just another example of lack of knowledge of procedure design parameters, and the part played by probabilities.
Needless to say, "pilot technical error" is a significant consideration in the overall risk assessment that resulted in the design criteria.
For just one example, would any of you like to quote the probability of an NDB being available, when an aircraft diverts to a filed served by a single NDB. Or an ILS failing to transfer to backup power in the event of a failure of the primary power source ---- and so it goes on.
And by the way, there is nothing "theoretical" about "risk management", its veracity is long since proven beyond reasonable doubt, as the High Court of Australia has found.
Tootle pip!!
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I think Mr mjbow2 likes comparing apples to oranges and introducing the occasional red-herring. Nothing like diversion and evasion when simple questions can't be answered.
Lead, it does not matter what the 'High Court of Australia has found.' In the case of an accident resulting in 100+ fatalities, 5E-9 will mean squat. The questions will be specific, pointed and go directly to why avoidable deaths occurred. Statistics will not save anyone who introduces a class of airspace that has a level of risk that is higher than an alternative that would have prevented the accident (for the same, or similar, cost).
That's the whole thrust of this thread Lead!
As regards:
I'll file that one for the next trivia night.
As for your assertion that we can't 'define safe,' cute.
Nobody on here purported that 'safe' is other than a relative, generic term. The majority of us contend, however, that in the terminal environment C is 'safer' than E. I'd argue that a jury would accept that argument as well.
Lead, it does not matter what the 'High Court of Australia has found.' In the case of an accident resulting in 100+ fatalities, 5E-9 will mean squat. The questions will be specific, pointed and go directly to why avoidable deaths occurred. Statistics will not save anyone who introduces a class of airspace that has a level of risk that is higher than an alternative that would have prevented the accident (for the same, or similar, cost).
That's the whole thrust of this thread Lead!
As regards:
Incidentally, the design risk for an unknown volcano pipe destroying a high level nuclear waste repository, with the widespread threat to life and health that would entail, is only 1E-8.
As for your assertion that we can't 'define safe,' cute.
Nobody on here purported that 'safe' is other than a relative, generic term. The majority of us contend, however, that in the terminal environment C is 'safer' than E. I'd argue that a jury would accept that argument as well.
You wouldn't old fruit, would you?
Only the highly esteemed Leadsled could couldn't they!
Only the highly esteemed Leadsled could couldn't they!
Actually, I was referring to the team that assessed EVERY reported incident during the 12 months that NAS2b survived, and their considered opinions. The team was made up of CASA, Airservices, Military, FAA and Industry representatives, the latter including some very highly qualified members of the International Society of Air Accident Investigators.
Much as I would like to post the comments here, I am not going to pay $30 for an FOI, which is the only way I could make them available legally. However, a very careful reading of the ATSB report has the information. You need to look at the flight paths of each aircraft very carefully.
Maybe you have all forgotten about this review panel. Almost all the "incident reports" were filed by "professional pilots" in larger aircraft against smaller aircraft --- usually, as it turned out, also flown by "professional pilots".
I don't recall the actual (dreaded) statistics, but my memory says most were rejected as not valid incidents, quite a few were judged to be nothing to do with the characteristics of NAS 2b, and the three referred to here were amongst the only ones investigated in depth.
My memory also tells me there were more RAs in C airspace during the same period, look for it in the ATSB records --- but RAs in C don't , do they, because C is "safe".
Would the High Court take notice of a 5E-9 separation assurance standard?? Be assured they would, because it is an internationally accepted and valid standard. Also because of existing High Court of Australia decisions rejecting damages, in a situation where "a safer outcome could have been achieved" (my words) but the court accepted that the standard applied was "safe", in that it complied with existing standards, and the court made it clear that there is no such thing as absolute safety.
The claim for damages appeal was dismissed by the HCA, that the relevant standard was complied with was accepted by the court. A link to one such decision is already on another thread.
That compromises are an accepted part of establishing a standard are acceptable to the courts, notwithstanding that "higher standards" might be available, but are not mandated for a variety of practical, societal, economic or other reasons.
What you blokes are completely unable to grasp is that, once the separation assurance standard is reached, no additional services will further reduce the residual risk.
That C is "safer" than E, when analysis only requires E, is a devoutly supported myth, but no matter the sincerity of your devotion to the notion, it is still a myth.
Tootle pip!!
PS: Visiting the doctrine of Duty of Care, as the law sees it, as opposed to what most laymen believe is a duty of care, would be well worthwhile in considering the application of risk management standards in the modern world.
Last edited by LeadSled; 20th Apr 2010 at 06:52.
