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the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18
the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time http://s7.directupload.net/images/11...p/osapfdgy.jpg |
Originally Posted by BOAC
(Post 6609162)
- ah - thanks for that. I am waiting for Wednesday to download that.
From personal experience, with a typical French-to-English translation, the wordcount and pagecount of the English text tend to be in the order of 20% less than those of the French text. So p'114' in the French report is unlikely to be the same page as in the English translation...... |
grity
If he didn't know he pulled, and the a/c had been in Normal Law at that point, would the FCS know that he didn't know? Otherwise occupied with his Roll problems, what was his PITCH 'up to' ? |
whenrealityhurts,
No lightning. No lightning strikes. Dark night, in the clouds, flying through ice crystals, moderate+ turbulence, on the periphery of a Cb cell, that's the environment outside. _________________________ An A-320 flying between Paris and Geneva at FL 270 in and out of the clouds in daylight when the crew suddenly spotted a Cb ahead (unanticipated), couldn't quite get around it. The turbulence knocked a generator off-line, and the captain's panels went dark. Stuff happens. But there is no indication of something similar happening to AF 447. Interesting that, in the Geneva flight, the turbulence was sufficient to send loose material in the cockpit flying about, one item cracking the co-pilot's headset. The BEA 'lessons learned' report didn't identify the airline or give the incident date, but that crew also was inattentive to its radar. |
At the risk of making myself appear more foolish than I already have, I feel compelled to offer an observation;
Some time back, in one of these threads, someone posted a link to some utubes of some Airbus simulator training in progress. At the time, probably because I've had very little experience in the pointy end during flight, I was struck by the "automaton" nature of the behaviours I saw. I thought it truly looked as though pilots had become mere accessories to the computers, with little room for thought and/or any sense of actually "piloting" their machines. It looked to me, as I watched the gents twiddling knobs and going through checklists and pecking away at keys, that these sorts of pilots had been programmed to deal with their jobs as a computer tech might with his network administration tasks. It struck me that these were not at all like the pilots of old who could fly any big old bird with several broken bits and malfunctioning whatnots, because they knew the basics of keeping their machine in it's element. "Two kinds of pilot" I thought. "Old" and "New". "Old" could fly almost anything with wings, but not a newer, glass and computer machine. "New" could fly the computer generation "smart" birds, but probably not an old DC3. I'm still mulling over those distinctions, but it has occurred to me more recently that this particular airplane needed both kinds of pilot, and the two "New" types that were in the seats just had none of the abilities of that "Old" type. I simply cannot fathom any of the type "Old" failing to recognize a stall. ... at any point during a 35000ft descent. These poor blighters were more computer programmers than pilots. They needed an old geezer.... and when their best shot at that re-entered the cockpit, he'd missed the beginning of it all, and in any case his AF training had probably left a whole quilt of cobwebs on any "Old" pilot within him. |
Amen, 3holelover
You have it right 3holelover. As Old Carthusian pointed out a couple of pages back, the overall AirBus safety record is splendid, but clearly when things go wrong, the Bus needs someone who can fly an airplane.
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Bearfoil,
I am going to do my best to answer, as I can't fully parse your post, and am guessing that my post have have been unclear, and thus difficult to understood. My post was only referring to the fact that the PF's action on the SS could have had a good reason to have a NU component, due to the context of the pitch/roll/power state of the plane left to him immediately after the AP disconnect. That as opposed to those that are the opinion that there was no reason for a NU action.. As far as the AF 447 accident, I mentioned several times that IMO, there are multiple confluent causes, which the "pitot tubes" are only a part of, in one category, and part of multiple classes in that category. The category is "a/c components failure".
Originally Posted by bearfoil
(Post 6609694)
airtren
Would you consider other than Pitot issues as cause? That would involve other than a "time interval" approach? The A/P is 'dynamic' (constant) in its inputs, No? So the disconnect is "instant", not sequential? The important vector is the 'logic' of its loss? Not the "cause"? So also the discussion involves a possible "remnant" of NORMAL LAW? Unfortunately, this introduces "mode Confusion". |
It may be out of character for me to say, but AirBus had 32 episodes of some hairy UAS that ended "well".
