Erebus 25 years on

[tinpis]

60's ANZ DC-10 had INS
DC8 had sun gun

[ampan]

And at night it would have been those star tables, wouldn't it?

So imagine what's going through the mind of a 1960s DC8 captain taking off from Auckland or Sydney, headed for Honolulu. If you miss Hawaii, you and all the passengers are dead, and the navigator seated behind you is using Captain Cook's methods to get you there. Wouldn't you be all over the first piece of land you saw?

[grummanavenger]

Dc8 nav equipment

AirNZ's DC 8's also had dual doppler which permitted pilot navigation after an initial period where qualified flight navs were used.
Also in the initial stages of pilot navigation the aircraft also Loran equipped altho this had limited availability in the S pacific.

[tinpis]

I understand on the DC8 the Mk8 up the centre of the windscreen was a popular back up

[ampan]

Someone should you guys a medal. Auckland/Sydney to Honolulu/Singapore/Hong Kong, for 7 years, without missing the target on any occasion (not to mention having to land at Kai Tak).

[SR71]

Hey Dingo,

Can you post another link to the Privy Council ruling?

That one doesn't work.

The case isn't even listed under the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council WWW page....http://www.privy-council.org.uk/output/Page171.asp

Anyone else know where I can read the document?

I've read the Court of Appeal ruling on Gutenberg.

Also, the actual Royal Commission report itself?

Is that online?

I've read Mahon's book.

"Impact Erebus" will set you back £95 on Amazon.co.uk!

"The Erebus Papers" will set you back £86 on Amazon.co.uk!

[ampan]

I haven't been able to find another link to the Privy Council decision. The easiest method might be to visit the library at the local law school. It's in a set of volumes called "Appeal Cases".

Mahon's report is probably out of print by now, but there are several copies available at the Auckland Public Library. They also have the transcript of the evidence given at the hearing (but not the documents).

There is also a useful book called "The Erebus Papers" (Stuart Macfarlane - Avon Press - 1991). It has decent photographic reproductions of many of the documents and also has extracts from the transcript of evidence. Unfortunately, the book also has the opinions of the lawyer who wrote it. Bit if those are ignored, it is very helpful.

Incidentally, if ALPA are going to do are proper job on the proposed website, why don't they dig up everything, scan it, and put it on the site so that everyone has all the information?

[hoggsnortrupert]

White Out:

ampan Maps

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I don't think I missed H'snort's point re a map. Yes, a map won't help if the sector whiteout prevents you seeing anything. But this wasn't the case. Although the crew couldn't see Erebus, they could see Beaufort Island. If you knew where you were in relation to Beaufort Island, then you would know where you were are in relation to Erebus - if you've got a decent map. If you haven't got a decent map, then that island down there in the sea is just an island down there in the sea.

Does anyone know what maps they had on the flightdeck?

AND READING A TOPOGRAPHICAL "CHART" (not map)

Reading a "CHART" is an "ART" a skill, one that is taught the basics of, and to varying levels to encompass a VFR "TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART" reading exercise with PPL and CPL training:

What you do with it from here after depends upon ones skill attained, and evolved from more and more use: and is directly proportional to the level they have attained up to the point they switch to Scheduled IFR operations.

Now having a "TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART" for IFR operations is not of the normally accepted:

To read a TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART you can never ever ever rely on matching just one visual outside observation, with a feature on a "CHART".

You need to have enough outside visual definition to do this:

If you are in "PARTIAL" (SECTOR) white out, and you are not trained to recognise this, then how are you going to use a "CHART".

The degree to which they ( the crew) could actually identify visually is unsure.

What was recorded to be, (thought to be) Beaufort Island is a matter of, from my memory (as I do not have my reference material handy) a matter of conjecture.

To have a TOPOGRAPHICAL CHART in POOR weather conditions, you are usually low to the ground and in no position to have your heads down!

Now in this case suppose they would have had to transition to a Topographical chart, at what stage of the Flt would you do it:?

