There are some striking CRM similarities with this accident and the Staines BEA Trident accident 25 years ago. Yes, there are some striking differences too - more on that later.
- Both aircraft were commanded by a high time training captain
- Both aircraft had a relatively junior co-pilot in the R/H seat
- Both aircraft had a third pilot on board - the Trident flew with 3 pilots as a norm (incredibly, the Trident had an experienced on type captain positioning in the jumpseat)
- Both aircraft suffered an in-flight event that led to the crash that, in itself, did not render the aircraft un-flyable
- Both aircraft crashed as a result of a lack of airspeed
The differences:
- The BEA had just taken off - the THY was just about to land
- The BEA suffered a self-inflicted mishap - the THY apparently suffered perhaps an insidious, but never-the-less evidently noticeable malfunction of a Rad Alt
- The BEA had a stall warning and stall recovery system (considered adequate at the time, but no real automation as we have today) - the THY had a modern aircraft with most of the recognised safety measures
The common ground:
In the case of the BEA a refusal to accept the situation that was presented to them, even to the point of cancelling the stall warning and protection. Whether this was the case with the THY .....? What does seem an absolute parallel is the apparent total lack of monitoring by the flight deck crew, AND, as was mentioned in the AIB report of the BEA, the distinct possibility that the junior crew might have been reluctant to report to, or comment to the captain that things weren't as they should be.
History repeats with monotonous regularity.