JAL incident at Haneda Airport
I just don't get, why is engine #2 (starboard, left in your picture) so badly damaged from the small wingtip. Missing Fan and even a "wing cut" on the outboard inlet? Why is engine #1 less damaged with almost no "wing cut" on outboard inlet when it had to take midspan wing section??
If you simply reverse the position of the DHC8 so that it's offset the other way, it all becomes clearer.
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From SLF, the Dash-8 was travelling to Niigata which from a Google search closes at 8.30pm local if correct, again Google search shows flight time between Haneda and Niigata as 2hr 30mins but doesn’t give type of aircraft. With accidents time of 17.47 did airport closing also play its part in putting more pressure on Dash-8 Captain and then with ATC also trying to accommodate early departure, hence depart from C5?
ref - https://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/...ac_20-165b.pdf para 3.8.4.3
I'm inclined to doubt the ADS-B position is accurate enough to determine which bits of these two aircraft came into contact first. The video evidence likely takes precedence.
In any case, the flight time would have been ~30 minutes for a DH3 (275km)
In fact, after the impact the wreck came to stop with offset to the right. I cant think of a reason what could shifted the wreck evenly to the right during or after the start of impact
The coastguard Dash 8 was told to hold at the stop bar "C5" and confirmed that command. The stop bar lighting for all the stops on taxiway "C" were NOT WORKING. There was a notice to pilots issued. Perhaps the coastguard pilot had not read that notice and seeing that the stop lights were "off" interpreted that to be that he was cleared to proceed to the runway. He should also have waited for a verbal clearance but perhaps in his haste to deliver the needed supplies to the earthquake area he just assumed he had missed hearing the verbal clearance. I wonder whether he had also been flying numerous hours because of the earthquake and was also tired.
https://nagodede.github.io/aip/japan.../RJTT_full.pdf
Stop Bar Lights Operations 1) Stop Bar Lights are installed at each RWY holding position associated with RWY16L/34R 2) Stop Bar Lights will be operated when the visibility or the lowest RVR of the RWY16L/34R is at or less than 600m. 3) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C1, C2, C13 and C14 are controlled individually by ATC 4) Stop Bar Lights on TWY C3 THRU C12 are not controlled individually by ATC. 5) During the period Stop Bar Lights operated, TWY C3 THRU C12 are not available for departure aircraft.
[...]
Civil Aviation Bureau, Japan (EFF:3 NOV 2022) 6/10/22
[...]
Civil Aviation Bureau, Japan (EFF:3 NOV 2022) 6/10/22
This was my initial thought too based on the engine damage, however if you look at the NHK video frame by frame, clearly the 350 fuselage passes behind (i.e. to the right) of the DH3. The explosion starts when the left engine of the 350 hits the DH3. The right engine damage may have been caused by ingesting heavier debris (engine parts, mlg, etc) that were dragged under the 350 after the initial collision.
I try a sequence of events list.
It's sped up most of the Dash-8 taxi so it's impossible to determine timestamps relative to the known timestamp of the collision.
Edit: the above link to the TV station now shows a slightly different video without the long taxi portion of the Dash-8
Last edited by waito; 5th Jan 2024 at 07:59. Reason: see comment
In all fairness, I think it needs little update. We know that JA722A entered the runway without permission, with the mental image that they were No 1. for takeoff and cleared. Psychologists and HF experts will have a field day theorizing on why, but probably we'll never know. A number of holes in the cheese prevented them from realizing their mistake, while other holes in the cheese prevented others from spotting this. We still don't have a full picture of why the SMR alert failed, but one post some way back suggested that JA722A, being essentially a military aircraft, did not have the compatible transponders, another hole in the cheese.
As for the position of the wreckage, my only explanation is that the 350 touched down further right of the centerline for it to pass to the right of the DH3, I agree nothing in the collision sequence would have shifted the -8 fuselage substantially to the right. In any case this has no relation to the causes, I'm sure the investigation report will have a detailed picture based on wreckage and ground tracks.
As for the position of the wreckage, my only explanation is that the 350 touched down further right of the centerline for it to pass to the right of the DH3, I agree nothing in the collision sequence would have shifted the -8 fuselage substantially to the right. In any case this has no relation to the causes, I'm sure the investigation report will have a detailed picture based on wreckage and ground tracks.
Jal incident at Haneda Airport
Since the Coast Guard facility is close to Runway 04 and the surface wind was 320 at around 8kts, I wonder why the CG crew weren't offered 04. Perhaps they were but refused for various reasons. In the UK, a 'humanitarian' flight is classed as Priority Bravo and filed as such, but ICAO's equivalent to B only covers search and rescue flights. As a result, the poor guys are said to have taxied for 50 minutes with zero priority, despite being a disaster relief operation. Surely a 04 departure could have been co-ordinated with minimal effort?
