RAF Rivet Joint
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I presume the 'paperwork' was readily available from the manufacturer at any stage, since it is not a 'new' product
Sorry, perhaps I wasn't being precise enough in my use of English.
I meant that it wasn't (presumably?) a 'new' product to L-3 Communications, as opposed to the RAF, for which it is definitely a new aircraft type.
I therefore thought that, as the firm doing what was for them (presumably) a 'standard conversion', L-3 Communications would have the "big boxes of paperwork" available for the MAA to read whenever they wanted to.
Hopefully that clarifies my previous comment!
I meant that it wasn't (presumably?) a 'new' product to L-3 Communications, as opposed to the RAF, for which it is definitely a new aircraft type.
I therefore thought that, as the firm doing what was for them (presumably) a 'standard conversion', L-3 Communications would have the "big boxes of paperwork" available for the MAA to read whenever they wanted to.
Hopefully that clarifies my previous comment!
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But it is a new product in that the starting baseline aircraft will almost certainly be unlike any other used for conversion in terms of hours, mod standard, etc etc. And the next airframe will also start from a different baseline. And will there really be a paper trail going back some 50 years?
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Am I reading into this thread that the MAA will have to do three complete reviews of the paperwork as all three base aircraft are slightly different?
This I think it brings the concept of the MAA recommending approval for the F35B as an audited as proven safe aircraft into question.
With the different branches of the US military deciding to declare IOC with different versions of the hardware and software, does the MAA have the resources to audit the software releases etc or can the MOD rely on US approval? It would seem not from the Rivet Joint experience.
This I think it brings the concept of the MAA recommending approval for the F35B as an audited as proven safe aircraft into question.
With the different branches of the US military deciding to declare IOC with different versions of the hardware and software, does the MAA have the resources to audit the software releases etc or can the MOD rely on US approval? It would seem not from the Rivet Joint experience.
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"With the different branches of the US military deciding to declare IOC with different versions of the hardware and software, does the MAA have the resources to audit the software releases etc or can the MOD rely on US approval? It would seem not from the Rivet Joint experience".
It shows that the decision to reduce the DES from 25,000 to 5,000 and make Civil Servants redundant was a little silly (as predicted back in 2010 when I finally left).
It shows that the decision to reduce the DES from 25,000 to 5,000 and make Civil Servants redundant was a little silly (as predicted back in 2010 when I finally left).
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At the risk of wading in where there are many ingrained opinions at play - I don't believe that it was ultimately the MAA's decision to order Rivet Joint, so a bit much to blame them if it's found unsafe.
And a clarification from the original article - the large boxes of paperwork are not from L-3, they are from DE&S, so no, this couldn't have been done previously.
And a clarification from the original article - the large boxes of paperwork are not from L-3, they are from DE&S, so no, this couldn't have been done previously.
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The MAA cannot certify Airseeker as the original Boeing certification evidence no longer exists, and that's assuming it existed in the first place. The creation of the MAA raised the airworthiness bar leaving Airseeker unable to meet the new criteria for service entry.
The creation of the MAA raised the airworthiness bar leaving Airseeker unable to meet the new criteria for service entry.
I agree with the sentient expressed above -re MAA and the boxes of evidence. They should have been working alongside the PT for the last 4 years to ensure that nothing came as a surprise when the recommendations were drafted for ACAS. However, the MAA DG's comments imply this hasn't happened. Their jobs are to avoid the avoidable, and manage the unavoidable. The boxes he speaks of should be the latter.
As Wensleydale said, in so many words, it is unlikely the MoD has sufficient people of junior enough grade to do the work. All this should be basic stuff to the most junior CS in DE&S. Few, if any, at this grade work in the MAA, which says it all.
Is the process about to be undertaken by the MAA likely to be credible, or is it potentially just a case of smoke and mirrors?
On the one hand, given its track record in this area, the MOD wants to be seen to be doing things correctly, hence considerable open publicity on this matter. The MOD wants to be able to say that they have done it thoroughly and correctly.