Neither Black, nor White, the upshot of 447 is that the Pilots may not have been ready, the a/c was, and neither could save the flight from destruction. Isolating any one 'format' is not helpful, there is a SYSTEMIC problem. That said, 3hl and :)Ed are also exactly correct. airtren. I get your post perfectly. Isolation of events is proper, as is a "global View". Neither is helpful, if all things as a whole are not considered together. "Somewhere between "Do Nothing" and ACM".... is the 'moving' target? (relative to a/p loss/handover)........ |
Thanks for posting Grity,
I think there is a possibility that with no training/practical experience in using the SS in Alternate 2, with no pitch/roll protections, he not only didn't realize that his amplitude of commands is excessive. Based on the graphs, I also think that he didn't realize that his perceived Neutral Position of the SS, was in fact "off-neutral", on the NU side, and thus what he thought that it's a return of the SS to Neutral, was in fact a SS NU command.
Originally Posted by grity
(Post 6609711)
the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18
the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time http://s7.directupload.net/images/11...p/osapfdgy.jpg |
Originally Posted by 3holelover
(Post 6609790)
These poor blighters were more computer programmers than pilots. They needed an old geezer.... and when their best shot at that re-entered the cockpit, he'd missed the beginning of it all, and in any case his AF training had probably left a whole quilt of cobwebs on any "Old" pilot within him.
The PF said he didn't have control of the plane. In fact he had full control of the plane, he was just a muppet. Captain turns up, PF says aircraft out of control, what's the captain supposed to think? He has to believe the PF, that the aircraft is out of control, and he (and PNF who should have caught this sooner) simply ran out of time to work out it wasn't. Reading that CVR transcript, words fail me. The PF fooled them both and a couple of hundred people died. |
3hl,
Not a bad write-up... thanks. Somebody in a much earlier post referred to the 'video game generation'. That may be a bit excessive, but there is some underlying truth in it. There were autopilots in the 'olden' days (even the pre-WWII 'very olden days'), but they only did the simple jobs, like ATT HOLD, ALT HOLD, HDG HOLD, and suchlike, relieving the human pilots from the mind-numbing (on long flights) task of simply maintaining altitude or heading, without letting them lose 'situational awareness'. 'George' was a much-appreciated crew-member in those days. Nowadays, 'HAL' is no longer looked at in the same way..... |
Something like a wing leveler was in there at the start?
|
3holelover
Good post. You have to embrace new technology, but build on the basics of the past. Buying a satnav for your car doesn't justify no longer being able to read a road atlas, just in case, if we are talking analogies. Old drivers should learn to use their satnav, and new drivers should still learn how to read a road atlas. It's not old ways v new ways. There were enough clues for most old school flyers to have recognised an aerodynamic stall, and there are enough references from the BEA to the effect that there was insufficient high altitude crew manual flight training (AF and generally). Something has gone awry in training and the human/aircraft interface, probably due to commercial pressures that have sadly prevailed, so it needs to be remedied. There is no IAS event without the substandard pitots, but pilots are there to deal with such problems.
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jcjeant,
referring to your post, I'm happy that at least two people read my message ... Unfortunately those two people don't understand why I posted this message (certainly Lemurian) I wanted to put the light on a discripancy between the two reports. This is about the licences of the PF (and this is a important point) Read again ... if you had not seen the PF licenses discripancy as reported by........ BEA one, notwithstanding your appeal to participate in a boy-scout like scavenger hunt (I think that's about what the French "jeu de piste" means, or, since your German is probably fine: "Schnitzeljagd":rolleyes:). Surely you do not want to infer in a definite manner that the terms used (remember also, we speak of the years 2000/1) in the 1st report mean a JAR licence (e.g. the word JAR does not appear) whereas the present one rather would hint a national professional pilot (but with out using the abreviation PP actually!)? So what exactely do you think is of any significance here for the genesis of the accident? Cheers |
Originally Posted by HN39
More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?
Q. Is there only one Mach source to be registered ? AoA 1 seems to be almost locked to 2.1 deg for the initial climb, up to the time 2 10 51. Q. What's the consequence on the Flight Control System ? THS never moved during the initial climb ... Why is that ? Is it G related ? Is it Protection related ? THS trace is absent from page 31 and 32 graphics ... Why is that ? ELEVATORS traces are also absent from those graphics ... Why is that ?
