NAS rears its head again
Is Class E Airspace really "controlled"?
Probably by ICAO definition, but how would the man on the street view an airspace in which ...
I use my previous analogy ... if it smells uncontrolled, if it looks uncontrolled and it operates like uncontrolled airspace ... then ...
How is non-surveillance Class E so different, and thus so much "safer" than Class G?
The only real difference is that ATC do the separating of IFRs in E.
Is that such a step up from G ?
Were IFRs having such a difficult time self separating over Broome?
And the big worry ... random, unknown targets are still there.
But, obviously, the boffins have calculated that ... that's not such a big deal.
But, as Dick says:
As I would support Non-Surveillance Class E ... if the same studies could be provided.
Probably by ICAO definition, but how would the man on the street view an airspace in which ...
- Jet Airliners were permitted to fly, and
- Random, unknown aircraft were also permitted to fly
I use my previous analogy ... if it smells uncontrolled, if it looks uncontrolled and it operates like uncontrolled airspace ... then ...
How is non-surveillance Class E so different, and thus so much "safer" than Class G?
- In Class G, all IFRs are advised of each other and self separate
- In Class E, all IFRs are separated from each other by ATC
- In Class G, random unknown VFR aircraft are permitted
- In Class E, random unknown VFR aircraft are permitted
The only real difference is that ATC do the separating of IFRs in E.
Is that such a step up from G ?
Were IFRs having such a difficult time self separating over Broome?
And the big worry ... random, unknown targets are still there.
But, obviously, the boffins have calculated that ... that's not such a big deal.
But, as Dick says:
I would support D over D if a scientific and objective safety study showed that was the best way to spend our finite safety dollars.
Dick,
is a crock when the sole shareholder receives a huge dividend from the service provider every year, year in, year out! That can also come back and bite a government if money is not spent in a safety service but rather removed from it as cash into consolidated revenue.
finite safety dollars
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Mr Smith
Perhaps our opinions/positions on these airspace allocation matters are really not that far apart.
We agree that Class D, if implemented properly, based on open, transparent and publically available process, will ensure that most everyone can have confidence that the correct methodology, input data and assumptions are ‘reasonable’. Posts on the last page or so indicate that we [and perhaps most others] agree on this issue.
Objectivity is the key to resolving these differences. With that in mind here are a few thoughts that I read you, I, and many others agree on.
CTA/R Operating premise [with equal importance]
- Airspace rules/classification should as far as practicable consider the safety of the fare paying public and other airspace users, particularly where the two categories mix, as a high priority
- Airspace rules/classification should as far as practicable consider the equality of access as a high priority
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to mitigate risk exposure where the cost and/or impost [VFR using a radio and receiving a free air traffic control service] of doing so is small, and more particularly where a cost advantage [type of service infrastructures needed] is derived
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to provide the most efficient use of limited ATS resources for the maximum benefit to all industry participants
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to ensure systemic workload is considered adequately to protect service providers and airspace users alike
Can we all work forward from here to a solution that the vast majority are happy with? I am hopeful, and confident it can be done.
Perhaps our opinions/positions on these airspace allocation matters are really not that far apart.
We agree that Class D, if implemented properly, based on open, transparent and publically available process, will ensure that most everyone can have confidence that the correct methodology, input data and assumptions are ‘reasonable’. Posts on the last page or so indicate that we [and perhaps most others] agree on this issue.
Objectivity is the key to resolving these differences. With that in mind here are a few thoughts that I read you, I, and many others agree on.
CTA/R Operating premise [with equal importance]
- Airspace rules/classification should as far as practicable consider the safety of the fare paying public and other airspace users, particularly where the two categories mix, as a high priority
- Airspace rules/classification should as far as practicable consider the equality of access as a high priority
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to mitigate risk exposure where the cost and/or impost [VFR using a radio and receiving a free air traffic control service] of doing so is small, and more particularly where a cost advantage [type of service infrastructures needed] is derived
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to provide the most efficient use of limited ATS resources for the maximum benefit to all industry participants
- Airspace rules/classifications should as far as practicable seek to ensure systemic workload is considered adequately to protect service providers and airspace users alike
Can we all work forward from here to a solution that the vast majority are happy with? I am hopeful, and confident it can be done.
