RAF Rivet Joint

[Single Spey]

. Tourist
When the whole flight safety thing was begun it was for very real reasons, but the pendulum has swung too far to the point that it is now driving the entire process and making a joke of our military.

Tourist, I think you are the one who is making a joke of our military.

I honestly don't give a flying **** about their behaviour as long as decent aircraft get to the front line. By decent I don't mean safe, though that is nice to have. By decent I mean capable.]

There is a whole bunch of guys and gals doing their utmost to ensure that your (and lots of innocent civilians) little pink body is not exposed to unnecessary risk, knowing full well that if it all goes pear shaped they are the ones who will be left to answer in front of the man wearing the white curly wig, while you are happily dining at the table of St Peter.

Do you really want to return to the days of 1952 because that is what you are advocating, and that would certainly put an end to military capability.

You still haven't said if you would take personal liability for a RJ coming down in the middle of Lincoln; are you man enough to take on the challenge?

SS

[tucumseh]

" a very immature variant entered service too quickly"

The entire aviation description of the Mk7
"The best bit of procurement in recent military history"

The two are not mutually exclusive. If you look at the RTS at date of accident, crucial parts of it reflect the AEW Mk2 circa 1996. As did the interoperability procedures with CVSs, the necessary contract to reconcile them having been cancelled by non-technical staff. The RTS was a cut and paste job without checking validity of, especially, read across. Hence the problem whereby speech intelligibility and the comms system in general was seriously compromised. (i.e. What you characterised as having "no effect on their situational awareness" which, coming from a pilot, I suppose I must concede. Just glad I don't have to implement any spec you have written!). In the same way the Chinook Mk2 RTS didn't come remotely close to reflecting a Chinook Mk2 in June 1994.


"Maturity" has a formal definition in MoD, measured (at the time) in technology and system integration readiness levels. ASaC was close, but short cuts had been ordered in critical Safety Case areas by the same non-technical staffs; for example, structural and electrical integrity. The Critical Design Review for the whole aircraft was waived by a non-engineer, which of course would have flagged the contributory factors noted by the BoI (yet again, because they'd been flagged in 1994-97). Similarly, system integration was largely waived. This crucial work was conducted in the background by Westland (a sub-sub-contractor, but actually leading player) and the programme manager, and hidden from the non-engineers and beancounters. That is what resulted in the "best bit of procurement in recent military history"; not the formal contracts and behaviour of ASE, DHSA, the IPT and parts of MoD(PE). Therefore, in a way I disagree with it being the "best bit of procurement", because it was actually the willingness of a small team of 2 (!) to serially disobey orders that made it SEEM a success. But you wouldn't want all programmes to be run like this, if only because there are so few willing to risk their careers, and even fewer who would know how!


As the aircraft had not been "Proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions", by (Secy of State and Chief Scientific Advisers') definition it was still a prototype. I'd slightly modify that statement if 849 had conducted trials on the way to the Gulf and the results had been fed back and plugged into the ongoing conversion programme, and ADS retrospectively amended - but I know the latter was not. One of the unproven parts (because the RN had stated there was no requirement at all for HISL and hence trials had not been scheduled) was using HISL or the new avionics off a ship, at night. When non-technical staff agreed HISL could be fitted to the 2nd Mk7 trials aircraft, no trials took place. (MoD claims it was in the first aircraft, but the pictures don't lie). Thus the first HISL trial was conducted by the BoI, who confirmed the installation (not HISL itself) did not meet the laid down design and airworthiness criteria. (With respect, this is where you don't recognise the difference between HISL and the HISL installation. No one has ever said HISL was not airworthy; it was the installation, which is much more than the strobe, combined with concept of use and lack of other defences in depth). The BoI were not told others had concluded the same some years before, so presented it as a revelation.

Unverified read-across was granted from HAS Mk6 (not AEW Mk2) to Mk7. Forgive me as a mere civilian, but the HAS Mk6 is quite different, and operated quite differently, with different systems, so read across would be so difficult to justify it would be cheaper and quicker just to trial the Mk7 properly, on an opportunity basis during a scheduled trial sortie. Which was recommended; and rejected, again, by non-technical staff. An order was issued that the regulations should be ignored, but a declaration made that they had been complied with. To this day MoD serially lies about this issue, despite the probing questions of various MPs representing the families. (Come on, all this stuff is freely available).