Originally Posted by P44
Ainsi, il apparaît à ce stade des travaux que l’essentiel des mouvements de l’avion dans l’axe longitudinal (assiette, vitesse verticale, altitude) est le résultat des actions du PF, à l’exception de faibles variations vraisemblablement dues à l’aérologie.
Originally Posted by P26
L’exploitation des 5 fichiers audio déchargés a permis de mettre en évidence que l’événement ne se trouvait pas à la fin de l’enregistrement des 5 pistes et que leur durée était inférieure de plusieurs dizaines de secondes aux valeurs attendues.
La synchronisation des différentes voies a montré qu’une partie des données était manquante. Par ailleurs, l’exploitation du contenu binaire de la mémoire EEPROM confirme l’incohérence des pointeurs utilisés par le moyen de lecture du constructeur pour débuter et terminer le déchargement des données. No reason for the victim's families (especially pilot's families) to not obtain the numeric data. Has anyone seen further comment on the WRG ACARS message ? |
On the initial roll
My apologies if this has been pointed before, I've read all the posts but for the ones from a couple posters that I skip over some of the time.
Just to settle a minor point that has sometimes in the past been discussed, this report clearly identifies the reason for the uncommanded initial roll to right: p.76: La présence de turbulences, mise en évidence par l’activité du PA pour contrôler le roulis dans les secondes qui ont précédé, a provoqué à sa déconnexion un départ de l’avion en roulis à droite jusqu’à environ 8°. The presence of turbulence, evidenced by AP activity in order to control roll in the preceding seconds, caused upon its disconnection a departure of the plane in roll to the right, to around 8º. |
Originally Posted by CJ
Re 'p114', be careful..
Re: This 'neutral' position for the SS (#1128)- is it not spring centred? If that strange pic by 'grity' represents the Right SS, is 'below the line' nose up? |
Would an entry into a robust updraft cause the reduction in IAS? Would it cause the a/p to lower the nose to hold altitude? Was the a/p handling Roll excursions that were rapid enough to challenge its remaining performance?
Loss of THS response with repeated ND inputs is apparent on the traces. It remains full UP. the elevators show PF commanding ND. Is anyone interested in looking closely at the 30 seconds prior/post a/p loss? airtren: Would those lateral excursions of the ss possibily be related to the Human body's reaction to changes in posture due ROLL? Might they have been reactions to, rather than attempts to control, ROLL? PF: Loose restraints? CONFiture: Are you aware of "missing traces" on other investigations by BEA re: Airbus? Because, at some point, after repetition, malicious becomes insulting....... |
Human Factors Nightmare
Lonewolf_50
Ian, please don't hate me for what follows: First note: if the two pilots were both aware of them being in condition UAS, what is the likelihood that they were skeptical of stall warning, knowing that airspeed is a component of stall AoA calculations? That might explain in part the apparent "ignore" of the stall warning. The first reaction to everything falling apart is disbelief that it is happening. So being sceptical of the stall warning is a 'normal' reaction. Like many other things when flying you have to believe the instruments - and - in this case when that was tried the normal instruments in the scan were either obviously invalid or flagged as in error. So it can't be true. Then the PF appears to have followed 'normal law' control procedures when the aircraft was in alternate - and he had accepted that. But under pressure one reverts to ingrained behaviors. So his 'learned' response was inappropriate for the aircraft state. The only way to prevent this happening is continual training in reversions to manual control and upsets at cruise level. How many line pilots here have that? How many can say that they have more than a few minutes actual manual piloting in alternate law at cruise level? So when everything goes pear shaped - the crew are dropped into a situation that they have NO consistent experience of even in straight and level flight - but here they are in an upset that possibly gave one chance at recovery. Second note: From the latest release, the aircraft went into a condition of unreliable airspeed. What leaped out at BEA was that (if I read this rightly) the crew didn't progress to the unreliable airspeed checklist/procedure as was standard practice at the time. (If I misunderstand that, my apologies). The information released shows me a PNF who had to focus on flying problems rather abruptly. His requirement to assist (rather than take over from??) the PF, to include the switch to (F/O 3 on the ATT select?? takata's illustration informs this) indicates to me that he felt that the PF was having difficulty with his PFD. Given the number of things going wrong on displays, and the PF being unclear on what he was seeing (from PNF perspective) giving the PF a better inertial unit to run his would be a helpful copilot (role) assisting PF. (If this guess is off, apologies). In the meantime, hand flying at altitude with UAS in Alt 2: is this trained for? If not, the PF was playing catch up. A human factors question arises that may be answered by AF SOPs or habits, or