Erebus 25 years on

[3 Holer]

That taken from John King publication. I think it shows very clearly what the New Zealand Court of Appeal, and the Privy Council thought of Justice Mahons methods and utterances.

Yes, all pro Air New Zealand and NZ government and their petty,futile attempts to lay the blame on Captain Collins. What would you expect?

Pathetic.

[prospector]

Yes, all pro Air New Zealand and NZ government and their petty,futile attempts to lay the blame on Captain Collins. What would you expect?

Pathetic.

Really? The Appeal Court of New Zealand, and the Privy Council of England finding of Mahons failings were just all to lay the blame on Capt Collins?

I do not think any more needs to be said.

[3 Holer]

I do not think any more needs to be said.

Amen.

[ampan]

chris2303 asks what the other first officer seated with the passengers would have that thought. The answer is in the CVR transcript. The captain announced to the passengers that the would be making a radar-assisted descent to McMurdo Station - so when the aircraft descended through the hole in the cloud, First Officer Lucas would have assumed that the aircraft's position had been confirmed by the radar controller and would not have been concerned.

[PapaHotel6]

Perhaps this question is woefully naive, but..... how did this become a union issue? Surely any union, ALPA included, should have no place in an accident investigation and Mahon was clearly manipulated by them. Victory for the union perhaps, but the casualty was truth.

[prospector]

Perhaps the union became involved because they pushed for the flights to be shared amongst their senior captains. This was against all the accumulated wisdom of all the operators who have been operating down to the ice for many years. The experience requirements for operating in Antarctic regions was completely disregarded.
This from 'A History of Civil Aviation in New Zealand" by Maurice McGreal.

The reality of the judgement of Erebus must rest in the knowledge that flying is a dangerous business and nothing has replaced the crucial role of the pilot in the whole scheme of things, for when we think about it, the prime role of a pilot is not to have an accident. To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight

This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.

"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"

[3 Holer]

the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"

Not if there are external issues contributing to the safe flight operation. (basic Human Factors) As Mahon,Vette, et al found out, by discovering the "incompetent administrative airline procedures", only Captain God could have prevented the Erebus disaster.

I think it has to be appreciated and acknowledged that the Honorable Justice Peter Mahon, during this Royal Commission of Inquiry, wouldn’t be bribed, bought or lied to and refused to have his integrity compromised. His relentless energy and enthusiasm to seek factual evidence of the causal factor(s) of this accident was testament to his ethos of respect and common decency to all parties touched by this tragedy. Unlike Air NZ management and the NZ government, Mahon never pointed the finger at any one person who caused the accident. He stated it was “......the incompetent, administrative airline procedures which made the mistake possible.” Mahon and Vette were well ahead of their time when it came to the correct protocol and understanding of Human Factors in this accident.

Justice Mahon’s final report was balanced, based on fact, truth and impartiality. The findings were well respected and unbiased. However, they were never going to sit well with Morrie Davis and Robert Muldoon, so they set out to discredit them and Peter Mahon. The Erebus Inquiry had to absolve Air New Zealand and the NZ Government of any blame in the accident no matter what it took.

Enter the Privy Council of the U.K. – the self appointed custodian of Royal Commissions in the colonies. The appeal to have Mahon’s finding overturned was farcical but predictable. It wasn’t sufficient just to declare the findings, not politically correct and overturn them within, they had to try and discredit Justice Mahon as well. Those who don’t believe that, may also believe, that one can pick up a piece of sh!t by the clean end.

There was a huge backlash and it took 21 years, but, in 2004, appeals to the Privy Council were abolished in NZ. Now the only avenue for appealing decisions/findings for Commission Inquiries is the Supreme Court of NZ.

[framer]

You have just beautifully demonstrated what I said in an earlier post.

But, as always with this subject the actions/ behaviours of one party often affect how we judge the actions/ behaviours of another.
That AirNZ and the government behaved poorly does not change the fact that Collins was in command of an aircraft, flying in a clean configuration, at 1500ft, below MSA, not in the vicinity of an airport, with crew members saying things like " I'm just wondering where Erebus is" .
The fact that one party behaved poorly does not mean that another party was making good decisions.

I wouldn't disagree with you when you say

Justice Mahon’s final report was balanced, based on fact, truth and impartiality.

if you added "and completely devoid of any understanding of the purpose,role, and responsibilities of an Airline Captain."

only Captain God could have prevented the Erebus disaster.

