Turkish airliner crashes at Schiphol
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At 50 RA' the automatic flare is initiated. Could this have contributed to a stall ?
If the DFCS was only in CMD B, which is what has been stated so far, then FCC B would have not gone into the flare mode since the right radio altimeter was outputting the correct RA. FCC B would have been the master FCC and it uses the right radio altimeter unless a failure flag from the right radio altimeter transceiver is present (it then would switch to the left).
If the DFCS was only in CMD B, which is what has been stated so far, then FCC B would have not gone into the flare mode since the right radio altimeter was outputting the correct RA. FCC B would have been the master FCC and it uses the right radio altimeter unless a failure flag from the right radio altimeter transceiver is present (it then would switch to the left).
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It is indeed interesting to note that even without any autopilot in use the AT goes into RETARD mode at "approximately" 27ft RA. Our SOP is to not switch the AT completely off when flying manual approaches but rather to de-select SPEED and have a low-speed protection available. If that is the case you will get a RETARD around 27ft even if you have the thrustlevers allready at idle or if you are in the process of retarding them.
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DC-8
Airbus... No the (side)stick does not "shake".
Usually there would be no need for a "Stall Warner".. the "protections" built into the FBW prevent getting to an AoA where a "Stall Warning would be issued... These protections are primarily "Alpha Floor" where Full power is selected... wherever the crew have the Thrust Levers. This is not foolproof, since firstly it is disabled at low altitude [<100R] (as Habshiem showed), and secondly it is an Autothrottle function, so if ATHR is U/S or disabled (possible) it will not work.
Secondly, in "Normal Law" the aircraft will make it harder for the crew to pull back to the stall... if the stick is left "neutral" the AP would disconnect as you reached an AoA called Alpha Prot, and then maintain Alpha Prot (well short of stall). If you pull back on the stick, full back stick equates to Alpha Max, a higher AoA, but still short of the stall.
If all the above fail, or in degraded Flight Control Modes, and the aircraft exceeds Alpha Max / approaches a stall, there is an audible stall warning - it shouts "STALL" at you - again prior to the stall AoA. This is what happened to the Air NZ A320 - for reasons various the protections above did not work / were disabled by the crew / were ignored, yet when the "STALL" warning came they reacted.
The "STALL" warning" audio is therefore the A320 equivalent of a stick shaker...
NoD
Speaking of Stick Shakers.....and I'm NOT trying to be funny or sarcastic here as I don't know.....what happens on an Airbus or any aircraft with a Side Stick? Does the Side Stick shake in the same manner as an aircraft with a yoke?
Usually there would be no need for a "Stall Warner".. the "protections" built into the FBW prevent getting to an AoA where a "Stall Warning would be issued... These protections are primarily "Alpha Floor" where Full power is selected... wherever the crew have the Thrust Levers. This is not foolproof, since firstly it is disabled at low altitude [<100R] (as Habshiem showed), and secondly it is an Autothrottle function, so if ATHR is U/S or disabled (possible) it will not work.
Secondly, in "Normal Law" the aircraft will make it harder for the crew to pull back to the stall... if the stick is left "neutral" the AP would disconnect as you reached an AoA called Alpha Prot, and then maintain Alpha Prot (well short of stall). If you pull back on the stick, full back stick equates to Alpha Max, a higher AoA, but still short of the stall.
If all the above fail, or in degraded Flight Control Modes, and the aircraft exceeds Alpha Max / approaches a stall, there is an audible stall warning - it shouts "STALL" at you - again prior to the stall AoA. This is what happened to the Air NZ A320 - for reasons various the protections above did not work / were disabled by the crew / were ignored, yet when the "STALL" warning came they reacted.
The "STALL" warning" audio is therefore the A320 equivalent of a stick shaker...
NoD
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-Dexter-
Well, if the presence of auto thrust is having an effect on crews such that they are abandoning basic airmanship and failing to monitor airspeed for the length of time implied by the preliminary results of this accident, then sad to say I fear you may be right.
There are perfectly adequate visual alerts to warn the pilot of dangerously slowing airspeed but simply put from a professional pilot's perspective, if no one is monitoring airspeed then no one is really flying the aircraft at all.
As a non-piliot I find it really strange that modern aircraft do not have any warning systems associated with the airspeed. Hundreds of aurals/alerts yet no warning about the airspeed. A simple warning horn can be a big help in certain situations me thinks.
