JAL incident at Haneda Airport
The departure sequence is likely to have two significant factors. 722 is likely to be a Category A flight, that is in effect blues and twos and has highest priority status meaning other traffic will be delayed/held/rerouted to allow the CatA flight to operate.
JAL incident at Haneda Airport
The other aircraft here are Heavy wake vortex aircraft. Therefore the DH8 (Small) would receive extra delay if departing behind the heavies due wake departure separation requirements. The controller knows the DH8 performance will allow an intersection departure from C5, this means the DH8 can get to the head of the queue minimising delay to both DH8 and any taxiway conflicts. This can be seen in the transcript where the controller informs the outbound aircraft which number in departures sequence they are. DH8 is cleared to C5 to allow to fit in most expeditious flow in the arrival and departure sequence.
Whilst having the above plan in mind there would probably be simultaneous internal twr/rad controller co-ordination to give an amended departure clearance to the DH8, either before or after takeoff, to clear it from arriving traffic and following departures.
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Évacuation speed
As a bog standard passenger, I had no hesitation in praising, elsewhere, the superb performance of the flight crew, especially cabin staff, in this case.
That sentiment remains true, despite what follows.
In the immediate aftermath, I watched Sky News where at least one commentator, echoing my positive sentiments quoted a concept to the effect that current safety standards specify that aircraft must be capable of being evacuated even with 50% of doors/ slides out of action in XXX seconds [I think I recall the figure quoted but I choose not to append it; though in one obvious respect my dummy specification above may be at fault.]
Though he certainly did not say so, the conclusion seemed to be that the crew here had met the target.
Latest reports appear to quote a consensus figure of 18 minutes (we can all multiply by 60) for this evacuation.
Consensus also seems to be that it would be impossible to find a more favourable passenger profile for a real-life evacuation than the one on this flight
Time to get real on the figures which I haven't quoted ?
Edited for spelling
That sentiment remains true, despite what follows.
In the immediate aftermath, I watched Sky News where at least one commentator, echoing my positive sentiments quoted a concept to the effect that current safety standards specify that aircraft must be capable of being evacuated even with 50% of doors/ slides out of action in XXX seconds [I think I recall the figure quoted but I choose not to append it; though in one obvious respect my dummy specification above may be at fault.]
Though he certainly did not say so, the conclusion seemed to be that the crew here had met the target.
Latest reports appear to quote a consensus figure of 18 minutes (we can all multiply by 60) for this evacuation.
Consensus also seems to be that it would be impossible to find a more favourable passenger profile for a real-life evacuation than the one on this flight
Time to get real on the figures which I haven't quoted ?
Edited for spelling
Re brilliance, there’s nothing to stop crews requesting changes in lighting settings. However the ability to meet that request will depend on traffic levels and if any mandated settings are required for the prevailing conditions. Changing settings from standard however has a risk in that a non standard setting might be overlooked and lighting not returned to its normal setting.
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The prevailing FAA regulation for evacuation is:
The appendix (not pasted here, it's longer) does not seen to mention disabling a certain number of exits, but I have heard of this being done....
SECTION: Sec. 25.803
Amendment Number: 25-72, Effective Date: 08/20/1990
TITLE: Emergency evacuation.
SECTION RULE: [(a) Each crew and passenger area must have emergency means to allow rapid evacuation in crash landings, with the landing gear extended as well as with the landing gear retracted, considering the possibility of the airplane being on fire.
(b) [Reserved.]
(c) For airplanes having a seating capacity of more than 44 passengers, it must be shown that the maximum seating capacity, including the number of crewmembers required by the operating rules for which certification is requested, can be evacuated from the airplane to the ground under simulated emergency conditions within 90 seconds. Compliance with this requirement must be shown by actual demonstration using the test criteria outlined in Appendix J of this part unless the Administrator finds that a combination of analysis and testing will provide data equivalent to that which would be obtained by actual demonstration.
(d) [Reserved.]
(e) [Reserved.]]
Amendment Number: 25-72, Effective Date: 08/20/1990
TITLE: Emergency evacuation.
SECTION RULE: [(a) Each crew and passenger area must have emergency means to allow rapid evacuation in crash landings, with the landing gear extended as well as with the landing gear retracted, considering the possibility of the airplane being on fire.
(b) [Reserved.]
(c) For airplanes having a seating capacity of more than 44 passengers, it must be shown that the maximum seating capacity, including the number of crewmembers required by the operating rules for which certification is requested, can be evacuated from the airplane to the ground under simulated emergency conditions within 90 seconds. Compliance with this requirement must be shown by actual demonstration using the test criteria outlined in Appendix J of this part unless the Administrator finds that a combination of analysis and testing will provide data equivalent to that which would be obtained by actual demonstration.
(d) [Reserved.]
(e) [Reserved.]]
Too mean to buy a long personal title
Conspicuity in the runway environment Neither the tower or the approaching crew noticed the DH3 in time. This is not the first such accident and there have been a number of recent close calls. Aircraft on the runway must be plainly visible to approaching aircraft - do I really have to say this.