On the other hand, given some comments here about the possible lack of historic evidence, if the case for recommendation is not proven, will the MAA have the gonads to say so, thus creating a massive white elephant, or will the political pressure to recommend release be overwhelming?
Please note, I am not deliberately trying to call into question the integrity of any individual involved in this process, and I apologize if anyone feels that to be the case. However, if the MAA were a truly independent body, as many on here have asked for, there might be more faith placed in any of its decisions.
On the one hand, given its track record in this area, the MOD wants to be seen to be doing things correctly, hence considerable open publicity on this matter. The MOD wants to be able to say that they have done it thoroughly and correctly.
On the other hand, given some comments here about the possible lack of historic evidence, if the case for recommendation is not proven, will the MAA have the gonads to say so, thus creating a massive white elephant, or will the political pressure to recommend release be overwhelming?
Please note, I am not deliberately trying to call into question the integrity of any individual involved in this process, and I apologize if anyone feels that to be the case. However, if the MAA were a truly independent body, as many on here have asked for, there might be more faith placed in any of its decisions.
Excellent questions Biggus.
The political pressure (both internal MoD and from Government) will be immense. We know this pressure often prevails over common sense and regulations. Chinook HC Mk2 for example. Nimrod was scrapped because it could never be certified and it would be slightly embarrassing for a replacement for a Nimrod variant to go the same way. The fact MoD have admitted "challenges" merely illustrates their utter failure to learn lessons over the last 20-odd years. The ludicrous Wg Cdr Spry thread here on pprune encapsulates the problem. The Flight Safety organisation can't get basic definitions right, even when MoD regulations get them spot on.
-re historical evidence. The rules governing technical and financial approval require this issue to be squared away under, at worst, a risk reduction programme, long before any development or production contract is let. Lack of such evidence has been regarded as a standing risk on all aircraft and equipment programmes since the Chief Engineer created the risk in 1991 (by issuing directives that savings should be made at the expense of safety). All aircraft PTs know it must be mitigated up front. I'd bet my house this has been largely ignored, in part because it is a career killer to implement this legal obligation and discover a problem. Nimrod MRA4 again.
Additionally, and as stated before, one cannot simply buy an aircraft, especially the avionics suite, "off the shelf" from the US. Our Home Office dictate certain parts of the specification which the US don't even know about (and they don't tell us of their equivalent). If the project has been planned assuming the aircraft will just be delivered and flown immediately, then some rather significant parts of the build standard and clearance process have been ignored entirely. Again, mandated risk reduction stuff on Day 1.
Another problem, as discussed above, is a distinct lack of corporate knowledge, not unrelated to the horrendous uncertainty anyone working in DE&S faces at the moment.
I think it will enter service, but the operational constraints and limitations may mean in some respects it is a dumbed down version of the R. Or perhaps the long delay means MoD are beavering away getting it up to spec.
The political pressure (both internal MoD and from Government) will be immense. We know this pressure often prevails over common sense and regulations. Chinook HC Mk2 for example. Nimrod was scrapped because it could never be certified and it would be slightly embarrassing for a replacement for a Nimrod variant to go the same way. The fact MoD have admitted "challenges" merely illustrates their utter failure to learn lessons over the last 20-odd years. The ludicrous Wg Cdr Spry thread here on pprune encapsulates the problem. The Flight Safety organisation can't get basic definitions right, even when MoD regulations get them spot on.
-re historical evidence. The rules governing technical and financial approval require this issue to be squared away under, at worst, a risk reduction programme, long before any development or production contract is let. Lack of such evidence has been regarded as a standing risk on all aircraft and equipment programmes since the Chief Engineer created the risk in 1991 (by issuing directives that savings should be made at the expense of safety). All aircraft PTs know it must be mitigated up front. I'd bet my house this has been largely ignored, in part because it is a career killer to implement this legal obligation and discover a problem. Nimrod MRA4 again.