They would have expected to pick up a intended track on a chart from there INS lead in track! yes?

But there in lies your problem, in a white out and not knowing they are in a white out, and the difference in the INS track and a track on a Topographical chart would have been seperated by 40 odd kilometers:

The crew would have been from their previous backgrounds pretty good at reading a topographical chart, certainly way above average.

But even the best would not have picked this in these circumstances, 40 km's?

They did not understand the relevence of white out, they did not understand the illusion created by nature, even an experianced mountaineer of Peter Mulgrews experiance, was fooled by this cruel twist of nature:

Yes I agree with a previous post : that the crew has to have some portion of the blame: IE the S.O.P. & FL 160/ 060 restriction:

BUT BUT BUT: the culture then, the old boy club etc etc, indeed the company its self, had advertised photographs as part of their publicity campaign showing photos from previous Flts well well below this "Paper restriction" it would have been unconceivable for the company to put the punters in the seats and truck on down to the ICE and stay above FL 160, would have been another disaster,< excuse the pun!

So the Q: The greater portion of blame is what?

Only my opinion, but Prospector and Desert Dingo are both correct: I guess and I say I guess! the Q will remain for along time yet, The greater portion of blame belongs to who?

Chr's
H/Snort

( Sorry! I don't wish for it to be thought that the below is mine, I got it from wikipedia and the net)

Read on:

Beginning in February 1977, Air New Zealand offered tourist overflights from Auckland to the Antarctic. These flights were quite popular--in 1979 four were offered. They flew the route shown at left (from the information brochure). The last of these scheduled flights, Flight TE 901, a DC-10 with 237 passengers and 20 crew, took off from Auckland at 0820 on 28 November, on what was supposed to be an 11-hour turnaround flight. But it crashed into the side of Mt. Erebus at 1249, killing all aboard.
The loss of radio contact was noted at McMurdo, and Air NZ was soon notified that communications had been lost. Soon after 2130, the itme when the DC-10 would have run out of fuel, two VXE-6 LC-130 aircraft returning from Pole and Byrd were diverted to search. Both LC-130's spotted the crash site and the wreckage at about 0100 on 29 November. Helicpter search parties reached the crash site at about 0900, and they quickly confirmed that the wreckage was from the ANZ aircraft, and that there were no survivors.
The recovery efforts were quite extensive--in part because of pressure from Japan due to the number of Japanese citizens who had been on board. The operation lasted until 9 December; at one time there were as many as 60 recovery workers at the crash site. Recovered bodies and fragments were flown directly back to Auckland, and eventually all but 44 of the victims were identified.
Several inquiries were held--after mechanical failures were quickly ruled out, the focus switched to the flight crew, who had never made this particular trip before. Initially they were blamed for flying below an approved altitude, and staying there while being unsure of their location. But a second inquiry determined that the coordinates in the navigation computer had been changed without telling the crew or the flight followers at Mac Center. At the time of the crash, TE 901 was flying in local whiteout conditions (in clear air under cloud cover, but with no surface definition), but most of the flight had been in clear air--if commentator Peter Mulgrew had been in his seat a minute or two earlier he would have recognized that the aircraft was off course. As it was, the flight crew was confident of their position and flight path until the collision alarms sounded just before the crash.