Backpeddle a bit...Smith
you have a different view? D over D?
Class D from the ground up to overlaying class C...thats a big class D zone! However, does it work. ICAO D, clearances required, separation IFR from IFR from VFR from VFR. Approaches protected...doesn't need radar to be effective. No need to retrain ATC to handle procedural E...and a lot less heartache
OK, what's the down side? My experience with EN tower charges has my wallet wincing...then again EN is a C tower.
All things equal radio and transponder requirment s the same...already trained up to handle procedures for ICAO D so thats a win...ARFOR, there must be a gotcha.
you have a different view? D over D?Class D from the ground up to overlaying class C...thats a big class D zone! However, does it work. ICAO D, clearances required, separation IFR from IFR from VFR from VFR. Approaches protected...doesn't need radar to be effective. No need to retrain ATC to handle procedural E...and a lot less heartache
OK, what's the down side? My experience with EN tower charges has my wallet wincing...then again EN is a C tower.
All things equal radio and transponder requirment s the same...already trained up to handle procedures for ICAO D so thats a win...ARFOR, there must be a gotcha.
ARFOR " can we all work forward"
You certainly can't because no one will take any notice of an anonymous PPRUNE poster.
Just look what is happening in practice!
If class E did not provide the required extremely high level of safety it is obvious that the experts in the FAA would have noticed this and changed the airspace.
OZ, a huge class D zone would clearly require more staffing than the FAA 4.3nm/2500'.
The key would whether that was the best way of allocating the limited safety dollars.
You certainly can't because no one will take any notice of an anonymous PPRUNE poster.
Just look what is happening in practice!
If class E did not provide the required extremely high level of safety it is obvious that the experts in the FAA would have noticed this and changed the airspace.
OZ, a huge class D zone would clearly require more staffing than the FAA 4.3nm/2500'.
The key would whether that was the best way of allocating the limited safety dollars.
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Mr Smith
Lets be frank.
The FAA can use surveilled Class E because of the number of ATC's operating small sector/TRACON with the time to watch for unseparated IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR conflicts. That is beside the fact that much of the Air carrier traffic operates within Class B and C
Australia will NEVER afford the cost of saturation surveillance where 'regional' Hi capacity RPT operate, nor the number of approach controllers required to be able to 'watch' 'unseparated' traffic in Class E terminal areas.
Australia can compensate for those huge differences by utilising class D i.e. separation in lue of the number of ATC eyes needed to look for unseparated collision opportunities.
Effective, cost efficient, safe and arguably a proper fit for the traffic densities, infrustructure and available funding.
Even if as Ozbusdriver mentioned, the government returned their profit from ATS, it would not go close to establishing terminal area sureveillance based approach and departures services [as per the US NAS] to facilitate Class E operations in terminal areas, which in reality would be necessary at YBRM, YPKA, YBAS, YMLT, YMHB, YMAY, YSTW, YSCH, YBMC, YBMK, YBRK, YBHM, and any others that met the establishment disestablishment criteria, which would be somewhere in the vicinity of 12+ X 10+ = 120++ approach rated controllers [as an absolute minimum, more likely 200+]. Add surveillance and VHF frequencies, approach room real estate etc on top of that, and for what reason? To necessitate Class E and VFR no-radio??
Impossible to justify in any 'reasonable' sense.
In reality, what are the viable options for Australia and Australian conditions? I think you [and others] have hit on it alreaDy.
Lets be frank.
The FAA can use surveilled Class E because of the number of ATC's operating small sector/TRACON with the time to watch for unseparated IFR/VFR and VFR/VFR conflicts. That is beside the fact that much of the Air carrier traffic operates within Class B and C
Australia will NEVER afford the cost of saturation surveillance where 'regional' Hi capacity RPT operate, nor the number of approach controllers required to be able to 'watch' 'unseparated' traffic in Class E terminal areas.
