Latest Qf Incident,where Will All This End
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Fair call nepotism - I know where you are coming from....BUT....I originally asked the "what if" question purely out of interest. Simply want to know if there is a checklist or any examples of it happening a long way out, and if so, what the outcome was. Would be interested to hear what a 744 pilot or sim trainer had to say on how they think the situation could be dealt with (assuming no personal GPS on board!!). Might be slightly morbid to think this, but it is a pretty amazing event. It reminds be of the Air Transit 236 A330 and the amazing outcome in that situation (obviously a totally different cause, result etc....). A totally unpredictable and unlikely event. Anyway, perhaps the answers are in the post already, but would love to here someone take a guess on how they might handle it! The guys who got QF2 down safely on Monday are perfect examples of why there is a fascination in these sitautions for many of us.....they dealt with an extraordinary situation on the fly (excuse the pun) and got out it ok thanks to their skill, intelligence and adaptability - exactly the skills that got us out of the trees all those millenia ago. Superb! 
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PJ2 - inspiring posts.
Unfortunately it is akin to venting ones spleen.
In this day and age, this downward spiral of standards, unique to our industry, is being borne by the majority of decent employees who are confronted with finding a balance within their function.
When, how will management types realise that this balance must be achieved, to serve their employees and the flying public.
Unfortunately it is akin to venting ones spleen.
In this day and age, this downward spiral of standards, unique to our industry, is being borne by the majority of decent employees who are confronted with finding a balance within their function.
When, how will management types realise that this balance must be achieved, to serve their employees and the flying public.
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VH-OJM
An interesting point, 8 days ago VH-OJM did the polar flights south, imagine if that had happened then, no standby compass available - useless in the polar regions, no nav aids, not HF let hope the crew toilet was available from the static inverter because they would have need it!
Clipped;
If any of this opens just one manager's eyes who lurks here, it will have done some good so hopefully it's not spleen venting. It's not intended as such anyway.
When? Management will discover this only when the costs are too high.
That statement means airline managements have consciously made the decision to be "safe enough but not as safe as before", just so that costs go down. That means starving safety programs or providing them with absolutely minimal (meaningless box-tick) resources just so they can pass an IOSA audit.
Anyone who wishes to examine the dynamics of this kind of organizational behaviour for themselves can read "The Challenger Launch Decision" by Diane Vaughan, or "Organization at the Limit", edited by Farjoun and Starbuck and Starbuck's article, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks". The term, "normalization of deviance" which is the process of lowering standards until they are "normal" and deviance from previous standards is no longer visible but the standard is lower, was coined by Vaughan in her book.
Nobody wants an accident. Although completely true, that is the illusion such normalization is accepted under. But both statistically and historically, with such an approach the risk goes up. Because very few organizations are actually, really, looking at their flight data, (because either the experts have left out of frustration or, under SMS, operations people have no time and don't understand the information anyway), they do not have any idea of where they stand in terms of risks and trends. So standards are being lowered but in actuality little monitoring of the effects of such changes is going on. That is what is meant by being able to do cost-control safely - if one monitors carefully, one can cut safely. But cost-control mantras cut a wide swath and the first to go or at least lose support are the safety people and programs.
If any of this opens just one manager's eyes who lurks here, it will have done some good so hopefully it's not spleen venting. It's not intended as such anyway.
When? Management will discover this only when the costs are too high.
That statement means airline managements have consciously made the decision to be "safe enough but not as safe as before", just so that costs go down. That means starving safety programs or providing them with absolutely minimal (meaningless box-tick) resources just so they can pass an IOSA audit.
Anyone who wishes to examine the dynamics of this kind of organizational behaviour for themselves can read "The Challenger Launch Decision" by Diane Vaughan, or "Organization at the Limit", edited by Farjoun and Starbuck and Starbuck's article, "Fine-tuning the Odds Until Something Breaks". The term, "normalization of deviance" which is the process of lowering standards until they are "normal" and deviance from previous standards is no longer visible but the standard is lower, was coined by Vaughan in her book.
