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bearfoil claims the plane hit 30 degrees pitch up.
BEA claims: The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15 degrees... and later on: ...pitch attitude of 16.2 degrees nose-up... They did declare AoA never got BELOW 35 degrees once it had stalled. (And I see from news reports training is getting a dose of blame. The aircraft should earn a dose, too, for the way stall warnings are handled and the utter lack if cross feed into the ADIRUs from the GPS and Intertial systems, IMAO.) |
airtren The Vertical Speed Curve shows continuous variations during the fall, indicating that the fall was very bumpy, and not at constant speed. the vitesse vertical on s114 is inconsistent after 2:12:45 like a lot of other parameters too at this moment the "incident par le iris 1,2,3" (what must be the AoA???) climb over 30 deg I think with more than 30 deg AoA a lot of the sensors are not longer in a clean flow and they will show also the turbulences of the flow at the bottom of the fuselage, so I do not think that it is the true vitesse vertical..... p.s. what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114) |
Originally Posted by takata
Having a camera showing all the displays and crew actions (postions/attitudes) would be very helpful rather than having to derive something from recorded data which doesn't give any hint about what can NOT be derived. (e.g. was the PNF reading silently the documentation? was he scanning the displays? looking at the PF actions? did they exchange meaningful regards?)
8 megabits/second is a megabyte per second. One hour is 3.6 gigabytes. This is within the size limits for well established solid state disk technology such as could be repackaged into a Honeywell box with modified interfacing. Getting the signal back to the position in the tail will require a new wire, probably using Ethernet, for the data to be store. If Ethernet is used well established backup disk software can be repurposed. They might be able to get this working in a few months and certified in a couple years. It would be a good idea. And I'd use a larger disk and perhaps 1/2 hour recording time before old is overwritten. Then higher resolution for more readability could be applied. With a 100 gigabyte solid state disk they could record three or four channels at quite respectable resolutions. They might need to be using gigabit Ethernet or even a pair of gigabit Ethernet connections to pass all the data. So four or more new cables might be needed to get the data back to the recorders. That's probably the most difficult to sell part of the concept. |
HN39,
Red, yellow, and green is needed. Red is means, "If' it's in this region and the plane is not resting on its landing gear then it is stalled no matter what." Yellow or perhaps orange means "You're stalled in this region if the air speed is above 60kts." That region gets adjusted for air speed. Green is "not yellow/orange/red" meaning you're probably OK but be paranoid if it's not neatly within the central region of green. An AoA above 30 degrees is stalled. I am sure the 30 degrees can be set a little lower. In the case of AF447 any sane set of AoA display parameters would have been a clue. Whether the pilots would have had a clue what to do is up for grabs, after things that BEA said. Oy! I rather wish they'd had words about AB's choice to shut off stall warnings with air speeds below 60kts no matter where the plane is. That's "bogus". It seems pretty obvious these pilots were not well enough aware of this counter intuitive trait. |
badgerh, regarding recoverability of the stall note that the instance a recovery was made does not mention the THS at its "up" limit as AF447 had. It would have taken over 5000' for the THS to become neutral and another who knows how much for it to go "down" enough to matter. Then could it be returned to neutral fast enough for the plane to fly out of the recovery. It'd be real close at 10000', I bet.
(grin) Anyone here willing to try? |
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Alber Ratman, I'm not even sure an AoA indication would have helped them at all. They were so hopelessly disoriented I'm sitting here with tears in my eyes.
The PNF should have trusted his hunches and pushed the stick forward to recover from the stall. His abiding by proper procedures cost him his life. Oh God! |
vanHork, "Further on I keep seeing that the captain is trying to make sense of what are apparently continuously divergent readings."
