Yes, I get that, and thanks. You are a man of Faith, then?

Faith? Hell no.
 

Bear,

I wrote about ACARS messages that would have been in the list as of day 1 of the reporting about this accident.
Or do you think that they had it all figured out by then already: - let's not tell about the ACARS messages that have to do with radar loss, cause you'll see, in about 2 years time we will have to cover up about bad quality radomes?
Facts, my friend, not faith.
We will not need to have the CVR available on Youtube to check for ourselves that the radome did not get blown away.

Whether ice crystals impacting on the windscreen will be audible on the CVR - who knows, the Cockpit Area Mike is not a marvel of audio quality, but processing logic can sometimes provide pleasant surprises.

Doing nothing
 

PJ2
By the phrase, I was assuming a great deal on the part of the reader. What I meant was, other than maintaining level flight as best one can using pitch and manual thrust settings, (which would be those which existed just prior to the failure), one "does nothing" in terms of climbing/turning/descending etc. Above all else, one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight. There is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event.

Can I -- a non-pilot -- tentatively challenge this wording.

There seem to be at least two situations where the current settings would not be "those which existed just prior to the failure":
a) The s/w "correctly" changed something. [e.g. IIRC the thrust changes on a/p drop-out].
b) The s/w has "inappropriately" (in 20:20 hindsight) modified the previous status-quo prior to the fully-recognised UAS event. [e.g. as a "correct" response to erroneous airspeed values.]

In either case the pilot needs to revert to something like the settings in effect before the s/w acted. In this situation "one stabilizes the aircraft in level flight" and "there is absolutely NO reason to change anything during a UAS event" would seem to be mutually inconsistent.

BTW I suspect that our positions could be reconciled by some sort of differentiation between "simple" and "complex/compound" UAS events.

As a retired s/w engineer, and assuming dual pitot failure:
If the 2nd pitot failure occurring while the 1st pitot failure was being analysed the s/w developers can be forgiven for failing to handle it "well". Especially as the s/w development team probably believed/were-told that double in-flight pitot failures were vanishingly improbable.

This could easily cause a brief period of erroneous airspeed, leading to: thrust changes, trim changes and a/p drop-out. Leaving the plane some way from steady-state-cruise settings.

Peter H.

Where have you been? You are so welcome here, at least by the bear.

The time to trim back on theory is after the data, not prior.

:ok:


What was a/c doing for the last fifteen seconds prior to a/p loss?

What did the PF do for fifteen seconds after a/p loss?


Everything has been done to Death, except..........

Thanks for your answer PJ2. As usual reading another post of yours is delightful.

The "great deal" assumption that the reader does not need explanations, may imply straight forward that he does not need the summarized "doing nothing" either, as if he knows the first, he knows the latter as well.....
...
Perhaps at a high experience/professional level the protections of Normal, versus Alternate 1, versus Alternate 2, versus Direct, don't bring or mean much, particularly in smooth non-adverse weather....

But we know their purpose, and that their degree of absence and importance becomes even more obvious when the flying conditions are no longer friendly and/or simple. And the short 4 minutes or less between life and death on the AF 447 exacerbates that like nothing else would....

As I mentioned before a recent cross continental flight with heavy turbulence almost out of nowhere, made me think a lot more...

Between a 200 tone airplane, at M0.8, and a 5 grams paper made plane at a hand throw speed, there may be a huge difference in mass, inertia, size of wings, and power behind the motion, but they are paradoxically similar, if not identical, in the proportionality of the air lift to their mass/weight.

That being said, the challenge in maintaining the level flight is the turbulent air in large masses, at random speeds, and random change of directions, which creates the demanding situation, to which the second-by-second inputs of the side stick are only the pilot's plane control responses/reactions.

Among many others, it is these very situations that elevate one having the control of the stick in the cockpit, to the title of true airline pilot, as much as many years ago, just flying an airplane would, and therefore I strongly believe they're worth mentioning.

In light of this,you may agree that the use of "do nothing" calls for an update, as it may present the risk of telling selectively only part of the story, which means the risk of over simplifying - (edited: trivializing)....
....
As much as the tremendous progress in the science of making and controlling flying objects after of about 100 years - although more, or even a lot more, if we go back to daVinci, or Icarus.... - with each step, and each gain, the pushing forward of the boundaries of knowledge brings with them inherently, also the boundaries of the unkown. The AF 447 seem to be an apogee, or a burst of a collection of unknowns, of the current stage in technology, and industry, which like many of the past, came with a tremendous, undesired, and sad sacrifice. When resolved - and one has to recognize the resources allocated by the French Government, BEA, Airbus, and Air France, the Industry at large, the International community for the resolution - the solutions will be, along with many other elements another step forward in the knowledge and advancing of man.

And hey... , even this Forum, and these threads are somewhat a contribution, and part of that step forward, as meager as it may be, ....