Nobody wants an accident. Although completely true, that is the illusion such normalization is accepted under. But both statistically and historically, with such an approach the risk goes up. Because very few organizations are actually, really, looking at their flight data, (because either the experts have left out of frustration or, under SMS, operations people have no time and don't understand the information anyway), they do not have any idea of where they stand in terms of risks and trends. So standards are being lowered but in actuality little monitoring of the effects of such changes is going on. That is what is meant by being able to do cost-control safely - if one monitors carefully, one can cut safely. But cost-control mantras cut a wide swath and the first to go or at least lose support are the safety people and programs.
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Was the full story told in the Media Release ?
This is extract from QF Media Release..... "Qantas Statement on QF2
Latest News
Sydney, 09 January 2008
........ Mr Borghetti said the incident was triggered by water entering the generator control unit, which caused loss of power. The aircraft had automatically reverted to standby power.
"The aircraft was subjected to stringent inspections and testing in Bangkok before being cleared to fly," he said..................
............ "As a precaution, Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly."
Today Friday ABC Radio News disclosed that six (6) other QF x 747's were found to have cracked drip trays . Presumably the other six problem trays were found during the checks, but simply not mentioned in the media release; just covered generally by the statement " ..... Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly." ?
Latest News
Sydney, 09 January 2008
........ Mr Borghetti said the incident was triggered by water entering the generator control unit, which caused loss of power. The aircraft had automatically reverted to standby power.
"The aircraft was subjected to stringent inspections and testing in Bangkok before being cleared to fly," he said..................
............ "As a precaution, Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly."
Today Friday ABC Radio News disclosed that six (6) other QF x 747's were found to have cracked drip trays . Presumably the other six problem trays were found during the checks, but simply not mentioned in the media release; just covered generally by the statement " ..... Qantas has inspected its entire B747-400 fleet and all of these aircraft have been cleared to fly." ?
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Mr Borghetti is a manager. He has no idea what goes on inside the MEC of a 744. He's probably using 4th or 5th hand information watered down (pun not intended).
Gotta laugh.. he was flying on a 744 recently.. and his (and all the other Business/First Class pax) electric chair power failed (no recline/restow operation). A random relay failure, but nevertheless a portent of things to come.
re the drip trays.. It's amazing what you can find when you know where to look. If a worldwide 744 airline Airworthness Directive is not raised, I'd be mighty surprised. If QF has them, all the other airlines do, too.
Rgds.
NSEU
Gotta laugh.. he was flying on a 744 recently.. and his (and all the other Business/First Class pax) electric chair power failed (no recline/restow operation). A random relay failure, but nevertheless a portent of things to come.
re the drip trays.. It's amazing what you can find when you know where to look. If a worldwide 744 airline Airworthness Directive is not raised, I'd be mighty surprised. If QF has them, all the other airlines do, too.
Rgds.
NSEU
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If a worldwide 744 airline Airworthness Directive is not raised, I'd be mighty surprised. If QF has them, all the other airlines do, too.
J
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Is there a battery or battery-bus controller/disconnector ??
Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??
How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??
If so I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.
Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.
Thanks
.
Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??
How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??
If so I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.
Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.
Thanks
.
An interesting point, 8 days ago VH-OJM did the polar flights south, imagine if that had happened then, no standby compass available - useless in the polar regions, no nav aids, not HF let hope the crew toilet was available from the static inverter because they would have need it!
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I cannot believe this
If what I read here is a correct picture of what has happened, then I think Qantas maintenance is worse than GA maintenance. I have been reading about water overflows that are common, and considered normal, and were allowed to continue until a very serious "incident " occurred.
And all this comes soon after reports of ground crews filling oxygen systems with nitrogen. Here also it seems this was not one isolated mistake. Reports indicate that despite colour coding and different fittings that were designed to make this impossible, someone persisted doing it wrong to the exteme, and the fittings were changed so that the error was possible.
Unbelieveable.
I think Ansett was shut down for less.
And all this comes soon after reports of ground crews filling oxygen systems with nitrogen. Here also it seems this was not one isolated mistake. Reports indicate that despite colour coding and different fittings that were designed to make this impossible, someone persisted doing it wrong to the exteme, and the fittings were changed so that the error was possible.
Unbelieveable.
I think Ansett was shut down for less.
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If what I read here is a correct picture of what has happened, then I think Qantas maintenance is worse than GA maintenance. I have been reading about water overflows that are common, and considered normal, and were allowed to continue until a very serious "incident " occurred.
