NTSB to probe Fedex/Southwest close encounter at Austin
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If you think of it, from what has been reasonably established to be factual, there was no _controlling_ taking place at all
”Hold, Cat III traffic on short final” and there’s no problem, apart from a <3 minute (?) delay to SW.
But that’s ‘controlling’, as opposed to saying ‘Yes’.
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Totally agree , also with FlightDetent, "viewpoint" this pressure to expedite shortcutting rules is not what normal ATC should be. Even with adding an "expedite" to the clearance , which would work in normal vis conditions, the mere fact of allowing a line up would penetrate the ILS proection zone for an arriving CAT III.
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I posted a question about a week or so ago, and that was whether "an expedited departure " is even a consideration in the very low vis conditions that were reported. There weren't many direct replies although there were some who agreed that it would be unusual to attempt a rolling takeoff in those conditions. In other words, should a more aware controller and a more situationally aware SW crew both understood that an expedited takeoff in those conditions was unlikely to occur?
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Definitively not in LVP (i.e. with low vis procedures in place) But not exatly sure of the US/FAA tolerances. I howeververy much doubt that their book allows that. but not my area..
In Europe, in normal vsisbility conditions an "expedite" can be asked whith one on finals at 3 , even 2,5NM .it is done in airports with single runway ops and high capacity ( e,g Gatwick, Geneva, etc..) It is also normal for a crew to reply "unable" if they are not ready , the clearance " is almsot always preceeded by a question like " ready for an immediate departure ? etc..
Definitively not in LVP (i.e. with low vis procedures in place) But not exatly sure of the US/FAA tolerances. I howeververy much doubt that their book allows that. but not my area..
Definitively not in LVP (i.e. with low vis procedures in place) But not exatly sure of the US/FAA tolerances. I howeververy much doubt that their book allows that. but not my area..
It is the same in the U.S. as it is in the U.K. with minor differences.
Our system as it pertains to low vis operations mirrors yours in the U.K. except we don’t announce LVP. For example, If you are driving a car in the U.K. and it begins to rain, do you turn on your windshield wipers, or wait for an announcement on the radio that “ Rain procedures are in effect, please turn on your windshield wipers, and open your umbrellas” of course not!
This incident is an outlier. Our Low Vis procedures and capabilities are robust, standardized, and crews are certified yearly and quite capable of operating in low vis. This event was caused by a poor decision by the tower controller to clear SW to takeoff, and poor SA or misunderstanding by the Southwest crew as to the existence or whereabouts of the FedEx 767.
Only half a speed-brake
There's no dispute about crew training and required standards or the "radio announcement for wipers". The understanding reached on those topics is primarily thanks to your patience in explaining over and over again how the US elements link together. I guess the discussion about (A-)SMGCS has been quite fruitful as well.
Yet still, despite guarding your flank on all of the above, I find the attempted conclusion of your last post narrow-sighted.
If the procedures (on ATC side) were proper the controller would not have cleared the departing onto the runway. We haven't heard what the separation limits are for 1/2 SM departure ahead of a landing (I'd like to think 5NM for lining one up, resulting in 2NM (600 ft) being the latest expected moment (i.e.1.5 minutes later) when the departing plane should exit the LLZ signal cone by overflying the antenna), and what are the procedures to avoid an absent-minded person to breach any such limit. Obviously, this forum does not have the expertise/insight to discuss that. Just my note then, that limits are not procedures.
Borrowing yours:
what we called (undisputedly ATC's) procedures is that after such broadcast everyone in the car must chant "wipers-on, umbrellas-up" out loud 3 times. Because under LVO we are required to a) be more conservative [limits] b) double down on the crosscheck [procedures].
Or better yet, let's ask the other direction around:
If, by an ugly play of the devil, the ATCO working the runway would have a brain tumour moment and line up a plane in front of landing traffic just short of 3NM....
... what are the procedures in the UK to stop him from doing so?