Aircraft Accident: DC. 10 ZK-NZP Flight 901
When: 28 November, 1979
Where: Mount Erebus, Antarctica
What happened:
• At 8:20 am on 28 November, 1979, Flight 901 left Auckland Airport. On board were 237 passengers and 20 crew, looking forward to the 11-hour return flight to Antarctica.
• These sightseeing flights had been operating since February, 1977, and took the passengers on a low-flying sweep over McMurdo Sound, returning to New Zealand on the same day.
• Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not flown the Antarctic flight before, but the flight was considered to be straightforward and they were both experienced pilots.
• 19 days earlier the pilots had attended a briefing session where they were shown the printouts of a flight plan used by previous flights to the Antarctic.
• The plan gave co-ordinates for the trip to Antarctica and across McMurdo Sound which when entered into the computerised navigation system, would be flown automatically by the plane.
• On the morning of 28 November Collins and Cassin entered the series of latitude and longitude co-ordinates into the aircraft computer.
• Unknown to them two of the coordinates had been changed earlier that morning, and when entered into the computer, changed the flight path of the aircraft 45 kilometres to the east.
• At 12:30 pm Flight 901 was about 70 kilometres from McMurdo Station. Permission was given by the McMurdo radio communications centre to descend to 3050 metres and proceed “visually”.
• Air safety regulations were against dropping lower than a height of no less than 1830 metres even under good weather conditions, but Collins believed the plane was flying over low, flat ground. Other pilots regularly flew low over the area to give their passengers a better view.
• At 12.45 Collins advised McMurdo Centre he was dropping further to 610 metres. At this point he locked onto the computerised navigational system, but Flight 901 was not where either McMurdo Centre or the crew thought it was.
• The change in the two co-ordinates had put Flight 901 on a path not across the flat ground of McMurdo Sound, but across Lewis Sound and towards the 3794 metre-high active volcano, Mount Erebus.
• Because the air was clear and beneath the cloud layer, the white of the ice blended with the white of the mountain, with no contrast to show the sloping up of the land - a whiteout.
• At 12:49 pm the deck altitude device began to blare a warning but there was no time for Collins to save the situation from disaster. Six seconds later Flight 901 hit the side of Mount Erebus and disintegrated.
• From 12:50 pm McMurdo Centre kept trying to contact Flight 901, and finally informed Air New Zealand headquarters in Auckland that communication with the aircraft had been lost. US search and rescue aircraft were put on standby.
• At 10:00 pm (New Zealand time), about thirty minutes after the DC-10 would have used the last of its fuel, the airline told reporters that it had to be assumed that the aircraft was lost. Searches were made over the usual flight path, but nothing was found.
• Just before 1:00 am (New Zealand time) the crew of a United States Navy plane found some unidentified wreckage on the side of Mount Erebus. There were no signs of survivors.
• 20 hours after the crash, helicopter search parties were able to land at the site and confirm that the wreckage was the remains of Flight 901. All 257 people on board had died.
How many died: 257 (237 passengers and 20 crew)
Other events and outcomes:
• The wreckage made a 600-metre trail across the lower slopes of Mount Erebus. As the fuel tanks exploded a fireball ripped through what was left of the fuselage. The force of the impact would have knocked the passengers out or killed them immediately.
• The task of recovering and identifying the bodies of the passengers and crew (200 New Zealanders, 24 Japanese, 22 Americans, 6 British, 2 Canadians, 1 Australian, 1 French, 1 Swiss) was made more difficult because of the numbers involved.
• Over 60 people worked on the accident site, most in body recovery. 213 victims were eventually identified.
• On 22 February 1980 a burial service was held for the 44 unidentified victims.
• Early in the investigation into the causes of the disaster, it became clear that there was no mechanical reason for the crash.
• The information on the flight recorder tapes showed there had been no emergency in the cockpit of the aircraft.
• Attention was then focussed on the possibility of pilot error, pointing to the inexperience of the two pilots in flying in the Antarctic.
• A report by the chief inspector of aircraft accidents, Ron Chippindale, came out in May 1980. It stated that the decision of the captain in dropping to a height below the approved level, and continuing at that height when the crew was not sure of the plane's position, had been the main cause of the accident.
• Only weeks before Chippindale's report came out, the government announced a one-man Royal Commission of Inquiry. On 27 April, 1981, Justice Peter Mahon, released his report.
• This report placed the blame for the accident on the airline systems that had allowed the aircraft to be programmed to fly on the path which led directly to Mount Erebus.
• Mahon found that Captain Collins had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres, and could not be said to have been guilty of unauthorised “low flying”.
• Air New Zealand and the Civil Aviation Division were ordered to pay the costs of the inquiry, and the airline had to pay an extra fee of $150,000.
• The chief executive of Air New Zealand resigned a week after the report was released to the public.
• Debate on where the blame for the crash should be placed continued. The changed flight path was in line with Mount Erebus but would have been safe if there had been no drop in height below the recommended level.
• Later court decisions questioned the way in which Mahon conducted his investigation.
• Public opinion has remained divided on where the blame for the disaster should rest.
• A wooden cross was erected above Scott Base to commemorate the disaster. It was replaced in 1986 with an aluminium cross after the original one was eroded by ice and snow.
• The Mount Erebus disaster was New Zealand's biggest single tragedy, with one more death than in the 1931 Napier Earthquake.

