Latest Qf Incident,where Will All This End
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In my CJ3 and in my Agusta A109E I have two generators with two separate generator control units mounted in different locations. I also have a separate battery back up unit running an attitude indicator.
Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.
In my CJ3 and in my Agusta A109E I have two generators with two separate generator control units mounted in different locations. I also have a separate battery back up unit running an attitude indicator.
Despite these, I always carry a battery operated Garmin 296 GPS – I have one in the glove box in each aircraft. This means that if everything else fails, I have navigation information and also quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as ground speed. The units operate from dry cells and will keep going for many hours.
Regarding whether Dick's Garmin has a spirit level attached, look up Bob Hoover, Shrike and Orange Juice to see why that wouldn't help! (e.g. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TUVWHUR5OEI)
Last edited by VH-Cheer Up; 10th Jan 2008 at 11:56.
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Mooney Driver..........Thank You
ACMS.....if I was in your shoes, you would emand an apology no dout, i will settle for.......thanks for the enlightening debate
Seriously, all dummy spitting aside, Dick raised a very practical point, just a pity all those who take any opportunity to publically dispute his thoughts do so without prejudice.
In this case he has a valid question.......I can tell you a well respected GA guy on here has been in the situation of a 296 scenario pending......and his coment was it would have done the job. Not a daily commute, but a bacon saver!
J
Ohhh yeah....thread drift was off......bad boy J
ACMS.....if I was in your shoes, you would emand an apology no dout, i will settle for.......thanks for the enlightening debate
Seriously, all dummy spitting aside, Dick raised a very practical point, just a pity all those who take any opportunity to publically dispute his thoughts do so without prejudice.
In this case he has a valid question.......I can tell you a well respected GA guy on here has been in the situation of a 296 scenario pending......and his coment was it would have done the job. Not a daily commute, but a bacon saver!
J
Ohhh yeah....thread drift was off......bad boy J
Anyone of you blokes used a Garmin 296. have a look at page 39 of the Pilots Guide and you will see what is close to a limited panel plus navigation. In limited panel flying you did not have a AH but derived attitude information from ASI, turn needle and VSI, all of which are presented here. All the info is there. It may be derived from a completely different source by some clever electronics and software, but it is there.
Dick was correct when he stated he could get attitude information from the Garmin.
Dick was correct when he stated he could get attitude information from the Garmin.
These things here are not portable, nor are they TSO'd but they basically have all it takes as a backup, provided a separate power source for them is available. GPS, AHARS, the works. Would make a great back up but no chance to put one of these on a certified aircraft. I wish those guys would take the plunge and certify them. Something with the functionality like this would be a great help in case, clearly tough, they need lots of installation.
http://www.bluemountainavionics.com/products.html
I've seen one of these installed in an experimental, works very nice indeed.
http://www.bluemountainavionics.com/products.html
I've seen one of these installed in an experimental, works very nice indeed.
kalavo;
[said with mock sarcasm....], Clearly you're not in the airline business then... Such reviews might come up with changes that cost money, you know. 
Unfortunately, easier said than done given resource levels at some regulating authorities. Internal safety management is what "SMS" is all about, so airlines under SMS are "self-regulating" with a drop-in audit by the regulator to see if the books and documentation are ok.
In the race to the bottom to control cost and increase shareholder profit, any deviance that can be normalized without result will be explored and with today's management mentality which doesn't know it's in the aviation business, likely taken.
The anger you readily recognized on this thread is a bunch of guys/gals who know aviation and who know this pattern and it's effects upon flight safety viscerally and not just the effects on pocketbooks industrially.
As someone else posted, a job-well-done in aviation which is both actually comprehended and perhaps even grudgingly respected by management goes a lot farther to maintaining a safe and profitable operation than any number in the bank accounts does. Numbers in the bank account sometimes even follow such mild apprehensions of the value of employees' skills and experience. Short-term thinking may work in pushing stock of department stores etc, but it doesn't work in airlines - it is the wrong metric because the technique's shelf-life is as short as the next accident.
The anger you see here boils from the one cauldron aviators know only too well and is seen in elementary posters in all flying schools...that;
— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. Circa early 1930's.