Australia can compensate for those huge differences by utilising class D i.e. separation in lue of the number of ATC eyes needed to look for unseparated collision opportunities.
Effective, cost efficient, safe and arguably a proper fit for the traffic densities, infrustructure and available funding.
Even if as Ozbusdriver mentioned, the government returned their profit from ATS, it would not go close to establishing terminal area sureveillance based approach and departures services [as per the US NAS] to facilitate Class E operations in terminal areas, which in reality would be necessary at YBRM, YPKA, YBAS, YMLT, YMHB, YMAY, YSTW, YSCH, YBMC, YBMK, YBRK, YBHM, and any others that met the establishment disestablishment criteria, which would be somewhere in the vicinity of 12+ X 10+ = 120++ approach rated controllers [as an absolute minimum, more likely 200+]. Add surveillance and VHF frequencies, approach room real estate etc on top of that, and for what reason? To necessitate Class E and VFR no-radio??
Impossible to justify in any 'reasonable' sense.
In reality, what are the viable options for Australia and Australian conditions? I think you [and others] have hit on it alreaDy.
Last edited by ARFOR; 27th Apr 2010 at 09:21. Reason: formatting
ARFOR you have been told the following many times however you ignore the facts,
The USA has 350 class D towers with over 50% not having any form of radar coverage in the E airspace directly above the D.
Even busy class D towers 140nm to the west of Washington DC do not have radar coverage in the E airspace at the lower and most busy levels.
As the VOR expert has stated class E does not require radar to operate safely.
The USA has 350 class D towers with over 50% not having any form of radar coverage in the E airspace directly above the D.
Even busy class D towers 140nm to the west of Washington DC do not have radar coverage in the E airspace at the lower and most busy levels.
As the VOR expert has stated class E does not require radar to operate safely.
Dick,
You say:
I say:
If the O Rings in the Shuttle Challeger did not provide the required extrememly high level of safety it is obvious that th experts at NASA would have noticed this and changed the specifications
You say:
If class E did not provide the required extremely high level of safety it is obvious that the experts in the FAA would have noticed this and changed the airspace.
If the O Rings in the Shuttle Challeger did not provide the required extrememly high level of safety it is obvious that th experts at NASA would have noticed this and changed the specifications
PEUCE you will have to better than that- space shuttle-say a dozen previous flights over a few years.
Class E over D ? Say tens of millions(or could it be hundreds of millions?) of flights over many decades. I know which statistics I would accept as most likely to give a true reflection on the resultant level of safety.
And they did fix the O ring problem after one accident. If the FAA considered non radar E link airspace as a safety problem surely they would have at least introduced a mandatory transponder requirement.
Class E over D ? Say tens of millions(or could it be hundreds of millions?) of flights over many decades. I know which statistics I would accept as most likely to give a true reflection on the resultant level of safety.
And they did fix the O ring problem after one accident. If the FAA considered non radar E link airspace as a safety problem surely they would have at least introduced a mandatory transponder requirement.
Dick,
I think you missed my toungue in cheek point ... so I'll spell it out.
NASA suposedly knew about the problems with the O Ring before the disaster.
So, don't necessarily take U.S. inaction as a sign of "everything's fine"
I think you missed my toungue in cheek point ... so I'll spell it out.
NASA suposedly knew about the problems with the O Ring before the disaster.
So, don't necessarily take U.S. inaction as a sign of "everything's fine"
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Clutching at straws
Mr Smith
It is you who ignores facts. The Australian airspace being discussed is utilised by large volumes of Hi capacity Air Carrier RPT/PTO aircraft. Stop trying to compare apples with spanners.
The following has been independently verified correct [FAA, AsA and CASA data]. I won't insult the other readers with repeats, I'll just staple these US/Australia comparision links to your rear end as you ride by on your merry-go-round of empty rhetoric.
