Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol

[DC-ATE]

Permafrost_ATPL

Loving the use of UPPER CASE in all those posts stating the obvious... CAPTAIN... NOT paying attention.. BASIC instruments..... AVIATE... NAVIGATE..etc.
Still, an experienced training captain, and experienced FO, and FO on jump seat somehow fail to spot it. We can either all claim to be GREAT aviators who would NEVER do such thing. Or we could try and learn something from it. Something distracted that crew. Possibly the gear GPWS warning. Hopefully the CVR will give some clues...

Very possible.....BUT.....SOMEONE HAS to FLY the airplane. It is the Captain's responsibility unless he is incapacitated.

[Rainboe]

..............

[Nigd3]

airfoilmod

"Why" is not for the investigation team, that is not their job, hence I said the aviation industry should ask these questions.

I don't think I am explaining my point very well when I say the facts don't really bring us much value, without the reasoning behind the actions during the critical stages of the crash.

Intent doesn't always have to mean in a negative way but there has to be an intent to do something when faced with multiple choices/actions.

[DC-ATE]

Back at NH -

Should have thrown it away and never got to stickshake at 450' and the consequences thereafter.

Shudda, cudda, wudda.....that's what we're talking about here. No one was minding the store!

[Midland63]

Just an SLF with no flying experience so shout me down if you will but it seems extraordinary that 3 pilots failed to spot their airspeed bleeding away for 100 seconds (correct me if that's wrong) at a critical phase of the flight. Something else must have been distracting their attention - what was it? Maybe that factor has not come out in this interim report because they don't know what it is yet (or it's too early to be certain). If there was something else distracting their attention, I'm not saying that absolves the crew - it's a reason not an excuse - but something to focus on in future design and training philosophies

But one thing which it may not be premature to count this as a lesson in is "If something doesn't seem right, then maybe it's not." By this I mean the suggestion (I put it no stronger) they dismissed the "Your wheels should be down" warning as a rogue. Reminds me of the Helios pressure warning dismissed as a rogue take off config warning - OK I'm guilty of not having read the full end report of Helios but it can't be wrong to say "Hang on - that's not right - let's have a good hard look around at fundamentals and check nothing's wrong."

[snowfalcon2]

Looking forward: Disregarding the obvious basic flying issues in this accident, What technical aid would be the most cost-effective way to prevent this from happening again?

I still suggest that a "deceleration alert" would have helped not only to avoid this accident, but in several other occurrences too.

I.e. an alert which is triggered in conditions where, if nothing changes, the aircraft will stall in X seconds (X somewhere between 5 and 10).

In this accident it seems the stick shaker would have done the trick, but only if the response had been both instant and perfect, which it wasn't. An "early warning" deceleration alert may in this accident have given the crew the vital additional seconds to discover that the throttle levers needed to be forcibly pushed against the AT. And it would be equally useful in other situations when the crew is distracted and does not notice the airspeed decaying until the actual stall warning/stick shaker, which may well be too late.

Comments? Feel free to criticize, but then preferably include an alternative solution

[fireflybob]

Thanks to the press, the fearful flying public are now going to think that a faulty altimeter is capable of causing a 737 to crash. Oh dear...

Depends which press they see/hear - I think this is quite a good report, not perfect I know but it does paint the right picture.

About 50 minutes in:-

PM

[BOAC]

There can be lots of distractions on an approach, but it is down to the crew to handle them, and particularly a TC who SHOULD be aware of the pitfalls. It is indeed possible that things were a bit 'rushed' - AMS is like that, you cope. It is also possible the cabin crew were late with the cabin secure in view of the compression in actual time to landing. Jumpseater possibly asking questions/talking etc. The radalt problem. Possible new Captain in training. Other unknown factors. Once again, all the ingredients are there, it just should not have happened. We still, of course, need 'the facts' and not some translated Dutch press briefing.

[757_Driver]

jesus guys, how many more alerts do you think we need!

Its fairly easy - fly the goddam plane! Hands should be on the levers (mine always are below about FL100, and at every level off) and speed is something (i hope) we always monitor.
BTW that doesn't mean that I subscribe to the opinion that these guys weren't flying the plane, I suspect that the final report will reveal a little more, but I have to admit it doesn't look good at the moment.

For those that don't know already (quite a few judging by some comments), the Shaker is not the stall, its the stall warning and occurs at about 1.05vs (obviously in highly dynamic situations this may change - but getting slow on an ils ain't exactly 'dynamic'!) and should give plenty of 'headroom' for recovery. What do you want - another warning at 1.1Vs - maybe one at 1.2 vs aswell!

[John R]

As Midlands says: "If something doesn't seem right, then maybe it's not." And that is where, I am afraid to say it, the airline's safety culture, the captain's attitude, CRM, views on when to G/A DO come into play. This was a rushed, badly managed and fatally executed approach. Why was it not aborted?

Thanks fireflybob - that was a good interview.

[BelArgUSA]

Flew many years of my life as TRE/TRI in line training. I never in "old days", or recent times, permitted F/O trainees, to use auroland and autothrust for approach, after reaching the vicinity of the IAF. Everyone can push buttons, but I want to see a demonstration of basic flying skills for F/Os...
xxx
As far as captains (upgrade training) are concerned, yes, I would admit aurothrust and autoland, if weather conditions so required, and would definitely still require that captain to demonstrate his manual flying skills in most of the approaches during the training.
xxx
Just my own technique.