And all this comes soon after reports of ground crews filling oxygen systems with nitrogen. Here also it seems this was not one isolated mistake. Reports indicate that despite colour coding and different fittings that were designed to make this impossible, someone persisted doing it wrong to the exteme, and the fittings were changed so that the error was possible.
Unbelieveable.
I think Ansett was shut down for less.
And all this comes soon after reports of ground crews filling oxygen systems with nitrogen. Here also it seems this was not one isolated mistake. Reports indicate that despite colour coding and different fittings that were designed to make this impossible, someone persisted doing it wrong to the exteme, and the fittings were changed so that the error was possible.
Unbelieveable.
I think Ansett was shut down for less.
Floor beam upper chord had approximately 181 open fastener holes located between BS480 and BS980. Seat track flanges in the same location had approximately 3,455 open fastener holes.
I guess this means the seats were not restrained so lucky passengers never got to test their crashworthiness. Has Qantas, as an organisation, reached the stage where it's an accident looking for a place to happen. In asking that I would put poor morale (said somewhere else the most rampant corporate disease in America... killer of motivation, productivity and enjoyment in the workplace) caused by management practices (and the drive to cut costs) as the main driver.
The Reverend
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Is there a battery or battery-bus controller/disconnector ??
Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??
How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??
If so I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.
Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.
Could the batteries have been thrown offline ??
How far would the battery controller, if it exists, be from the generator controllers ??
If so I wonder how close they were to also losing the battery bus.
Any ideas on how the battery relay-control units works.
Join Date: Feb 2004
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If what I read here is a correct picture of what has happened, then I think Qantas maintenance is worse than GA maintenance. I have been reading about water overflows that are common, and considered normal, and were allowed to continue until a very serious "incident " occurred.
Thanks for your comments... Please pass these on to QF Management.
Unfortunately, "maintenance systems" in their entirety don't always reflect the level of skill/dedication of its engineers. If effective maintenance time is less than an hour (typical of a lot of transits), there is not much a pair of engineers assigned to an airplane can do in this time... especially if one is monitoring refuelling. There are routine checks to be done, as well as non-routine Cabin and Tech Log items to attend to. Only a year or two ago, there were four or more engineers assigned to a 747 transiting an Australian port. Now there seems to be two (and in some cases one of these might not even be a licensed maintenance engineer). I can only imagine what goes on at ports outside Australia (on QF aircraft).
Is this the norm for most airlines these days?... Possibly. Maybe worse... with baggage handlers arriving and departing aircraft.
Management keep asking the engineers "How can we compete with budget overseas airlines if you don't moderate your wage demands and let us outsource maintenance". So when overseas airlines start using trained monkeys to service and fly their aircraft... should QF jump on the bandwagon? As someone recently said in the engineering fraternity "We used to be "old world", then we changed to "new world" (for the sake of efficiency)... and after the wheels fell off that... then we became "third world"
Don't the public love cheap flights... until something goes wrong
Rgds.
NSEU
Thanks for your comments... Please pass these on to QF Management.
Unfortunately, "maintenance systems" in their entirety don't always reflect the level of skill/dedication of its engineers. If effective maintenance time is less than an hour (typical of a lot of transits), there is not much a pair of engineers assigned to an airplane can do in this time... especially if one is monitoring refuelling. There are routine checks to be done, as well as non-routine Cabin and Tech Log items to attend to. Only a year or two ago, there were four or more engineers assigned to a 747 transiting an Australian port. Now there seems to be two (and in some cases one of these might not even be a licensed maintenance engineer). I can only imagine what goes on at ports outside Australia (on QF aircraft).
Is this the norm for most airlines these days?... Possibly. Maybe worse... with baggage handlers arriving and departing aircraft.
Management keep asking the engineers "How can we compete with budget overseas airlines if you don't moderate your wage demands and let us outsource maintenance". So when overseas airlines start using trained monkeys to service and fly their aircraft... should QF jump on the bandwagon? As someone recently said in the engineering fraternity "We used to be "old world", then we changed to "new world" (for the sake of efficiency)... and after the wheels fell off that... then we became "third world"
Don't the public love cheap flights... until something goes wrong
Rgds.
NSEU
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I knew PJ2 had been studying the normalisation of deviance as experienced by NASA. Firstly Challenger, then the foam shedding the ultimately claimed Columbia. In the high risk space environment, non operational people had eroded the control of operational personnel.