it may not have an answer. With what appears to be the senior pilot between the two recognizing a pilot who was fighting the aircraft a bit, or chasing it, his initial "talk him back into the scan/situation" is what most of us would do as good copilots ( in terms of our role at the time.) At what point should/would it have been "I have the controls" when the PF kept chasing the attitude and the PNF kept having to prompt him to go in a different direction? (Aside: Isn't that the question every Captain must have a clear answer to before takeoff, or an instinct for, in terms of his threshold of "that's enough, I have controls" when his copilot is flying?) If the PNF made a number of inputs on the SS but didn't take controls, I know a few CRM people who'd be aghast, as the preference is that one pilot is on controls, the other isn't. (We could probably spend all day debating the intricacies of what's behind that.) WIth a SS, his inputs won't be felt by the PF, so the "summing" function may have less than the desired effect, as opposed to conventional controls where the PF would have felt what PNF was doing. <== Is this a shortcoming of SS, or an advantage? I can see it both ways. (Anyone whose instructor "rode the controls" while you were learning probably sees the issue here). The problem of sidesticks and the visibility of what a pilot is doing both for the PNF and perhaps for the pilot himself. is a subject of debate among cockpit designers and pilots. Personally, I would think that for single seat aircraft and for 'flying the computer' a sidestick is probably good. For instances where a dual crew have to fly an aircraft manually (even if through some computer assistance) then the larger central yoke or joystick rapidly shows others what the PF is doing without the need for verbal or instrument clues that may not be easily available due to noise or vibration. There are a HUGE number of human factors issues that will need to be investigated
I am sure that there are more but this crew had EVERY one of those issues and probably 30 seconds at the beginning of the incident to get everything right or it would be too late. It proved too difficult for this crew to manage. Is everyone sure that the crew they are next flying with would do any better in similar circumstance? |
Ian W?
SS v Yoke? (at the very end) CAPTAIN: "PULL UP" PF: "But I have been pulling for quite awhile"........ something like that? |
Originally Posted by grity the stick move of first 10 sec. after AP disconect 2:10:07 --- 2:10:18 the moves are more or less horizontal so I think he did not realise that he pulled, just fight with the rolling ship....left right left right left right.... realising that he had no longer correct speed at this time Initial grip to the SS was with the intention to counter the roll to the right. Thereby he overcontrolled or he chased the roll like in an PIO. During each reversal from left to right or vv PF induced a pitch change as well. The initial grip had also a big NU input, which brought the plane of the later left / right movements considerably in the NU region, with only two considerable ND inputs but only enough to reach the neutral SS pitch position. The assumption, that those NU inputs where associated with the aim to climb to a higher FL is IMHO obsolete (i didn´t believe in it anyway). PF might have intended to counter a sinking tendency as described by hazelnuts39, but i meanwhile doubt that. The whole mess might as well have started with - not being prepared for the situation - being surprised by the dropout of AP + ATHR, - PF gripping SS in a hastily and unsuitable mannor - and thereby implementing unwanted and anneccessary steering inputs - chasing the roll and missing the pitch (PNF might have noticed it) - and loosing instrument cross check and SA all together - and PNF on the LH seat not seeing the need to take over - or not willing due to expierience in LH seat LH SS - stall warning triggered the TOGA initiation in PF´s intinctive reaction - and pitch control stayed as bad as before. Was the seat position not suitable for the correct operation of SS? Training issues had been mentioned month before already. Unfortunately the graphs in the report are not good quality, i hope they show up some time in a higher resolution. There i a lot of info in them, and we will have lots of discussions about them. In Phase 3, there are a few points where vertical speed goes close to zero, in one time at 02:14:15 (page 113 of the report) and also some 17 sec. before that it even shows positive climb. Other times descent rate is more than 15.000 fpm. Do we know, that those values are valid indications or are those values wrong? It will be much enlighting to understand the behaviour of the crew in phase 3, because most probably their reactions based on things they saw. If those above mentioned VV values are correct, then they saw a drastic increase of descent rate when pitching down and a reduction of descent rate when pitching up with TOGA, with the expectation to get the ship flying again. We know that they had been stalled completely and that this increase in descent rate was a necessary tradeoff to achieve recovery, they probably didn´t. |
Originally Posted by CONF iture
(Post 6610013)
THS trace is absent from page 31 and 32 graphics ... Why is that ?