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5563937
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5576247
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5576481
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5576654
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5617507
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5621582
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5624192
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5624339
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5628708
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5636914
Be reasonable and stop playing with circular platitudes
It is you who ignores facts. The Australian airspace being discussed is utilised by large volumes of Hi capacity Air Carrier RPT/PTO aircraft. Stop trying to compare apples with spanners.
The following has been independently verified correct [FAA, AsA and CASA data]. I won't insult the other readers with repeats, I'll just staple these US/Australia comparision links to your rear end as you ride by on your merry-go-round of empty rhetoric.
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5563937
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5576247
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5576481
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5576654
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5617507
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5621582
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5624192
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5624339
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5628708
http://www.pprune.org/dg-p-reporting...ml#post5636914
Be reasonable and stop playing with circular platitudes
Dick,
As you are so fond of trotting out VOR's thoughts on Class E airspace ... which they do in fact support ... in principle, I thought I might extract a few more of their thoughts. I know some are dated, but they do bear some reflection, less we fall into similar traps:
On implementation:
Relative risk in different Airspace classes:
On radar requirements:
On risk to the fare paying passengers:
On differening risk appetites:
On transplanting airspace systems:
On using TCAS as a mitigator:
On airspace upgrading:
On Class E workload differences:
On risk increases:
On transponders in non-surveillance Class E:
As you are so fond of trotting out VOR's thoughts on Class E airspace ... which they do in fact support ... in principle, I thought I might extract a few more of their thoughts. I know some are dated, but they do bear some reflection, less we fall into similar traps:
On implementation:
That said, it has been evident through the last two years, that there is an aggressive campaign to “crash or crash through” the airspace reform agenda, with no regard for established safety and change management systems and practices.
Indeed over this period we have been supplied with large quantities of information that would indicate, if not a deliberate attempt to circumvent those processes, then at the very least a level of naďveté of the processes.
Once more we have to say that the proposed changes under NAS were not necessarily unsafe – but the manner in which they were being introduced, and the total lack of transparent process, made the transition risk unacceptable. If further reform is to be achieved, not only must the risk associated with the changes be examined, but those associated with implementing the changes must be examined and carefully managed.
Indeed over this period we have been supplied with large quantities of information that would indicate, if not a deliberate attempt to circumvent those processes, then at the very least a level of naďveté of the processes.
Once more we have to say that the proposed changes under NAS were not necessarily unsafe – but the manner in which they were being introduced, and the total lack of transparent process, made the transition risk unacceptable. If further reform is to be achieved, not only must the risk associated with the changes be examined, but those associated with implementing the changes must be examined and carefully managed.
It is absolutely correct to say that in any given volume the level of risk associated with Class C airspace is less than that associated with Class E.
Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc.
Yes, it is absolutely true to say that for a given volume of airspace, with a set volume of traffic, the risk associated with Class G is higher than Class F, which is higher than Class E, which is higher than Class C etc.
Perhaps you would like to find a reference in ANY global documentation that identifies a requirement for radar in Class E airspace. It is not a pre-requisite, and Class E - in fact Class A, B, C, D E, F and G can - and are - be operated satisfactorily with or without radar coverage.
Good and effective airspace management is about ensuring that the fare paying passenger is not exposed to inappropriate risk levels – and just as important – inequitable risk levels. So, the risk to a passenger flying to Sydney should be no higher than that for a passenger flying to Broome, Alice Springs, Launceston or Mildura, and vice versa.
We said “appropriate levels of risk”. Here is where it can get exceptionally difficult, even for a clean sheet approach. What one section of the aviation community will accept as appropriate may differ by one or two orders of magnitude to another section of the community. So a glider pilot might well be prepared to accept risk levels one hundred times higher than an airline pilot, or ten times higher than a VFR general aviation pilot. A VFR general aviation pilot might accept risk at a level ten times higher than an airline pilot. Is this wrong – basically no. The point of most contention comes where the high risk acceptor and the low risk acceptor come together. Here the airspace designer may need to impose an airspace classification that accommodates the lower risk threshold, or establish mitigating procedures.