[prospector]

hogsnortrupert,
Following the U.S. District Court hearing in Washington DC, Judge Harold H. Greene wrote in his ruling,

"It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing he took SOLE RESPONSIBILITY for separating THE AIRPLANE FROM OTHER AIRCRAFT and the TERRAIN and he was on his own,
There also was much credible testimony to the effect that, and the Court finds that, air traffic controllers are not in a position to challenge, or second guess, the representation of a pilot that he can see where he is going and. indeed, that controllers are trained not to question such a representation".

'Mahon found that Captain Collins had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres, and could not be said to have been guilty of unauthorised “low flying”."

Where exactly did Mahon find that that the flight had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres?????

"• Captain Jim Collins and his co-pilot Greg Cassin had not flown the Antarctic flight before, but the flight was considered to be straightforward and they were both experienced pilots."

And herein lies the major problem, they were experienced pilots carrying out their usual duties of airline pilots, but were complete novices in the vagaries of Antarctic flying. the comments from Mr Bob Thomson, New Zealands most experienced Antarctic operator, printed earlier in this thread sums it up very well.

[Desert Dingo]

Prospector, it appears your favorite investigator screwed up Justice Green's investigation.

Stewart McFarlane, Senior lecturer in Law, University of Auckland (now retired)
http://www.investigatemagazine.com/a...ate_nov_4.html

In 1987 during a claim for compensation by the dependents of the deceased Chippindale asserted that the engineers displayed their mounting alarm by the tone of their voices. Here again the evidence disproves his claim. He also claimed by implication that the voices marked by the Washington team as unidentified were in fact the voices of the engineers. He claimed this despite previously saying “At no time did I attribute any comment to any person. I relied totally upon the recognition of the voices made by the team in Washington.”
<snip>
So what did Chippindale actually do in order to create his theory of mounting concern? He took overlapping snatches of different conversations of passengers and cabin crew speaking in the galley area and flight deck and attributed them to the engineers when the Washington team agreed the voices were unidentifiable. He added words to the transcript which the Washington team agreed were unintelligible and suggested they suited his theory that the engineers were expressing their concern about flying conditions to the pilots. He latched onto a few remarks passing between Mulgrew and Moloney. After his theory was disproved by evidence given to the Royal Commission in 1980, he claimed seven years later, contrary to the opinions of seven to nine others, and supported only by Gemmell, that the engineers expressed mounting alarm by their tone of voice.
The conclusion must be that Chippindale’s claims are untrue. The engineers voiced no queries about the proposed descent, expressed no mounting alarm as the flight continued, and expressed no dissatisfaction. Those claims ought not to have been made by an inspector of air accidents. They brought no credit to the Office of Air Accidents Investigation. They were approved for release to the public by the Minister of Transport on 12 June 1980 and are still at the time of writing on the website of that Office’s successor. They have done lasting damage. They must have caused grief over the years to the flight crew’s families. They have created a fantasy scenario of events which supposedly led to the disaster that endures in the public mind to this day as media comments such as Cullen’s, Rudman’s, and Rankin’s bear witness and perpetuates this untrue scenario into history.
Chippindale’s evidence in the court case brought for compensation by the dependents of those killed by the crash against the US Government no doubt contributed to their case failing. He attended in person to give evidence “at the direction of the New Zealand Government”. The US Government paid for his transportation to and from the US.