Additionally, and as stated before, one cannot simply buy an aircraft, especially the avionics suite, "off the shelf" from the US. Our Home Office dictate certain parts of the specification which the US don't even know about (and they don't tell us of their equivalent). If the project has been planned assuming the aircraft will just be delivered and flown immediately, then some rather significant parts of the build standard and clearance process have been ignored entirely. Again, mandated risk reduction stuff on Day 1.
Another problem, as discussed above, is a distinct lack of corporate knowledge, not unrelated to the horrendous uncertainty anyone working in DE&S faces at the moment.
I think it will enter service, but the operational constraints and limitations may mean in some respects it is a dumbed down version of the R. Or perhaps the long delay means MoD are beavering away getting it up to spec.
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If MAA don't approve RivetJoin after we've bought it and its been in service for years with the USAF I doubt the Treasury or No. 10 will ever allow the RAF to buy another aircraft ever again......................
And everyone involved with turning it down will be on the s*** list forever - no promotion, no gongs
I'm sure that thought isn't in their minds at all tho'.........
And everyone involved with turning it down will be on the s*** list forever - no promotion, no gongs
I'm sure that thought isn't in their minds at all tho'.........
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The original decision makers involved in this Project have moved on. Many have left.
Those in the decision chain now must be strong and ensure the system is safe. Saving embarrassment and face saving is not an option.
Those in the decision chain now must be strong and ensure the system is safe. Saving embarrassment and face saving is not an option.
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This all seems like something from a "Yes Prime Minister " sketch. We scrap an excellent platform (R1) because another version of that platform is declared unsafe (MR 2) after spending miliions developing an advanced version (MRA 4).
We then buy an older platform (EC-135) from some one else who is already using it quite happily. But... we can't use the newly purchased platform because of the red tape put in place (quite correctly) after a fatal enquiry into a crash of the original platform concludes that better safety checks should have been in place. Said safety checks are put in place but they now prevent us flying the newly aquired platform.
Where were the checks and balances, project management, forward planning, risk assessment- whatever we want to call it that should have checked to see if we could have been cleared to fly the new platform if we went ahead and purchased it?
If the Red Tops decide to focus on this one they will have a field day, surely.
There has to be a simple answer, if the spams are flying it and they consider it safe, can someone not have a B**ls to sign it off as safe for RAF crews to fly in, surley with rank comes responsibility, lets say if Chief of the Air Staff flies on the first 5 sorties and declares , there you go boys I'm okay, crack on (yes I know if only it was that simple but aparrently thats what the Indian Air force bosses are doing).
We then buy an older platform (EC-135) from some one else who is already using it quite happily. But... we can't use the newly purchased platform because of the red tape put in place (quite correctly) after a fatal enquiry into a crash of the original platform concludes that better safety checks should have been in place. Said safety checks are put in place but they now prevent us flying the newly aquired platform.
Where were the checks and balances, project management, forward planning, risk assessment- whatever we want to call it that should have checked to see if we could have been cleared to fly the new platform if we went ahead and purchased it?
If the Red Tops decide to focus on this one they will have a field day, surely.
There has to be a simple answer, if the spams are flying it and they consider it safe, can someone not have a B**ls to sign it off as safe for RAF crews to fly in, surley with rank comes responsibility, lets say if Chief of the Air Staff flies on the first 5 sorties and declares , there you go boys I'm okay, crack on (yes I know if only it was that simple but aparrently thats what the Indian Air force bosses are doing).
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So we crack on with the US certification, and there is either an accident, or the mission system makes an error resulting in collateral damage or a blue on blue? The chap(s) who signed off the system is then hounded by ambulance chasing lawyers on behalf of the families and people on this forum write how we should have done things properly. YOU CANNOT HAVE BOTH RISK AND SPEEDY INTO SERVICE NOW THAT CROWN IMMUNITY IS NO LONGER WITH US! That is why we have lost maritime capability and probably why we will lose other capability in the future - especially with the reduction in manpower in the support organisations.
