JAL incident at Haneda Airport
It is fortuitous that there were no losses from the A350, that is miraculous given the complexity of the problem that they were confronted with. There was fire around the aircraft from the time of impact through to hours afterwards. The RH engine was continuing to run in a damaged state, presumably the destruction in the E&E bay was sufficient to disrupt control to the FCU and FWSOVs. Not the first time something like that has happened. It was still a very long time to get any doors opened. The decision to use the front doors is usually a reasonable choice, planes tend to TO and land into wind, but not aways, and history of fire events has indicated that even light winds can affect the survivability of the occupants. L1 appears to have been useable from the start, R1 was a high risk option but it paid off this time. L4 was a high risk as well, but it did pay off, however it promoted the spread of fire in the crown area of the aircraft. 8 minutes to begin, with uncontrolled fire around the aircraft, and 18 minutes to complete the evacuation should raise a level of industry safety specialists concern, and will be a substantial part of the final report. The outcome was miraculous, the manner by which it was achieved may not be so fortunate next time. It is reminiscent of the SR111 event, and should promote critical, but positive analysis in lessons learned.
The event did not have particularly demanding conditions, however there were enough events occurring together to achieve a nearly normal accident. The limitations of expectations on compliance of clearances, which requires clear transmission, comprehension, response and confirmation failed patently in this case. In hindsight, use of 34R for landings only would have mitigated fully the loss of the stopper system which has generally been a highly effective means to avoid runway incursions. That would have resulted in 34L for departures, and 34R for landings, which would have had greater resilience for communications events.
The communications event here is a routine failure in the USA, we have been seeing a high level of similar events all over the USA, so lessons from this event should be considered for applicability everywhere, The UK has its share of clearance adherence events, even when all concerned are native English speakers.
The airframe combustibility is going to be a thick part of the report. As is RFF facilities and procedures.
This was a challenging and shocking event for the crew, and terrifying for the passengers. It was not by definition "textbook", but it did achieve the desired outcome; the analysis will determine if that was enhanced or not by the actions of the crew. This is not a criticism of the crew; system safety needs analysis that is dispassionate in nature to assure that lessons learned are valid to avoid future unintended consequences.
The report will be interesting reading, the causation will be straightforward sadly, but the group reports will be interesting reading, and should be a positive contribution to global system safety.
The event did not have particularly demanding conditions, however there were enough events occurring together to achieve a nearly normal accident. The limitations of expectations on compliance of clearances, which requires clear transmission, comprehension, response and confirmation failed patently in this case. In hindsight, use of 34R for landings only would have mitigated fully the loss of the stopper system which has generally been a highly effective means to avoid runway incursions. That would have resulted in 34L for departures, and 34R for landings, which would have had greater resilience for communications events.
The communications event here is a routine failure in the USA, we have been seeing a high level of similar events all over the USA, so lessons from this event should be considered for applicability everywhere, The UK has its share of clearance adherence events, even when all concerned are native English speakers.
The airframe combustibility is going to be a thick part of the report. As is RFF facilities and procedures.
This was a challenging and shocking event for the crew, and terrifying for the passengers. It was not by definition "textbook", but it did achieve the desired outcome; the analysis will determine if that was enhanced or not by the actions of the crew. This is not a criticism of the crew; system safety needs analysis that is dispassionate in nature to assure that lessons learned are valid to avoid future unintended consequences.
The report will be interesting reading, the causation will be straightforward sadly, but the group reports will be interesting reading, and should be a positive contribution to global system safety.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 4th Jan 2024 at 10:29. Reason: Remove quote from previous deleted post
Comms on different channels
There were a few accidents with trains and planes where comms on different channels were a contributing factor:
- Brazil midair collision between military and private jet
- Transrapid train accident in Germany in which maintenance vehicle was on different frequency
Probably a few others. Will try to find and add sources.
- Brazil midair collision between military and private jet
- Transrapid train accident in Germany in which maintenance vehicle was on different frequency
Probably a few others. Will try to find and add sources.
Now when we imagine the horizontal stab and wings aligning with the marked green impact positions, we get a small nose up pitch and MLG almost on the ground. Which I bet is more or less compressed on the drawing.
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: on root
Posts: 157
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
After touchdown the nose gear oleo will compress under braking.
If the horizontal stab hit the radome I feel there would have been much more of an incision, perhaps with debris from the Dash embedded in the 350s nose.
I think they collided with the 350 nose gear still in the air, horizontal stab of the Dash impacting the 350 nose gear door area as the 350 derotated, tipping the Dash momentarily, the 350 radome impacting the top fuselage of the Dash as it rose up.
Had the 350 engines hit the Dash wings edge on I suspect there would have been more damage to the engines too. The Dash wings were probably oblique to the horizontal on engine/wing impact and snapped more easily. With the tail pinned, the Dash wings may have folded forwards on impact with 350 engines and the props literally sawed the cockpit off the Dash. The (smallish) incisions on the 350 nose may even have been caused by debris from Dash propeller blades.
Just my speculation looking at the damage. I'm no air crash expert, I spend my life avoiding them.
Edit. Check scale on above diagrams, Dash prop diameter is 4m and XWB fan 3m, would make the Dash larger at same scale and put the Dash horizontal stab higher up
If the horizontal stab hit the radome I feel there would have been much more of an incision, perhaps with debris from the Dash embedded in the 350s nose.