And apparently they never looked at the inertial instrument readings for either velocity, pitch, or altitude. It was not even mentioned. WTF is it even in the cockpit if the crew are not trained to use it? And why in (totally censored) are they NOT taught how to use it? I can't seem to get these tears out of my eyes. {o.o} |
Originally posted by ventus45 ... .... unswerving belief in, "the gospel according to Toulouse It's their belief in Air France that brought them down ... and it shouldn't have. |
Hello Grity
p.s. what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114) It seems to me that On glaresheld : FPA/VS knob was selected VS 0 Take care of you and happy landing |
Takata;
Re your message #999: Originally Posted by ACARS .1/FLR/FR090601 0210 279334 06 EFCS1 X2,EFCS2X,,,,,, FCPC2 (2CE2) /WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD It seems to be simply due to PNF selection of ADR3 in place of its own ADR1 displayed. Hence, he switched to ADR3 (wrong) shortly before ADR1 returned "good" again. A while later, it seems that ADR+IR 3 was switched for ADR+IR 2 on PF display. (3) Fault detection and analysis (except for the internal FWS computer faults) As soon as an internal or external fault is isolated, it is considered as being at DETECTED status. The FWS computer which detected the fault must confirm it. The fault duration affecting ARINC bus links is: - 2 s for a label with its SSM coded FW or FT FLIGHT, for the SDACs - 2 s + maximum of 500 ms or 5 cycles for a label not refreshed or if its parity is incorrect , for the SDACs and for the FWCs - 2 s + 5 cycles for a label if its SSM is coded FW or FT FLIGHT, for the FWCs. Then, the fault is at DECLARED status. A declared fault must be sent to the CMC. A DECLARED fault is then consolidated. This consolidation is performed by the computer which declared the fault. It consists in checking the duration of the fault or its recurrence. If the fault is still present after 10 seconds or if it occurs 3 or more times during the flight, it is consolidated. A fault which is declared not consolidated is transmitted to the CMC as being a TRANSIENT fault, with bit 19 of label 356 at 0 (INTERMITTENT). A fault which is declared consolidated is transmitted to the CMC as being a PERMANENT fault with bit 19 of label 356 at 1 (HARD). A declared fault, whether it is consolidated or not, is transmitted for correlation: - a fault declared by a SDAC is transmitted to the FWCs, - a fault declared by a FWC is transmitted to the opposite FWC, - an ECAM control panel fault is transmitted to the FWCs. The correlated message which is transmitted in any case to the CMC by the FWC 1 is stored in each FWC. NOTE : Very few LRUs connected to the FWS, are not checked at the BITE level but remain checked at the operational level. (4) Correlation principle In addition to one fault detection, each FWC starts a correlation process. This correlation is only possible because every LRU which is acquired by the FWS is connected at least to two computers of the FWS. This correlation is performed on the buses and on the analog data. The correlation enables a greater precision on the origin of the fault. - Example of a message not correlated: If a fault is detected only by one FWS computer, the associated message will be: FWCi(1WWi)/WRG:FMGECn BUS E GEN TO FWCi - Example of a correlated message: If the same fault is detected by two computers of the FWS, the associated message will be: FMGECn(1CAn) BUS E GEN The correlation process which is performed by the FWCs can be initiated only after the consolidation.
Yes, it means "Vertical Speed Selector", on the FCU - it also doubles as the FPA selector when the mode is in TRK-FPA. An observation - (one of many, I suspect); Just so everyone is clear on this, the "MAX REC" on the MCDU is not displayed in red font as shown in the BEA Report. I suspect this is for emphasis only. The MAX REC is not a limitation but an advisory based upon both crew-entered TROP heights, and current weights and temperatures, (SAT). One doesn't attempt to climb above it but it wouldn't be a "limitation" in the same sense that the service ceiling of the aircraft is a certification limitation. Thus far, in my reading of the Report, I cannot find clear comments on why the initial pitch-up occurred. The stick movement was brisk - 7deg (almost half-stick aft movement) in one second. As I posted earlier, I thought it might have been 4 to 5 degrees, which equated to about 3cm of aft stick movement or about roughly about six inches on a standard control column. This aft movement is far greater than that. We can understand a bit better why the aft stick movement during the cockpit confusion, but not the initial movement. Still reading. |
p.s. what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114) It seems to me that On glaresheld : FPA/VS knob was selected VS 0 |
mm43 your old calculations compares wery good with the outcoming
2 points I found: they lost more energie in the first time, maybe du to the strong corections with ailerons and the pitch was not constant high it moves up and down +16deg.....--8 deg so the stall was not so stable, the stable flow must have braked down 2 or 3 times with a move to the front |
Originally Posted by JD-EE
(Post 6606206)
They might need to be using gigabit Ethernet or even a pair of gigabit Ethernet connections to pass all the data. So four or more new cables might be needed to get the data back to the recorders. That's probably the most difficult to sell part of the concept.