It is and continues to happen at Q. Look at our organisational flow chart..See where the head of engineering and Flight operations sit?? The bean counters are levels above Flight operations. The department that runs the flying is "A department" of many. The CP another department head.
CAO 82 is very clear, this should not be allowed to persist. It doesn't in GA yet is tolerated in Qantas.....CASA permits the normalisation of deviance in operational control..It is why so many decisions that impact adversely on the flying operations are challenged. If the WX is bad at destination, why do the company call an aircraft on the sat phone and say we want you to go to place Y. It is an operational decision!! PIC is PIC however the more pilots are dicated by commercial concerns the more the normalisation is allowed to persist. Who amongst us on the a short haul contract has gone to work sick because the financial penalty mean it costs us money..Yet CAO 48 is very clear..(i am guilty) Commercial is important, but operational decisions are for operational personnel. Not commercial...Who in Qantas has noticed the "non technical markers of performance labelled "commercial awareness" That has no bearing on flying an aircraft safely...It is this acceptance of transfer away from operational personnel that COULD generate the big one...
It is and continues to happen at Q. Look at our organisational flow chart..See where the head of engineering and Flight operations sit?? The bean counters are levels above Flight operations. The department that runs the flying is "A department" of many. The CP another department head.
CAO 82 is very clear, this should not be allowed to persist. It doesn't in GA yet is tolerated in Qantas.....CASA permits the normalisation of deviance in operational control..It is why so many decisions that impact adversely on the flying operations are challenged. If the WX is bad at destination, why do the company call an aircraft on the sat phone and say we want you to go to place Y. It is an operational decision!! PIC is PIC however the more pilots are dicated by commercial concerns the more the normalisation is allowed to persist. Who amongst us on the a short haul contract has gone to work sick because the financial penalty mean it costs us money..Yet CAO 48 is very clear..(i am guilty) Commercial is important, but operational decisions are for operational personnel. Not commercial...Who in Qantas has noticed the "non technical markers of performance labelled "commercial awareness" That has no bearing on flying an aircraft safely...It is this acceptance of transfer away from operational personnel that COULD generate the big one...
The Reverend
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NSEU
Rather unfortunate choice of words mate, I think I'll report you to the ICC!
Seriously though I spent 33 years flying for an overseas airline with an excellent record of safety (no excursions to the golf course) on aircraft serviced and overhauled by your "Monkeys" to the highest of standards. There is life outside QF you know.
So when overseas airlines start using trained monkeys to service and fly their aircraft... should QF jump on the bandwagon?
Seriously though I spent 33 years flying for an overseas airline with an excellent record of safety (no excursions to the golf course) on aircraft serviced and overhauled by your "Monkeys" to the highest of standards. There is life outside QF you know.
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Hey, I didn't say they had yet (literally) started training monkeys! (and I do mean ANIMALS)
The point I was making was.. Should QF stoop to the lowest common denominator just to keep on an equal footing with competitors?
Sorry if that caused offence... It certainly wasn't intended.
Jeez... the guys on this forum really are a sensitive (but sweet bunch)
Cheers,
NSEU (former engineer... now, trained monkey)
The point I was making was.. Should QF stoop to the lowest common denominator just to keep on an equal footing with competitors?
Sorry if that caused offence... It certainly wasn't intended.
Jeez... the guys on this forum really are a sensitive (but sweet bunch)
Cheers,
NSEU (former engineer... now, trained monkey)
DICK: ok then...........I was not aware of ANY GPS that replicated a normal panel with that sort of display.
I still can't see how it's refresh rate would be fast enough for you to fly in light turbulance IMC day or night?
I guess it's worth a try though.
Trust you to have deep pockets for the latest gizmos.
I still can't see how it's refresh rate would be fast enough for you to fly in light turbulance IMC day or night?
I guess it's worth a try though.
Trust you to have deep pockets for the latest gizmos.
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Personally, i think a GPS on the flight deck is a good idea - not necessarily because of electrical failure, but because chances are it has better info available than on some of QFs antiquated basic FMC non GPS jets.
The Reverend
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Ok NSEU, peace. You didn't really offend me, I'm far too old and thick skinned for that.
(HotDog-ex LAME-ex Flight Engineer; now retired p!ss head.)
(HotDog-ex LAME-ex Flight Engineer; now retired p!ss head.)