There are perfectly adequate visual alerts to warn the pilot of dangerously slowing airspeed but simply put from a professional pilot's perspective, if no one is monitoring airspeed then no one is really flying the aircraft at all.
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If, as the above NOTAM alludes the RA was faulty then Mr Boeing's programming of automatic thrust retardation to take place on the basis of a single RA reading is quite simply bad design but I suspect something like that could not get past the regs/testing, so there is a lot more to this.
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how pilots can be dumb
way back when I was a cfii, I was giving dual to a guy under the hood. he didn't like to tune and IDENTIFY the radio. So, one VFR day, while shooting an ILS to KSJC, he was up to his old tricks.
The simple display ( left right and up down) centered right up...on the VOR freq, not the ILS...but for some reason NO flag on the GS...he started his descent thinking he was ''right on'' all the way down.
It was shear luck, but he was right on as I carefully monitored visually and with DME backup.
We landed and I asked him to Identify it...he figured out he was on the VOR...how could that happen he said? Because you are undisciplined in the cockpit and it was shear luck.
Instead of teaching people how to use automation, we must also teach them how to monitor it.
The simple display ( left right and up down) centered right up...on the VOR freq, not the ILS...but for some reason NO flag on the GS...he started his descent thinking he was ''right on'' all the way down.
It was shear luck, but he was right on as I carefully monitored visually and with DME backup.
We landed and I asked him to Identify it...he figured out he was on the VOR...how could that happen he said? Because you are undisciplined in the cockpit and it was shear luck.
Instead of teaching people how to use automation, we must also teach them how to monitor it.
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FlyingVisit
You sure this was the official report? Because the English version of the report states:
"There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit."
The Dutch version states the same, that captain was in LH seat.
Official Report I read this afternoon confirmed the Captain was sitting in the RH seat. The voice recorder showed he was going through pre-landing checks with trainee who was in LH seat.
"There were three people in the cockpit, the captain was located on the front, left hand side. On the right hand side there was the first officer, for whom this was a training flight. (The first officer had all appropriate qualifications). There was also an extra first officer in the centre of the cockpit."
The Dutch version states the same, that captain was in LH seat.
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The Dutch version states the same, that captain was in LH seat.
This is a different version from the # 1 - different wording ....... also different font
This is a different version from the # 1 - different wording ....... also different font
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glad rag, single, dual radio altimeters...
On the A340 you are not allowed to make an autoland if there is a difference of more that 15 ft. between R/L radio altimeters.
You will get a warning light and aural warning if this difference takes place below 200 ft. - and a go-around (or manual landing) must be performed.
You will get a warning light and aural warning if this difference takes place below 200 ft. - and a go-around (or manual landing) must be performed.
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protectthehornet wrote:
It is always very easy to blame the pilots after the accident.
However please all note that we are dealing with very unusual things such as ATHR commanding RETARD with single AP engaged, RA all of sudden reads -48 feet.
And for sure if this happened to you, you would also not know how and when to react.
For the moment we still don't know if there was any info on the FMA to read. May be YES, but may be NO!
It's all about the initial FDR report.. Let's wait and see what the FDR and CVR combination will show..
how pilots can be dumb
However please all note that we are dealing with very unusual things such as ATHR commanding RETARD with single AP engaged, RA all of sudden reads -48 feet.
And for sure if this happened to you, you would also not know how and when to react.
For the moment we still don't know if there was any info on the FMA to read. May be YES, but may be NO!
It's all about the initial FDR report.. Let's wait and see what the FDR and CVR combination will show..
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Vref should have been 140kt. They hit the ground at 94kt. As Vref may not be less than 1.23Vs-1g (1.3vs old money) They could well have been well below stall speed. The shaker fired at almost 500' yet they hit the ground at 94kt??
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grebllaw123d
Since you mentioned A... , I have to say that the Airbus-fanciers have been extraordinarily restrained and gentlemanly all throughout this sorry story.
If this had been an A320, the fly-by-seat-of-pants dinosaurs would have attacked like never before.
If this had been an A320, the fly-by-seat-of-pants dinosaurs would have attacked like never before.
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Human beings do the best that they can at the time with the resources available to them.
You have to look at the entire "system" which has resulted in this catastrophic failure. This would include, but not be limited to, a/c design, maintenance, airline safety culture systems, pilot selection and training etc.
You have to look at the entire "system" which has resulted in this catastrophic failure. This would include, but not be limited to, a/c design, maintenance, airline safety culture systems, pilot selection and training etc.
Those poor passengers and cabin crew did not have to have their lives sacrifised do to incompetence of the crew!