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dozy, thanks for the translation of that section of the report.
jcgeant, the answer to your 'bizarre' question is that the wife of the PF is back in the cabin, and they both are returning from a vacation in Brazil. The PF had apparently not previously flown with the captain before this flight. That's why the captain asks if he is qualified. (You can check the passenger list and match her name with the name of the PF.) Now one can ask whether it was prudent for the captain to take his rest while the flight is transiting a turbulent section of the ITCZ, and turning the flight over to a junior FO with whom he has never flown before. |
@Grity
Quote: p.s. what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114) It seems to me that On glaresheld : FPA/VS knob was selected VS 0 but it has 3 values over the time, so it can not be a single knob ??? 1.31.40 INDICATIONS ON PFD VERTICAL SPEED: The displayed vertical speed information is normally based on both inertial and barometric data. ---If inertial data is not available, it is automatically replaced by barometric information. In this case, the window around the numerical value becomes amber. 3 values? on page 116 only 2 (ADR or IR) |
Initial stick movements
Sorry everybody, meant to send this as a PM. No disrespect intended to any pilot, living or dead.
PJ2 Thus far, in my reading of the Report, I cannot find clear comments on why the initial pitch-up occurred. The stick movement was brisk - 7deg (almost half-stick aft movement) in one second. As I posted earlier, I thought it might have been 4 to 5 degrees, which equated to about 3cm of aft stick movement or about roughly about six inches on a standard control column. This aft movement is far greater than that. We can understand a bit better why the aft stick movement during the cockpit confusion, but not the initial movement. I share your confusion about why the pilot saw the need for the initial stick movement. However I wonder if the magnitude of the input might be be the result of [trained?] poor piloting technique. If the full "protections" are there, a huge input simply says "give me all you can". I have no idea if such a practice exists anywhere, but can see how the available pilot interface might encourage it to develop. Or at the least, not discourage its use. Any opinion? |
Has anyone else gained the impression that PF actions, appear to assume 'Normal' law ? - despite acknowledgements of Alternate reversion soon after the AP disconnect sequence.
If so, does this indicate a stress reversion to Normal law ss inputs by PF, confused training, or lack of understanding just how sensitive the a/c is at cruise altitude to manual control... I don't wish to criticise, but the focus on what this that or the other instrument was displaying, where this that or the other switch was set or not set, and what was being said is all but immaterial once you look at the gross insensitivity of manual flight control... and what appears to be an assumption, at least on the part of PF, that the answer to almmost everything has simply got to be stick back (and possibly more thrust) ... only when explicitly countermanded, did PF try anything else. The meaning and dangers of MAX ALT (recommended) being exceeded were acknowledged by PNF & PF, but whereas coarse NU had been used to get there, only weak, tentative and ineffectual ND is observed as the response. Here we have an extreme FEAR of any ND inputs (speed fear) Here we have a seeming belief that NU inputs at the very edge of the High Alt flight envelope, in Alternate Law, are perfectly acceptable. The 'speed fear' can perhaps be explained by the known UAS - the NU inputs as a response a serious failure by PF (and yes, its been said PNF should then & there taken firm control) Let us also not forget that the 'silent & unobserved' Alternate Law THS movement - undoubtedly a big factor in the stability of the stalled pitch attitude, requiring large ND for long periods (many tens of seconds) to overcome... I am glad the BEA have reported their concerns over this unfortunate oversight. |
HarryMann
I agree totally. The actions following the stall could suggest an "Alpha Floor" fixation. I don't think the PF understood the implications of the reversion to Alternate Law. |
...and I don't think you lot would have a clue as to what you are talking about!! :sad:
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I have been advised by the BEA this morning that they hope that the English version of the Interim Report #3 "will be available.....next Wednesday."
I am somewhat surprised that in a matter of such importance this should be the case. The date for the issue of the report was chosen by the BEA and I would have thought they could have factored in the time needed for the simultaneous issue of an authoritative translation. |
Originally Posted by Amos2
..and I don't think you lot would have a clue as to what you are talking about!!