Where I work we would get our arses kicked if we left that situation untouched. There is a change management process, and peer review to make sure we're not going from bad to worse, but anyone who left something so significant without doing anything about it, would more than likely be asked not to come Monday.
Now, if management isn't taking these problems as seriously as they should be, then that is an issue CASA should be addressing and you have means of contacting the regulator to ensure that happens.
In the race to the bottom to control cost and increase shareholder profit, any deviance that can be normalized without result will be explored and with today's management mentality which doesn't know it's in the aviation business, likely taken.
The anger you readily recognized on this thread is a bunch of guys/gals who know aviation and who know this pattern and it's effects upon flight safety viscerally and not just the effects on pocketbooks industrially.
As someone else posted, a job-well-done in aviation which is both actually comprehended and perhaps even grudgingly respected by management goes a lot farther to maintaining a safe and profitable operation than any number in the bank accounts does. Numbers in the bank account sometimes even follow such mild apprehensions of the value of employees' skills and experience. Short-term thinking may work in pushing stock of department stores etc, but it doesn't work in airlines - it is the wrong metric because the technique's shelf-life is as short as the next accident.
The anger you see here boils from the one cauldron aviators know only too well and is seen in elementary posters in all flying schools...that;
Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.
— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. Circa early 1930's.
The story unfolding on this and the other thread in the R&N section is that airline employees the world over are seeing the same thing: the race to the bottom in cutting costs, the unbridled power of the shareholder to control management decisions despite the business they're investing in, and the resulting pressure to maximize profit at all cost. One way or another, airline managements will come to learn the lessons which taught you the processes you describe in your post - that they would get their arses kicked if they permitted such processes to compromise the integrity of the work at hand. Sadly for airlines, such processes are increasingly unwelcome at corporate safety meetings. Unfortunately for aviation and the airline business, the people who are good at kicking employees and suppliers for being the expensive liabilities they are while cutting notches in their cost-control rifle-stock, are invited to return Monday morning and those who take, and otherwise suggest the side of caution (which always equals increased costs), are increasingly unwelcome or at best, tolerated as boardroom anachronisms. In other words, the exact opposite of what you describe often takes place - nobody wants to hear about mistakes.
Intelligent, informed, comprehending cost control can be done safely. It takes experience, expertise, good data and a sense of aviation to do so wisely. It also takes listening to employees which today is about the last thing a management experiences as employees the world over have turned so strongly against management that there is virtually no communication. You cannot beat down wages to eight bucks an hour, make pilots pay for training, or dump employees' futures off in court bankruptcies forever. The effects of poorly-implemented LCCs are now being seen, first with employees but sooner or later, likely in the accident rate.
Airline employees know these truths. That is the anger you are seeing expressed on this and other threads - perhaps mildly misdirected at times and not perfectly grammatical, but real nonetheless.
The key to resolving these fundamental issues lies in two areas - the separation of hegemonies from realities and the return to governance by aviators or those who know aviation and not mere MBAs who couldn't describe an aileron from a coffee-maker but who know the price of both and the wages of the guy installing them, both of which are automatically too much.
Managements' seeming incapacity to comprehend why employees are angry means we can expect that despite the new year's optimism in re the numbers, the accident rate will rise over the coming years. And, no one will know why because there is absolutely no courage to look inside this business and why commercial priorities are pushing out the fundamentals. The last one to do so was Virgil Moshansky of Canada and he has expressed great concerns over SMS, or the "de-regulation of safety".
The employees of airlines around the world who are at the pointy end and in the engine compartments are the canaries in the mine. Their cautions, sometimes forcefully put and perhaps pushed out in all directions because they know that the friend as well as the enemy of aviation is profit, are being set aside by those who know nothing about aviation and who don't know that they don't know.
There is so much more to this than any one post or even thread can delineate...
Not sure if a garmin 296 would work in a Boeing cockpit because your windscreen heating is a conductive film that may give a Faraday cage effect, giving you a poor signal. Anyone care to try?
Last count, I have about six GPS (boat, plane,car) they seem to multiply like coat hangars. The 296 works for me, but I'm only a VFR driver.