Every single mandated regulation governing Naval Service Mods was breached by this act, yet doing the job properly would have been easier and cheaper (because the NSM was deemed physically non-compliant by Westland, and functionally unsafe by the programme manager - the latter confirmed by the BoI). What the BoI failed to address was the fact the Safety Case was not updated by the IPT when they fitted HISL behind the PM's back. How could it be - there had been no trials and Westland had snagged the installation design.


However, an upside was the RN's renewed interest and support for the Mission System part of the programme (ASE having withdrawn RN support in 1995), epitomised by the superb 849 team at Boscombe. Good guys, let down a little by a rather oblique reference to safety criticality misleading the inquest, when a firm statement was needed as to the content of their IFF MAR recommendation report. (The original one, before succumbing to pressure to retract). That was fixed and made safe in the Mk7, but Tornado refused to, resulting in the Patriot shootdown of the same day. Another story......

[Tourist]

Spey

"You still haven't said if you would take personal liability for a RJ coming down in the middle of Lincoln; are you man enough to take on the challenge?"

Nope, and the challenge in itself is indicative of the problem.

If there is a one in a million chance of something happening, then it will eventually happen.
Should the man who made the decision to take a one in a million risk be penalised because it eventually happens?
No, the world should sit back and say "Sh1t Happens"

This idea that commanders should have personal liability if a reasonable risk is taken and the unlikely happens is stupidity and is calcifying our militaries ability to fight.
It is easy to see in todays military that nearly all commanders are becoming risk averse. They are constantly worried about going to jail rather than winning.

"Do you really want to return to the days of 1952 because that is what you are advocating"

I have never advocated that actually, but a quick glance at the graph I posted earlier would make 1968 seem optimum. The big easy gains have been made. The low hanging fruit have been plucked, but we still have the ability to operate.
Every year after that has been totally ineffective at reducing accidents at a growing cost to capability.

[Tourist]

Tuc

How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash?

It was turned off.

The previous fit would also have been turned off.

The pilot may also have been wearing incorrect underpants. The Observer may have had a non cleared crayon.
To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks.

In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way.
And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook.

Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7?

So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health.
So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened.

The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!

We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..

How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!

[FATTER GATOR]

Farewell PPRuNE

It started so well and has descended over the years into a mediocre shop for one-sided vitriolic diatribes and personal insults. I hope the 'crusading' does more good than satisfying the cyber ego's of faceless commentators.

The thought of reading through another depressing essay on airworthiness will help me resist the urge to look at this site again.

If your intentions are well-meaning, I wish you goodbye and good luck.

FG
Inverness.

[Chugalug2]

Fatter Gator, if I have been instrumental in your abrupt departure then please stick around and take me to task. I can assure you that all I want is to see the airworthiness that operated on my behalf and of which I was blissfully unaware be there for those who do Military Aviation today. Why else would I be forever chuntering on about it? Self aggrandisement? A bit difficult being, as you say, that I post anonymously. On the other hand if you support Military Air Safety then stick around and post accordingly.

This isn't an entertainment, it's supposed to be an exchange between aviation professionals. Now we can all slip below the high bar that infers, self most definitely included, but if our intentions are honourable and we are not being two faced then we can all gain from the process, whether we be pro or con. The problem about announcing one's departure is that it can follow the Law of Diminishing Returns as one comes and goes...

Which Law brings us of course back to you Tourist. I'm confused as to why the previous practice of switching off fwd Anti-Collision lights in the conditions that pertained at the time of the accident somehow means that switching off the later fwd HISLs was not a factor in the mid air collision of the two i/b o/b Seakings? I know that the BoI said they were not, but that trial was then the only formal one to date, ie no such trials had been carried out on the Mk7 previously. Even your can-do civvies would have trialled them, having 'glued' them on, wouldn't they?

Now I am an old retired fixed wing truckie, with very few rotary hours and they all pax, but isn't the whole raison d'etre of such devices to avoid collisions (there's a clue there somewhere in the name)? So with both aircraft having switched off said devices it follows that the risk of collision is increased doesn't it, yet the BoI finds that it wasn't and indeed that the HISLs had no bearing on it. Can you see the difficulty here? Operator illegally fits HISLs, 7 killed and two a/c lost in a mid-air, operator investigates accident, operator finds HISLs not to be a factor. Perhaps they weren't, but that is why the civvies have a regulator and an investigator separate and independent of the operators and of each other. That is all I ask for, all we ask for. Is it really so much?