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Hi,
It's a little difference between the interim report N°1 and interim report N°3 concerning the PF .. but it's a important point. Let see ..... Rappor intérimaire N°1 1.5.1.3 Copilote Homme, 32 ans ˆ Licence FCL de pilote professionnel (CPL) obtenue le 23 avril 2001 ˆ Qualification de vol aux instruments multi-moteur (IR ME) obtenue le 16 octobre 2001 ˆ ATPL théorique obtenu en septembre 2000 Void space (my edit) ˆ Qualification de type Airbus A340 obtenue le 26 février 2008 ˆ Fin d’adaptation en ligne le 9 juin 2008 ˆ Qualification de type Airbus A330 obtenue le 1er décembre 2008 ˆ Fin d’adaptation en ligne le 22 décembre 2008 ˆ Autre qualification de type : Airbus A320 obtenue le 7 septembre 2004 ˆ Dernière visite d’aptitude médicale de classe 1 effectuée le 24 octobre 2008, valable jusqu’au 31 octobre 2009 avec port de verres correcteurs obligatoire. ˆ Heures de vol : „ totale : 2 936 heures de vol „ sur type : 807 heures de vol (9) „ dans les six derniers mois : 368 heures, 16 atterrissages, 18 décollages „ dans les trois derniers mois : 191 heures, 7 atterrissages, 8 décollages „ dans les trente derniers jours : 61 heures, 1 atterrissage, 2 décollages Ce pilote avait réalisé cinq rotations sur le secteur Amérique du Sud depuis son arrivée dans la division A330/A340 en 2008, dont une vers Rio de Janeiro. Sa reconnaissance de ligne de type océanique était valide jusqu’au 31 mai 2010. ECP saison d’instruction 2008/2009 : ˆ Entraînement E33 le 2 février 2009 ˆ Contrôle Hors Ligne C34 le 3 février 2009 ˆ Cours au sol 4S le 15 janvier 2009 La validité des entraînements, contrôles et cours au sol E34, C33, CEL34, CEL33, S1 est couverte par les dates d’obtention des qualifications de types Airbus A330 et A340 ainsi que par la date de fin d’adaptation en ligne (lâcher). Ces entraînements et contrôles étaient à programmer avant les échéances suivantes : ˆ Entraînement E34 : 31 août 2009 ˆ Contrôle Hors Ligne C33 : 31 août 2009 ˆ Contrôle En Ligne CEL34 : 31 décembre 2009 ˆ Contrôle En Ligne CEL 33 : 31 décembre 2010 ˆ Cours au sol S1 : 31 mars 2010 Rapport intérimaire N°3 1.5.1.3 Copilote place droite 1.5.1.3.1 Historique détaillé de la carrière aéronautique : Brevet de pilote privé avion obtenu en 2000 Pilote de ligne théorique en 2000 Brevet de pilote professionnel avion obtenu en 2001 Qualification de vol aux instruments sur avion bimoteur obtenue en 2001 Brevet de pilote de planeur obtenu en 2001 A la suite de sa sélection par Air France, stage de formation pilote à l’école de pilotage Amaury de la Grange à Merville à partir d’octobre 2003 QT A320 obtenue en 2004 (au sein d’Air France). Fin d’AEL et lâcher en septembre 2004 Brevet de pilote de ligne obtenu le 3 août 2007 QT additionnelle A340 obtenue en février 2008 (au sein d’Air France). Fin d’AEL et lâcher en juin 2008 QT additionnelle A330, fin d’AEL et lâcher en décembre 2008 ECP saison d’instruction 2008/2009 : Cours au sol 4S le 15 janvier 2009 Entraînement E33 le 2 février 2009 Contrôle Hors Ligne C34 le 3 février 2009 Note : la validité des entraînements, contrôles et cours au sol E34, C33, CEL34, CEL33, S1 est couverte par les dates d’obtention des qualifications de types Airbus A330 et A340 ainsi que par la date de fin d’adaptation en ligne (lâcher) Des entraînements et contrôles étaient à programmer avant les échéances suivantes : Entraînement E34 : 31 août 2009 Contrôle Hors Ligne C33 : 31 août 2009 Contrôle En Ligne CEL34 : 31 décembre 2009 Contrôle En Ligne CEL 33 : 31 décembre 2010 Cours au sol S1 : 31 mars 2010 1.5.1.3.2 Entraînements IAS douteuse o Entraînement au simulateur E33 de la saison d’instruction 2008-2009. Exercice « IAS douteuse ». Note : le programme de la QT A320 chez Air France en 2004 ne comprenait pas d’exercice sur le vol avec IAS douteuse. Décrochage o QT A320 : séance FFS n° 4 : « pilotage en loi dégradée (effet de buffeting). Evolutions en loi alternate ». o QT A320 : séance FFS n° 7 : « Reconnaissance préventive et contre-mesure de l’approche du décrochage. DEMONSTRATION STALL WARNING ». La procédure STALL en vigueur était celle de décembre 1999. Note globale : les QT additionnelles A330 et A340 n’abordent que les différences par rapport aux QT déjà obtenues sur les autres types (A320, A330, A340). Do you see the difference or I must explain ? The date for the issue of the report was chosen by the BEA and I would have thought they could have factored in the time needed for the simultaneous issue of an authoritative translation. Don't forget some politic pressures ..... |
There isn't much communication in those 3 mins. One gap lasts 25 seconds which seems an age give the situation.