ELEVATORS traces are also absent from those graphics ... Why is that ? I'm therefore presuming it can be inferred from the statement that the aircraft performed as designed that the control surfaces responded to the commands given in the correct manner, for which you'd need to get your Airbus manuals out to correlate. Remember that this is an interim rather than a final report, and that hopefully the FDR traces you would like to see will be included in that document. |
Operations Attitude a Causal Factor
vanHorck
Whilst you are essentially correct, you are at risk of being side-lined as an old-school pilot who refuses to see the advantages of modern technology.... To further enhance your argument: There are now automatic messages for pilots exceeding the narrowest of tolerances during hand flying, resulting in gentle phone calls from ops to the PF and/or the captain urging them at the very lest caution if not nudging them to use the automation rather than flying by hand. This clearly results in less hand flying than would otherwise be the case. If they are so insistent that automation should always be used then perhaps the airlines should order fully automated aircraft. Then they can dispense with the expensive instrument monitors that they appear to want in the cockpit. |
Longitudinal sidestick deflection (left/right), elevators, THS 2:09:00 - 2:14:30 (page 114).
http://img846.imageshack.us/img846/4897/screen01v.png |
Old Carthusian,
Let's not fight, read my last sentence. Many lives have been saved through automation so I am all for it and a bus fan as well, but I dislike the (in my view insufficient hand-fly) training and I dislike even more the reluctance of (some) carriers to allow their pilots to hand fly both in the cruise as well as in the approach in varying circumstances. Ian W It's easily checked.... Ask the FO's in your fleet what percentage of captains allows them to hand fly in anything but the smoothest CAVOK weather (better even is a captain who asks his FO to hand fly), although I suspect it varies from airline to airline (and I am certainly not implying AF have such a policy as I don't know) |
What's that smell?
Evidently OZONE. Noted by the crew, one is allowed to associate OZONE with WRG.....? That would explain the dire need to recover the avionics bay. Can anyone devise a way to recover an a/c via Inertial Cues? Those boys from the Segway scooter should give it a go. |
Originally Posted by bearfoil
(Post 6610236)
What's that smell?
Evidently OZONE. Noted by the crew, one is allowed to associate OZONE with WRG.....? Real avionics faults stink, but not of ozone..... Since ther was a mention of St.Elmo's fire, that sounds as a more plausible explanation..... |
Going back to link 959 and subsequent discussions:
Now, I understand also why the BEA would like to have the whole scene with all pannels filmed as many things said all along are related to instruments and very hard to guess what it was exactly. Thoughts. |
Citing a "more plausible" explanation than another somehow gives one the right to be insulting?
Electric motors produce OZONE, as does welding, Heating, Lightning, etc. Sparking of any kind produces OZONE. Dismissing causes other than Saint Elmo's Fire strikes me as more consistent with, erm.....ignorance. Can you please refrain from personal insult? |
Bear, I don't think CJ was trying to be insulting, but I can understand his frustration. Hanging on to every last thing you can trying to prove a hardware/software fault is one thing, but spamming two threads with the same post smacks of desperation.
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"...demonstrate your ignorance....."
What is it with this thread?
The whole series on the search for the truth about AF447 was one of the highest standing ones EVER with magnificent contributions from many mm43 just to name one. So please let's have respect, and continue the good work with debate not insults. I am sure I speak on behalf of many. |
I tried to accommodate the different fora with a question I thought more consistent with the foundation.