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Lead,
Fine and beaut. I understand precisely where you're coming from:
That's OK Lead. It won't wash in the aftermath of a disaster, but I still respect your devotion to numbers. As I alluded to before, no amount of verbage related to concepts such as 'vanishingly small' and the association of a human life to some abstract figure called 5E-9 will save the poor dick who signs off on this.
I hope he's an avid reader, because he'll have plenty of spare time.
Fine and beaut. I understand precisely where you're coming from:
That C is "safer" than E, when analysis only requires E, is a devoutly supported myth, but no matter the sincerity of your devotion to the notion, it is still a myth
I hope he's an avid reader, because he'll have plenty of spare time.
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Yeah..........why?
When I go to Broome I will go in IFR, but if I do some scenics around the traps it will be VFR.......whats in it for me with E?
Just so I know how much money I saved myself.
NB: And if and when you guys answer its safe to assume I will be driving the IFR/VFR bugsmasher and not a paying PAX in Bloggsies jet and a local charter .
J
When I go to Broome I will go in IFR, but if I do some scenics around the traps it will be VFR.......whats in it for me with E?
Just so I know how much money I saved myself.
NB: And if and when you guys answer its safe to assume I will be driving the IFR/VFR bugsmasher and not a paying PAX in Bloggsies jet and a local charter .
J
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Re , ".....quite a few were judged to be nothing to do with the characteristics of NAS 2b....."
Quite rightly put. NAS2b was designed to put hi-performance RPT jets in close proximity of VFR pilots. Anything other than a hit was just the airspace working as it was designed to do. Nothing abnormal about aircraft missing to the left after planning to pass on the right?????
Truly inspiring airspace design, Joseph Heller would be proud.
Quite rightly put. NAS2b was designed to put hi-performance RPT jets in close proximity of VFR pilots. Anything other than a hit was just the airspace working as it was designed to do. Nothing abnormal about aircraft missing to the left after planning to pass on the right?????
Truly inspiring airspace design, Joseph Heller would be proud.
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DNS, Don't get the sweats about posting that one again and again. And again!
It sums up beautifully the question we all asked in regard to NAS that the proponents could never answer.
'What is the actual problem that we are trying to solve?'
It sums up beautifully the question we all asked in regard to NAS that the proponents could never answer.
'What is the actual problem that we are trying to solve?'
love the references to ILS v. NDB and "safer", just another example of lack of knowledge of procedure design parameters, and the part played by probabilities.
Word for word 2.1 Aeronautical data
2.1.2 Contracting states shall ensure that integrity of aeronautical data is maintained throughout the data process from survey/origin to the next intended user. Aeronautical data integrity requirments shall be based upon the potential risk resulting from the corruption of data and upon the use to which the data item is put. Consequently, the following classification and data integrity level shall apply;
a) critical data integrity level 1x10-8 there is a high probability when using corrupted critical data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severly at risk with the potential for catastrophy
b) essential data, integrity level 1x10-5: there is a low probability when using corrupted essential data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severely at risk with the potential for catastrophy; and
c) routine data, integrity level 1x10-3; there is a very low probability when using corrupted routine data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severly at risk with the potential for catastrophy.
2.1.2 Contracting states shall ensure that integrity of aeronautical data is maintained throughout the data process from survey/origin to the next intended user. Aeronautical data integrity requirments shall be based upon the potential risk resulting from the corruption of data and upon the use to which the data item is put. Consequently, the following classification and data integrity level shall apply;
a) critical data integrity level 1x10-8 there is a high probability when using corrupted critical data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severly at risk with the potential for catastrophy
b) essential data, integrity level 1x10-5: there is a low probability when using corrupted essential data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severely at risk with the potential for catastrophy; and
c) routine data, integrity level 1x10-3; there is a very low probability when using corrupted routine data that the continued safe flight and landing of an aircraft would be severly at risk with the potential for catastrophy.
Everything else is designed to a tolerance far greater than can be achieved by on board navigation equipment. I do not understand your interpretation of tolerance inclusion in the design of minima and "probability"
Just show me the quote in Annex 14 that says the design of an approach has a probability level of "X" and I will shut up.
Ledsled,
You ARE a stuck record
Pray tell us what your thoughts are on this. There is nothing untoward about what either crew did.
Irrelevant. Stop your Dick-Smith "I think all RPT crews that are not Skygods are w@nkers" rants and stick to the topic.
Who said? This has been covered before in the thread. You have obviously forgotten. Oh and yes, you talk about statistics. How about you advise the volume of unsurveilled C around Australia vs the volume of E? Maybe that's one of the reasons there was more RAs in C?
Stating the bleeding obvious again.
Your consistent refusal to acknowledge that your "analysis" includes the two E airproxs, still resulting in a "vanishingly small" collision risk, is breathtaking.
