Guys,
Perhaps I can help here.
As I posted before, it's rare for any accident or incident to have a single, lone, cause. I almost every case where a BoI (now an SI) takes place, there are a number of factors involved. Some are what used to be called 'primary' - they were in the direct chain. Some were called 'contributory' - in old speak, they had an influence on the chain, but weren't actually part of it. And some were just observations. I hope you can already see that there is plenty of scope for disagreement and variation in how these factors are assessed and reported. And that's in an accident where the cause is definitely established. When the cause can't be established (as in the MoK crash), the field is left open for speculation, dispute and disagreement. This thread shows that in spades.
The difficulty that Tuc and Chug constantly highlight is in the area where shortcomings in 'airworthiness' are a factor.
Achieving an 'airworthy' aircraft (which I see as one that is safe to maintain, fly and operate, including on ops) starts with requirements, runs through design, acceptance, configuration management, and then into maintenance and operation. Oh, and that old bug bear modifications. The issues Tuc and Chug are highlighting is that the actions of VSOs (some in the MoD, some in the RAF - and there's a difference) have damaged the MoD's current ability to properly manage and deliver that 'airworthiness' process.
So, when an SI finds that there was a shortcoming in the MoD's 'airworthiness management system', the question arises whether it is a result of historical decisions by those VSOs, or the failure of those on the ground at the time to do the job. Here's a hard idea - it could be both. Or either. The decision is harder if the airworthiness factor is probably the primary cause. The real challenge (at least in my view) is how the MoD moves forward.
What I don't think what necessarily helps is trying to use casualty figures from accidents that don't have 'airworthiness' as a primary cause as a main argument for change. (Sorry, Chug, if you disagree). But what I do think is absolutely flaming vital is that the MoD gets its 'airworthiness house' in order as soon as practicable. And if that means highlighting some of the more horrible lapses that have occurred and are occurring (Chinook RTS, abuse of STFs, lack of basic technical competencies, putting schedule before safety), then I'm all for that. The arguments for fixing these can stand on their own merits, in my view.
I've already posted my ideas for change on the ground. My preferences for organisational change would be, for a starter, to see the MAAIB removed from the MAA, expanded and made directly accountable to the SoS for defence, or his PUS. MAAIB reports could then be separate from any MAA SIs, with their own chain of conclusions and observations. Oh, and published separately.
Next, policy and strategy for 'military air safety' should be stripped out of the MAA. Location? I'd say an independent Commission reporting to the SofS for Defence.
That would leave an in MoD' 'MAA' developing the detailed regulations and orders required to implement them.
What I think also needs a thorough scrub is the MoD's system for 'assurance' and even 'inspection' We've seen any number of recent scandals in the NHS where alledgedly responsible 'assurance' organisations couldn't find their own a**e with a map, let alone problems on the ground. My own view is that many areas of MoD have been too ready to shrug their shoulders and let the MAA have responsibility for seeing that things are done right. That responsibility starts with the person doing the job, and should run right up through every department. The recent Hawk accident SI should be a wake up call for this area.
I suppose there aren't any easy answers. My parting thought is this - we must never let 'airworthiness' (or 'air safety') become such a 'holy grail' that it damages our ability to deliver effective and acceptably safe kit to the front line in a timely way. I'm with Tourist all the way on this one. The teams doing the 'airworthiness' job need to be professional and brave enough to tell the politicians when they can't do that, and to defend (and explain) the trade offs that will have to be made to achieve the military aims.
Best Regards to all as ever
Engines