I think they collided with the 350 nose gear still in the air, horizontal stab of the Dash impacting the 350 nose gear door area as the 350 derotated, tipping the Dash momentarily, the 350 radome impacting the top fuselage of the Dash as it rose up.
Had the 350 engines hit the Dash wings edge on I suspect there would have been more damage to the engines too. The Dash wings were probably oblique to the horizontal on engine/wing impact and snapped more easily. With the tail pinned, the Dash wings may have folded forwards on impact with 350 engines and the props literally sawed the cockpit off the Dash. The (smallish) incisions on the 350 nose may even have been caused by debris from Dash propeller blades.
Just my speculation looking at the damage. I'm no air crash expert, I spend my life avoiding them.
Edit. Check scale on above diagrams, Dash prop diameter is 4m and XWB fan 3m, would make the Dash larger at same scale and put the Dash horizontal stab higher up
Last edited by JG1; 4th Jan 2024 at 11:48.
Been feeding this forum with simultaneous news updates from Japanese TV since the event began, but pulling out for the time being.
This evening they were discussing how ATC admits they did not notice the coastguard aircraft waiting there on the runaway.
The Dash 8 pilot has reportedly said he was just increasing the throttle to initiate take off when whatever it was happened.
This evening they were discussing how ATC admits they did not notice the coastguard aircraft waiting there on the runaway.
The Dash 8 pilot has reportedly said he was just increasing the throttle to initiate take off when whatever it was happened.
Join Date: Jul 2009
Location: Tokyo
Age: 74
Posts: 26
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
WSJ is reporting "Haneda Airport in 2009 implemented a system that tracks planes on the ground to make sure they are keeping proper distance from one another, but the coast guard plane wasn’t equipped with a transponder to be monitored by the system."
Join Date: Jan 2024
Location: SG
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fwiw, Scenario A seems more likely.
Frame-by-frame of the CCTV shows a leftward displacement of the DH3's taxi light at impact. A "tipping" of the DH3 due to a downward crushing impact would have more likely resulted in an upward movement of the light.
If you look closely, you can also see the vert stab of the DH3 illuminated by the A350 before impact.
Can't inline pictures, but see: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p3S...zMSBuU4lv/view
Frame-by-frame of the CCTV shows a leftward displacement of the DH3's taxi light at impact. A "tipping" of the DH3 due to a downward crushing impact would have more likely resulted in an upward movement of the light.
If you look closely, you can also see the vert stab of the DH3 illuminated by the A350 before impact.
Can't inline pictures, but see: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1p3S...zMSBuU4lv/view
Last edited by Jasonbay; 7th Jan 2024 at 04:27. Reason: Linked
This was one of my similar thoughts. This Transponders' Capabilities and activated modes played a role and possibly positioned 2 or 3 own swiss cheese slices in an unfortunate position.
Reading the holes in the Swiss cheese, I started to wonder if the Dash 8 captain might have talked himself on to the runway. He had a mental picture of the airport traffic movements, which were all departures from his runway, perhaps he was misled by auto-suggestion that the clearance to hold was to hold on the runway, as his mental image of the procedure was he was next in line on a departure only runway. If he wasn't operating at 100% for any reason I can envisage such a scenario ahead of many others being suggested here.
From the Twr transcript posted earlier it seems JA722A joined Twr possibly just after JAL516 reads back their landing clearance so probably is completely unaware of JAL516. 722 checks in about 10s after the 516 readback and is cleared to C5 and then hears JAL166 cleared to continue approach, misses the bit about “….{166} #2” but hears “…. we have a departure [ahead of you]….”. Thinking 166 is next to land rather than the unheard 516, and knowing they (722) are #1 in the departure sequence, that could lead to an “Eek, we better get on and gone so as not to delay 166” moment despite never having had any clearance past C5. This could also explain the short hold of 722 once lined up as they catch up from a rushed runway entry, focus and settle themselves for the takeoff itself. Elsewhere it is mentioned that the Captain of 722 is just starting to power up when, unexpectedly, 516 arrives with a bang…….
The other thing is the poor crew of JAL516 who will, I’m sure, forever wish that they’d seen 722 in time. Many have already commented on the difficulties they faced but it won’t be easy – “If only we’d seen…..”. A sad day which could have been far worse.....
Been feeding this forum with simultaneous news updates from Japanese TV since the event began, but pulling out for the time being.
This evening they were discussing how ATC admits they did not notice the coastguard aircraft waiting there on the runaway.
The Dash 8 pilot has reportedly said he was just increasing the throttle to initiate take off when whatever it was happened.
This evening they were discussing how ATC admits they did not notice the coastguard aircraft waiting there on the runaway.
The Dash 8 pilot has reportedly said he was just increasing the throttle to initiate take off when whatever it was happened.
Join Date: Jan 2024
Location: SG
Posts: 12
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It could also explain why he first said that his aircraft had 'exploded'. (Later he changed it to 'burst into flames behind him'.)
Join Date: Dec 2010
Location: UK
Age: 68
Posts: 103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This wasn't a collision between two civil aircraft. We ought not to forget that the DHC8 was a quasi-military aircraft, differently equipped to most of the civil aircraft using Haneda. The organisational culture and SOPs are probably somewhat different, too, with possible areas of friction with normal Haneda civilian procedures.