I am not desperate to prove anything. On the contrary, I am trying to unstick some narrow thinking that seems to be herding itself into the corral being built by partisans. The BOEING 787 recently had a serious inflight electrical Malfunction/Fire. The a/c was nearly lost. Do you know what those on board were breathing? You talk of frustration? Tedium is listening to the same old suspects gather around the 'B'anner and sing the 'A'nthem. take care friend |
Originally Posted by vanHorck
The whole series on the search for the truth about AF447 was one of the highest standing ones EVER
|
Originally Posted by bearfoil
(Post 6610307)
Can you please refrain from personal insult?
|
Christiaan
You are not moderator, and have no business 'judging' the relative 'purity' of anyone's input. You have control issues, my friend. 'I' is for ignore....... |
Originally Posted by bearfoil
(Post 6610326)
The BOEING 787 recently had a serious inflight electrical Malfunction/Fire.
PS. CJ is a former Concorde engineer, so I'd think *very* carefully before tangling with him. [EDIT : Misunderstood KBPsen's post - my apologies, sir.] |
Thanks, DW !
Oh, and, bearfoil, if it wasn't for your pollution showing up in other peoples posts, I'd have pushed the "I" button long ago. |
CJ
Now it's alliances and feudal warfare? Again, it is not for you to 'judge'. How about principles, rather than personalities? You are indeed a valued resource here, and my goal is not to annoy. Doze, B787 has neglected a serious flaw in their certification program, and no one notices. Airbus clearly has ignored some critical flaws in their product's performance relative to operator proficiency. That's called an opinion, and is neither desperate, not personal. |
unofficial CVR transcript translation - plus VS
Based on Lemurian's post #958, in turn based on spagiola's #940:
I've added the synthetic voice (VS) announcements and stall warnings, from pages 91-104 of the report in French. I wanted to see where the stall warnings occurred in relation to the pilots' conversation, but it adds some other info as well -- eg, warnings about dual inputs toward the end, and the final "pull up"s. And there's a puzzling (to me anyway) VS announcement at 2 h 12 min 17: « Priority right » Just before that, the column of notes about FDR parameters has: 2 h 12 min 16 Le pilote en place OPL prend la priorité. The pilot in place OPL takes precedence. According to the key on page 89, "OPL" is the PF: Copilote en place droite (PF) pilotant avec le manche OPL Was the "PF" (sitting in place OPL) not actually the one with "la priorité" up until that moment?? Anyway, on with the unofficial transcript translation: ===== gpc62: Added synthetic voice (VS) announcements. A few other minor additions/trivial corrections. Lemurian: To spagiola I took the liberty to proof-read your very good translation and this is how it is : spagiola: I'm a native French speaker and have a PPL, but have no further relevant qualifications, so caveat emptor. ===== 2 h 10 min 05 Cavalry charge (Alarme de déconnexion du pilote automatique) Cavalry charge (Autopilot disconnect alarm) 2 h 10 min 06 PF: J’ai les commandes I have control 2 h 10 min 09 PF: Ignition start Ignition start 02 h 10 min 10.4 : VS : « Stall, stall » (sans cricket) VS: "Stall, stall" (without cricket) 2 h 10 min 11 PNF: Qu’est ce que c’est que ça ? What's that ? 2 h 10 min 13 VS : « Stall, S » VS: "Stall, S" 2 h 10 min 14 PF: On n’a pas une bonne… On n’a pas une bonne annonce de… We don't have a good... we don't have a good indication of ... 2 h 10 min 17 PNF: On a perdu les les les vitesses alors… engine thrust A T H R engine lever thrust We've lost the the the speeds so ... engine thrust A T H R (off) engine lever thrust 2 h 10 min 18 PF: … de vitesse ... of speed 2 h 10 min 22 PNF: Alternate law protections Alternate law protections 2 h 10 min 24 PNF: Attends on est en train de perdre… Wait we're losing... 