Negative!!! A pilots are in command of their aircraft, aircraft systems, and regime of flight. It just comes down to negligence! We are not talking low IFR conditions here. It was plain dereliction of duty on all in the cockpit!
Those poor passengers and cabin crew did not have to have their lives sacrifised do to incompetence of the crew!
Those poor passengers and cabin crew did not have to have their lives sacrifised do to incompetence of the crew!
But I really do not think it is quite as simple as that. Notwithstanding that we do not know all the facts I would agree that it seems that the crew have not performed in a manner that all professional aviators would expect.
But the point I was making it that it is the overall "system" which has allowed this to come about. No crew member ever gets on the a/c with the intent or even the expectation of crashing the aeroplane.
All aspects have to be considered. e.g. the airlines safety culture, the State's regulation and overseeing of an operation, the selection, training and checking procedures etc etc. These are all part of the Swiss cheese model so that when all the holes line up an accident occurs.
I just think it is too simplistic to say that the crew were just negligent. We need to know why they acted as they did.
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Automation or Crew problem here?
Let's come at it from a different angle. Airline crews (in the UK anyway) do 2 3-4 Hour Sims every 6 months, training in various areas, and being tested for various (serious) failures e.g. engine, whole systems (Hyd/Elec) and multiple complex failures.
In my opinion, a single RA failure leading to the Thrust being retarded prematurely to idle, would not generally be included in a simulator scenario... It is rather trivial and probably considered a waste of time, particularly if, as per the Boeing comments, all the FMAs were wrong as well.
Just my view - others may differ...
But there are 2 crew and 3 ASIs etc. etc. in aircraft for a good reason, and we cannot really expect "automation" to cover every scenario - we are there to monitor and intervene as required... not by choice, but because we are the safety backstop.
NoD
Let's come at it from a different angle. Airline crews (in the UK anyway) do 2 3-4 Hour Sims every 6 months, training in various areas, and being tested for various (serious) failures e.g. engine, whole systems (Hyd/Elec) and multiple complex failures.
In my opinion, a single RA failure leading to the Thrust being retarded prematurely to idle, would not generally be included in a simulator scenario... It is rather trivial and probably considered a waste of time, particularly if, as per the Boeing comments, all the FMAs were wrong as well.
Just my view - others may differ...
But there are 2 crew and 3 ASIs etc. etc. in aircraft for a good reason, and we cannot really expect "automation" to cover every scenario - we are there to monitor and intervene as required... not by choice, but because we are the safety backstop.NoD
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......sadly poor CRM
I tried to read this thread from beginning to end but I gave up at 80%. So many assumptions on MCP AP/AT usage, so many missinterpretations. I remember flying 737 long time ago and some basics to follow, which btw apply to all types: AS A PILOT YOU ARE PAID TO FLY THE A/C.
Means established on ILS, no matter in which mode, S=speed, P=pitch & P=power are the crucial datas to monitor. If any of these is not like it should be (of course a training Cpt should be aware of the right params for actual LAW) there must be somthing wrong. Trying to find out at 450' is way to late. Seems like nowadays, that what it means to get an a/c into the "coffin corner" is something, that pilots, who mostly rely on APs and fancy displays, did not learn anymore. You can't ever allow the a/c to get into that state, pure lack of raw data monitoring.
Happy fuelflow to all of You.
Fh
Means established on ILS, no matter in which mode, S=speed, P=pitch & P=power are the crucial datas to monitor. If any of these is not like it should be (of course a training Cpt should be aware of the right params for actual LAW) there must be somthing wrong. Trying to find out at 450' is way to late. Seems like nowadays, that what it means to get an a/c into the "coffin corner" is something, that pilots, who mostly rely on APs and fancy displays, did not learn anymore. You can't ever allow the a/c to get into that state, pure lack of raw data monitoring.
Happy fuelflow to all of You.
Fh
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NOD:
Even so, this scenario cannot be simulated in the current machines. You can fail either or both radalts, have the flag appear on the PFD and the dual autoland conk out, but an erroneous indication to make the AFDS and A/THR system go into flare mode and retard the throttles prematurely is not included in the suite of malfunctions.
Yet.
Even so, this scenario cannot be simulated in the current machines. You can fail either or both radalts, have the flag appear on the PFD and the dual autoland conk out, but an erroneous indication to make the AFDS and A/THR system go into flare mode and retard the throttles prematurely is not included in the suite of malfunctions.
Yet.