JAL incident at Haneda Airport
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The damage to the front section was severe. There was not a lot left below the floor of the flightdeck.
Also the DHC-8 was dragged along the RW quite a bit.
There is video evidence much further up thread (I think around post #130) taken from an aircraft taxiing past C5, showing that the A350 main gear was firmly on the ground at the moment of impact. There is absolutely no question of it being Flying Roland's scenarios B or C.
However, this must be said, upon landing, even in a F16 or F18, you see if something is moving on the runway, while landing given that the lightning is on. For me the DH3 from behind was not illuminated properly until the very last moment where the landing light of the A350 would light the obstacle up. But thats probably at a speed of 160 knots about 1 or 2 secs away from collision. In short, it leaves the A350 crew exactly to say "s...t" and thats it
The TDZ lighting extends well past C5/C6, there is an airport lighting diagram much further up thread showing its extent (the 500ft touchdown aiming point is only just before C5) so there's no way the Dash 8 was beyond the TDZ lighting. Its wings would probably not have obscured many of the lights until a very late stage. Being among the TDZ lights made it even harder to see, in my opinion.
There is video evidence much further up thread (I think around post #130) taken from an aircraft taxiing past C5, showing that the A350 main gear was firmly on the ground at the moment of impact. There is absolutely no question of it being Flying Roland's scenarios B or C.
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Lots of talks here, but this should be an easy case in terms of establishing the facts: both captains are alive, CVR/CDR recovered, ATC recording is available, and maybe many eyewitnesses. It will be really fast, I have no doubts.
The important question is regarding the (human) factors that arranged the pieces of the domino in a way that led to this accident.
And my bet is on the coastguard's aircraft crew and, partly, on the ATC. Somehow the crew of the DH8C was convinced that they were allowed to enter the runway.
I don't think - as it was speculated - that they thought they were cleared for take-off, otherwise, they would not have just sat there for almost 1', they simply took off.
But they entered the runway and patiently - I suppose - expected the take-off clearance.
They had no motive to scan the approach path once they entered the runway, or they did - just as a routine check -, but the result was irrelevant since 1) they "knew" they were allowed to enter the runway, 2) the first a/c in the landing sequence was miles out, so less visible, and 3) the DH8C crew missed the landing clearance issued to JAL516 on 34R because they were on another TWR frequency, or switched late to the same TWR frequency as JAL516 - doesn't matter, they just missed that one.
Add to this a routine, built up in time, maybe the past hours/days of intense operations? It will be key to learn the previous actions of the coastguard's crew at Haneda, to understand their actions. There is where the Devil hides.
The important question is regarding the (human) factors that arranged the pieces of the domino in a way that led to this accident.
And my bet is on the coastguard's aircraft crew and, partly, on the ATC. Somehow the crew of the DH8C was convinced that they were allowed to enter the runway.
I don't think - as it was speculated - that they thought they were cleared for take-off, otherwise, they would not have just sat there for almost 1', they simply took off.
But they entered the runway and patiently - I suppose - expected the take-off clearance.
They had no motive to scan the approach path once they entered the runway, or they did - just as a routine check -, but the result was irrelevant since 1) they "knew" they were allowed to enter the runway, 2) the first a/c in the landing sequence was miles out, so less visible, and 3) the DH8C crew missed the landing clearance issued to JAL516 on 34R because they were on another TWR frequency, or switched late to the same TWR frequency as JAL516 - doesn't matter, they just missed that one.
Add to this a routine, built up in time, maybe the past hours/days of intense operations? It will be key to learn the previous actions of the coastguard's crew at Haneda, to understand their actions. There is where the Devil hides.
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Another question that needs to be asked is why this fire wasn’t extinguished before taking hold? From what I’ve seen it looked like a very slow response from the fire service who perhaps were struggling to manage two sites at once.
You’re right that with a successful outcome it is hard to be too critical but I’m sure this will be a major topic in the investigation. I can tell you one thing for sure though, there’s no way the CC I work with would wait for 8 minutes to initiate an evacuation in this scenario.
Also, the aircraft is certified to be evacuated using 50% of the slides in 90 seconds. They had 38% of the slides open and it took 10 minutes. Nothing about this evacuation suggests it was well executed to me.
You’re right that with a successful outcome it is hard to be too critical but I’m sure this will be a major topic in the investigation. I can tell you one thing for sure though, there’s no way the CC I work with would wait for 8 minutes to initiate an evacuation in this scenario.
Also, the aircraft is certified to be evacuated using 50% of the slides in 90 seconds. They had 38% of the slides open and it took 10 minutes. Nothing about this evacuation suggests it was well executed to me.
As I mentioned earlier, we need to wait for all these aspects to be clarified by the investigation. I personally have not seen any officially released synopsis and time frames for the event so far.
I think the cabin crew did an amazing job given the facts we know. They would have had to evaluate the inside and outside conditions and decide now where its safer to be: inside or outside. Rushing to evacuate from an the aircraft which is still in one piece is not always the best decision. It takes a bit to understand what is happening and initiate evacuation........ and now which doors are safe to operate. Again, this was an unplanned emergency, at night.
I personally have only praise for the cabin crew. They controlled the crowed, opened only doors which were safe to operate, got everyone out in one piece, no serious injuries reported, had only 3 slides available (none of them was in ideal condition/angle wise).......job extremely well done!
There is video evidence much further up thread (I think around post #130) taken from an aircraft taxiing past C5, showing that the A350 main gear was firmly on the ground at the moment of impact. There is absolutely no question of it being Flying Roland's scenarios B or C.
From the post accident aereals and Google Earth: The DH3 remains lie just between C5 and C6. TDZ is running until almost C7, so the Dash was sitting well inside the TDZ strip of lights.
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But indeed the Dash 8 wreckage is not on the centre line, but a couple of meters to the left.
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For sure the (aluminum) front section of the A350 is extremely sturdy,
Last edited by EDML; 4th Jan 2024 at 13:17.
Dash 8 - fatigue and or fixation?
Reading the holes in the Swiss cheese, I started to wonder if the Dash 8 captain might have talked himself on to the runway. He had a mental picture of the airport traffic movements, which were all departures from his runway, perhaps he was misled by auto-suggestion that the clearance to hold was to hold on the runway, as his mental image of the procedure was he was next in line on a departure only runway. If he wasn't operating at 100% for any reason I can envisage such a scenario ahead of many others being suggested here.
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Inlet cowl sliced
Juan analyzes the cowl damage in his video, showing slice damage consistent with the wing of the Dash8 at both A350 inlet cowlings. At impact the A350 was rolling after touch down.
Last edited by spornrad; 4th Jan 2024 at 11:01.
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Last edited by JG1; 4th Jan 2024 at 10:26.
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Could be that when the 350 nose just under the radome collided with the tail of the Dash, it forced the tail of the Dash down, and the nose up, and the 350 radome collided with the rising forward fuselage of the Dash. Which might be why the cockpit of the Dash was not as badly damaged as the rest of it - it was knocked off and clear.