Ron Chippindale RIP

Obituary: Vale Ron Chippindale: Erebus investigator was one of the many victims of TE 901, the disaster that will not go away
In November 1989, 10 years after the crash of Air New Zealand flight TE 901, chief air accidents investigator Ron Chippindale admitted to me that he knew Air New Zealand had lied about sightseeing flights to Antarctica not being allowed lower than 16,000 feet. But he’d gone along with that fiction, during his own investigation of that terrible disaster, and all through the long royal commission that followed, at the end of which Justice Peter Mahon accused the airline of concocting “palpably false evidence” and “an orchestrated litany of lies.”
Because of that ringing phrase, Justice Mahon became another victim of Mt Erebus, driven from the Bench for it by his fellow judges and a furious prime minister, Rob Muldoon. But Ron Chippindale was an Erebus victim too, never forgiven by many pilots for obstinately supporting the airline’s lie that TE 901 had no right to be flying below 16,000 feet when he knew otherwise.
But even his 1989 admission did not stop Chippindale continuing to accuse the pilots of causing the crash by bad airmanship. Despite conclusive evidence to the contrary, he still held that they were flying at a low altitude knowingly uncertain where they were in the hostile, mountainous Antarctic environment. And he bizarrely told me that they could have saved the DC10 and its 237 passengers and 20 crew by sliding it across the icy slopes it hit to a standstill, rather than letting it smash to smithereens after the ground proximity warning system shrieked its awful “Whoop whoop! Pull up!” That would have been a feat of airmanship unparalleled in aviation history.
(more)
http://poneke.wordpress.com/2008/02/13/te901/

If this is true it demolishes Chippindale’s credibility for producing the definitive report of the disaster, as claimed by some on this thread.

[hoggsnortrupert]

Right vs Wrong:

Prospector:

Matey I agree with you, I don't mean that as a contradiction.
Where it becomes murky, they didn't have the area knowledge base, antarctic flying experiance, or training, to be able to make the VMC decision in the conditions they "thought" they where in, when in fact they were in sector white out,( an illusion) together with the fact that their actual track was 40 k's from where they thought they were.

The only way for them to have cross checked their route would have been to have a series of charts with the route drawn and the waypoints ticked off as being crossed and the Lat & Longs matched, why was this not in practice is a good Question, this way they would hve seen their parallel track era.

They thought Erebus was 20+ miles to the West.

Judge Greene is correct, but he's wrong, how can that be?

If they were where they were supose to be, Mac center would have had clear Comms, they had not had comms difficulty with the other flights.

They had comm's problems because the signal was blocked by a huge piece of granite.

While the controllers are not responsible for the decision, or to second guess a pilot for making a decision to operate VMC, in this case their operational experiance was enough for them to have "perhaps" enquired more.

Rights wrong, wrong is right, there are so many liks in the chain here that were broken, and hind sight is always 20/20.

Chr's
H/Snort.

[Gary Parata]

ampan said:

"Incidentally, if ALPA are going to do are proper job on the proposed website, why don't they dig up everything, scan it, and put it on the site so that everyone has all the information? "

As one of the webmasters for the new site, I can confirm that this is exactly what is going to be happening. The site will be short on opinion, and long on information, although ultimately the judges of that will be you. Many of the questions on this thread will be answerable by researching the site. I don't yet have a date for when the site will go live, possibly April/May but I can tell you that this thread is having an influence on its ongoing development because it is serving as a useful barometer as to the necessity of having such a site.

The PC judgment has been scanned and will be available, as well as the Mahon and Chippindale Reports.

Other features will include a media kit, an area that will facilitate research, school projects, and a commemoration section.

It will not be a tool for venting one's spleen, nor should there be cause for anyone to vent at it(!), provided we have done our jobs correctly. Once again, that will be for you to decide.

A panel of experts will be available to answer questions by e-mail. All attempts will be made to ensure the impartiality of answers and I will be personally ensuring that this is the case. Whether I succeed in your estimation is another matter.

