Light Aircraft crash at Blackbushe.
Join Date: Jun 2008
Location: Estonia
Posts: 140
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can't see how someone who is incapacitated is going to manage to get down at that descent rate and get over the threshold and touch down at all, let alone stay on the runway.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I can't see how someone who is incapacitated is going to manage to get down at that descent rate and get over the threshold and touch down at all, let alone stay on the runway.
I think our guessing here is to get to a point, so that we can build a acceptable scenario for ourselves - its hard to accept that someone with that experience level just 'fukced it up' completely.
I sure hope the AAIB can come up with an explanation that would at least give us something to learn from this accident, but I doubt it...
de minimus non curat lex
It will be interesting to see what observations/recommendations, if any, the AAIB make in relation to the stopend & overrun areas with "obstacles" in the vicinity of the airfield.
Had the carpark been empty, then the outcome may well have been survivable.
CAA aerodrome standards may well be considering suitable changes to CAP168. Was any mention made about obstacles in the report after the yearly inspection?
The type of traffic encountered in the circuit was an important factor in the unplanned profile flown. A significant distraction and increased workload impacting upon capacity resulting in a serious unstable approach.
The pilot's history may well reveal some interesting factors.......
What evacuation briefings are given when no cabin crew are present on this size of private operation?
Have VIPs got a scoobie about how to get out in a hurry?
Had the carpark been empty, then the outcome may well have been survivable.
CAA aerodrome standards may well be considering suitable changes to CAP168. Was any mention made about obstacles in the report after the yearly inspection?
The type of traffic encountered in the circuit was an important factor in the unplanned profile flown. A significant distraction and increased workload impacting upon capacity resulting in a serious unstable approach.
The pilot's history may well reveal some interesting factors.......
What evacuation briefings are given when no cabin crew are present on this size of private operation?
Have VIPs got a scoobie about how to get out in a hurry?
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It will be interesting to see what observations/recommendations, if any, the AAIB make in relation to the stopend & overrun areas with "obstacles" in the vicinity of the airfield.
Had the carpark been empty, then the outcome may well have been survivable.
Had the carpark been empty, then the outcome may well have been survivable.
Now, meanwhile, on planet earth airports are continuing to "grow in"...and bigger airports are harder to get into by the day (slots).
What evacuation briefings are given when no cabin crew are present on this size of private operation?
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: In the boot of my car!
Posts: 5,982
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If that is the case, then why was the Phenom 300 being flown single pilot with a MTOW just under 18000 lbs ? witnessed on many occasions with only one person leaving the aircraft at Blackbush i.e. one pilot.
I thought you were talking about the 500 series aircraft where only the 501SP and 551SP and with the 551SP it has to be flown below 12500 IBS which literally means crew and no PAX or NO range
If you can show legal documentation to show otherwise I for one would be delighted
The aircraft single pilot certification and the pilot single pilot certification are very different
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 8th Aug 2015 at 14:01.
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
subtle incapacitation
It is quite clear that some people abovefail to understand that incapacitation can be quite subtle and as the result of a multitude of factors.
A few weeks back a co-worker was talking to me in a very logical way and less than two minuets later she fainted and could not walk unassited.
There are indications to the onset of this sort of incapacitation but the victim is always the last to know. Airline aproach callouts as well as challenge and responce monitoring during critical phases of flight are designed to alert crew members to subtle incapacitation.
Unfortunately this incapacitation monitoring is unavalable to single pilot operations.
A quick traul of the incapacitation numbers and you will find that it is not the major killers that result in most incapacitations, it is the humble food poisoning that stops most pilots from functioning fully.
A few weeks back a co-worker was talking to me in a very logical way and less than two minuets later she fainted and could not walk unassited.
There are indications to the onset of this sort of incapacitation but the victim is always the last to know. Airline aproach callouts as well as challenge and responce monitoring during critical phases of flight are designed to alert crew members to subtle incapacitation.