My latest Yacht autopilot has a rate gyro in it (about the size of a postage stamp - Kynetix), so I guess a hand held Garmin unit that could provide attitude information is not beyond the bounds of possibility.
Last count, I have about six GPS (boat, plane,car) they seem to multiply like coat hangars. The 296 works for me, but I'm only a VFR driver.
My latest Yacht autopilot has a rate gyro in it (about the size of a postage stamp - Kynetix), so I guess a hand held Garmin unit that could provide attitude information is not beyond the bounds of possibility.
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Has Qantas ever thought of equipping each aircraft with one of these small portable units? The cost is virtually nothing and in the situation at Bangkok, if the same problem had occurred at night over the Pacific in the LAX – Sydney flight, a small GPS could have saved the lives of everyone. What do others think?
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I just heard an interesting story. It may even be true.
Soon after OJM lost power into BKK, QF grounded the fleet until all drip trays were inspected. OJD was inspected in SIN and sents home by the local line stn lame. In SYD it was inspected again due to duplicate paperwork. In SYD it was found to have 5 cracks in the drip shield.
I wonder if the line station guys are into "safety before schedule" too?
Soon after OJM lost power into BKK, QF grounded the fleet until all drip trays were inspected. OJD was inspected in SIN and sents home by the local line stn lame. In SYD it was inspected again due to duplicate paperwork. In SYD it was found to have 5 cracks in the drip shield.
I wonder if the line station guys are into "safety before schedule" too?
Skyscanner;
Absolutely a truism in aviation. Like all those who fly for an airline posting here, I've had those kinds of days with thankfully very few serious events. It is a testimony to systems already in place that there is, in the millions of departures every month around the world, so little by way of serious occurence. What is increasingy under-appreciated is, such performance of complex systems does not occur naturally as part of the enterprise.
Likely you know this, but the whole idea is mitigation and preparation, not eradication of risk. Though it is observed, sometimes jokingly, it is trivially obvious that if nothing operated, it would be perfectly safe.
The idea is to take advantage of all input and have both a system and a culture in place which accepts all input, (the "what", not the "who"), is capable of sorting out the wheat (risk) from the chaff (unfounded fears) and creating a process to deflect/handle risk. That's what kicking tin, (an investigative process which only prevents the second accident), is all about and that's what data programs, (a preventative process whereby risk in downloaded flight data is examined daily, hopefully preventing the first accident), under SMS are supposed to do.
The issue comes when either nobody takes such data seriously, nobody wants to talk about it or nobody wants to fund it out of their budget and instead wants to look good in front of the meeting by keeping costs "under control". The career lifespan of someone who spends and comes up with increasing budgets these days, is short. Nobody wants to bell this cat so commercial, not safety decisions drive the daily operation until someone puts their foot down, usually a crew dealing with a mess of an airplane or other ops circumstances. We've often said that the best ally in the cockpit is the park brake followed by the word, "no". If anyone says the pressure to press on isn't there, they haven't sat in on one of these disputes where operations and dispatch are pushing and the crew is slowing it down. Most of the time it resolves itself intelligently and frankly that is the nature of the beast - there is always and forever a necessary tension between operations and safety - the balance obtains in well-run organizations. It is when, in ignorance or willingness to please others for atta-boys and look good to those higher in the food-chain for one's next promotion, that the balance is tossed out in favour of pure cost-control. These are real organizational bureaucratic dynamics, present all the time but most of the time dealt with in a healthy, quiet manner to good outcomes.
The one-in-ten-million chance that the N1 rotor disc on the center engine of a DC10 who's flying parts lined up with the junctions of all three hydraulic systems illustrates the valid point you are also making - **** happens and most crews deal with it quietly, professionally and there's never a peep out of the media or even management. That's airline work.
But daily operational safety, - good decision-making and a system which withstands and accepts the occasional "no" from crews requires an enormous infrastructure which is difficult to both demonstrate the need for, (because, frankly, we're so good at the safety game and "nothing" happens most of the time), and therefore tough to sustain under the present circumstances which is why it is slowly being dismantled through a thousand tiny cuts.
The results aren't here yet - they're coming, unless it is realized what course is being taken.