2 h 10 min 25 PNF: Wing anti-ice Wing anti-ice 2 h 10 min 27 to 2 h 10 min 31 PNF: Fais attention à ta vitesse Fais attention à ta vitesse Watch your speed Watch your speed PF: Okay, okay okay je redescends ok ok ok I'm going back down PNF: Tu stabilises stabilize (“stay there”) PF: Ouais Yeah PNF: Tu redescends You're going back down 2 h 10 min 33 PNF: Selon les trois tu montes donc tu redescends According to the three you're going up, so you go back down (meaning the three vertical speed indicators... ) 2 h 10 min 35 PF: D’accord Agreed 2 h 10 min 36 PNF: T’es à ... Redescends You're at ... go back down ! PF: C’est parti on (re)descend On our way we're going (back) down 2 h 10 min 39 to 2 h 10 min 46 PNF: Je te mets en en A T T I'm putting you in in A T T 2 h 10 min 42 PF: On est en ouais on est en climb We're in yeah we're in climb 2 h 10 min 49 PNF: (…) il est où euh ? Uh, where is he? 2 h 10 min 51 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 11 min 45] 2 h 10 min 56 PF: (TOGA) (TOGA) 2 h 11 PNF: Surtout essaie de toucher le moins possible les commandes en en latéral hein Above all, try to touch the controls as little as possible in in lateral, hey ?! 2 h 11 min 03 PF: Je suis en TOGA hein ? I'm in TOGA, no ? 2 h 11 min 06 PNF: (…) il vient ou pas Is he coming or not ? 2 h 11 min 21 PF: On a pourtant les moteurs qu’est-ce qui se passe (…) ? We've got the engines yet (nothing is happening...),. what's going on (...)? 2 h 11 min 32 PF: (…) je n’ai plus le contrôle de l’avion là J’ai plus du tout le contrôle de l’avion I no longer have control of the plane; I no longer have any control at all of the plane 2 h 11 min 38 PNF: Commande à gauche Controls to the left 2 h 11 min 41 PF: J’ai l’impression (qu’on a de) la vitesse I have the impression (that we have) some speed 2 h 11 min 43 [Bruit d’ouverture de la porte du cockpit] [Sound of the cockpit door opening] CAP: Eh qu’est-ce que vous (faites) ? Hey what are you doing? PNF: Qu’est-ce qui se passe ? Je ne sais pas je sais pas ce qui se passe What's happening? I don't know I don't know what's happening 2 h 11 min 45 Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket Stall alarm stops 2 h 11 min 52 CAP: Alors tiens prends prends ça So here take take that 2 h 11 min 53 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete 2 h 11 min 55 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet VS: "Stall, stall" + cricket, incomplete 2 h 11 min 58 PF: J’ai un problème c’est que j’ai plus de vario là I have a problem it's that I no longer have vertical speed CAP: D’accord OK PF: J’ai plus aucune indication I no longer have any indication 2 h 12 min 04 to 2 h 12 min 07 PF: J’ai l’impression qu’on a une vitesse de fou non qu’est-ce que vous en pensez ? I have the impression that we have some crazy speed, don’t we ?.. what do you think ? 2 h 12 min 07 PNF: Non surtout ne ne (les) sors pas No, in any case, don't don't extend them VS : « Stall, stall » 2 h 12 min 10 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet 2 h 12 min 13 PNF: Qu’est-ce que tu en penses qu’est-ce que tu en penses, qu’est-ce qu’il faut faire ? What do you think ?what do you think ? what do we have to do? 2 h 12 min 15 to 2 h 12 min 19 CAP: Là je sais pas là ça descend I don't know we're going down 2 h 12 min 17 VS : « Priority right » 2 h 12 min 19 to 2 h 12 min 45 PF: Là c’est bon là on serait revenu les ailes à plat, non il veut (pas) there ! that's good ! we'd be back to wings level, no he (doesn't) wan't to CAP: Les ailes à plat ... l’horizon l’horizon de secours Wings level ... the horizon the backup horizon PNF: L’horizon The horizon 2 h 12 min 26 PNF: La vitesse ? The speed? 2 h 12 min 27 PNF: Tu montes ... You're going up ... VS : « Stall, stall » PNF: Tu descends descends descends descends go down go down go down go down 2 h 12 min 30 PF: Je suis en train de descendre là ? Am I going down? PNF: Descend ! Go down 2 h 12 min 32 CAP: Non tu montes là No you're going up, now 2 h 12 min 33 PF: Là je monte okay alors on descend There I'm going up ok so let's go down 2 h 12 min 34 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket incomplet 2 h 12 min 39 PF: Okay on est en TOGA ok, we're in TOGA 2 h 12 min 40 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu Stall alarm starts [continues until 2 h 12 min 46] 2 h 12 min 42 PF: En alti on a quoi là ? In alti[tude] we're at what, here? 2 h 12 min 44 CAP: (…) C’est