Happy contrails

[speedbirdconcorde]

Too much reliance on automation often leads to complacency. Probably 90-95% of the time, FBW does what it is supposed to do...emotion is taken out of the equation and the aircraft is flown following very specific laws. That 5-10% though is what is worrying. Thats when 'bad things' happen ( I didnt say 'accident' because in many cases the end result could have been avoided ) - Pilots find themselves in a unfamiliar situation...decisions needs to be made very quickly....emotion enters the equation...and the rest is history. Appropriate training and discipline are crucial in our world of man-machine interfaces.

[Nigd3]

757

I don't think anyone wants more alerts as these just detract away from the "actual" problem alerts. Consistent ones would at least be a start.
I think Rainboe mentioned a visual cue that was not too bright and could be missed, not that it means it had anything to do with this accident.

To say just fly the plane, is too simplistic, unless you want a robot in the cockpit then you will always get a human element. Sometimes the human element is a good thing, as in, I don't think many programmers would have coded in a "Land in the Hudson river" routine.

[EGCC4284]

http://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/docs/ra...4_maart_GB.pdf

[Dani]

There is a simply feature that could prevent the stall: Alpha Floor protection (like in the Airbusses and the Fokkers).

But also that didn't prevent some idiots from crashing in Perpignan... - at least there were no passengers involved.

But hey, you have speed tolerances, depending on company, +5, -0kts. If you as PM you see that the PF is off the tolerance, you are shouting "Speed!"

Dani

[TRC]

There are some striking CRM similarities with this accident and the Staines BEA Trident accident 25 years ago. Yes, there are some striking differences too - more on that later.

• Both aircraft were commanded by a high time training captain
• Both aircraft had a relatively junior co-pilot in the R/H seat
• Both aircraft had a third pilot on board - the Trident flew with 3 pilots as a norm (incredibly, the Trident had an experienced on type captain positioning in the jumpseat)
• Both aircraft suffered an in-flight event that led to the crash that, in itself, did not render the aircraft un-flyable
• Both aircraft crashed as a result of a lack of airspeed

The differences:

• The BEA had just taken off - the THY was just about to land
• The BEA suffered a self-inflicted mishap - the THY apparently suffered perhaps an insidious, but never-the-less evidently noticeable malfunction of a Rad Alt
• The BEA had a stall warning and stall recovery system (considered adequate at the time, but no real automation as we have today) - the THY had a modern aircraft with most of the recognised safety measures

The common ground:

In the case of the BEA a refusal to accept the situation that was presented to them, even to the point of cancelling the stall warning and protection. Whether this was the case with the THY .....? What does seem an absolute parallel is the apparent total lack of monitoring by the flight deck crew, AND, as was mentioned in the AIB report of the BEA, the distinct possibility that the junior crew might have been reluctant to report to, or comment to the captain that things weren't as they should be.

History repeats with monotonous regularity.

[PiG]

Turkish Airlines denies earlier defectiveness of Radio Altimeters
- ( sorry, in Dutch again ) Turkish Airlines weerspreekt eerder defect - Trouw

Highlights (or lowlights, pick your preference) translated;

• TA announces no reports of failing radalts exist
• two radalts have been serviced as scheduled in july 2008
• One of the radalts failed at feb 5, but was repaired immediately
• a day after the crash TA have already told that there was a defective master caution light earlier, which was resolved more than 8 flights before it's last

Which makes me question:
Apparently ( assuming the black box didn't make things up ) the same error has occured twice, without anyone noticing !!!. Which may have been accidentally the FO being PF with manual landing and the CPT not watching the altimeter.

..and
Repairs are not carried out in such a way that it keeps working for a month.. Is that Technician's bad luck or lack of skill ?

[snowfalcon2]

For those that don't know already (quite a few judging by some comments), the Shaker is not the stall, its the stall warning and occurs at about 1.05vs (obviously in highly dynamic situations this may change

Thanks for the comments.
Key word is "dynamic situation may change". Re. the stick shaker: You can fly at 1.05vs all day or you may stall in 2 seconds. Not a very smart alerter if you ask me. This suggested alert would sense the instantaneous flight dynamics (keyword: 6 degrees-of-freedom AHRS) and compute time-to-stall in real time for the current a/c configuration. Technically possible today, and presumably could be commercially available in five years at the most. The actual alert might be aural, or a stick "nudge", or whatever.

[BOAC]

Originally Posted by Dani

here is a simply feature that could prevent the stall:

- nope - it will not work when the a/c thinks it is landing!.....otherwise you'd never get it down!

thinks about a hundred different things were responsible for the crash by now.

- and as with a lot of accidents, they may not be far away from the truth.

[captplaystation]

Topslide6,
in an ideal world maybe a bit more than 1 yr in Command.
But. . . you & I both know that ideal doesn't equal what is commercialy ideal ,or commercialy expedient. Merely offered as food for thought, along with the fact that LTC4500hr all with one company /trainee Capt 3500hr all with one company /First Officer anywhere between 300 & 3500hr all with one company doesn't perhaps constitute what I would call "experience". . . . . but then again neither does crewing your airline entirely with ex fighter jocks QED.