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Early opportunity to climb
During the brieffing:
"Les deux copilotes discutent encore de la température et du REC MAX. Les turbulences augmentent légèrement et ils décident de prévenir l’équipage de cabine de l’entrée dans une zone plus turbulente. Le copilote de droite dit qu’ils sont « apparemment à la limite de la couche », avant de rajouter qu’il aurait préféré monter au FL 360. Accéder à un niveau supérieur est une préoccupation constante de l’équipage. Les pilotes désirent visiblement évoluer en dehors de la couche, probablement pour limiter les turbulences". (3rd interim report, page 75) Could it be the reason why a reflex of the PF was to climb (violently) when the A/P and A/THR went off, and when he got the commands ? (note that it is the PNF who told the PF to reduce the VS and stabilize the altitude). When the AF 447 climbed to FL 375, no one in the cockpit seemed concerned by the RECMAX anymore. |
Hi,
Another fact .. (from the interim N°3) The PF was not belted The PNF was partialy belted All this when they know (and they advise the cabin personnel about) they will have some more turbulences .. and anyways they are cruising in a possible turbulent aera .. Seem's they were very relax on the flight deck ..... How can the PF be accurate with stick if his body is free ... Accéder à un niveau supérieur est une préoccupation constante de l’équipage. Les pilotes désirent visiblement évoluer en dehors de la couche, probablement pour limiter les turbulences" Seem's to me a bad solution ... the best seem's to change heading ... |
hyperveloce, perhaps a pre-disposition, but then there seems to be little coordination between the two of them.
Le bruit de fond change rapidement vers 2 h 09 min 46. Ce changement de bruit de fond a été identifié comme pouvant être caractéristique de la présence de cristaux de glace mais ne donne lieu à aucun commentaire particulier de l’équipage, le phénomène étant très peu connu des pilotes à l’époque. Le PNF prend alors l’initiative de diminuer le Mach vers 0,8 et les antigivrages moteurs sont enclenchés. |
Hi,
Strangers in the cockpit at a difficult time and inopportune moment. |
Not only had the PF apparently never flown with the captain before this flight, but I am thinking he hadn't flown before with the PNF. |
Originally Posted by jcjeant
(Post 6606860)
It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane ....
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I think the French Transcript is not reflecting properly the tone/intonation of the voice in that particular section, and perhaps in others as well.
"tu montes" is an acknowledgment of the situation, what the action of the PF drives the plane to do. I am quite sure the "tu descend" should be "tu descend!!!" as an "imperative", a recommendation, an order. It must be related to attitude. Practically, the PNF is saying "you're NOSE UP", so "GET THE NOSE DOWN"... From what I could sense, the PNF is somewhat unpatient, with the way the PF controls the stick, while he is also trying to help, guiding him. It's clear he is not realizing the effects that this is going to have a minute or so later.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
(Post 6604567)
...And tellingly, the Captain says :
One question for our Gallic cousins - do I interpret "Tu montes" and "Tu descends descends" as literally climb and descend, or could the PNF be referring to attitude (nose-up/nose-down) here? [EDIT : Corrected Captain's statement - thanks for the catch! ] The "a/c to pilot information interface" - my words - is part of the "a/c category" of elements that BEA document points to among contributing factors, and recommends to be addressed.