pas possible It's not possible 2 h 12 min 45 PF: En alti on a quoi ? In alti[tude] we're at what ? [*** during the following 19 seconds of speech, the stall alarm stops for 3 seconds, and then restarts for another 8 seconds. The transcript does not indicate the exact times for the pilots' speech, or where these stops and starts occur in relation to the speech: ***] 2 h 12 min 46 Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket Stall alarm stops 2 h 12 min 49 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu Stall alarm starts 2 h 12 min 57 Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket Stall alarm stops [*** now here's the pilots' speech for that time interval: ***] 2 h 12 min 45 to 2 h 13 min 04 PNF: Comment ça en altitude ? What do you mean in altitude? PF: Ouais ouais ouais j’descends là non ? yeah yeah yeah i'm going down now, no? PNF: Là tu descends oui You're going down now, yes CAP: Hé tu ... tu es en… Mets mets les ailes horizontales hey you ... you're in ... put put the wings level PNF: Mets les ailes horizontales Put the wings level C’est ce que je cherche à faire That's what I'm trying to do CAP: Mets les ailes horizontales Put the wings level 2 h 12 min 59 PF: Je suis à fond à… avec du gauchissement I'm at the limit of the stick... to the left CAP: Le palonnier Rudder pedals 2 h 13 min 23 : VS : « Dual input » 2 h 13 min 25 PF: Qu’est-ce qu’y… comment ça se fait qu’on continue à descendre à fond là? What is... how come we're continuing to descend so fast? 2 h 13 min 28 PNF: Essaye de trouver ce que tu peux faire avec tes commandes là-haut Les primaires et cetera Try to see what you can do with your controls up there. The primaries etc 2 h 13 min 32 PF: au niveau cent At level 100 2 h 13 min 36 PF: Neuf mille pieds 9000 feet 2 h 13 min 38 CAP: Doucement avec le palonnier là Easy with the rudder 2 h 13 min 39 PNF: Remonte remonte remonte remonte Climb climb climb climb (literally, "remonte" is "climb back up") [*** another sequence where the transcript does not splice the VS and the pilots' speech together: ***] 2 h 13 min 41 : VS : « Dual input » 2 h 13 min 43 : VS : « Dual input » 2 h 13 min 45 : VS : « Dual input » 2 h 13 min 47 : VS : « Dual input » 2 h 13 min 40 PF: Mais je suis à fond à cabrer depuis tout à l’heure But I've been pulling to the back stop for a good while CAP: Non non non ne remonte pas No no no don't climb back up PNF: Alors descend Go down, then 2 h 13 min 45 PNF: Alors donne-moi les commandes à moi les commandes So give the me controls. I have control PF: Vas-y tu as les commandes on est en TOGA toujours hein Go on, you have control. We're still in TOGA, right ? 2 h 13 min 55 VS : « Stall, stall » + cricket en continu Stall alarm starts 2 h 14 min 03 Fin de l’alarme « Stall, stall » + cricket Stall alarm stops 2 h 14 min 05 CAP: Attention tu cabres là Watch it, you're pitching up PNF: Je cabre ? I'm pitching up? PF: Ben il faudrait on est à quatre mille pieds Well, we should, we're at 4000 feet 2 h 14 min 17 VS : « Sink rate » VS : « Pull up » (3x) 2 h 14 min 18 CAP: Allez tire Go on, pull PF: Allez on tire on tire on tire on tire Go on, we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling we're pulling ! 2 h 14 min 21 to end VS : « Pull up » (4x) 2 h 14 min 26 to end CAP: (Dix) degrés d’assiette (Ten) degrees of trim 2 h 14 min 28.4 [Fin des enregistrements] [End of data] ===== |
Originally Posted by bearfoil
(Post 6610396)
Now it's alliances and feudal warfare?
You are indeed a valued resource here, and my goal is not to annoy. Doze, B787 has neglected a serious flaw in their certification program, and no one notices. Airbus clearly has ignored some critical flaws in their product's performance relative to operator proficiency. That's called an opinion, and is neither desperate, not personal. A note to anyone who wants to bring up Ziegler and concierges again - that was a *very long time ago* - please don't! The "race to the bottom" is a corporate disease that affects many more industries than aviation, and automation (and Airbus's role in the advances made within) is a factor, not a culprit. |
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