Unfortunately this incapacitation monitoring is unavalable to single pilot operations.
A quick traul of the incapacitation numbers and you will find that it is not the major killers that result in most incapacitations, it is the humble food poisoning that stops most pilots from functioning fully.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: In the boot of my car!
Posts: 5,982
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
A and C
I agree with your comments something happened to that single Pilot experienced Captain to act out of character and perform such a crazy landing attempt.
Food poisoning is one option. As stated earlier in these threads I know a pilot who flew a fast turboprop single pilot for most of his career. He resented having another pilot but was forced to do so after the owning company insisted on two for insurance reasons.
Soon after coming back from the south of France he collapsed and past out at the controls and did not come round till after the FO had landed in France. his was a case of severe food poisoning.
Other possibilities could be drug reactions, mini strokes, overload where I have seen pilots freeze at the controls and literally go blank.
I never understand these owners spending Millions, having two engines and back up systems yet only one heart and brain at the controls. In a Single pilot aircraft with a single pilot rated pilot there are many young pilots who would relish the right seat time and would cost little to be there in the total cost scheme of things costing very little
Pace
I agree with your comments something happened to that single Pilot experienced Captain to act out of character and perform such a crazy landing attempt.
Food poisoning is one option. As stated earlier in these threads I know a pilot who flew a fast turboprop single pilot for most of his career. He resented having another pilot but was forced to do so after the owning company insisted on two for insurance reasons.
Soon after coming back from the south of France he collapsed and past out at the controls and did not come round till after the FO had landed in France. his was a case of severe food poisoning.
Other possibilities could be drug reactions, mini strokes, overload where I have seen pilots freeze at the controls and literally go blank.
I never understand these owners spending Millions, having two engines and back up systems yet only one heart and brain at the controls. In a Single pilot aircraft with a single pilot rated pilot there are many young pilots who would relish the right seat time and would cost little to be there in the total cost scheme of things costing very little
Pace
Last edited by Pace; 8th Aug 2015 at 18:38.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Hotel Sheets, Downtown Plunketville
Age: 76
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"I never understand these owners spending Millions, having two engines and back up systems yet only one heart at the controls
Pace "
TBM 700 N30LT crash at EGTK on 6 Dec 2013, killed the sole prof pilot and the owner and his wife. The owner was the wealthy boss of the French supermarket chain, Carrefour. So nothing new in the case of high net worth owners choosing to fly not only single pilot but also single engine.
This is what the AAIB said in conclusion:
"it is possible that control of the aircraft was lost during an attempted late go-around, or as a result of an unknown distraction".
Their`s not to reason why, their`s but to do and die, seems to have ring of truth.
Pace "
TBM 700 N30LT crash at EGTK on 6 Dec 2013, killed the sole prof pilot and the owner and his wife. The owner was the wealthy boss of the French supermarket chain, Carrefour. So nothing new in the case of high net worth owners choosing to fly not only single pilot but also single engine.
This is what the AAIB said in conclusion:
"it is possible that control of the aircraft was lost during an attempted late go-around, or as a result of an unknown distraction".
Their`s not to reason why, their`s but to do and die, seems to have ring of truth.
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Axminster Devon
Age: 83
Posts: 166
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
wealthy owners of single pilot and single engine aircraft
Chronos #171.
The Kidlington accident was in December 2003 rather than 2013 – no doubt a typo.
https://assets.digital.cabinet-offic...N30LT_5-05.pdf
The aircraft was not owned by either passenger. It was externally contracted to replace the fractionally owned aircraft which was (or were) not available.
You denote the pilot as professional, but he seems less qualified and experienced than perhaps the hiring passenger might have expected. At age 46 he had accrued 500 hours or so on type over four years, which by itself seems enough; however he was CPL rather than ATPL and he had only 1600 hours or so total time. He seems not have flown the type for nearly three months. The previous week he was doing his “day job” on the ground. He tried to get a chum to fly the trip with him. The chum had to leave the aircraft after the two of them had positioned it for the revenue flight. I infer that the accident pilot was a bit rusty, a bit under-confident.
