How, exactly does the un-airworthy installation of HISL cause to aircraft to crash?
I again refer you to the BoI President. Other failures (which I know you agree occurred), necessary events (e.g. inbound radar mode change) and faults (e.g. outbound without radar/JTIDS/IFF) left HISL as their last line of defence in a situation that required them to see and be seen.
You continue to ignore repeated statements that no-one has ever claimed HISL caused the crash. It was a contributory factor, and the point is that WHY it was a contributory factor is part of the systemic airworthiness failings within MoD, which link this discussion to the thread subject. Specifically, in this case, refusal to obey mandated regulations.
To say that this makes the accident airworthiness related is b@llocks.
I again refer you to the BoI President. However, if you have tried to get him to listen, I appreciate your frustration, as he won’t.
In the regime of flight they were in, the bagger and a pinger were operating in exactly the same way. And I have both Mk6 and 7 in my logbook.
Interesting. Didn’t know that. How far from the ship did the Mk6 need to be before switching on, in her case, radar, IFF or secure comms. And how far out did an inbound have to start switching off?
Incidentally, you know that after all this palava, they decide to leave HISLs on the Mk7?
Irrelevant; you are fixated on the strobes themselves, which no one has ever said are unairworthy. The key question is, was the installation design or the way it is maintained changed, and was the Service Deviation amended? (Yes)
So the process did not tick the boxes, but the bit of kit has a clean bill of health.
I again refer you to the BoI President! There's a trend here.
So if they had followed the correct process, the HISL would have been fitted and the accident would still have happened.
You reveal a very narrow mindset. If
MoD had followed the correct process, NONE of the contributory factors noted by the BoI would have been present and more defences in depth would have been intact. I agree the fact Ark Royal’s IFF being unserviceable would still be a factor, along with other ship-side failures, but that is why you have defences in depth.
For example, If the HMS Liverpool Lynx had not encroached into the Carrier Control Zone without permission, flying across outbound ASaC’s nose at a critical point (on the precise track inbound would have been on a couple of minutes later on final approach), with lights off, then perhaps outbound would not have called “Visual”. (The diagrams derived from radar traces later published by RNFAISC demonstrate this vividly. When asked about the Lynx, MoD only ever talk about Inbound's perspective, avoiding the question of Outbound confusing her with the Inbound ASaC. In fact, at the critical point, the Lynx was directly behind the Outbound ASaC (as seen by Inbound), but the question as to how these converged targets would appear on their radar was not asked). Why did MoD lie about this? One witness said the Lynx was half a mile from Liverpool when the collision occurred. Another said the aircraft was on deck with the crew speaking to maintainers. An obvious conflict, so why did the Coroner shout down the father of outbound’s pilot when he asked for the conflict to be reconciled? Mr Green’s understandable outburst of "WHAT A FIX" sums up the inquest and post-BoI investigation (which MoD now claim didn’t happen).
The military now lives in a world where if you need something done quickly and effectively, you step outside the military framework and get it cleared the civilian route!!
We deployed a UOR to Afghan totally bypassing Boscome because it was the only way to get the capability to theatre inside a decade and a billion dollars..
How crazy is it that the civvys can pretty much glue anything they want to an airframe and the military cannot!!
Not sure I understand all this or its relevance to this case or RJ. Are you advocating that the military be permitted to “glue anything they want to an airframe”? Neither RJ nor ASaC were endorsed as UORs, so a quite different process kicks in, which only converge at key points. However, I wholeheartedly agree that the norm should be, shall we say, a "UOR+" route, rather than the convoluted and often unnecessary process forced upon DEC and DE&S.
This programme is a classic example of requirements not being set properly, but MoD getting very lucky. You call it a success, and from the very narrow viewpoint of front line operators, who didn’t see and probably don’t care what their seniors formally endorsed, then of course it was a success. But you should tell your bagger friends what the RN DIDN’T endorse, and so were a “gift” from the civilian PM. The Full Mission Trainer. Ask them how they’d have got on since 2003 without one! It wasn’t accidentally omitted from the requirement. It was specifically stated it was not wanted or needed. They’d still be flying under the late 2002 Switch On Only release, which did not permit operational use. Active Noise Reduction, Airborne Video Recording System (a vital source of data to the BoI, whose endorsement of it was the first), a working and safe IFF, a working comms system; and so on. So much of what they have was unendorsed and/or rejected, with robust lobbying to cancel critical components of the Mk7 programme supported by RN staffs.
Do they realise the endorsed requirement was a simple radar transmitter power upgrade with a few minor upgrades to various LRUs? Hence, the original project (not programme) title of “Radar System Upgrade” and the RN's insistence that 849 would simply shut down for a week-end while all cabs were converted (only 8, not 13), and the modified LRUs stuffed into the old decrepit Trainer. You couldn't make that up. (RSU was re-named “Mission System Upgrade” in 1995 at PE’s behest, but it was but one project within a much larger programme. It was a device to gently point out the RN hadn’t asked for anything that could actually be put to any use – which is a common cause of failed projects). The programme (not project) only got back on track when ASE(N) withdrew RN support, leaving the civilian MoD(PE) staff relatively free from interference, and to set the requirements and do the job properly. Is there a lesson there? It is little wonder the senior staffs didn’t want the Post Project Evaluation report written, or anywhere near the powers that be. It is a conundrum that is very relevant to the thread subject.