What we have repeatedly stated is that you cannot simply pick up a set of procedures from one country – be it the United States or Mongolia – and apply them in another State, without addressing the potential safety issues [and by the way we have already stated that we don’t believe there is a significant safety issue associated with the proposed changes] – AND implementing the changes safely.
The United States has grown up with a culture of free access to airspace. You only have to spend time with US AOPA management to realize that the culture is GA focused, with air transport having to fight for access to – or retention of – controlled airspace. Type “Class E airspace” into your internet search engine, and you will find hundreds of references to legislative processes around simple matters such as establishing Class E surface areas. Being based in North America, you will also be aware that it is the States of the United States that request Class E airspace in excess of corridors associated with IFR routes – and that is why some States have blanket E, and some simply have corridors. Changing terminal area routing at major airports in the United States requires at least two years notice, and legislative change.
The United States has grown up with a culture of free access to airspace. You only have to spend time with US AOPA management to realize that the culture is GA focused, with air transport having to fight for access to – or retention of – controlled airspace. Type “Class E airspace” into your internet search engine, and you will find hundreds of references to legislative processes around simple matters such as establishing Class E surface areas. Being based in North America, you will also be aware that it is the States of the United States that request Class E airspace in excess of corridors associated with IFR routes – and that is why some States have blanket E, and some simply have corridors. Changing terminal area routing at major airports in the United States requires at least two years notice, and legislative change.
You CANNOT [yet], however, design a system that relies on aircraft-to-aircraft surveillance or separation based on the use of transponders – that is, the use of airborne collision avoidance systems, like TCAS and Mode A/C transponders, as an airspace design tool, is prohibited.
..... Effectively, ICAO – and the ANC specifically – has determined that ACAS MAY NOT be used as a risk mitigator under any circumstances in the design of airspace management procedures. ALL ICAO Technical Panels have been directed that they may not factor such systems in the development of separation standards, the design of procedures, or the development of future systems. ACAS is a “last line of defence” for pilots – NOT a system design tool.
ICAO ANNEX 11:
SECTION 2.4: DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES
2.4.1 The need for the provision of air traffic services shall be determined by consideration of the following:
a. the types of air traffic involved;
b. the density of air traffic;
c. the meteorological conditions;
d. such other factors as may be relevant.
Note:- due to the number of elements involved, it has not been possible to develop specific data to determine the need for air traffic services in a given area or at a given location. For example:
a. a mixture of types of aircraft of varying speed (conventional jet, etc) might necessitate the provision of air traffic services, whereas a relatively greater density of traffic where only one type of operation is involved would not;
b. meteorological conditions might have considerable effect in areas where there is a constant flow of air traffic (e.g., scheduled traffic), whereas similar or worse meteorological conditions might be relatively unimportant in an area where air traffic would be discontinued is such conditions (e.g., local VFR flights);
c. open stretches of water, mountainous, uninhabited or desert areas might necessitate the provision of air traffic services even though the frequency of operations is extremely low.
2.4.2 The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.
..... Effectively, ICAO – and the ANC specifically – has determined that ACAS MAY NOT be used as a risk mitigator under any circumstances in the design of airspace management procedures. ALL ICAO Technical Panels have been directed that they may not factor such systems in the development of separation standards, the design of procedures, or the development of future systems. ACAS is a “last line of defence” for pilots – NOT a system design tool.
ICAO ANNEX 11:
SECTION 2.4: DETERMINATION OF THE NEED FOR AIR TRAFFIC SERVICES
2.4.1 The need for the provision of air traffic services shall be determined by consideration of the following:
a. the types of air traffic involved;
b. the density of air traffic;
c. the meteorological conditions;
d. such other factors as may be relevant.