(and while I trust 'oh that couldn't ever happen here', the point of the question is to hear why and how is that assured)
Yet still, despite guarding your flank on all of the above, I find the attempted conclusion of your last post narrow-sighted.
If the procedures (on ATC side) were proper the controller would not have cleared the departing onto the runway. We haven't heard what the separation limits are for 1/2 SM departure ahead of a landing (I'd like to think 5NM for lining one up, resulting in 2NM (600 ft) being the latest expected moment (i.e.1.5 minutes later) when the departing plane should exit the LLZ signal cone by overflying the antenna), and what are the procedures to avoid an absent-minded person to breach any such limit. Obviously, this forum does not have the expertise/insight to discuss that. Just my note then, that limits are not procedures.
Borrowing yours:
“ Rain procedures are in effect, please turn on your windshield wipers, and open your umbrellas”
Or better yet, let's ask the other direction around:
If, by an ugly play of the devil, the ATCO working the runway would have a brain tumour moment and line up a plane in front of landing traffic just short of 3NM....
... what are the procedures in the UK to stop him from doing so?
(and while I trust 'oh that couldn't ever happen here', the point of the question is to hear why and how is that assured)
Only half a speed-brake
It's also called taring with a wide brush, though I am far from a native speaker.
Makes you think, what will the challenger learn from the response if the opinion is raised this way. Started the communication like a true yank, one almost dares to say.
No. We all have our heads up each own tailpipe in exactly the same way.
Makes you think, what will the challenger learn from the response if the opinion is raised this way. Started the communication like a true yank, one almost dares to say.
No. We all have our heads up each own tailpipe in exactly the same way.
Nordic777.
At my company, before we fly an actual CAT II/IIII approach we are required by company SOP’s to brief the approach as per a special CAT II. /III briefing guide. The Briefing guide is 4 pages long and describes required equipment, lighting systems, SMGCS procedures (if applicable) RVR requirements, aircraft system requirements etc etc.. It normally takes 10 minutes to run through the entire briefing guide. We are also certified every year during our annual checkride to fly a CAT II/III approach to a go around and another to a landing in order to renew our certification. We are also tested on low vis procedures. I assure you, we are not cowboys, or indifferent.
You wrote,
“If this is the attitude of some American pilots, that means the level of training, education and knowledge needs to be improved, changed and seriously studied.”
Slightly dramatic.
What should be seriously studied is why the Tower controller cleared SouthWest to take off, and why Southwest didn’t wait for FedEx to land. Again, if this exact incident occurred in the U.K., with LVP announced and in effect…would you be asking for wholesale changes to procedures that have a proven track record? By the Way, I don’t know what airline you flew for in the US, but no airline I know of, plus my Air Force experience, downplayed the importance of knowledge and procedural compliance while flying a CAT II/III approach.
On a less serious note, I will be visiting Duxford and the famous Eagle Pub in a few weeks! Looking forward to it!
At my company, before we fly an actual CAT II/IIII approach we are required by company SOP’s to brief the approach as per a special CAT II. /III briefing guide. The Briefing guide is 4 pages long and describes required equipment, lighting systems, SMGCS procedures (if applicable) RVR requirements, aircraft system requirements etc etc.. It normally takes 10 minutes to run through the entire briefing guide. We are also certified every year during our annual checkride to fly a CAT II/III approach to a go around and another to a landing in order to renew our certification. We are also tested on low vis procedures. I assure you, we are not cowboys, or indifferent.
You wrote,
“If this is the attitude of some American pilots, that means the level of training, education and knowledge needs to be improved, changed and seriously studied.”
Slightly dramatic.
What should be seriously studied is why the Tower controller cleared SouthWest to take off, and why Southwest didn’t wait for FedEx to land. Again, if this exact incident occurred in the U.K., with LVP announced and in effect…would you be asking for wholesale changes to procedures that have a proven track record? By the Way, I don’t know what airline you flew for in the US, but no airline I know of, plus my Air Force experience, downplayed the importance of knowledge and procedural compliance while flying a CAT II/III approach.