The notion of the MCPL, 200hr Pilot Wonders from "PilotTemps.com", (ficticious address!) is merely a variation on a theme, where it is acceptable to non-aviation types especially those under pressure to produce, that button-pushers who have memorized the SOPs to a "T" can be safely placed in airliner cockpits with minimal training and no experience.
As I say, one thread is not sufficient to fully explore the issue being touched upon by so many here and elsewhere.
You cannot plan for every contingency, sometimes its just not your day...
Likely you know this, but the whole idea is mitigation and preparation, not eradication of risk. Though it is observed, sometimes jokingly, it is trivially obvious that if nothing operated, it would be perfectly safe.
The idea is to take advantage of all input and have both a system and a culture in place which accepts all input, (the "what", not the "who"), is capable of sorting out the wheat (risk) from the chaff (unfounded fears) and creating a process to deflect/handle risk. That's what kicking tin, (an investigative process which only prevents the second accident), is all about and that's what data programs, (a preventative process whereby risk in downloaded flight data is examined daily, hopefully preventing the first accident), under SMS are supposed to do.
The issue comes when either nobody takes such data seriously, nobody wants to talk about it or nobody wants to fund it out of their budget and instead wants to look good in front of the meeting by keeping costs "under control". The career lifespan of someone who spends and comes up with increasing budgets these days, is short. Nobody wants to bell this cat so commercial, not safety decisions drive the daily operation until someone puts their foot down, usually a crew dealing with a mess of an airplane or other ops circumstances. We've often said that the best ally in the cockpit is the park brake followed by the word, "no". If anyone says the pressure to press on isn't there, they haven't sat in on one of these disputes where operations and dispatch are pushing and the crew is slowing it down. Most of the time it resolves itself intelligently and frankly that is the nature of the beast - there is always and forever a necessary tension between operations and safety - the balance obtains in well-run organizations. It is when, in ignorance or willingness to please others for atta-boys and look good to those higher in the food-chain for one's next promotion, that the balance is tossed out in favour of pure cost-control. These are real organizational bureaucratic dynamics, present all the time but most of the time dealt with in a healthy, quiet manner to good outcomes.
The one-in-ten-million chance that the N1 rotor disc on the center engine of a DC10 who's flying parts lined up with the junctions of all three hydraulic systems illustrates the valid point you are also making - **** happens and most crews deal with it quietly, professionally and there's never a peep out of the media or even management. That's airline work.
But daily operational safety, - good decision-making and a system which withstands and accepts the occasional "no" from crews requires an enormous infrastructure which is difficult to both demonstrate the need for, (because, frankly, we're so good at the safety game and "nothing" happens most of the time), and therefore tough to sustain under the present circumstances which is why it is slowly being dismantled through a thousand tiny cuts.
The results aren't here yet - they're coming, unless it is realized what course is being taken.
The notion of the MCPL, 200hr Pilot Wonders from "PilotTemps.com", (ficticious address!) is merely a variation on a theme, where it is acceptable to non-aviation types especially those under pressure to produce, that button-pushers who have memorized the SOPs to a "T" can be safely placed in airliner cockpits with minimal training and no experience.
As I say, one thread is not sufficient to fully explore the issue being touched upon by so many here and elsewhere.
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PJ2 great posts
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But was the risk of the loss of 4 generators actually 1 in 1,000,000 ^4 as you imply? This would be true if the systems where truly independent, but as this is a new failure mode it would appear to render that assumption incorrect. In fact, the 1 in 1,000,000 number that you quote is now totally meaningless. The risk in now what chance of 1) water leakage 2) failure of the water shield to the MEC?
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Dick, the probability of 1 AC Bus dropping off is 1 in a million. The probability of 2 dropping off is a million squared. According to CASA, the probability of them all droping off is 3 in recorded aviation history
Last edited by Launch_code_Harry; 10th Jan 2008 at 20:17.
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There are several layers of protection in place. Not just one or two. I had a look at the area above the MEC racks 2 days ago.
1)There is the drip shield directly above the racks
2) there are fiberglass honeycomb floor panels with rubber seals around the edges.
3) Didn't get the chance to look on top, but there will be a plastic waterproof barrier on top of the floor panels in galley areas (thick black adhesive plastic if I remember correctly).