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A basic SMR based RIMCAS system would not require any transponders at all as it works from the primary returns.
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Since the Coast Guard facility is close to Runway 04 and the surface wind was 320 at around 8kts, I wonder why the CG crew weren't offered 04. Perhaps they were but refused for various reasons. In the UK, a 'humanitarian' flight is classed as Priority Bravo and filed as such, but ICAO's equivalent to B only covers search and rescue flights. As a result, the poor guys are said to have taxied for 50 minutes with zero priority, despite being a disaster relief operation. Surely a 04 departure could have been co-ordinated with minimal effort?
Last edited by DarkPenguin; 4th Jan 2024 at 20:46.
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Exactly. SMR uses different radar frequencies and detects primary targets. Transponders are only needed for additional information (e.g. flight number). However, the Coast Guard A/C operating from busy commercial airports surely had a Mode S transponder. That’s all that is needed for full RIMCAS functionality. SMR does not need ADS-B.
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Exactly. SMR uses different radar frequencies and detects primary targets. Transponders are only needed for additional information (e.g. flight number). However, the Coast Guard A/C operating from busy commercial airports surely had a Mode S transponder. That’s all that is needed for full RIMCAS functionality. SMR does not need ADS-B.
CG Crew Duty Time We do not yet how much the crew was on duty over the last few days.
+Confirmation Bias The CG crew may have been accustomed to being cleared direct to the runway. Fatigue from duty time may have dropped their guard, but there's no call that they are ready 34R which may have saved their day.
HUD Possibly the donut contributed to obscuring the DH3.
Conspicuity in the runway environment Neither the tower or the approaching crew noticed the DH3 in time. This is not the first such accident and there have been a number of recent close calls. Aircraft on the runway must be plainly visible to approaching aircraft - do I really have to say this.
Nor does it help for ATC to position aircraft on or near TDZ lighting. This practice needs to be stopped yesterday.
Collision Dynamics FR has done an excellent job with his diagrams. The nose cone shows a dent all the way across indicating contact with the stabiliser. Did it stay put and slew the DH3 or snap off, or something in between? I suspect the #2 prop severed lines and possibly got stuck under the A350 fuse. A burning object was dragged underneath for a considerable distance, which could have included #1 and fuel tankage.
Limited Passenger Injuries from near vertical rear slide It's fortunate that these pax landed on soft ground only a few feet above water. Onto concrete the injuries could have been much worse.
L2 & L3 Exits and ARFF Support Had ARFF foamed the area around #1 these two exits could have been viable.
Putting out uncontrollable engines Foaming can shut down an engine and reduce the danger to personnel as well as prevent fire spread. It's possible that they ran out of foam.
+Confirmation Bias The CG crew may have been accustomed to being cleared direct to the runway. Fatigue from duty time may have dropped their guard, but there's no call that they are ready 34R which may have saved their day.
HUD Possibly the donut contributed to obscuring the DH3.
Conspicuity in the runway environment Neither the tower or the approaching crew noticed the DH3 in time. This is not the first such accident and there have been a number of recent close calls. Aircraft on the runway must be plainly visible to approaching aircraft - do I really have to say this.
Nor does it help for ATC to position aircraft on or near TDZ lighting. This practice needs to be stopped yesterday.
Collision Dynamics FR has done an excellent job with his diagrams. The nose cone shows a dent all the way across indicating contact with the stabiliser. Did it stay put and slew the DH3 or snap off, or something in between? I suspect the #2 prop severed lines and possibly got stuck under the A350 fuse. A burning object was dragged underneath for a considerable distance, which could have included #1 and fuel tankage.
Limited Passenger Injuries from near vertical rear slide It's fortunate that these pax landed on soft ground only a few feet above water. Onto concrete the injuries could have been much worse.
L2 & L3 Exits and ARFF Support Had ARFF foamed the area around #1 these two exits could have been viable.
Putting out uncontrollable engines Foaming can shut down an engine and reduce the danger to personnel as well as prevent fire spread. It's possible that they ran out of foam.
et voila
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240105_04/
WRT A350:
Check Touchdown point
Notice it's still at pitch when impacting
What do you think happened with the Spoilers and T/R? activated and retracted again? never activated?
https://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20240105_04/
WRT A350:
Check Touchdown point
Notice it's still at pitch when impacting
What do you think happened with the Spoilers and T/R? activated and retracted again? never activated?