[Willard Whyte]

This isn't an entertainment

Ah, but it is.

[Tourist]

Chug

This has become like arguing with the chemtrail freaks.

If you cannot see that an incorrect process, no matter how incorrect it is, for fitting a good piece of kit has no bearing on an accident then you need a tinfoil hat. You are questing for conspiracy.

Personally I think a straight read across from the mk 6 is perfectly reasonable. All bagger pilots at the time were ex mk6 and comfortable with its operation. Apart from its spacky wobble it flies the same too plus generally operated in the vicinity of the ship the same.

[Chugalug2]

Ah, but it is.

Well I should get self-righteous I suppose and go off on one about life and death issues, but better perhaps to admit that I fed you the lead in and you delivered the punch line, Willard. Well done you.

Tourist,
Nimrod was an incorrect process. Chinook was too many to list, Tornado was, etc. The Mk 10 seat was just about missing paper, the Safety Case. It killed its pilot by not doing what its job was, saving him from a zero zero ejection. And how do you know that your 'good piece of kit' wont wait 30 years before killing you, Tourist? How do you know that it ever was a 'good piece of kit' in the first place? How do you know if it still is?

Anyway, my question was not about whether the HISLs were good or bad, my question was how do we know that switching off the fwd ones on both baggers was not the cause of them colliding with one another? You say it wasn't, you say all the other baggers say it wasn't, the BoI President said it wasn't, but you tell us it was your custom as operators to switch them off anyway, and the Anti Collision Lights that preceded them, so you would all say that wouldn't you? You may all be right, but it would be better if that were confirmed by a truly independent MAAIB rather than the same operator, wouldn't it?

[Lonewolf_50]

how do we know that switching off the fwd ones on both baggers was not the cause of them colliding with one another

chug:
At the risk of incurring your wrath ... if both pilots reported to the controllers that they had visual on the other, and if the procedural control of altitude separation were being maintained (or not), then perhaps the lights being on or off is only part of the problem and not quite the "smoking gun" that it is being protrayed as. (If not being sold as such, that is how this line is coming off, perhaps unintentionally).

Night formation has its share of hazards regardless of kit installed. Closure rates can be deceptive day or night, and certainly much tougher at night.

FWIW, a very good friend of mine made a small mistake in closure rate back in 1984, flying an A-6 over the Med, during a low level rendezvous with his flight lead.
Daytime. (RIP, Pat. )
If these two Sea Kings were doing a join up in the dark ... it only takes a small mistake for things to go wrong.

[tucumseh]

How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash?

I again refer you to the BoI President. Other failures (which I know you agree occurred), necessary events (e.g. inbound radar mode change) and faults (e.g. outbound without radar/JTIDS/IFF) left HISL as their last line of defence in a situation that required them to see and be seen.



You continue to ignore repeated statements that no-one has ever claimed HISL caused the crash. It was a contributory factor, and the point is that WHY it was a contributory factor is part of the systemic airworthiness failings within MoD, which link this discussion to the thread subject. Specifically, in this case, refusal to obey mandated regulations.

To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks.

I again refer you to the BoI President. However, if you have tried to get him to listen, I appreciate your frustration, as he won’t.

In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way. And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook.

Interesting. Didn’t know that. How far from the ship did the Mk6 need to be before switching on, in her case, radar, IFF or secure comms. And how far out did an inbound have to start switching off?

Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7?

Irrelevant; you are fixated on the strobes themselves, which no one has ever said are unairworthy. The key question is, was the installation design or the way it is maintained changed, and was the Service Deviation amended? (Yes)

So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health.

I again refer you to the BoI President! There's a trend here.

So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened.

You reveal a very narrow mindset. If MoD had followed the correct process, NONE of the contributory factors noted by the BoI would have been present and more defences in depth would have been intact. I agree the fact Ark Royal’s IFF being unserviceable would still be a factor, along with other ship-side failures, but that is why you have defences in depth.