4) There are a number of drains/filters at various levels (coffee maker compartments, benchtop and floor).
Rgds.
NSEU
1)There is the drip shield directly above the racks
2) there are fiberglass honeycomb floor panels with rubber seals around the edges.
3) Didn't get the chance to look on top, but there will be a plastic waterproof barrier on top of the floor panels in galley areas (thick black adhesive plastic if I remember correctly).
4) There are a number of drains/filters at various levels (coffee maker compartments, benchtop and floor).
Rgds.
NSEU
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PJ2 and Harry, I don't disagree with anything you said. As with everything in aviation we learn from our mistakes/ accidents/ incidents etc. The original question from Dick Smith questioned whether a hand held GPS should be considered for this scenario... My response was just trying to provide a realistic view given the fact that QF and Boeing DO NOT plan for this situation.. Furthermore, the likelihood of this happening again still remains 3 in a giga-billion..
It is extraordinary stuff. I have been watching the posts attacking me in relation to my suggestion that a Garmin 296 GPS be carried on Qantas flights – just as I do. Following are some of the comments.
Torqueman, I do have a clear understanding of this, but as the incident occurred there is obviously a problem, and if the incident had occurred over the Pacific at night, I believe the Garmin unit, held near a side window, would have allowed the aircraft to get to a suitable airfield.
ACMS, in fact I have, and as shown in an article posted after your comment, it is possible to fly under the hood using the Garmin unit with only GPS inputs, even in a small aircraft. In a larger aircraft with greater inertia it could possibly be even more satisfactory. It would be very simple for Qantas to test this.
Here is a page from the manual:
ACMS also says:
As stated by others (and as stated in my original post) it gives “quite acceptable attitude, climb and descent information as well as groundspeed.”
In fact, my comment is “reasonable.” As you would have seen by later posts, the unit is designed for just such a situation as the Qantas crew could have found itself in – i.e. an emergency last resort back up when everything else fails when in IMC.
As I have stated previously, my tests under the hood show that even a helicopter can be flown with this basic information.
If there is a problem with the windscreens of the 747, a simple remote antenna with suction cup could be carried and the antenna could be mounted on the side windscreen of the cockpit. I understand that a Garmin GPS works perfectly well in any airline aircraft with the suction cup antenna mounted on one of the side passenger windows.
ACMS, you kept harping on the following point:
By the sound of it you are a pilot and one of the few pilots with a closed mind. There are a number of handheld units, including the Garmin 296, which are specifically designed to give information that will allow a pilot to fly in cloud in an emergency – the very situation we are referring to. That is exactly why this special page is provided on the Garmin unit. I will repeat – for flying in cloud in an emergency.
From now on when I fly Qantas – and I do often as I still consider it one of the best airlines in the world – I will take my Garmin 296 GPS with me. If ever we have a similar problem I will be able to have it sent to the flight deck!
It is obvious why we can’t upgrade to Class E airspace in the terminal area with such incredible resistance to lateral thinking.
By the way, with all the criticism we have of Qantas (and some of the criticism is well due) at least when problems occur they get publicity in our country. I understand that in some Middle East countries, when there are problems with the airline the media would not actually be game to publicise this – they might end up in prison.
Dick your comments on this matter have clearly demonstrated your shallow view of this industry and a clear lack of understanding of the importance of suitably resourced and competent engineering staff and facilities.
DICK: how does your hand held GPS provide you with Att info updated fast enough to fly in IMC with? I'd like to see you try that under the hood.
Here is a page from the manual:
ACMS also says:
Apart from GS and Alt what ATT info does it give you anyway?
People are sick to death of hearing people like Dick, who have a reasonable all rounded voice which people are inclined to listen to, comment in such away.
As I have stated previously, my tests under the hood show that even a helicopter can be flown with this basic information.
If there is a problem with the windscreens of the 747, a simple remote antenna with suction cup could be carried and the antenna could be mounted on the side windscreen of the cockpit. I understand that a Garmin GPS works perfectly well in any airline aircraft with the suction cup antenna mounted on one of the side passenger windows.