Are you suggesting that if any of the other Air NZ Captains had been called out to operate that duty the crash would still have occurred?
If so I believe you are wrong.

[PapaHotel6]

The reality of the judgement of Erebus must rest in the knowledge that flying is a dangerous business and nothing has replaced the crucial role of the pilot in the whole scheme of things, for when we think about it, the prime role of a pilot is not to have an accident. To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight
This from "The Erebus Enquiry, a Tragic Miscarriage of Justice," compiled by C.H.N. L'eSTRANGE.
Quote:
"his final sentence has these damning words'..once airborne, the captain is finally and totally responsible for the safe flight operation"

Actually, such statements really irritate me. They reek of pompous sanctimony and imply that once in the air, a competent captain should gain some sort of overriding omnipresence that protects the flight from all outside influence. Which of course is glaringly untrue and in this case, irrelevant anyway - it was the misuse of the INS combined with failure to observe MSA which caused the accident here; not the vagueness of the destination waypoint.

It's statements such as those above which give ammunition to those who would write off Chippindale as an anachronistic buffoon who didn't understand "computerised" aircraft.

I think it has to be appreciated and acknowledged that the Honorable Justice Peter Mahon, during this Royal Commission of Inquiry, wouldn’t be bribed, bought or lied to and refused to have his integrity compromised.

I agree. Mahon was utterly sincere but - utterly wrong. He allowed personality politics to cloud his judgment. It's clear he was irritated by the fact Gemmell wasn't intimidated by him, for example. He placed far too much credence on his own superficial and very quickly acquired knowledge of aviation procedures. Some of his logic is grossly assumptive and laughably facile "pilots had found from experience that the INS was very accurate, therefore it was okay for Collins to be wholly reliant on it" is one such example. I could go on and on.

[prospector]

PapaHotel6,

To help him or her achieve this result, no let or hinder should be acceptable and this applies to those on the ground who prepare the data for use in flight

I fail to see how your comment .

ctually, such statements really irritate me. They reek of pompous sanctimony and imply that once in the air, a competent captain should gain some sort of overriding omnipresence that protects the flight from all outside influence

Can be reconciled with the written comment of Maurice McGreal. To my mind that statement covers the Erebus situation very well.

It's statements such as those above which give ammunition to those who would write off Chippindale as an anachronistic buffoon who didn't understand "computerised" aircraft.

How do you come to that conclusion??

[PapaHotel6]

How do you come to that conclusion??

Because nebulous statements like "the Captain must have ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight" implying therefore, that this was pilot error, are facile in the extreme. Now, the Erebus crash *was* due to pilot error, but for very specific reasons - not because the Captain failed in some ill-defined ultimate responsibility.

Mahon - with a level of arrogance that beggars belief - thought his own level of insight was superior to that of Chippindale, who he wrote off as an uneducated, concrete thinking militaristic individual with no insight into the intricacies and infrastructure of "computerised" navigation. Nothing could have been further from the truth. But making generalised statements like "the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.

Am I making any sense??

[prospector]

Am I making any sense??

Well, to me, sort of. A very fine line you have drawn with

Because nebulous statements like "the Captain must have ultimate responsibility for the safety of the flight" implying therefore, that this was pilot error, are facile in the extreme

Followed by

Now, the Erebus crash *was* due to pilot error, but for very specific reasons - not because the Captain failed in some ill-defined ultimate responsibility.

Your second paragraph I would agree with until

"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.

I really cannot see any reason why this should be so, perhaps you could explain why you think it would be so.

[PapaHotel6]

Quote:
"the Captain has sole responsibility once the wheels have left the ground" as if they mean anything (which really, they don't) serve only to entrench the belief of the Mahon camp that those who would ascribe this to pilot error are nothing but a bunch of conservative reactionaries who don't understand modern aviation or teamwork.
I really cannot see any reason why this should be so, perhaps you could explain why you think it would be so.

Simply that the logic "the Captain is solely responsible for the safety of his passengers, these patients did not arrive safely therefore it was by definition the Captain's fault" is childish, and makes us look shallow.

It's not a big deal in the overall context of the discussion. Cheers.

[onetrack]

Doesn't this following article explain the Erebus disaster fairly precisely? - and lay the blame where it is rightfully due? The article is written by a professional pilot.

