JAL incident at Haneda Airport

[MichaelOLearyGenius]

Similar incident happen in LAX in the 80s. A USAir 737 landed on top of a metro liner. Different circumstances though, ATC cleared the metro liner to line up and wait then forgot about it, they then cleared the 737 to land. All on board metro liner were killed but survivors on the 737.

[jolihokistix]

Originally Posted by Indarra

NHK is now reporting all three JAL cockpit crew are saying the runway was clear during the approach and landing and they were unaware for a couple of minutes that the sudden issues had resulted from a collision (with an unseen aircraft).

NHK news this morning Japan time says: また、「衝突の直前に一瞬、何かが見えた」と話すパイロットもいるということです。
'Also, one of the pilots did say, "For a split second right before the collision I did see something."' (my translation)

Another NHK news article, 11:35 am Japan time, 'Subsequent questioning of the coast guard captain by police headquarters records him saying 海上保安庁の機長がこれまでの警視庁の聞き取りに対して「突然、機体の後ろから火が出た」'Suddenly there was an outbreak of fire from the back of my aircraft."'

[framer]

I had a hard time picking out the CG aircraft in the video from the terminal surveillance camera, also. And now that you mention it (and without reviewing it) I don't remember seeing landing lights.

an interesting point, I think it is wide spread SOP’s to activate the landing lights with the clearance for take-off. I suspect if the Dash 8 had its landing lights on the accident would not have occurred. Would aviation be safer if the selection of landing lights ON was tied to identifying and lining up with the runway center-line? This would also draw the PM ‘s attention to centerline identification which has been an issue in a whole different set of aviation incidents and accidents.
Food for thought for the investigators. SOP’s are always evolving.

[Ozgrade3]

There is a point that no one has mentioned so far. The type of strobe lights used on the wingtips of all modern aircrat.

All modern aircraft use an LED type strobe that blinks like a strobe but seems to have a small fraction of the light output of the traditional old style strobe. Old style strobes operate like a camera flash and bathe the ground in an intence flash of light. When on final, with an aircraft on the runway in front of you, you can clearly see the ground close to the wingtip light up as the strobes flash. With these new LED strobes, there is little or no ground reflection so unless you are looking directly at the strobe, as in from forward quarter, you cant see the flash.

[Old Carthusian]

Originally Posted by BFSGrad

Inconceivable? What is “inconceivable” occurred not only in this accident but also in many other accidents and incidents. Recent examples: (1) KBOS near collision between JetBlue and Hop-a-Jet, (2) KHOU mid-air collision between Hawker and CJ, (3) KJFK near collision between AA 777 and DL 737. In all these examples, ATC instructions were correctly read back and then not complied with. Putting an aircraft “temporarily out of mind” based solely on a correct read back is a very dangerous mindset that has no place in ATC. The “C” in ATC has to mean more than just verifying read backs.

<br />This is how it works in Japan especially with officialdom and procedures. The procedure is laid down and is followed religiously (until it's not and someone shortcircuits it). Initiative and variation from the set procedure is not acceptable - as I said it is very rigid and it comes from a different cultural mindset. Anyone trying to understand this accident needs to understand this point first.

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by Old Carthusian

<br />This is how it works in Japan especially with officialdom and procedures. The procedure is laid down and is followed religiously (until it's not and someone shortcircuits it). Initiative and variation from the set procedure is not acceptable - as I said it is very rigid and it comes from a different cultural mindset. Anyone trying to understand this accident needs to understand this point first.

What? Actually initiative/variation from the set procedure is done all the time as long as it doesn't violate any SOP.

[Old Carthusian]

I'm afraid it's not encouraged in Japan. The procedures are there to be followed exactly even if meaningless. Deviation from them is punished, often severely.

[glekichi]

I gather you work in Japan also, but that couldn't be further from the truth. Except in checks. Day to day with the Japanese guys and that was not the case at all. Also suggested improvements to procedures were always looked at and in some cases implemented RAPIDLY.

[maxter]

Landing lights were on. You can see the CG plane line up on the runway, in the longer video posted here, with landing lights on

[missy]

Originally Posted by waito

I OCR converted into text, rearranged and marked bold the passages of the two accident aircraft. Please somebody crosschecked for OCR errors
The last line is MY comment, that's the impact time. It coincides with the CCTV timestamp, I hope that's accurate

17:43:02
(JAL516): Tokyo TOWER JAL516 spot18.
(Tokyo TOWER): JAL516 Tokyo TOWER good evening RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/7, we have departure

17:43:12
(JAL516): JAL516 continue approach 34R.

17:43:26
(DAL276): Tokyo TOWER DAL276 with you on C, proceeding to holding point 34R
(Tokyo TOWER): DAL276 Tokyo TOWER good evening. taxi to holding point C1.
(DAL276): Holding point C1, DAL276

17:44:56
(Tokyo Tower): JAL516 RUNWAY 34R cleared to land wind 310/8

17:45:01
(JAL516): Cleared to land RUNWAY 34R JAL516.

17:45:11
(JA722A): TOWER JA722A C.
(Tokyo Tower): JA722A Tokyo TOWER Good evening, No.1, taxi to holding point C5

17:45:19
(JA722A): Taxi to holding point C5 JA722A No.1, Thank you.

17:45:40
(JAL179): Tokyo TOWER JAL179 taxi to holding point C1.
(Tokyo Tower):JAL179 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.3, taxi to holding point C1
(JAL179): Taxi to holding point C1, we are ready JAL179.