ACMS, you kept harping on the following point:
A HANDHELD GPS, OF ANY TYPE, IS NOT DESIGNED TO GIVE ATTITUDE INFORMATION to enable the pilot to fly in cloud.
With all due respect my friend I suggest you stick to fixing the aircraft and we will fly em......ok?
With all due respect my friend I suggest you stick to fixing the aircraft and we will fly em......ok?
From now on when I fly Qantas – and I do often as I still consider it one of the best airlines in the world – I will take my Garmin 296 GPS with me. If ever we have a similar problem I will be able to have it sent to the flight deck!
It is obvious why we can’t upgrade to Class E airspace in the terminal area with such incredible resistance to lateral thinking.
By the way, with all the criticism we have of Qantas (and some of the criticism is well due) at least when problems occur they get publicity in our country. I understand that in some Middle East countries, when there are problems with the airline the media would not actually be game to publicise this – they might end up in prison.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 10th Jan 2008 at 21:57.
Tall poppy syndrome mate.....sure you have come across it before! All the best.
"Dick, the probability of 1 AC Bus dropping off is 1 in a million. The probability of 2 dropping off is a million squared. According to CASA, the probability of them all droping off is 3 in recorded aviation history. You cannot plan for every contingency, sometimes its just not your day..."
I don't know anything about flying or repairing aeroplanes but I do know about statistics. If I understand correctly what I am reading the generator control units are close together so failure via water is not an independent event for each one. For non-independent events you don't multiply probabilities. From what happened in this case I would suspect the probability of all four failing via water is the same as the probability of one failing. So it is not one in a giga-billions it is one in a million.
Mind you I never understand how people get failure numbers like one in a million. Do they mean that or do they just mean it is a rare event? Or maybe they are basing it on experience of how long these planes have flown without incident? In the latter case they are assuming the aging of the planes has no effect. News today is suggesting there are more cracks in water shields.
Thanks for all your posts -- makes interesting reading for a lurking passenger.
Michael
I don't know anything about flying or repairing aeroplanes but I do know about statistics. If I understand correctly what I am reading the generator control units are close together so failure via water is not an independent event for each one. For non-independent events you don't multiply probabilities. From what happened in this case I would suspect the probability of all four failing via water is the same as the probability of one failing. So it is not one in a giga-billions it is one in a million.
Mind you I never understand how people get failure numbers like one in a million. Do they mean that or do they just mean it is a rare event? Or maybe they are basing it on experience of how long these planes have flown without incident? In the latter case they are assuming the aging of the planes has no effect. News today is suggesting there are more cracks in water shields.
Thanks for all your posts -- makes interesting reading for a lurking passenger.
Michael
I believe a most important question has not been answered. If the Qantas Bangkok incident had occurred a few hours before (when the aircraft was over the Himalayas) what would the most likely scenario have been?
Or if the incident had occurred on the Qantas flight from Australia to South Africa (or from Australia to South America) at night in the remote southern latitudes, what would have happened?
Surely professional pilots who fly for Qantas must have some idea on how the crew could get out of this problem – or would it be a definite loss of the aircraft and all the passengers?
Or if the incident had occurred on the Qantas flight from Australia to South Africa (or from Australia to South America) at night in the remote southern latitudes, what would have happened?
Surely professional pilots who fly for Qantas must have some idea on how the crew could get out of this problem – or would it be a definite loss of the aircraft and all the passengers?
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Some of you guys astound me. Dick Smith has probably forgotten more about aviation than you people (including me) will ever know. As a current Boeing Pilot (on 3 different types all up in my career), what he has to say about a handheld GPS makes perfect sense.
And Nepotism, without the "what ifs", it makes it hard for the rest of us to actually think what we would have done in the same situation, or especially if it worsened. If the problem had occurred (say over the Pacific, or the Himalayas as Dick suggested), I would hate to think of the potential ramifications, especially at night or in IMC. What Dick brings up is definitely food for thought.
And Nepotism, without the "what ifs", it makes it hard for the rest of us to actually think what we would have done in the same situation, or especially if it worsened. If the problem had occurred (say over the Pacific, or the Himalayas as Dick suggested), I would hate to think of the potential ramifications, especially at night or in IMC. What Dick brings up is definitely food for thought.