Note:- due to the number of elements involved, it has not been possible to develop specific data to determine the need for air traffic services in a given area or at a given location. For example:
a. a mixture of types of aircraft of varying speed (conventional jet, etc) might necessitate the provision of air traffic services, whereas a relatively greater density of traffic where only one type of operation is involved would not;
b. meteorological conditions might have considerable effect in areas where there is a constant flow of air traffic (e.g., scheduled traffic), whereas similar or worse meteorological conditions might be relatively unimportant in an area where air traffic would be discontinued is such conditions (e.g., local VFR flights);
c. open stretches of water, mountainous, uninhabited or desert areas might necessitate the provision of air traffic services even though the frequency of operations is extremely low.
2.4.2 The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.
So if you determine that you should have Class C in one area, Class D adjacent to that airspace, and then Class E adjacent to that airspace – AND it would cost you no more to make it all Class C – then that should be your decision.If there is no cost impact – and no demonstrable negative impact on amenity for a VFR flight – nothing in the “rule book” says you can’t exceed the “minimum requirement”.
Where the differences occur, of course, is the interaction between IFR and VFR flights. By that, we mean that an IFR aircraft may require services more urgently [i.e., tactically rather than in a planned fashion] in Class E airspace because of the proximity of VFR flights, or may not be able to comply with a planned ATC instruction. This adds a level of complexity to the model – for both pilots and providers of services – something that needs to be factored in the holistic airspace design. That is not to say Class E should not be used – far from it – but it must be appreciated that Class E operates in a fundamentally different way than Classes A through D.
In any given volume of airspace, with the same number of IFR and VFR flights, the level of risk must increase when Class C airspace is changed to Class E [or Class D, or Class F or Class G for that matter]. Equally, a change upwards in classification, from Class C to Class B or Class A, for a given volume of airspace, with the same number of IFR and VFR flights, the level of risk is decreased.
As we have pointed out previously, the operation of transponders within Class E airspace is only of use as a design tool where there is secondary radar coverage – to allow enhanced provision of traffic information by a third party.Transponder carriage and operation outside of radar coverage cannot possibly be used as a tool to enhance airspace design.
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Hmmm
So VOR does not actually support Class E if C is the available at the same cost?
Then again what would they know they posted with a nome d'plume and should be ignored! Or are they different because part of the posts part way support the theories espoused by the nastronauts.
So VOR does not actually support Class E if C is the available at the same cost?
Then again what would they know they posted with a nome d'plume and should be ignored! Or are they different because part of the posts part way support the theories espoused by the nastronauts.
What is the VFR mitigator in non-surveillance Class E?
Leadsled,
Note: This is a serious question.
As we don't have a transparent safety/cost/benefit analysis of Class E Aispace above Broome available, that I know of ... with your experience of such matters, could you offer a suggestion on how the risk of an IFR RPT Jet hitting a VFR, whilst on descent into Broome might have been mitigated against in the alledged analyses?
We know that Transponder useage can't be used as a mitigator, so what is left?
I can only see three possibile decisions:
I think we can discount No 1
I think No 2 has been proven to be unlikely
I would hate to back my decision on such a gamble as No 3
Have I missed something?
If not, then I can't see any assurance here ...
I know its what is happening in G now (except broadcasts are required around Broome), but E is supposed to be a better, safer alternative than what we have ... isn't it?
Note: This is a serious question.
As we don't have a transparent safety/cost/benefit analysis of Class E Aispace above Broome available, that I know of ... with your experience of such matters, could you offer a suggestion on how the risk of an IFR RPT Jet hitting a VFR, whilst on descent into Broome might have been mitigated against in the alledged analyses?
We know that Transponder useage can't be used as a mitigator, so what is left?
I can only see three possibile decisions:
- There are no VFRs above Broome
- The IFR will see them, or
- The probability of an IFR and a VFR being in the same place over Broome is too small
I think we can discount No 1
I think No 2 has been proven to be unlikely
I would hate to back my decision on such a gamble as No 3
Have I missed something?