I have no opinion on some of the opinions I have read here, preferring to value them as a valid contribution to a robust debate. However I have to say that some of the statements of 'fact' I have read on here are nothing of the kind, and only serve to perpetuate myths that result in a debate that waste's everyone's time. Several claims that generate false thoughts in readers' minds that the Privy Council and the Court of Appeal "overturned" the Mahon Report are good examples.

It is hoped that the site will minimise pointless debate, but that may be wishful thinking. At least debate is better than no debate, and I, for one, have enjoyed reading every contribution on this thread. So keep it up, PPRuNers.

Gary Parata

[Desert Dingo]

And while you are waiting....try this lot

SR71,
Sorry, I was not smart enough to save the Privy Council Appeal report when I had it and the link is now broken.
Maybe it exists somewhere else now, but I can’t find it with a quick Google search.
If anyone else finds it please post it so I can add it to this list.
In the meantime here are the links I do have.

The reports and appeals
Archives New Zealand
http://www.archives.govt.nz/exhibitions/pastexhibitions/erebus/erebus.php
1.Chippindale’s Accident Report
Aircraft Accident Report No, 79-139

2.Justice Mahon’s Royal Commission Report
Report of the Royal Commission to Enquire into The Crash on Mount Erebus, Antarctica of a DC10 Aircraft

3.NZ Court of Appeal
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16130/16130-8.txt

4.Privy Council appeal:
http://www.uniset.ca/other/css/1984AC808.html
(Link now broken; VDeck error – File not found)


Video: Impact Erebus two
http://www.stage6.com/user/mradamo/video/2203043/Impact-Erebus-Two#

The Briefing room: Investigate Nov 05, Return to Erebus:
www.investigatemagazine.com/archives/2006/03/investigate_nov_4.html

Saving Human Lives: Lessons in Management Ethics By Robert E. Allinson
http://books.google.com/books?id=5dG...w9Q8#PPT340,M1

Accidents, Failures, Mistakes and Leaky Buildings : A Paper presented at the National IPENZ Conference Wellington New Zealand March 2006 by Andrew McGregor
http://www.prosolve.co.nz/accidents.pdf

Erebus Impact: FLIGHTSAFETYAUSTRALIA NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 2004 ,Macarthur Job
http://www.casa.gov.au/fsa/2004/dec/25-31.pdf

[prospector]

Desert Dingo,
I prefer to take the findings of a qualified, experienced, well trained aircraft Accident Investigator, rather than some legal eagles OPINIONS. I mean if I want to paint my house I dont hire an electrician.

I have read the Erebus Papers some years ago, and I must agree with what is printed in John Kings "New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation.

"Its author was Stuart Macfarlane, a senior lecturer in law at the University of Auckland, who roundly criticized the two highest Courts in th New Zealand legal system, First he pointed out the family connections between two of the Court of Appeal judges and Air New Zealand staff and counsel. Then he made the bizarre accusation, for somebody at his level in the law system, that the Privy Council was, at best, somewhat economical with the truth and made its judgement purely to clear the establishment, which included Ron Chippendale, the government and the government airline of any blame.
The cumulative effect is that the Privy Council constructed a fantasy world which bore no relation to the truth."

If that is the opinion a senior law lecturer has of his peers in the Highest court in the land, than his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is surely to be taken with a shovel full of salt.

[Desert Dingo]

OK, you are entitled to your OPINION too.
However, how about trying to make a convincing rebuttal using some facts to counter all the arguments that Chippindale made serious errors?
Appeal to authority is not good enough here.
(The advocate makes an unwarranted appeal to an authoritative person or organization in support of a proposition.)

[ampan]

Gentlemen, Who really gives a toss about what the lawyers think, whether it be Justice Mahon, or Stuart McFarlane, or Judge Greene, or the NZ Court of Appeal, or the Privy Council? I just want to be able to see the information that these lawyers saw, so that I can make up my own mind. And today's postings have been excellent in that regard, especially those of Desert Dingo and Gary Parata.