On a less serious note, I will be visiting Duxford and the famous Eagle Pub in a few weeks! Looking forward to it!
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What should be seriously studied is why the Tower controller cleared SouthWest to take off, and why Southwest didn’t wait for FedEx to land
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Senate - Commerce
In light of this very interesting set of dialogues among and between aviators the confirmation hearing set for tomorrow (Wednesday March 1) for the current nominee to head the FAA should be quite interesting. Or maybe quite interesting for what is not asked and what is not said - will the nominee be asked about how this incident, and other recent incursions, reveal the imminent needs of the NAS? And will anyone, whether Committee members or the nominee, delve into this particular ATCO and what did and did not happen in Austin . . . Texas?
I'm holding back on slamming the administration for dallying about the vacancy in Montreal. If it can't comprehend the necessity in the current overall situation confronting FAA to nominate and get confirmed an FAA Administrator deeply aware of the workings of all the parts of the NAS and how they interact in good times and also when things go wrong - and evidently it hasn't comprehended this yet- what hope can there be to get someone nominated and confirmed for holding up the United States's end of the deal at ICAO? The pending activity to reformulate NOTAMs, by itself, warrants getting real aviation depth in place . . . . . without delay.
I'm holding back on slamming the administration for dallying about the vacancy in Montreal. If it can't comprehend the necessity in the current overall situation confronting FAA to nominate and get confirmed an FAA Administrator deeply aware of the workings of all the parts of the NAS and how they interact in good times and also when things go wrong - and evidently it hasn't comprehended this yet- what hope can there be to get someone nominated and confirmed for holding up the United States's end of the deal at ICAO? The pending activity to reformulate NOTAMs, by itself, warrants getting real aviation depth in place . . . . . without delay.
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Looks like everyone in the chain accepted the error as "normal ops" : the SW lining up knowing there was traffic a 3NM, the Fedex wondering is the runway was clear where in fact it is the protection area he should have been worried about : i.e the quality of the ILS signal to perform the autoland, lack of standard phraseology leading to confusion : (e.g " abort" ) lot of cheese layers missing and too many holes in those remaining.
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@ Flight Detent :
I am not and never worked in the UK, but until Brexit at least they worked the same as us , and then the answer to your question is simple , a controller is never alone , we follow ICAO 4 eyes porinciple , So incapacity of a controller,? the guy sitting next to him takes over. Plus in large Tower there is also normally a supervisor too.
One of the questions I asked ( not for here to answer ) is was the guy alone, and if yes ,was it officially planed by local management ( single Man ops due staff shortages ) or plain bad luck , e.g. toilet break, etc.. of the other.one.
I remenber Ueberlingen collsion in Zurich , the controler was also alone in his position ,and the Pilot of the DHL 757 was also alone in the cockpit when TCAS started.
Or better yet, let's ask the other direction around:
If, by an ugly play of the devil, the ATCO working the runway would have a brain tumour moment and line up a plane in front of landing traffic just short of 3NM....
... what are the procedures in the UK to stop him from doing so?
(and while I trust 'oh that couldn't ever happen here', the point of the question is to hear why and how is that assured)
If, by an ugly play of the devil, the ATCO working the runway would have a brain tumour moment and line up a plane in front of landing traffic just short of 3NM....
... what are the procedures in the UK to stop him from doing so?
(and while I trust 'oh that couldn't ever happen here', the point of the question is to hear why and how is that assured)
One of the questions I asked ( not for here to answer ) is was the guy alone, and if yes ,was it officially planed by local management ( single Man ops due staff shortages ) or plain bad luck , e.g. toilet break, etc.. of the other.one.
I remenber Ueberlingen collsion in Zurich , the controler was also alone in his position ,and the Pilot of the DHL 757 was also alone in the cockpit when TCAS started.