Is it not a commercial pilots responsibility to know where he is at all times, in relation to that nasty cloud type, "cumulus granitus? I always thought it was - am I wrong in this belief?

Derek Ellis: Erebus - why the pilot was at fault - National - NZ Herald News

[Dick Smith]

I initiated the Antarctic flights and went on the 9 Qantas ones I chartered.

I was always on the flight deck when at low level and personally marked the lat and longitude from the INS on the ONC chart. In those days the aircraft operated at low levels - as low as 500 agl over the pack ice.

One of the flights was on the 17 TH Nov 1977 and was an attempt to get to the South Geographic pole but adverse winds meant a change and we overflew McMurdo at low level. Descent was in IMC using guidance from the McMurdo radar operator . I marked all the positions on the chart so there was a backup.

It's clear that no one in the accident aircraft marked positions on a visual chart as a safety backup.

[27/09]

Perhaps this question is woefully naive, but..... how did this become a union issue?

Yep I'd say naive. Have a look at history and you will find many instances of the crew being blamed, partly because they're no longer around to defend themselves. This is the reason many pilot bodies like ALPA have become involved.

I am not passing comment on the rights or wrongs of the crew in this accident, just highlighting reasons why the likes of ALPA become involved, to ensure the crew get a fair hearing.

[3 Holer]

In the early hours of 28 November a navigational coordinate in the flight plan presented at the briefing was changed. The airline’s navigation section believed it was making a minor adjustment to the flight’s longstanding destination point, but a typing error some 14 months earlier meant it had actually shifted this point some 27 nautical miles to the east. Instead of the IFR route taking Flight TE901 over flat sea ice, as Collins and Cassin had been briefed, it would take them directly over Mt Erebus, a 3794-metre-high active volcano. The flight crew were not alerted to the change. On the morning of 28 November they received the adjusted 'correct' flight plan and entered these coordinates into the on board computer.

Good point Dick,in retrospect, it would have been a good idea to have plotted the course on a visual chart. In retrospect, there were many things that could have been done differently and may have prevented this tragic accident. Many were raised and considered in Justice Mahon's inquiry. Unfortunately, these findings were not in the best interest of Air NZ and Robert Muldoon's government at the time.

[gulfairs]

nz 901

I was nearly on stand by as a lowley First Officer for that particular flight.
I say nearly, because Greg Cassin and I had agreed to switch dutys because of a family illness, and I agreed to change; but I did make it clear that I was NOT interested in joyriding around the South pole.
I can add now in hind sight that the mindset of many of the the then Captains, and even right up until 1980's was of unmittigated omnipotence.
I flew with Collins about two weeks prior to the il-fated 901,and admit he was a pleasant fellow to fly with, but there was a hard nosed streak, that occasionally showed up.
Cassin was at the other end of the scale, a very pleasant and mildly submissive.
The utimate end could have been different, if there had been a crew change, but never the less MSA is just that, Minimum Safe Altitude.
and VMC means a visual flight conditions which must include a defined horizon of some sort,that did not exist that day.
The first warnings were loud and clear by their ommisssions.
Loss of VHF radio contact, and a loss of VHF Nav contact.
I think most of us would have made it known that all is not well and to get back up to MSA was necessary at that time.
The 'Bell' could not have been much louder!
I am like most aviators, I suffer from 20-20 hind sight.
The Moving Finger writes; and, having writ, Moves on: nor all thy Piety nor Wit. Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line, Nor all thy Tears wash out a Word of it.” ― Omar Khayyám.
It had a very sad ending.


GLGR

[Dick Smith]

Yes. Agree the waypoint was moved without the crew being informed.

That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.

[prospector]

That's why it is necessary, where practicable, to have a check system in place. The simpler the better.

How far back in the thread have you gone?. There were many check systems in place, including the mandatory requirements to be met before any descent below MSA, these have all been raised many times. The shifting of the waypoint in itself had nothing to do with the cause of the disaster.

1. Vis 20 km plus.
2. No snow shower in area.
3. Avoid Mt Erebus area by operating in an arc from 120 degree Grid to 270 degree Grid from McMurdo Field, within 20 nm of TACAN CH 29.
4. Descent to be coordinated with local radar control as they may have other traffic in the area.

You will note that this is the ONLY let down procedure approved by the Company and the CAA. The crew was aware of this requirement as a copy of the memorandum was recovered from the cockpit wreckage.