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Old 19th Apr 2010, 07:40
  #432 (permalink)  
LeadSled
 
Join Date: Jul 2001
Location: Australia
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"Dimensionless terms"? Rubbish! It was measured, in the three months after NAS 2b was introduced, with two airproxs. Why do you continue to refuse to acknowledge the statistics?
Bloggs,

All that statement illustrates is how little you understand risk management ----- perhaps you would like to tell us all about numerical values of "safe" ----- in fact, why don't you start by defining something called "safe" ---- what is "safe".***

Perhaps you could point me tho the Australian/New Zealand Standards for "safe" management ( as opposed to AS/NZ 4360).

As to the two NAS 2b incidents, they didn't measure anything, but clearly you don't understand that. As I have said in a previous post, and if you were capable, re-read the whole reports, not just the reports of the RPT Captains involved --- you might just find alternative interpretations ----- but I don't expect you will.

In particular, the NAS 2b incident north of Brisbane, have a very close look at the actions of the RPT crew, and I mean a very close look, and ask yourself, if you are, in fact, an RPT pilot: Would that have been your response to a TA followed by an RA, or would you, perhaps, have done something different, and perhaps avoided the RA.

As to accepting the "risks" during departure/approach phases, there is certainly something of the acceptance of risk when a person thinks
"they are in control"
unjustified self confidence, and lack of knowledge of what might be out of your control.

It doesn't, however, have anything to do with the system design risk for procedure design, which is all about assessing the reliability of the components of the system (including the pilot) ---- and arriving at a final set of criteria which are nothing more than a compromise ------ with the pilot flying having little or no knowledge of compromises.

The number of approach or departure phase accidents, versus mid-airs, tends to illustrate the point.

Once again, it is revealing of Australian attitudes that the implicit assumption is that the "professional" will always behave in an appropriate manner, and in the case of the dreaded VFR "Terry Towling Brigade Bug Smasher", it will always be that pilot who is the collision risk threat. That it is always "the other pilot" who is the threat.

However, the record doesn't support such a proposition, see the various reports available, Ambidjii being only the latest. Indeed, the "might is right" attitude is not limited to "professional" v. "private", we have several very interesting incidents where pilots of larger turbo-props have attempted to assume priority over smaller turbo-props -----

Tootle pip!!

*** There is a very useful High Court definition of "safe", which does absolutely nothing for your desired/assumed definition of safe.
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