[hoggsnortrupert]

It will go on for years yet!

prospector hogsnortrupert,
Following the U.S. District Court hearing in Washington DC, Judge Harold H. Greene wrote in his ruling,

"It is clearly established that, when the pilot told Mac Centre he wished to descend VMC, he effectively informed the controllers that he could see where he was going. In so doing he took SOLE RESPONSIBILITY for separating THE AIRPLANE FROM OTHER AIRCRAFT and the TERRAIN and he was on his own,
There also was much credible testimony to the effect that, and the Court finds that, air traffic controllers are not in a position to challenge, or second guess, the representation of a pilot that he can see where he is going and. indeed, that controllers are trained not to question such a representation".

'Mahon found that Captain Collins had been authorised by McMurdo to descend to 450 metres, and could not be said to have been guilty of unauthorised “low flying”."

I AGREE! MAHON GOT THIS WRONG:

LINKS in a chain, or holes in Suisse cheese? you choose!

Where did the first link crack? where was the first hole to open up in the cheese, this is a sequence of events, that each on its own amounts to nothing, put together we are all the wiser for.

I have just finished a book written by Commander Beach USN Rtd, about the US Nautilus! around the world submerged, occurred in 1956:

He explains a bit about his Fathers Court Martial "Commander Beach Snr"
Beach Snr's Ship was at anchor at some port, when a Tsunami occured.

Upon seeing the Pre wave sign of the sea rolling back he tried valiantly to put his ship to sea, but was not quick enough.

At his trial he was "Convicted" of putting his ship at risk by not being prepared for a Tsunami? His was the "unlucky" one amongst other's at anchor?

It would appear by nature, we always have to have someone to blame!

The older I get the more I am convinced, that the more we learn the more stupid we become.

Why have we not got a hot line to GOD?

Chr's
H/Snort

[prospector]

Gary Parata,

Your web site will no doubt be quoting from Bob Thomson's "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88."

"Nor did Air New Zealand take advantage of the experience gained by members of their aircrews who flew on earlier flights. Apparently the NZALPA saw the Antarctic flights as a "special perk" for their members and had an agreement with Air New Zealand that flight crews should be spread widely amongst its members.

Therefore aircrews, including aircraft captains, usually had not had any previous experience on these flights, an experience which would have avoided the Erebus Disaster from ever happening."

And also,
" Air New Zealand and NZALPA went to some lengths to ensure that their Senior Pilots and members were seen as professionals , who knew it all and did not therefore need to seek advice from elsewhere, such as the RNZAF,USAF,USN or the Division".

The level of Antarctic flight experience on TE901 flight deck would certainly agree with those statements.

Desert Dingo,
In my opinion, the chain of events was precipitated by just those facts, and they cannot be overturned by all the legal twists and turns that legal people spend years learning to master.

[Gary Parata]

Prospector said:

Your web site will no doubt be quoting from Bob Thomson's "History of New Zealand Antarctic Research Programme 1965-88."

Yes it will be, but only to debunk it. No, I won't be drawn into doing that now, you will have to wait.

I will say now that there are some things that NZALPA could have done better, and those things will be exposed clearly for everyone to see.


Gary Parata

[Desert Dingo]

John King and New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation.

Prospector says:

I have read the Erebus Papers some years ago, and I must agree with what is printed in John Kings "New Zealand Tragedies, Aviation.”

Its author was Stuart Macfarlane, a senior lecturer in law at the University of Auckland, who roundly criticized the two highest Courts in the New Zealand legal system, First he pointed out the family connections between two of the Court of Appeal judges and Air New Zealand staff and counsel. Then he made the bizarre accusation, for somebody at his level in the law system, that the Privy Council was, at best, somewhat economical with the truth and made its judgement purely to clear the establishment, which included Ron Chippendale, the government and the government airline of any blame.
The cumulative effect is that the Privy Council constructed a fantasy world which bore no relation to the truth."