17:45:56
(JAL166): Tokyo TOWER JAL166 spot 21.
(Tokyo Tower):JAL166 Tokyo TOWER good evening, No.2, RUNWAY 34R continue approach wind 320/8, we have departure, reduce speed to 160 knots.

17:46:06
(JAL166): Reduce 160 knots RUNWAY 34R continue approach, JAL166 good evening

17:47:23
(Tokyo Tower):JAL166, reduce minimum approach speed
(JAL166): JAL166

Thanks waito. I've bolded a couple of bits, for both arrivals Tokyo Tower says "we have departure".
When JAL516 called was Tokyo Tower thinking depart JA722A then land JAL516? Or was there then a change of plans to land JAL516 then depart JA772A then land JAL166?

[MartinM]

Originally Posted by maxter

Landing lights were on. You can see the CG plane line up on the runway, in the longer video posted here, with landing lights on

Not sure. Lights are locate left and right wing, pretty close to the turbines. I watch the video, there is no strobe that i can make out and likely only taxi light was on.

[Old Carthusian]

Originally Posted by glekichi

I gather you work in Japan also, but that couldn't be further from the truth. Except in checks. Day to day with the Japanese guys and that was not the case at all. Also suggested improvements to procedures were always looked at and in some cases implemented RAPIDLY.

I'm sure your experience is perfectly valid but it isn't the general rule. The Amagasaki Rail disaster is a perfect illustration of the point I was trying to make. If an example from Japanese aviation is required, the JAL bankruptcy and how it came about is also pertinent. JAL have changed but even with this accident the CAs felt the need to contact the pilots first for instruction. The point I am making is that we run the risk of judging a different culture by Western standards which CAN add value to that culture but not necessarily.

[waito]

Originally Posted by missy

Thanks waito. I've bolded a couple of bits, for both arrivals Tokyo Tower says "we have departure".
When JAL516 called was Tokyo Tower thinking depart JA722A then land JAL516? Or was there then a change of plans to land JAL516 then depart JA772A then land JAL166?

None of us knows, but I think yes. And somebody else here also thought in the same direction.

When we consider this 45-50 seconds waiting time of dash-8 (unconfirmed), a rolling takeoff would have worked before the A350. But the Tower Controller finally decided to have the A350 land first, because the Dash-8 didn't show up on frequency in time (I guess that's what could have changed the controllers mind)

[glekichi]

Originally Posted by Old Carthusian

even with this accident the CAs felt the need to contact the pilots first for instruction.

​​​Interestingly that was literally in the JAL recurrent training program last year. They are to attempt to make contact (for very good reasons) and then evacuate on their own if unable to make contact. The pilots are to answer, even mid checklist.
Why they didn't follow that procedure and evacuate immediately when unable to contact the flight crew and the situation clearly warranting it is a bit of a mystery but in the absence of any further info I'll say we'll done to them in some seriously challenging circumstances. The level of shock/surprise is unfathomable.

[monkey.tennis]

Originally Posted by EGPI10BR

The CC did a great job. All PAX and crew out before the aircraft was consumed by fire was exemplary. I am sad about the crew of the JCG -8.

Misty.
(Who has been into HND twice in the last year.)

strong disagree. 8 minutes to initiate and 18 minutes to complete an evacuation of a clearly burning aircraft is far from textbook. I’m sure lessons will be learned when the report is published.

[magyar_flyer]

Originally Posted by monkey.tennis

strong disagree. 8 minutes to initiate and 18 minutes to complete an evacuation of a clearly burning aircraft is a catastrophic failure.

If those are indeed the figures then indeed pretty poor. And if anything luck was the biggest factor for this not being a major catastrophe 🙄

[VHOED191006]

Originally Posted by monkey.tennis

strong disagree. 8 minutes to initiate and 18 minutes to complete an evacuation of a clearly burning aircraft is a catastrophic failure.

If these reports are accurate, this reminds me of QF1 in 1999. Can anyone remember if there were any recommendations with regards to an evacuation process and decision-making?

[andrasz]

Originally Posted by waito

It was me wiping some of the quote's content on purpose:

Thanks for the update, indeed a few things were clarified in the elapsed time. I do not agree with the Delta bit though, the list was not of contributory causes but holes in the cheese. Had DL been still abeam of the DH3 I'm sure the crew would have acted (and I would not be so sure if it were a Japanese crew).

[andrasz]

Originally Posted by glekichi

​​​Interestingly that was literally in the JAL recurrent training program last year. They are to attempt to make contact (for very good reasons) and then evacuate on their own if unable to make contact. The pilots are to answer, even mid checklist. Why they didn't follow that procedure and evacuate immediately when unable to contact the flight crew and the situation clearly warranting it is a bit of a mystery but in the absence of any further info I'll say we'll done to them in some seriously challenging circumstances. The level of shock/surprise is unfathomable.

Eerily reminiscent of the SQ 777 with the wing on fire in SIN. In all Asian cultures there is such a strong sense of deference to authority, that it is very hard for any individual to take personal initiative. This attitude has its ups and downs, as was demonstrated in this very case, with the initial (and potentially fatal) hesitation followed by an amazingly orderly evacuation.

[framer]

If these reports are accurate, this reminds me of QF1 in 1999. Can anyone remember if there were any recommendations with regards to an evacuation process and decision-making?

The thing that stands out to me is that there was no loss of life on the two aircraft mentioned above, could that be because in neither case did crew go off half-cocked blowing doors into dangerous environments? For example, if the JAL crew had blown 8 doors within 30 seconds of coming to a halt, would everyone have survived? Pretty hard to Monday morning quarterback these events.