The accident itself took the form of a short-term mishandling or loss of control on finals. The approach seems to have been steep with the power off (for perhaps too long) but it was nothing like the long-drawn-out disaster experienced by the Phenom pilot.
However wealthy, the TBM700 passenger had made a reasonable one-off bet on the aviation industry providing him a safe journey. I suggest you have not found here a parallel to the ownership / CRM situation of the Phenom flight.
The Kidlington accident was in December 2003 rather than 2013 – no doubt a typo.
https://assets.digital.cabinet-offic...N30LT_5-05.pdf
The aircraft was not owned by either passenger. It was externally contracted to replace the fractionally owned aircraft which was (or were) not available.
You denote the pilot as professional, but he seems less qualified and experienced than perhaps the hiring passenger might have expected. At age 46 he had accrued 500 hours or so on type over four years, which by itself seems enough; however he was CPL rather than ATPL and he had only 1600 hours or so total time. He seems not have flown the type for nearly three months. The previous week he was doing his “day job” on the ground. He tried to get a chum to fly the trip with him. The chum had to leave the aircraft after the two of them had positioned it for the revenue flight. I infer that the accident pilot was a bit rusty, a bit under-confident.
The accident itself took the form of a short-term mishandling or loss of control on finals. The approach seems to have been steep with the power off (for perhaps too long) but it was nothing like the long-drawn-out disaster experienced by the Phenom pilot.
However wealthy, the TBM700 passenger had made a reasonable one-off bet on the aviation industry providing him a safe journey. I suggest you have not found here a parallel to the ownership / CRM situation of the Phenom flight.
de minimus non curat lex
The parallel is an unstable approach in both cases:
The 2003 accident occurred during the G/A, followed by loss of control.
This month's accident was caused by being too fast/long on landing, and leaving the paved surface at speed into obstacles.
For light aircraft, a critical decision is needed at 200ft AGL
Is the approach stable (as defined) YES ~ continue NO~ G/A.
Simple to say, often difficult to do in the heat of battle.
The 2003 accident occurred during the G/A, followed by loss of control.
This month's accident was caused by being too fast/long on landing, and leaving the paved surface at speed into obstacles.
For light aircraft, a critical decision is needed at 200ft AGL
Is the approach stable (as defined) YES ~ continue NO~ G/A.
Simple to say, often difficult to do in the heat of battle.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: schermoney and left front seat
Age: 57
Posts: 2,438
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The 2003 accident occurred during the G/A, followed by loss of control.
There was some subjective witness evidence to indicate that the aircraft was initiating a go-around but this could not be confirmed as fact. The cyclist was the only witness who commented on an increase in engine noise. While this may have been an actual increase in power, it could also have been an apparent increase in noise as the aircraft passed overhead
Despite an extensive investigation, no definite conclusion could be reached as to why N30LT crashed on a visual approach to Oxford (Kidlington) Airport. No technical evidence was found which would explain the uncontrolled roll but there were certain operational possibilities. Without hard evidence, however, none could be fully supported, but loss of control resulting from an unknown distraction, or during the application of power for flight path adjustment or an attempted late go-around, must be considered as possibilities.
Join Date: Feb 2003
Location: Axminster Devon
Age: 83
Posts: 166
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
HD.
The point Chronos aimed for was how negligent owners might be in buying a single pilot service. I argued that the TBM700 accident was not a case in point.
I hoped to show that neither the professional status of the pilot nor the nature of the final approach made a good parallel either.
The point Chronos aimed for was how negligent owners might be in buying a single pilot service. I argued that the TBM700 accident was not a case in point.
I hoped to show that neither the professional status of the pilot nor the nature of the final approach made a good parallel either.
Last edited by rlsbutler; 8th Aug 2015 at 23:19.