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Wensley and Jim,
In all my working life as an engineer, I never once thought about 'ambulance chasing lawyers' when making decisions. However, I thought quite a lot about the safety of those who were flying the aircraft that I had signed off as serviceable. And I can speak for all my engineering colleagues.
As Tuc and many others have tried to get over on this thread - you can get aircraft and new equipment into service safely, effectively and quickly. There is no compromise as long as you do the job properly first time. And honestly, it's not rocket science (except, maybe, for rockets).
But it's a job for engineers, one we do for the aircrew because we damn well care. We know we can't solve 'world peace' every time an aircraft is bought , or modified. We know the kit is needed at the front line. We know when something is acceptably safe and when it isn't. And we work with aircrew to get those decisions right. We do this because we are professionals.
A little while back, I had an interesting conversation with an aircrew VSO, who loudly and aggressively informed me that if he had his way, he would buy the aircraft he wanted direct from the US Armed Force concerned, and fly them in the UK 'under US rules'. He went on to inform me that the 'airworthiness concerns' being voiced by 'engineers who don't fly' were 'an attempt to justify their existence'.
And this was a VSO who was, at the time, a full Duty Holder. Go figure.
You do not, repeat, not, get CAS into an aircraft, get him to pole it around for 5 sorties, and then ask him to say 'there you go boys, I'm okay, crack on'. Look, you really don't.
Some aircrew need to understand this. When they don't they start applying pressure to 'just get the aircraft into service', asserting that 'they can get over the little problems engineers obsess over' (another actual quote from another aircrew officer just a few weeks ago). Then, things suddenly get 'political'. This is happening right now, and it needs to stop.
If (and it's an 'if, I hope I'm wrong), someone decided that we could buy old USAF airframes off the shelf with US kit in them, and didn't do the 'due diligence' required to get them cleared for UK service, then I sincerely hope they stay on the ground until they are fixed so that they are acceptably safe for use.
However, I more sincerely hope that they did do the necessary preparation, and that the aircraft get into service as soon as possible. Our dedicated and professional aircrew deserve nothing less.
Best Regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing for the right people,
Engines
In all my working life as an engineer, I never once thought about 'ambulance chasing lawyers' when making decisions. However, I thought quite a lot about the safety of those who were flying the aircraft that I had signed off as serviceable. And I can speak for all my engineering colleagues.
As Tuc and many others have tried to get over on this thread - you can get aircraft and new equipment into service safely, effectively and quickly. There is no compromise as long as you do the job properly first time. And honestly, it's not rocket science (except, maybe, for rockets).
But it's a job for engineers, one we do for the aircrew because we damn well care. We know we can't solve 'world peace' every time an aircraft is bought , or modified. We know the kit is needed at the front line. We know when something is acceptably safe and when it isn't. And we work with aircrew to get those decisions right. We do this because we are professionals.
A little while back, I had an interesting conversation with an aircrew VSO, who loudly and aggressively informed me that if he had his way, he would buy the aircraft he wanted direct from the US Armed Force concerned, and fly them in the UK 'under US rules'. He went on to inform me that the 'airworthiness concerns' being voiced by 'engineers who don't fly' were 'an attempt to justify their existence'.
And this was a VSO who was, at the time, a full Duty Holder. Go figure.
You do not, repeat, not, get CAS into an aircraft, get him to pole it around for 5 sorties, and then ask him to say 'there you go boys, I'm okay, crack on'. Look, you really don't.
Some aircrew need to understand this. When they don't they start applying pressure to 'just get the aircraft into service', asserting that 'they can get over the little problems engineers obsess over' (another actual quote from another aircrew officer just a few weeks ago). Then, things suddenly get 'political'. This is happening right now, and it needs to stop.
If (and it's an 'if, I hope I'm wrong), someone decided that we could buy old USAF airframes off the shelf with US kit in them, and didn't do the 'due diligence' required to get them cleared for UK service, then I sincerely hope they stay on the ground until they are fixed so that they are acceptably safe for use.
However, I more sincerely hope that they did do the necessary preparation, and that the aircraft get into service as soon as possible. Our dedicated and professional aircrew deserve nothing less.