You ARE a stuck record
...a very careful reading of the ATSB report has the information. You need to look at the flight paths of each aircraft very carefully.
Maybe you have all forgotten about this review panel.... Almost all the "incident reports" were filed by "professional pilots" in larger aircraft against smaller aircraft --- usually, as it turned out, also flown by "professional pilots".
My memory also tells me there were more RAs in C airspace during the same period, look for it in the ATSB records --- but RAs in C don't , do they, because C is "safe".
What you blokes are completely unable to grasp is that, once the separation assurance standard is reached, no additional services will further reduce the residual risk.
That C is "safer" than E, when analysis only requires E, is a devoutly supported myth, but no matter the sincerity of your devotion to the notion, it is still a myth.
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Have just spent the last hour reading through this thread, geezuz !!!.
Please correct me if I mis-understand, some here are saying that:
"E" over "D" is safer than, "C" over "D" ("D" = old GAAP for example JT/BK etc etc ?)
Now "E" over "D" would probably be cheaper, no argument, but safer ?, how do you work that ?.
Please correct me if I mis-understand, some here are saying that:
"E" over "D" is safer than, "C" over "D" ("D" = old GAAP for example JT/BK etc etc ?)
Now "E" over "D" would probably be cheaper, no argument, but safer ?, how do you work that ?.
Last edited by Josh Cox; 20th Apr 2010 at 10:20.
Josh,
I have never said that E over D is "safer" than C over D, what I have constantly said is simple, if E over D achieves the separation assurance criteria, going to C does not make it "safer", because the standard is so high that a risk reduction, in a real world sense, just doesn't happen with the move from E to C.
Whoever produced a few standards for data reliability, thanks for that, at least somebody understands that there are probability standards behind a lot of ICAO docs.
Chimbu,
Was it you who said they operated widely internationally, and never operated in other then A, B(?)C. Have a look at the extract from the Indian AIP below.
The highest class of airspace in India is D, and that is TMAs.
<http://www.aai.aero/public_notices/aip/cont/AIP/AIP/aip/enr/enr1/le_ENR_1_4_en.pdf>
Tootle pip!!
PS 1: I have never minded being in the minority, fortunately air safety is not a democracy, as the record over many years has shown, particularly in Australia. Remember the blanket (certainly a majority) opposition to the introduction of weather radar by Ansett and TAA. That is just one example.
PS 2: Clearly most of you cannot comprehend that the whole point of CNS/ATM classification is that services are related to traffic, so every class of airspace achieves the design separation assurance standard. Ergo, is equally "safe".
PS 3: Anybody who has flown with me will testify that my approach briefings are short and to the point, the minimum required by SOPs ---- with a company that encouraged same ---- but somebody from ATC would probably (that word again) not understand that.
PS 4: One man bands went out with the retirement of the WW11 generation --- but a few of you can't help yourselves, you have to attack an individual who will not fall in line with your groupthink.
I have never said that E over D is "safer" than C over D, what I have constantly said is simple, if E over D achieves the separation assurance criteria, going to C does not make it "safer", because the standard is so high that a risk reduction, in a real world sense, just doesn't happen with the move from E to C.
Whoever produced a few standards for data reliability, thanks for that, at least somebody understands that there are probability standards behind a lot of ICAO docs.
Chimbu,
Was it you who said they operated widely internationally, and never operated in other then A, B(?)C. Have a look at the extract from the Indian AIP below.
The highest class of airspace in India is D, and that is TMAs.
<http://www.aai.aero/public_notices/aip/cont/AIP/AIP/aip/enr/enr1/le_ENR_1_4_en.pdf>
Tootle pip!!
PS 1: I have never minded being in the minority, fortunately air safety is not a democracy, as the record over many years has shown, particularly in Australia. Remember the blanket (certainly a majority) opposition to the introduction of weather radar by Ansett and TAA. That is just one example.
PS 2: Clearly most of you cannot comprehend that the whole point of CNS/ATM classification is that services are related to traffic, so every class of airspace achieves the design separation assurance standard. Ergo, is equally "safe".
PS 3: Anybody who has flown with me will testify that my approach briefings are short and to the point, the minimum required by SOPs ---- with a company that encouraged same ---- but somebody from ATC would probably (that word again) not understand that.
PS 4: One man bands went out with the retirement of the WW11 generation --- but a few of you can't help yourselves, you have to attack an individual who will not fall in line with your groupthink.
Last edited by LeadSled; 20th Apr 2010 at 10:57.
Short, brief and to the point!
Please explain how there can ever be separation assurance criteria in E space with no surveilance?
Who supplies the assurance and by what means...all ears, Leadie!
Please explain how there can ever be separation assurance criteria in E space with no surveilance?
Who supplies the assurance and by what means...all ears, Leadie!