I note a little angst arising between some of the posters.

Rest assured that, if I observe an excessively inappropriate post, I'll edit/remove it.

This doesn't extend to heavy handed moderating along any given party line eg I might not particularly like a particular style of post - however, so long as it generally complies with our requirements, my like/dislike is not a reason to censor it. Non-nasty banter and a bit of give and take is quite acceptable and the place would be boring without it.

If you, as an individual, take exception to a particular line of post, please either ignore the post and move on or, if you see the need, PM me and I'll review the complaint circumstances.

Peter;

Thank you for your thoughtful post.

Yes, I not only agree with your "notwithstanding", but know of at least one reasonable explanation for the immediate aft-stick movement.

Still, the key here is in the notion of "stabilizing the aircraft". One must absolutely establish control of the aircraft and one does what one must to maintain control, which also means avoiding those actions and changes which will de-stabilize the aircraft. So, for example, if there is a momentary apparent "loss of altitude", say 300ft (I am not citing a known example, I'm positing, here), the reaction could, (not 'would'), be to pull back and "regain" the altitude, from which one then levels off, sets power and gets out the QRH. I'm using quotation marks in this example because any such loss would almost certainly be an indication issue and not an actual loss of height, and in any case, such loss, real or merely indicated, is not serious and does not require instant response or correction when one is wrestling with another abnormality. Sure is easy to say and type, isn't it? My golly. We have to be so careful of hindsight bias when reading what is coming.

Of course, I, we, don't know if any of this occurred, but the notion does lie within what I would consider the "plausible" arena vice some of the theories placed out in the open for consideration by other contributors.

PJ2

I knew what you meant, from the git. However, lacking some explanatory, it is (perhaps), red meat for those ready to pounce. So you know, I am most grateful for your input. You and others have multiplied my meager knowledge manifold.

I come from a professional standpoint where it is not necessary to comfort the afflicted. More like afflicting the comfortable.

At no time do I believe it is appropriate to get personal. I hope my presence is not annoying to anyone, except to make my points, which I believe in.......

with great respect, Bear

(erm.....what was that back ss, then?) :ok:

airtren;

Yes, the phrase "do nothing" doesn't really describe what one really does and should do when a UAS event occurs. One does something, but the goal is level, stable flight or a return to same with an establishing of the former cruise attitude and power - the goal isn't "5 degrees up, then sort it out" because that destabilizes the aircraft making it difficult to "find home" again.

Control in moderate to heavy turbulence is an issue dealt with in the FCOM - the SOP is clear: in addition to reducing Mach and disconnecting the auto-thrust, one also lets the speed and altitude wander slightly. How much is up to the pilot because the manuals cannot provide rules for everything. I've seen excursions between green dot and VMO, and +/- 300ft - the airplane "rides downhill or uphill" - it doesn't "fall"...(getting rid of the notion of the "air pocket" has been one of the toughest nuts to crack!) Temperature (SAT), wind shears of 60 to 80kts in short time periods, will result in all kinds of local instability which make control of the aircraft difficult, if only because it is tough to hang onto the stick in such conditions. So it's a factor, given all. My sense of it being a factor here is that it wasn't, or that it was light, possibly moderate but nothing more, but that's just me.

We seem to have a difference of opinion over what happened following the AP/ATHR disconnect.

The graphic included with my post clearly indicates what is believed to have happened. The initial nose-up input was responsible for the double stall warning per the above quote, and if the attitude didn't change, then why did the AoA trigger the SW? The graphic(s) may be close to the truth or completely wrong, and remember you said, " [they] will pass rapidly into the 'factual' world - as pseudo FDR traces - when in fact they are supposition - guess-work - based on extremely limited information".:ok:

Nothings changed, and the 'facts' will supercede everything that this forum has promoted at each successive release of information by the BEA. Until then, I'm quite happy to be classed as 'clairvoyant'.:p

Adr fault
 

A33Zab,
Could we then think, as long as ADR DISAGREE was not present, that High and Low Speed Stabilities were at least available ?

Le Point
 

And some other comments made (I don't comment myself, just try to translate):

• Pilots were fully aware of the weather situation. Weather situation had nothing of extreme, only relatively moderate turbulence.
• Like a Boeing, the Airbus is a complex system, there are many computers, bugs and false indications are possible, and the user manual for the man-machine interface is not always understood.
• The man-machine interface didn't work, it is the whole challenge, and the object of the coming legal battle.
• Inappropriate maneuver has been applied, but we understand why such wrongly doing could take place.
• It will be necessary to review the user manual.
• It will be necessary to review the procedures to be applied in extreme situations.
• The Airbus is different from any conventional aircraft in a way that it will maintain the last flight control order.
• I've made hundreds of simulator sessions on this type, some with similar malfunctions.