The AAIB report said (at p.27): "... the use of strobe lights would have improved the conspicuity of the ... aircraft on the runway. Some UK companies have operating procedures requiring their crews to activate strobe lights whenever their aircraft are on an active runway. However, at present there is no national regulation requiring this. The use of strobe lights on the ground could be disturbing to other crews awaiting take off particularly at night. Nevertheless, the use of strobe lights would increase the conspicuity of aircraft on an active runway. It would therefore be appropriate for the CAA to standardise procedures and require all UK aircraft to use strobe lights, when fitted, when on an active runway in [the] UK."
The recommendation (at p.37) was that "The [CAA] should issue instructions requiring United Kingdom Registered aircraft to use strobe lights, if fitted, when on an active runway in the UK."
Was this adopted, and is it SOP for UK airlines? Is it widespread elsewhere? And in the light of this accident, should it be?How long did it take to drown the uncontrollable engine on VH-OQA at SIN? ISTR that it wasn't finally shut down until about three hours after the aircraft landed, but a lot of other things had been tried in the interim.
Last edited by Globaliser; 4th Jan 2024 at 21:45.
I sense there will be a rather lengthy section on the evacuation in the report, with a number of recommendations. It was very fortunate (my primary praise would go to Airbus, rather than the crew) that the cabin maintained its integrity for as long as it did, otherwise we would have a very grim picture. Behind the carefully and politely worded statements there is a rather clear picture that the cabin crew were waiting for orders rather than taking the initiative when communication with the pointy end failed. In my book if the aircraft is stopped, there are visible flames outside, and electric supply is cut (no comms), you start to evacuate on all usable exits, no ifs or buts. In this case, there was a 8 minute delay in initiating evacuation in the front, and we don't know when was it started in the back. It was sheer damn luck that nobody got killed. Of course once evacuation did start, the Japanese culture kicked in in reverse effect, with passengers following instructions and making an orderly exit.
When I was doing my PPL, a controller was telling me how a pilot in a Cherokee and a pilot in a C172 couldn’t see each other if the low winged aircraft was above and behind the high winged one.
The aircraft was on its third mission within 24 hours, possibly with the same crew. Flight and duty time limits for aircraft involved in rescue operations wouldn’t be as stringent as they are for public transport. Fatigue may very well be a major factor.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia...ission-4025071
The aircraft was on its third mission within 24 hours, possibly with the same crew. Flight and duty time limits for aircraft involved in rescue operations wouldn’t be as stringent as they are for public transport. Fatigue may very well be a major factor.
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia...ission-4025071
Beside the accident causes, the dismal time wasted until the evacuation started and the long time it took the first fire responders to arrive on scene need to be addressed.
They where lucky that the A350 airframe withstood two burning engines, sloshing fuel from its own tanks and two fuel filled Dash-8 wings hauled along half the runway with its main gear.
According to current information it took 6 minutes until the first evac started and the captain left 18 minutes after the crash as last person the A350.
There was clear light from burning fuel and burning engines on both sides on the landing run, so everyone inside the cabin should have known that an immediate evac was in oder as soon as the aircraft came to its final stop. You got smoke in the cabin, from the engine feed air system, so there was not doubt, that they where in serious trouble. Intercoms to the filght deck was inop. The situational awareness of the cockpit crew was in this case lower as from the cabin crew and each passenger. To look out of the windows and determine which slides and doors are safe might take 30 seconds, but should never need 6 minutes.
First fire crew should be at the scene in less then three minutes. It took them al lot longer.
So there are a lot of questions and there need to be changes. Even so they had ruly passengers, it was sheer luck that the airframe withstood 18 minutes the fire for all to escape.
andrasz was faster...
They where lucky that the A350 airframe withstood two burning engines, sloshing fuel from its own tanks and two fuel filled Dash-8 wings hauled along half the runway with its main gear.
According to current information it took 6 minutes until the first evac started and the captain left 18 minutes after the crash as last person the A350.
There was clear light from burning fuel and burning engines on both sides on the landing run, so everyone inside the cabin should have known that an immediate evac was in oder as soon as the aircraft came to its final stop. You got smoke in the cabin, from the engine feed air system, so there was not doubt, that they where in serious trouble. Intercoms to the filght deck was inop. The situational awareness of the cockpit crew was in this case lower as from the cabin crew and each passenger. To look out of the windows and determine which slides and doors are safe might take 30 seconds, but should never need 6 minutes.
First fire crew should be at the scene in less then three minutes. It took them al lot longer.
So there are a lot of questions and there need to be changes. Even so they had ruly passengers, it was sheer luck that the airframe withstood 18 minutes the fire for all to escape.
andrasz was faster...
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See Post 576 JAL incident at Haneda Airport
"WSJ is reporting "Haneda Airport in 2009 implemented a system that tracks planes on the ground to make sure they are keeping proper distance from one another, but the coast guard plane wasn’t equipped with a transponder to be monitored by the system."
"WSJ is reporting "Haneda Airport in 2009 implemented a system that tracks planes on the ground to make sure they are keeping proper distance from one another, but the coast guard plane wasn’t equipped with a transponder to be monitored by the system."