If not, then I can't see any assurance here ...
I know its what is happening in G now (except broadcasts are required around Broome), but E is supposed to be a better, safer alternative than what we have ... isn't it?
Peuce
What is amazing about this VOR stuff is that no-one is stating this information under their own name. Why could this be? Surely they wouldn’t be scared of giving factual information which is so important for our aviation community?
I find the whole thing totally mysterious.
Yes, I understand that whistle blowers can post on PPRuNe to get important information across without prejudicing their jobs. But VOR – obviously a number of different people – has an excellent knowledge of airspace and airspace design but there is no equivalent person in Australia that I know of who actually has similar views and puts their name to their views.
By the way, I understand the ruling in relation to transponders not being used as a safety mitigator came because a group of Air Traffic Controllers at an ICAO meeting were concerned in the early days that ACAS may replace Air Traffic Control. They naturally made their decision to preserve their jobs. Who wouldn’t?
It seems strange to me that CASA allows something as basic as a radio (which may not even be working) as a major safety mitigator for Class G, however ACAS is not similarly treated.
I particularly note the comment,
One of the main reasons for this is that every time the NAS Implementation Group put forward the recommendation that we get someone who is an expert on the US NAS system to assist with the introduction, it was refused.
Imagine if you could get these VOR people educating Australian Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers into the advantages and disadvantages of the US NAS. I believe the level of understanding would be totally different.
Isn’t it interesting that even now, with the proposed introduction of more NAS airspace, that as far as I know no expert on the NAS system has been employed to communicate how it actually works.
This type of stubbornness and sheer bastardry has the potential to needlessly damage our industry.
What is amazing about this VOR stuff is that no-one is stating this information under their own name. Why could this be? Surely they wouldn’t be scared of giving factual information which is so important for our aviation community?
I find the whole thing totally mysterious.
Yes, I understand that whistle blowers can post on PPRuNe to get important information across without prejudicing their jobs. But VOR – obviously a number of different people – has an excellent knowledge of airspace and airspace design but there is no equivalent person in Australia that I know of who actually has similar views and puts their name to their views.
By the way, I understand the ruling in relation to transponders not being used as a safety mitigator came because a group of Air Traffic Controllers at an ICAO meeting were concerned in the early days that ACAS may replace Air Traffic Control. They naturally made their decision to preserve their jobs. Who wouldn’t?
It seems strange to me that CASA allows something as basic as a radio (which may not even be working) as a major safety mitigator for Class G, however ACAS is not similarly treated.
I particularly note the comment,
Once more we have to say that the proposed changes under NAS were not necessarily unsafe – but the manner in which they were being introduced, and the total lack of transparent process, made the transition risk unacceptable.
Imagine if you could get these VOR people educating Australian Pilots and Air Traffic Controllers into the advantages and disadvantages of the US NAS. I believe the level of understanding would be totally different.
Isn’t it interesting that even now, with the proposed introduction of more NAS airspace, that as far as I know no expert on the NAS system has been employed to communicate how it actually works.
This type of stubbornness and sheer bastardry has the potential to needlessly damage our industry.
It seems strange to me that CASA allows something as basic as a radio (which may not even be working) as a major safety mitigator for Class G, however ACAS is not similarly treated.
no expert on the NAS system has been employed to communicate how it actually works.
This type of stubbornness and sheer bastardry has the potential to needlessly damage our industry.
No, this is just a continuation of the Dick Smith dream of Free in GE. Nothing more, nothing less.
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Dick, stubbornness and sheer bastardry has already needlessly damaged our industry. What cost to roll out/roll back NAS MK II.
The cost was NAS-tronomical.
Now here we go with MK III. The same weak 'straw man' arguments, the same comparisons of apples with spanners, the same determination to crash through, same result will occur.
Fare paying passengers in RPT deserve the best protection we can provide/afford. Thats C (or possibly D)over D at Broome and Karratha. It works, its no more expensive than E over D. End of story.