If that is the opinion a senior law lecturer has of his peers in the Highest court in the land, than his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is surely to be taken with a shovel full of salt.

Stuart Macfarlane argues that there were contradictions in both appeals.
This is backed up by Robert Elliot Allinson in Saving Human Lives

… Thus the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.

The question then arises, how can five of the greatest legal minds of the Commonwealth (not to mention five Justices of the Court of Appeal in New Zealand) have made such a series of egregious blunders in their reasoning? The only explanation that makes sense out of this is that the Law Lords were guided by the practical consideration of attempting to absolve the pilots of blame, Air New Zealand of blame, and to find fault with Justice Mahon’s verdict which tended to place too much blame (in their opinion) on Air New Zealand while at the same time upholding his finding on causation.
Needless to say, one cannot reconcile all of these objectives (which are self-contradictory) without involving oneself in self-contradictory reasoning.
It is only somewhat astounding that such self-contradictory reasoning – and there are other examples pointed out by Mr. Macfarlane in his masterly Erebus Papers and additional examples pointed out below – now is permanently recorded in print in the law reports.

And in Appendix 2 (citations deleted for clarity – it’s hard going reading this stuff.)

…. In giving testimony, the briefing officers maintained that they had presented the route as being over Mt. Erebus. This was contested by the surviving pilots (those pilots present at the briefing who were not aboard Collins’ flight) who maintained that the route was presented as being over McMurdo sound. The briefing officers did not wish to appear to have informed the pilots that the route was over McMurdo sound because to have done so would have removed all blame from the pilots and at the same time placed it on the shoulders of either themselves or management or both.
The Woodhouse ruling of the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council ruling both, by implication, accepted the version of events related by the briefing officers. In so doing they ignored completely the conflicting testimony of the surviving pilots and the confirming evidence of pilots from previous briefings. That the conflicting evidence was ignored may be inferred from the oblique reference of the Privy Council that ‘… their Lordships have examined the evidence of primary facts [they must here be referring to the testimony of the surviving pilots, i.e. the pilots present at the briefing but who were not aboard Collins’ flight] relevant to this matter [the adoption of the McMurdo routing] that was given at the hearings. This they did, not for the purpose of assessing its reliability, but simply to see whether any positive evidence that supported such an inference [that there was a deliberate adoption of the McMurdo routing] existed; and that none was to be found’.
Why was the testimony of the surviving pilots (those who had not been on board flight 901) ignored?
By ignoring any conflicting evidence, by implication, the PC accepted the version of events as presented in the testimony of the briefing officers. In this case the PC accepted that the briefing officers were telling the truth when they testified that their route was over Mt. Erebus. This then forms the self-contradiction that is at the basis of the judgement of the PC discussed above.
The reason that Justice Mahon placed so much weight on the concept of a conspiracy was that it was by finding the evidence of the briefing pilots not credible that he was able to reach his verdict on causation.
The PC placed so much emphasis on Justice Mahon being out of line for his conspiracy finding because they did not wish to make it appear that deceiving evidence had been given by the Air New Zealand witnesses. If the conspiracy portion of Mahon’s ruling can be overturned, then it might appear more plausible that the evidence of the briefing officers was reliable. This despite the fact that the Law Lords themselves state that they accept as correct that Justice Mahon found some evidence unreliable. They are careful not to say which evidence as if to imply that it was the evidence of the surviving pilots (<snip>) for if they were to agree that it was the evidence of the briefing officers that Justice Mahon was correct in finding unreliable their entire case would have fallen apart.

Hardly the “bizarre accusation” King claims. Seems to me that there are a few facts tied together with logical reasoning in there.

Then Prospector says about Macfarlane

If that is the opinion a senior law lecturer has of his peers in the Highest court in the land, than his opinion on anything to do with Erebus is surely to be taken with a shovel full of salt.

Why should it “be taken with a shovel full of salt”?
Would you care to tell us exactly where Macfarlane and Allinson are in error when they say “…the very basis of the Law Lord’s ruling is a blatant contradiction.”