For example, If the HMS Liverpool Lynx had not encroached into the Carrier Control Zone without permission, flying across outbound ASaC’s nose at a critical point (on the precise track inbound would have been on a couple of minutes later on final approach), with lights off, then perhaps outbound would not have called “Visual”. (The diagrams derived from radar traces later published by RNFAISC demonstrate this vividly. When asked about the Lynx, MoD only ever talk about Inbound's perspective, avoiding the question of Outbound confusing her with the Inbound ASaC. In fact, at the critical point, the Lynx was directly behind the Outbound ASaC (as seen by Inbound), but the question as to how these converged targets would appear on their radar was not asked). Why did MoD lie about this? One witness said the Lynx was half a mile from Liverpool when the collision occurred. Another said the aircraft was on deck with the crew speaking to maintainers. An obvious conflict, so why did the Coroner shout down the father of outbound’s pilot when he asked for the conflict to be reconciled? Mr Green’s understandable outburst of "WHAT A FIX" sums up the inquest and post-BoI investigation (which MoD now claim didn’t happen).

The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!

We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..

How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!

Not sure I understand all this or its relevance to this case or RJ. Are you advocating that the military be permitted to “glue anything they want to an airframe”? Neither RJ nor ASaC were endorsed as UORs, so a quite different process kicks in, which only converge at key points. However, I wholeheartedly agree that the norm should be, shall we say, a "UOR+" route, rather than the convoluted and often unnecessary process forced upon DEC and DE&S.



This programme is a classic example of requirements not being set properly, but MoD getting very lucky. You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators, who didn’t see and probably don’t care what their seniors formally endorsed, then of course it was a success. But you should tell your bagger friends what the RN DIDN’T endorse, and so were a “gift” from the civilian PM. The Full Mission Trainer. Ask them how they’d have got on since 2003 without one! It wasn’t accidentally omitted from the requirement. It was specifically stated it was not wanted or needed. They’d still be flying under the late 2002 Switch On Only release, which did not permit operational use. Active Noise Reduction, Airborne Video Recording System (a vital source of data to the BoI, whose endorsement of it was the first), a working and safe IFF, a working comms system; and so on. So much of what they have was unendorsed and/or rejected, with robust lobbying to cancel critical components of the Mk7 programme supported by RN staffs.



Do they realise the endorsed requirement was a simple radar transmitter power upgrade with a few minor upgrades to various LRUs? Hence, the original project (not programme) title of “Radar System Upgrade” and the RN's insistence that 849 would simply shut down for a week-end while all cabs were converted (only 8, not 13), and the modified LRUs stuffed into the old decrepit Trainer. You couldn't make that up. (RSU was re-named “Mission System Upgrade” in 1995 at PE’s behest, but it was but one project within a much larger programme. It was a device to gently point out the RN hadn’t asked for anything that could actually be put to any use – which is a common cause of failed projects). The programme (not project) only got back on track when ASE(N) withdrew RN support, leaving the civilian MoD(PE) staff relatively free from interference, and to set the requirements and do the job properly. Is there a lesson there? It is little wonder the senior staffs didn’t want the Post Project Evaluation report written, or anywhere near the powers that be. It is a conundrum that is very relevant to the thread subject.

[Chugalug2]

Lonewolf 50, I'm not saying why these two aircraft collided because I don't know. What I am querying is why the operator was so sure that it was not because both their fwd HISLs were switched off. As tuc rightly points out all the other holes in the cheese slices meant that this compromised their last line of defence. As to both calling visual, visual with what? You mentioned a smoking gun, might that not have been the Lynx?

I don't expect anyone to know why these aircraft collided, and if they say they do I would suspect an agenda of some sort. My point all along is that, in common with all other Military Air Accident investigations to date, this was investigated under the auspices of the operator. That does not make for objective conclusions on which one can build in order to avoid avoidable accidents. That is the whole point of Aircraft Accident Investigation.

In the meantime a question mark hangs over this tragedy. One thing we do know though is that the HISLs had been fitted in contravention of the Airworthiness Regulations and had not been subject to trials, as well as other LRU discrepancies mentioned by Dervish . That is why it remains an Airworthiness Related Accident.

[Engines]

Guys,

Perhaps I can help here.

As I posted before, it's rare for any accident or incident to have a single, lone, cause. I almost every case where a BoI (now an SI) takes place, there are a number of factors involved. Some are what used to be called 'primary' - they were in the direct chain. Some were called 'contributory' - in old speak, they had an influence on the chain, but weren't actually part of it. And some were just observations. I hope you can already see that there is plenty of scope for disagreement and variation in how these factors are assessed and reported. And that's in an accident where the cause is definitely established. When the cause can't be established (as in the MoK crash), the field is left open for speculation, dispute and disagreement. This thread shows that in spades.

The difficulty that Tuc and Chug constantly highlight is in the area where shortcomings in 'airworthiness' are a factor.