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Which suggests to me that that we've been all the way around this buoy (however you pronounce it!) and it's time to await the results of the analysis of this incident; lets hope it's not too long in gestation. Dobbin in his stable is looking closely at that door flappin' in the breeze.
Edit: in response to the comment of about how would this incident have been prevented in Europe, I offer the following, based on UK practise: When an aircraft is given clearance to land or take off, that 'tally' (again, for want of a better word) be it flight strip, pin, or whatever electronic wizardry is used nowadays, is placed in a 'runway occupied' slot that can only be allocated to 1 tally. Having given the Fed Ex 'clearance to land', Twr would would have had an immediate reminder that the runway was already committed when SW called for departure that should, at least, suggest 'time for reflection'. I still maintain that the practise of clearing multiple aircraft to land is a fundamental 'fail hard'.
Last edited by Downwind.Maddl-Land; 3rd Mar 2023 at 13:16.
There was at least one other controller in the Austin tower working ground control (female voice, dare I say?). Supposedly the FAA stopped the off-hour, single-controller policy after the 2006 Comair 5191 accident.
US v Europe Low Vis Ops.
In the US, pilots can assume they have cat 3 protection as soon as the weather drops below limits unless ATC tells them otherwise.
In Europe, pilots don’t have cat 3 protection until they are told LVPs in place.
One is fail safe, one is fail dangerous.
As someone said earlier, a sudden drop in vis during a busy period of departures or with runway works or free ranging vehicles could mean there is a delay in activating LVPs, surely it’s more safe to assume runway is not protected until specifically notified?
And from a human factors point of view, moving into a different method of operation - a different mental mode by announcing Low Vis Procedures on ATIS and frequency and confirming with pilots, wouldn’t that make it less likely the controller would make a mental slip and try and get a departure away in a non LVP gap?
In the US, pilots can assume they have cat 3 protection as soon as the weather drops below limits unless ATC tells them otherwise.
In Europe, pilots don’t have cat 3 protection until they are told LVPs in place.
One is fail safe, one is fail dangerous.
As someone said earlier, a sudden drop in vis during a busy period of departures or with runway works or free ranging vehicles could mean there is a delay in activating LVPs, surely it’s more safe to assume runway is not protected until specifically notified?
And from a human factors point of view, moving into a different method of operation - a different mental mode by announcing Low Vis Procedures on ATIS and frequency and confirming with pilots, wouldn’t that make it less likely the controller would make a mental slip and try and get a departure away in a non LVP gap?
Del Prado,
You make a good point, and I’m sure someone in the FAA or NTSB will consider how low vis ops are handled in other countries. Perhaps some procedures may be implemented here stemming from this incident.
You make a good point, and I’m sure someone in the FAA or NTSB will consider how low vis ops are handled in other countries. Perhaps some procedures may be implemented here stemming from this incident.
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You make a good point, and I’m sure someone in the FAA or NTSB will consider how low vis ops are handled in other countries. Perhaps some procedures may be implemented here stemming from this incident.
Is there a shortage of ATCOs in the U.S. or a shortage of money to pay for them in the system.
And yes wizardry. Even in my lowly position as an A/G operator I have a touch screen device where I can move an aeroplane on to the runway and anyone in the final or climb out aera will result in both images flashing. Before that we had pins and a board. Is there a shortage of resource for wizardry too.
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For instance here in Austin TWR/APP , the safiing is 76% ( so 1/4 of the workdorce is missing) takes 1.3 year to train and qualify as a controller ( average) with a 67% success rate . , max salary 155.000 $
A few small facilities are 100% staffed , but the worst by far is New York Tracon staffing is only 54% ( half of what is needed ) training /qualifying takes over 2 years , success rate is only 38% ( i.e 6 out of 10 fail ) and max salary in 228.000 $/ year. But that is not sufficient to attract and retaining controllers there. As a result of the shortage most facilties in the US controllers work 6 days on, one day off with no releif in sight , If you take New York Tracon again the projected staff for next year is down 1% .to 53%. .