Originally Posted by DozyWannabe
(Post 6606891)
... Aside from the pitots, nothing was wrong with that aircraft. ....
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jcjean,
Do you see the difference or I must explain ? The two *biographies* refer to both co-pilots and, this is news to you : Contrarily to what everyone thought, the PF, on the RHS was the younger and the less experienced pilot on board. ( see pages 11 to 16 of the report on experience and position in the flight deck ) That's the reason for the BEA recommendation about new SOPs for cockpit task attribution when Captain is resting. So, Mister, would you have solved , without much information the situation these pilots were facing ? in view of your performance in reading / understanding a simple text, may I be allowed to doubt it ? Further more, wouldn't a bit of respect and humility be in order ? |
How can the PF be accurate with stick if his body is free ... |
Concur with your observations.
The "silent THS move and max position" is an important issue part of the "a/c to pilot information interface". It's true they could have corrected the THS position manually, had they been aware of that factor being involved, which puts a light on the training of the very basic "principles, and elements of flight control".
Originally Posted by HarryMann
(Post 6606627)
Has anyone else gained the impression that PF actions, appear to assume 'Normal' law ? - despite acknowledgements of Alternate reversion soon after the AP disconnect sequence.
.... Let us also not forget that the 'silent & unobserved' Alternate Law THS movement - undoubtedly a big factor in the stability of the stalled pitch attitude, requiring large ND for long periods (many tens of seconds) to overcome... I am glad the BEA have reported their concerns over this unfortunate oversight. |
Apologies-my reading of the French language isn't up to it- can someone advise when was the first indication that the Captain appreciated their loss of altitude and continuing descent ?
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Auto trim question
Does the auto trim follow stick inputs?
Stabilizer at 13º aft can limit forward stick inputs? BEA report says all control surfaces movement were consistent with pilot inputs. But why trim stays "locked" at 13º all the way down? Some aircraft are almost impossible to control pitch with full aft stabilizers. |
Originally Posted by JD-EE
(Post 6606206)
That may require just a whole lot of large disk space for fully readable displays from about ceiling height mid console. Decent HD width video requires about 100 megabits per second or more. Poor quality is about 13 megabits/second. Displays may be visible and gross features may be readable. ...
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Yellow pen
This is a common occurence at any large airline. ______________________________________________ From Boeing, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...mg/A5_fig2.jpg This image depicts a cross-section view as an airplane is headed for a nonclassic convective system. During a typical ice crystal engine event, the airplane will be flying in convective cloud with light radar returns at flight level. However, if the pilot uses the radar tilt function to scan below the airplane, moderate to heavy radar returns will be seen. These are regions to avoid because they are associated with regions of HIWC [High Ice Water Content]. le copilote modifie l’échelle de son ND de 320 NM à 160 NM et constate qu’« il y a un truc droit devant », qui fait sans doute référence à des échos détectés par le radar météo. Le commandant de bord confirme et l’équipage discute à nouveau du fait que la température élevée ne leur permet pas de monter au niveau 370. At 0208 Vers 2 h 08, le copilote de gauche, sans doute après avoir vu des échos détectés par le radar météo, propose d’« altérer un peu à gauche ». Le mode HDG est activé et le cap sélecté diminue de 12 ° par rapport à la route. Le copilote de gauche passe le réglage de gain du radar météo au maximum, après s’être aperçu qu’il était en mode calibré. La discussion est interrompue par une sensation d’augmentation de température et l’apparition d’une odeur à propos desquels les pilotes échangent pendant plus d’une minute. Le copilote de gauche identifie cette odeur comme étant celle de l’ozone. |
A33Zab what means "vitesse vertical selecte" also s.114 3 values? only 2 (ADR or IR) |
most of the matters are now self evident,however after reading all of this its clear the PF's status as impaired from early on and 'twas unrecognised.
1.... distrustfull of the Artificial Horizon at a time when it was his only reliable indication apart from altitude. 2. Degrading into spatial disorientation, under psychological pressure, whilst unfortunately retaining control of the aircraft. The saddest part was the Pf's comment that "it feels fast", which ,if one was repeatedly pulling back on the controls to slow the aircraft, sounds very somatogravic.... |
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