Achieving an 'airworthy' aircraft (which I see as one that is safe to maintain, fly and operate, including on ops) starts with requirements, runs through design, acceptance, configuration management, and then into maintenance and operation. Oh, and that old bug bear modifications. The issues Tuc and Chug are highlighting is that the actions of VSOs (some in the MoD, some in the RAF - and there's a difference) have damaged the MoD's current ability to properly manage and deliver that 'airworthiness' process.

So, when an SI finds that there was a shortcoming in the MoD's 'airworthiness management system', the question arises whether it is a result of historical decisions by those VSOs, or the failure of those on the ground at the time to do the job. Here's a hard idea - it could be both. Or either. The decision is harder if the airworthiness factor is probably the primary cause. The real challenge (at least in my view) is how the MoD moves forward.

What I don't think what necessarily helps is trying to use casualty figures from accidents that don't have 'airworthiness' as a primary cause as a main argument for change. (Sorry, Chug, if you disagree). But what I do think is absolutely flaming vital is that the MoD gets its 'airworthiness house' in order as soon as practicable. And if that means highlighting some of the more horrible lapses that have occurred and are occurring (Chinook RTS, abuse of STFs, lack of basic technical competencies, putting schedule before safety), then I'm all for that. The arguments for fixing these can stand on their own merits, in my view.

I've already posted my ideas for change on the ground. My preferences for organisational change would be, for a starter, to see the MAAIB removed from the MAA, expanded and made directly accountable to the SoS for defence, or his PUS. MAAIB reports could then be separate from any MAA SIs, with their own chain of conclusions and observations. Oh, and published separately.

Next, policy and strategy for 'military air safety' should be stripped out of the MAA. Location? I'd say an independent Commission reporting to the SofS for Defence.

That would leave an in MoD' 'MAA' developing the detailed regulations and orders required to implement them.

What I think also needs a thorough scrub is the MoD's system for 'assurance' and even 'inspection' We've seen any number of recent scandals in the NHS where alledgedly responsible 'assurance' organisations couldn't find their own a**e with a map, let alone problems on the ground. My own view is that many areas of MoD have been too ready to shrug their shoulders and let the MAA have responsibility for seeing that things are done right. That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department. The recent Hawk accident SI should be a wake up call for this area.

I suppose there aren't any easy answers. My parting thought is this - we must never let 'airworthiness' (or 'air safety') become such a 'holy grail' that it damages our ability to deliver effective and acceptably safe kit to the front line in a timely way. I'm with Tourist all the way on this one. The teams doing the 'airworthiness' job need to be professional and brave enough to tell the politicians when they can't do that, and to defend (and explain) the trade offs that will have to be made to achieve the military aims.

Best Regards to all as ever

Engines

[dervish]

tuc, I suggest you stop. You have a distinct advantage.


tourist, atg, can we please have your thoughts on how the current problems on Rivet Joint could have been avoided and how MoD should now proceed? You criticize excessive process. You criticize tuc, who has said he agrees with you and has presented his own thoughts. What alternatives do you suggest? Alternatives don't mean the other is wrong. It seems to me more good has come out of this thread by discussing what does and doesn't work than has come out of RJ so far. MoD has admitted it knew of the problems years ago yet 7 months after delivery of the first aircraft it is going cap in hand to Hammond. What should Hammond do?

[Chugalug2]

Engines:-

What I don't think what necessarily helps is trying to use casualty figures from accidents that don't have 'airworthiness' as a primary cause as a main argument for change. (Sorry, Chug, if you disagree). But what I do think is absolutely flaming vital is that the MoD gets its 'airworthiness house' in order as soon as practicable.

I'm not using casualty figures as a main argument for anything other than to underline the gravity of a situation whereby the operator is judge and jury of its own conduct as well as of its own accidents. We have time and again seen instances whereby evidence has been withheld from BoI's, witnesses have been withheld from BoIs, BoI findings have been changed upon 'review', families have been serially lied to, coroners have been lied to, and evidence offered to address this subversion refused as not being 'new'. All that is over and above the deliberate suborning of Regulations to the extent that knowingly grossly unairworthy aircraft were illegally released to service.

Given such conduct I cannot see how anything can be taken at face value from such a source. That is why I call accidents 'airworthiness related' whereby the only reason that proven airworthiness shortcomings were not found to have contributed to an accident was because the operator said so. Air Safety has to be founded in trust or it is nothing. UK Military Air Safety has now reached that nadir and must be placed in independent hands to restore that essential trust, ie an independent MAA and MAAIB, both of the MOD and each other.