Best Regards as ever to all those trying to do the right thing for the right people,
Engines
HH:-
What goes around comes around! The genesis for this debacle dates back to the late 80's and 'is coming to a unit near you soon'. Your comments are well made HH and point to the urgency of making the MAA and the MAAIB independent of the MOD and of each other. High visibilty situations like MRA4 or RJ are simply the tip of this ginormous iceberg. There probably isn't an aircraft or system in service that won't upon investigation prove to be unairworthy, as the SI into the tragic death of Flt Lt Cunningham has shown us.
Reversing the effects of the deliberate and malevolent attack on UK Military Airworthiness by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s is going to take decades. Like any such long march it can only be started by taking that first step. That must be by the RAF biting the bullet, admitting what happened, and taking action against the willful suborning of Mandatory Regulations and the issuing of Illegal Orders. That will take leadership...is it there?
If MAA don't approve RivetJoin after we've bought it and its been in service for years with the USAF I doubt the Treasury or No. 10 will ever allow the RAF to buy another aircraft ever again......................
And everyone involved with turning it down will be on the s*** list forever - no promotion
, no gongs
I'm sure that thought isn't in their minds at all tho'.........
And everyone involved with turning it down will be on the s*** list forever - no promotion
, no gongsI'm sure that thought isn't in their minds at all tho'.........
Reversing the effects of the deliberate and malevolent attack on UK Military Airworthiness by RAF VSOs in the late 80s/ early 90s is going to take decades. Like any such long march it can only be started by taking that first step. That must be by the RAF biting the bullet, admitting what happened, and taking action against the willful suborning of Mandatory Regulations and the issuing of Illegal Orders. That will take leadership...is it there?
Read what Engines said!
Throughout my career I came across very few aircrew who were “anti”. But I well remember the last one who was. He wanted me to cancel a trial of kit his superiors had declared Safety Critical, pack my bags and go back to AbbeyWood. He’s dead, killed by a non-engineer’s decision that functional safety could be ignored and a false declaration made that the work had been satisfactorily carried out. This kit was not fitted or being used correctly in the aircraft he was flying on his last flight. The non-engineers actions were withheld from the BoI and Coroner, and the MoD/MAA continue to support him.
It only takes one like that to get to Star rank and the system is in trouble. He did, and it is....... MoD engineers, Service and Civilian, knew how to get it right first time, and were within a whisker of doing so when this fraud was perpetrated upon us (and aircrew). It is almost always cheaper and quicker to simply implement the regs. Every accident or issue we discuss here has that same common denominator. Avoidable if the regs had been implemented. Yet, still, MoD/MAA rail against anyone who says this. Instead, they re-write the regs, somehow implying they are to blame. And cause so much confusion in the process their own Flight Safety centre doesn't know if they're full bored or countersunk. (Neither, you're being screwed ).
Throughout my career I came across very few aircrew who were “anti”. But I well remember the last one who was. He wanted me to cancel a trial of kit his superiors had declared Safety Critical, pack my bags and go back to AbbeyWood. He’s dead, killed by a non-engineer’s decision that functional safety could be ignored and a false declaration made that the work had been satisfactorily carried out. This kit was not fitted or being used correctly in the aircraft he was flying on his last flight. The non-engineers actions were withheld from the BoI and Coroner, and the MoD/MAA continue to support him.
It only takes one like that to get to Star rank and the system is in trouble. He did, and it is....... MoD engineers, Service and Civilian, knew how to get it right first time, and were within a whisker of doing so when this fraud was perpetrated upon us (and aircrew). It is almost always cheaper and quicker to simply implement the regs. Every accident or issue we discuss here has that same common denominator. Avoidable if the regs had been implemented. Yet, still, MoD/MAA rail against anyone who says this. Instead, they re-write the regs, somehow implying they are to blame. And cause so much confusion in the process their own Flight Safety centre doesn't know if they're full bored or countersunk. (Neither, you're being screwed ).