The real reform that should take place is that VFR (including ultralights) should have the best access to airspace possible. That means a relaxation of some aspects of our regulations and airspace and greater surveillance. It works in places like Hobart and should be rolled out elsewhere.
Until you focus your efforts in this area, I believe you will continue to be frustrated.
The cost was NAS-tronomical.
Now here we go with MK III. The same weak 'straw man' arguments, the same comparisons of apples with spanners, the same determination to crash through, same result will occur.
Fare paying passengers in RPT deserve the best protection we can provide/afford. Thats C (or possibly D)over D at Broome and Karratha. It works, its no more expensive than E over D. End of story.
The real reform that should take place is that VFR (including ultralights) should have the best access to airspace possible. That means a relaxation of some aspects of our regulations and airspace and greater surveillance. It works in places like Hobart and should be rolled out elsewhere.
Until you focus your efforts in this area, I believe you will continue to be frustrated.
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Mr Smith
Are you seriously suggesting that 'a group of air traffic controllers' in an ICAO meeting would succeed in having a rule [ratified by signatory nations] included in Annex 11
to protect jobs?
Is that your view on anything airspace that does not fit your ideology?
The limitations of ACAS target [including GA] detection and avoidance are well documented. Those are the reasons it is a 'last line of defence' ONLY, and agreed to as such by all signatory nations.
By the way, I understand the ruling in relation to transponders not being used as a safety mitigator came because a group of Air Traffic Controllers at an ICAO meeting were concerned in the early days that ACAS may replace Air Traffic Control. They naturally made their decision to preserve their jobs. Who wouldn’t?
2.4.2 The carriage of airborne collision avoidance systems (ACAS) by aircraft in a given area shall not be a factor in determining the need for air traffic services in that area.
to protect jobs?
Is that your view on anything airspace that does not fit your ideology? The limitations of ACAS target [including GA] detection and avoidance are well documented. Those are the reasons it is a 'last line of defence' ONLY, and agreed to as such by all signatory nations.
I just got off the phone with my brother. He is an engineer with NEC..spends a lot of time transitting the planet in airliners. Anyway, I put this situation to him...
Would you feel comfortable sitting in an airliner that must share airspace with unknown VFR aircraft...he said," surely, you mean the VFR is segregated from my aircraft by an altitude limit."..I said "no, in exactly the same block of airspace".... I explained to him the situation how class E works. IFR need a clearance, ATC separate IFR from IFR and known VFR... VFR do not need a clearance, need not even talk to ATC or other aircraft unless the VFR considers they are in conflict, and are free to operate in that airspace as long as they maintain a listening watch and have their transponder turned on. I explained how in Broome there is no radar... my brother wanted to know how ATC "know" about VFR if they do not need to talk to ATC and ATC cannot see them....He was not very happy with that situation......
...a reasonable person would consider class E without a radar surveillance service as not safe....
How many other punters would be happy if the situation was explained to them....after all, the risk is acceptable
Would you feel comfortable sitting in an airliner that must share airspace with unknown VFR aircraft...he said," surely, you mean the VFR is segregated from my aircraft by an altitude limit."..I said "no, in exactly the same block of airspace".... I explained to him the situation how class E works. IFR need a clearance, ATC separate IFR from IFR and known VFR... VFR do not need a clearance, need not even talk to ATC or other aircraft unless the VFR considers they are in conflict, and are free to operate in that airspace as long as they maintain a listening watch and have their transponder turned on. I explained how in Broome there is no radar... my brother wanted to know how ATC "know" about VFR if they do not need to talk to ATC and ATC cannot see them....He was not very happy with that situation......
...a reasonable person would consider class E without a radar surveillance service as not safe....
How many other punters would be happy if the situation was explained to them....after all, the risk is acceptable
Yes, I know G without a transponder requirement is OK at places like Broome and Ballina - but upgrade the airspace to E and add a mandatory transponder requirement and it suddenly becomes unsafe.
Get Real!
Get Real!