kalavo;
Where I work we would get our arses kicked if we left that situation untouched. There is a change management process, and peer review to make sure we're not going from bad to worse, but anyone who left something so significant without doing anything about it, would more than likely be asked not to come Monday.
[said with mock sarcasm....], Clearly you're not in the airline business then... Such reviews might come up with changes that cost money, you know.
Now, if management isn't taking these problems as seriously as they should be, then that is an issue CASA should be addressing and you have means of contacting the regulator to ensure that happens.
Unfortunately, easier said than done given resource levels at some regulating authorities. Internal safety management is what "SMS" is all about, so airlines under SMS are "self-regulating" with a drop-in audit by the regulator to see if the books and documentation are ok.
In the race to the bottom to control cost and increase shareholder profit, any deviance that can be normalized without result will be explored and with today's management mentality which doesn't know it's in the aviation business, likely taken.
The anger you readily recognized on this thread is a bunch of guys/gals who know aviation and who know this pattern and it's effects upon flight safety viscerally and not just the effects on pocketbooks industrially.
As someone else posted, a job-well-done in aviation which is both actually comprehended and perhaps even grudgingly respected by management goes a lot farther to maintaining a safe and profitable operation than any number in the bank accounts does. Numbers in the bank account sometimes even follow such mild apprehensions of the value of employees' skills and experience. Short-term thinking may work in pushing stock of department stores etc, but it doesn't work in airlines - it is the wrong metric because the technique's shelf-life is as short as the next accident.
The anger you see here boils from the one cauldron aviators know only too well and is seen in elementary posters in all flying schools...that;
Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect.
— Captain A. G. Lamplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group, London. Circa early 1930's.
The story unfolding on this and the other thread in the R&N section is that airline employees the world over are seeing the same thing: the race to the bottom in cutting costs, the unbridled power of the shareholder to control management decisions despite the business they're investing in, and the resulting pressure to maximize profit at all cost. One way or another, airline managements will come to learn the lessons which taught you the processes you describe in your post - that they would get their arses kicked if they permitted such processes to compromise the integrity of the work at hand. Sadly for airlines, such processes are increasingly unwelcome at corporate safety meetings. Unfortunately for aviation and the airline business, the people who are good at kicking employees and suppliers for being the expensive liabilities they are while cutting notches in their cost-control rifle-stock, are invited to return Monday morning and those who take, and otherwise suggest the side of caution (which always equals increased costs), are increasingly unwelcome or at best, tolerated as boardroom anachronisms. In other words, the exact opposite of what you describe often takes place - nobody wants to hear about mistakes.
Intelligent, informed, comprehending cost control can be done safely. It takes experience, expertise, good data and a sense of aviation to do so wisely. It also takes listening to employees which today is about the last thing a management experiences as employees the world over have turned so strongly against management that there is virtually no communication. You cannot beat down wages to eight bucks an hour, make pilots pay for training, or dump employees' futures off in court bankruptcies forever. The effects of poorly-implemented LCCs are now being seen, first with employees but sooner or later, likely in the accident rate.
Airline employees know these truths. That is the anger you are seeing expressed on this and other threads - perhaps mildly misdirected at times and not perfectly grammatical, but real nonetheless.
The key to resolving these fundamental issues lies in two areas - the separation of hegemonies from realities and the return to governance by aviators or those who know aviation and not mere MBAs who couldn't describe an aileron from a coffee-maker but who know the price of both and the wages of the guy installing them, both of which are automatically too much.
Managements' seeming incapacity to comprehend why employees are angry means we can expect that despite the new year's optimism in re the numbers, the accident rate will rise over the coming years. And, no one will know why because there is absolutely no courage to look inside this business and why commercial priorities are pushing out the fundamentals. The last one to do so was Virgil Moshansky of Canada and he has expressed great concerns over SMS, or the "de-regulation of safety".
The employees of airlines around the world who are at the pointy end and in the engine compartments are the canaries in the mine. Their cautions, sometimes forcefully put and perhaps pushed out in all directions because they know that the friend as well as the enemy of aviation is profit, are being set aside by those who know nothing about aviation and who don't know that they don't know.
There is so much more to this than any one post or even thread can delineate...