With respect, the MOD will never get its house in order, and airworthiness will remain unsafe in its hands. As to:-

we must never let 'airworthiness' (or 'air safety') become such a 'holy grail' that it damages our ability to deliver effective and acceptably safe kit to the front line in a timely way.

Who on earth is proposing that? The whole point of Air Safety in Military Aviation is to enhance Operational Capability. The reason there is an OC problem now is because of the unairworthiness infecting the whole military airfleet, which in turn is because of action/inaction by the MOD. It is nothing less than a national scandal.

[Heathrow Harry]

"That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department."

I thought that was what Cullen said...........

certainly a lot of oil companies moved to that - no special safety department, safety is a line responsibility and it's on your head as a director/manager/supervisor if the brown stuff hits the fan

pity BP never managed to get their US subsids to recognise it..............

[Roland Pulfrew]

Bl00dy Hell

The reason there is an OC problem now is because of the unairworthiness infecting the whole military airfleet

That is some kind of sweeping statement!! And probably a gross over exaggeration. Just think about all those military aircraft out there flying around serially un-airworthy.

I used to fly one type where paperwork grounded the fleet ensuring we delivered NO capability. The F700s ended up so big they had to be split into 2 because of the "husbandry log"; no airworthiness issues recorded, but lots of trivia and aircraft spent weeks, if not months, NOT flying. That's an example of the airworthiness tail wagging the OC dog. I'm beginning to think that Fatter Gator was right.

[Heathrow Harry]

be fair RP!

Tecumseh at al have spent pages explaining how they believe that "airworthy" means it meets the specs especially on failures and failure rates - if it doesn't meet those then it cannot be "airworthy" by definition

The others reckon if it can stagger off the ground and get back without killing any of the crew or taxpayers it must be fine

the MoD obviously haven't a clue otherwise SOMEONE should have stood up and said "Will this pass any Safety Case review?"

Hammond is now on the grill - say No and the SO's and the Treasury will go mad, they will breif against hm in the Press ("Minister wastes Zillions")

say YES and be placed, if something goes wrong, to be viliified ("Murderer of our brave lads .......")

[Engines]

Chug,

I really don't think we are very far apart, and I fully support the brave and proper stance you and Tuc have led. However, we have to bring the aircrew with us on this.

The point I was making was that it is possible for the less competent engineer to make airworthiness a 'fetish', a sort of 'holy grail', instead of applying their professional judgement and expertise to solve the problem and get the aircraft into service. I've had first hand experience of that (thankfully uncommon) side of the argument. Out of date Def Stans don't help when they are used as a sort of 'holy writ'. To be brutally honest, Boscombe lost a deal of cred because of attitudes like that. I don't think it was fair, but it happened, and the RAF managed to build a whole slew of OEUs to replace the AAEE function off the back of that perception.

I absolutely support using all best means to get the point over - but one thing I was always told in HQ staff was that you have to carry all the stakeholders with you. If 'airworthiness' is sen as an obstacle to effective combat operations, then I fully agree with you that it's an indictment of the attitude of generations of VSOs and those customers (aircrew). However, we also have to realise that there's a perception problem out there.

I suppose my focus is on the people at the sharp end doing the job properly. The regs aren't great, but they are sufficient for the job. The system isn't fab, but if the project engineers do their job right, the system won't stop them. The biggest challenge I see is getting the people on the desks back up to a level of technical expertise and experience that allows them to properly manage and deliver the kit. Of course, they need the support and encouragement of their superiors, and that's where your excellent points come in, in my view.

A more independent MAA? I've offered my thoughts on that. A more independent MAAIB, to produce really independent reports, yes. A rework of the currently flawed SI system? Definitely. But whatever you end up calling it, there will have to be some sort of MoD 'air safety administration house', to keep specs and regs up to date, and to carry out the 'QA' function (sorry, old speak there) to keep the desks honest as best they can.

Very much hoping that we stay on the same(ish) page here,

Yours ever

Engines

[Genstabler]

I apologise for being a thick, geriatric Pongo, but can someone explain for me in one, max two simple sentences without abbreviations, acronyms and other coding what exactly the problem is that keeps the beast grounded?
And try to be polite. I may be a trained killer but I am a sensitive one.