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It's very obvious this was such an event due to equipment malfunction not allowing communication with the crew. It's also obvious that after the initial explosion and subsequent fire (likely fuel from Dash 8) the subsequent fire abated as the aircraft came to rest. From listening to many passenger reports it's obvious that the crew largely succeeded in keeping the passengers calm in the initial stages and by not lauching into a full evacuation likely had more control over the subsequent evacuation (shown by very few passengers taking bags, well done CC). History has shown that it's unlikely to ever require an immediate evacuation without assessing the situation even if that does take a few minutes. Yes some procedures and learnings will come from this, but overall, i'd commend the CC on the current information I have seen. Also some alluding to the crew gradient in Japan playing a part, that is purely a racist observation, I am happy for my CC to take time to gather the Information before popping slides in panic, into fire, running engines etc.
Aircraft are certified to evacuate in 90secs it never means upon coming to rest it must be completed in 90secs. If 379 passenger evacuated safely in 8mins or 18mins then great effort. Too many people here that add no value to the discussion, that will never experience an emergency of this magnitude, while writing from the comfort of their sofa, getting their neck massaged, sipping wine.
Narita has had MLat since 2015, and Haneda was due to follow soon after. That should have allowed anything with a Mode S transponder to be tracked.
When I first read about the 18 minute evacuation time, I reread Wikipedia about the Brtitish Airtours at Manchester in 1985
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_M...rport_disaster
In the middle was this:
A 14-year-old boy was found lying across the top of the man from seat 16C by firefighters 5 1⁄2 minutes after the aircraft had stopped. He was alive, suffering only superficial burns to his hands. He was the last of 27 survivors to escape through that exit, and the last evacuee to survive the accident.
Clearly the fire resistance of materials in aircraft interiors has improved since then, but I don't think that should lead anyone towards satisfaction or complacency about longer times
I've been in a queue exiting a 1000 seat theatre, and thought myself how much faster would this be in an emergency ...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_M...rport_disaster
In the middle was this:
A 14-year-old boy was found lying across the top of the man from seat 16C by firefighters 5 1⁄2 minutes after the aircraft had stopped. He was alive, suffering only superficial burns to his hands. He was the last of 27 survivors to escape through that exit, and the last evacuee to survive the accident.
Clearly the fire resistance of materials in aircraft interiors has improved since then, but I don't think that should lead anyone towards satisfaction or complacency about longer times
I've been in a queue exiting a 1000 seat theatre, and thought myself how much faster would this be in an emergency ...
According to this ICAO document: https://www.icao.int/APAC/Documents/...asid/cns4a.pdf (page 14) they have SMR.
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This is an awful heuristic that confuses luck for skill. Investigators will certainly examine what happened in those eight to 18 minutes and see if protocol broke down. The timeline raises questions no matter your perspective.
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So I now believe we agree that scenario A is the most likely one.
- The A350 was probably 1.5 to 2 meters RIGHT of centerline based on last position data.
- The DHC-8 was probably 2 to 3 meters LEFT of centerline based on the wreckage position.
I split the event in 2 (A1 and A2).
A1: At approximately the moment of main gear touchdown the A350's RADOME hit the right side of DHC-8's TAIL (HORIZONTAL STABILIZER).
A2: About 0.4 seconds later the A350's nose hits the ground and the A350's ENGINE NACELLES hit the WING of the DHC-8.
- The A350 was probably 1.5 to 2 meters RIGHT of centerline based on last position data.
- The DHC-8 was probably 2 to 3 meters LEFT of centerline based on the wreckage position.
I split the event in 2 (A1 and A2).
A1: At approximately the moment of main gear touchdown the A350's RADOME hit the right side of DHC-8's TAIL (HORIZONTAL STABILIZER).
A2: About 0.4 seconds later the A350's nose hits the ground and the A350's ENGINE NACELLES hit the WING of the DHC-8.
That's a lot of angular momentum to overcome, especially when any impact force -- whether tending toward horizontal deceleration or upward reaction -- would tend toward forcing the A350 more (not less) nose-up.
Furthermore, if we assume a vertical drop of just 2m (from level pitch to nose on ground) in 0.4s, the implication is that the flight deck would have experienced a peak acceleration of at least 2.5Gs (and probably more). I don't see any force present that would virtually instantly derotate the A350 and angle it nose-down with that ferocity, especially not given the smaller mass of the DH3.
Fwiw, the A350 can well continue in a nose-up attitude, with the nacelles striking the DH3 wing in a manner consistent with photos, and collapse onto the ground post-impact with only the effect of gravity (1G) acting on the CG.
On the time taken to evacuate, I have a feeling at least part of it may be a result of the still-running engine. The crew was likely aware of this and attempted shutdown procedures multiple times.
I am also of the belief that the crew had no idea what had happened, possibly thinking they had just had a nosewheel collapse on landing. If you put those two issues together I could see the crew being in a state of confusion. A nose wheel collapse wouldn't lead to an inability to shut down an engine.
I am also of the belief that the crew had no idea what had happened, possibly thinking they had just had a nosewheel collapse on landing. If you put those two issues together I could see the crew being in a state of confusion. A nose wheel collapse wouldn't lead to an inability to shut down an engine.
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