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: In the boot of my car!
Posts: 5,982
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I hoped to show that neither the professional status of the pilot nor the nature of the final approach made a good parallel
Any experienced mentally aware pilot would not do that so we have to look at his medical status at the time or another person flying the aircraft with little or no experience, a suicide attempt or Single Pilot overload? I have seen pilots overloaded go into brain freeze and act like zombies
Pace
Pace
Just as many experienced pilots are involved in incidents than inexperienced.
We can all make bad judgements or decisions no matter what the experience.
Greater the experience greater the pride in their own ability. I have seen this mentality of 'I don't make errors like this so I ll use my vast experience to sort it out without the passengers knowing, go-around surely that's what an inexperienced guy would do not a sky god like myself'.
Problem with biz jets your pax are a lot closer to pass judgement on the flight. This then can decide your future employment as their pilot.
I hope this is some incap situation to explain the landing but don't rule out judgement and ability just because he's experienced.
Mooneyboy
Just as many experienced pilots are involved in incidents than inexperienced.
We can all make bad judgements or decisions no matter what the experience.
Greater the experience greater the pride in their own ability. I have seen this mentality of 'I don't make errors like this so I ll use my vast experience to sort it out without the passengers knowing, go-around surely that's what an inexperienced guy would do not a sky god like myself'.
Problem with biz jets your pax are a lot closer to pass judgement on the flight. This then can decide your future employment as their pilot.
I hope this is some incap situation to explain the landing but don't rule out judgement and ability just because he's experienced.
Mooneyboy
While it would be nice to think incapacitation is involved, there is no evidence for it. We can speculate as much as we want, but it is worth remembering that history is littered with accidents where unstable approaches have been continued with disastrous results.
Some, like the Air India Express accident at Bangalore and the Learjet overrun at Northolt (2 pilots, same sort of private flight) were excursions resulting from long and hot landings - the Learjet was 30-40 kts fast on bug speed at touchdown. Others have turned into CFIT accidents through missing the runway entirely in VMC. The Birmingham UPS A300 accidents hit the ground a mile short even though the crew had seen the runway.
The common thread is people persisting with a flawed mental model when all the indications should have been telling them to chuck the approach away and start again. Incapacitation is extremely rare, and I suspect incapacitation on the late stages of an approach is rarer still.
Some, like the Air India Express accident at Bangalore and the Learjet overrun at Northolt (2 pilots, same sort of private flight) were excursions resulting from long and hot landings - the Learjet was 30-40 kts fast on bug speed at touchdown. Others have turned into CFIT accidents through missing the runway entirely in VMC. The Birmingham UPS A300 accidents hit the ground a mile short even though the crew had seen the runway.
The common thread is people persisting with a flawed mental model when all the indications should have been telling them to chuck the approach away and start again. Incapacitation is extremely rare, and I suspect incapacitation on the late stages of an approach is rarer still.
Join Date: Jan 1999
Location: north of barlu
Posts: 6,207
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Fortissimo
While there is no evidence for inccapasitation apart from the appaulingly bad approach that was so far away from the norm for an experienced pilot who had used this airfield before, there is also a lack of reason for a pilot with all his faculties intact continuing an approach with the knowlage that the touchdown point would be that far down the runway.
Unlike some of the more far fetched stuff on these forums both these theorys cant be ruled out according to the only reliable form of information avalable (the AAIB prelimenary report ).
The chances are that the full reasons for this accident are unlikely to be understood even after the full AAIB report is published unless something positive comes out of the postmortem on the pilot.
Unlike some of the more far fetched stuff on these forums both these theorys cant be ruled out according to the only reliable form of information avalable (the AAIB prelimenary report ).
The chances are that the full reasons for this accident are unlikely to be understood even after the full AAIB report is published unless something positive comes out of the postmortem on the pilot.
I wouldn't be so quick to rule out the possibility of some clues to the pilot's physical/mental state being discernable from the CVR examination.