The T/Rs are a translating aft cowling system , and they are shown to be stowed post event. They would not move without command and without hydraulic pressure. The spoiler position in overhead images post event suggest they were raised or at least not stowed. Spoilers will normally close on the failure of hydraulic pressure, but they have a lot of stiction in the system and can be found in any position from commanded to faired, depending on the system integrity and pressure bleed in the extend lines of the actuators. The spoilers being raised would support the main gear being in ground contact at impact, but otherwise would not be material to the event causation or survivability.
Japan used to have a fairly common spoofing problem on VHF radio transmissions, it was notable at Narita for some good reasons, and IIRC it also occurred down south in Fukuoka. The CVR recording of the JCG aircraft may bring out some surprises, but it is an extremely unlikely situation, but it is not zero probability. If the JCG received a spoofed clearance, that should have still been responded to with a read back and that would have been recorded by the ATC system.
SLF/atty with a few observations about the evacuation of passengers and crew from the A350. Or questions (for reason to be given). This post is in reaction, perhaps in response, to this afternoon's WSJ article (which keys on the 90-sec. standard and compares it to this event).
If we count up each time everyone who has posted on this thread has read the standard safety briefing card (or know it verbatim without reading) we would get into hundreds of thousands or millions of times that "look out the window to see if it is safe to exit in that area" has been seen, if not appreciated. But under conditions, not of an ongoing in-flight emergency and then landing, but an essentially instantaneous runway collision, so that getting mobilized to determine which doors could be opened would seem to be a large challenge. First the shock of the sudden emergency has to be set aside, and then the search for "what has happened" relative to safe areas or not-safe areas.
Plus, the intercom was not working; iirc some cabin lighting also inop. I'm not scoring, or praising, the JAL crew. An earlier post by fdr expressed the sense of wanting to see safety lessons learned, and then applied -hear, hear.
Is such a very sudden traumatic situation drilled in cabin crew training? I wonder what the very estimable Sara Nelson, the labor organization leader, would say about the content and the effectiveness of current cabin crew training programs not for emergency landings when the steps taken because of the emergent problem already are being commanded by the authorized crew, but where all of a sudden, ka-boom. If it's covered fine already, great. Of course, in the States and Canada we now and again hear of less than perfectly behaved passengers . . . . .
And the FAA reauthorization bill winding its way through Congress has a provision dealing with taking needs and characteristics of different segments of the population more fully into account in certifying evacuation compliance, pressed by Sen. Duckworth (D., IL). If there ever was a case where events provide clarity on pending legislation, this is it.
If we count up each time everyone who has posted on this thread has read the standard safety briefing card (or know it verbatim without reading) we would get into hundreds of thousands or millions of times that "look out the window to see if it is safe to exit in that area" has been seen, if not appreciated. But under conditions, not of an ongoing in-flight emergency and then landing, but an essentially instantaneous runway collision, so that getting mobilized to determine which doors could be opened would seem to be a large challenge. First the shock of the sudden emergency has to be set aside, and then the search for "what has happened" relative to safe areas or not-safe areas.
Plus, the intercom was not working; iirc some cabin lighting also inop. I'm not scoring, or praising, the JAL crew. An earlier post by fdr expressed the sense of wanting to see safety lessons learned, and then applied -hear, hear.
Is such a very sudden traumatic situation drilled in cabin crew training? I wonder what the very estimable Sara Nelson, the labor organization leader, would say about the content and the effectiveness of current cabin crew training programs not for emergency landings when the steps taken because of the emergent problem already are being commanded by the authorized crew, but where all of a sudden, ka-boom. If it's covered fine already, great. Of course, in the States and Canada we now and again hear of less than perfectly behaved passengers . . . . .
And the FAA reauthorization bill winding its way through Congress has a provision dealing with taking needs and characteristics of different segments of the population more fully into account in certifying evacuation compliance, pressed by Sen. Duckworth (D., IL). If there ever was a case where events provide clarity on pending legislation, this is it.
Aircraft on the runway must be plainly visible to approaching aircraft - do I really have to say this.
Nor does it help for ATC to position aircraft on or near TDZ lighting. This practice needs to be stopped yesterday.
"WSJ is reporting "Haneda Airport in 2009 implemented a system that tracks planes on the ground to make sure they are keeping proper distance from one another, but the coast guard plane wasn’t equipped with a transponder to be monitored by the system."
Can we find out, how reputable their source is for this detail?
And it does not rule out another alert system could cope with this Dash-8. We can't even rule out an actual Alert went off but got lost for whatever freaking reason.