Just one personal note : The last comment is from Gérard Feldzer. I have a doubt he has practiced UAS at cruise flight level, and exit from a full stall situation.
For the record, Feldzer is also the guy who, two years ago, was talking about Global Warming and Monster CB.

Hello PJ2,

Thanks for your thoughtful reply.

The more I think about the "do nothing", the more I conclude that you were right when you wrote that Machinbrid was right that it is not the exact answer.

Knowing many of your posts, I know what you mean. But that is not the point.

Readers may come to this forum after a search hit, for a quick answer, and after a quick read, they don't come back to better understand, what is behind a certain statement.

I know well you didn't mean that, but the danger of the "do nothing" is that it gives the wrong message, that a pilot really does not have to do much, or know much, even when he gets the controls, as the A/C does everything by itself.

The "do nothing" resonates with a certain philosophy I disagree with, which is that modern airplanes don't require highly qualified and knowledgeable pilots. This is one of the reasons why a pilot when put in front of the controls, can loose it.

To me it's clear, that pilots of modern planes, need to be as good as the old days, old school pilots, PLUS also be technically so good as to understand well the various aspects of the new technologies used by the plane, so that any time can take best decisions.

A pilot in the cockpit needs to be like a Master/Champion chess player - understand well the situation on the chess board, and anticipate, see ahead, as many moves and combinations as possible.

A pilot, while the AP and A/THR are ON, and flight is in Normal Law, should follow closely the flight, particularly when the weather is problematic. He has to understand and anticipate all the possible scenarios that may develop, at any given point of time, based on a good knowledge of the A/C. and specifically the weaker points of the A/C. He needs be ahead of the game, ahead of all the other players, outside and inside the A/C, so that his reaction to anything that happens outside, or inside, is quick, to the point, very effective, and with immediate positive results.

When given the controls, he should be already aware of all of the conditions of the flight, before the control transition, and a quick assessment immediately after the transition, is only to confirm that all checks out. His subsequent actions should not be a guess, but rather a well known series of moves with a known ahead result, and driving to a known result.

Just an opinion,
airtren

@Conf:
 

NO,

From 02:10:06 it was in Alternate 2 Law, after 02:10:16 this ALT 2 was latched.

http://i474.photobucket.com/albums/r...b999/Dia13.jpg

Hi,

Indeed ...
And in the case of the AF447 ... it's not really a surprise as it's many events of same nature on the same type of plane that happened in the years and months before the AF447 event .. well reported and published in many reports and testimonies of those concerned
So .. it must be normal that because the backup of experience and the care of Air France about the safety they have formed and warned their pilots about the scenario encountered by the AF447 .....
At least ... this is how it must be ..
Maybe the 3 interim BEA report will not show a so good picture ....

no chess master can look all day with all his skills to an automatic chess game/turnament to wait for the moment of a s/w bug

it was one of the fruits of this treat, to realize that even a champion needs training to hold his level (onbord training),

fly 10% of the time with your hands...

Hi grity,

In over 7 years of AB FBW, I've never had any real time experience in ALT LAW. Plenty of "Direct Law" handling on previous Boeing & Lockheed types though. I bet it feels completely different to anything else I've tried.

How long did the PF have in order to practice that night before they stalled?

Keeping it under control
 

Light, Moderate, or extreme -- doesn't really matter. What really matters is how prepared the pilot was to handle this unique situation. Hand flying in turbulence when everything goes out.
I am disturbed that it is not permissable to "hand fly" the aircraft in real life let alone the simulator/and or duplicate the "emergency" that they encountered in training.
I can't imagine a new guy, or inexperienced guy, being able to keep this thing under control under these conditions. Even if it was benign.

That's what training and testing is for. So far I see no evidence of it.

- yes, from the report of May, the 'difference' is that I am unable to ascertain exactly what sequence happened, while you appear to be able to! Anyway, 1230GMT today and hopefully we will know a lot more.

To summarise where I sit on AM 29 July:

The SW's following A/P disconnect are unexplained and a 'puzzle' - possibly due turbulence, possibly due to a low faulty IAS, possibly due to over-controlling in pitch or ???. It does not take a big pitch change at FL350 at that weight to push past the stall warning alpha - perhaps 'recovering' from a perceived drop in altitude?

The zoom climb, apparently 'unremarked' by either pilot, is a puzzle.

After the a/c 'flopped over' at FL380 and began to sink in a (possibly unrecognised) stalled condition - this is far less of a puzzle, due to their lack of experience of the 'impossible' full stall - as in PGF. My gut feeling is that from somewhere between 15 and 20k, they had insufficient altitude to recover anyway.

Why the AB software stops the stall warning when the a/c is deeply stalled defeats my logic.

My sincere hope, however, is that most FBW/software (particularly AB) pilots (and the training system) have had some quiet, contemplative and sobering thoughts over the last few months about what they need to think about and what the system might NOT do for them.

"Crew disregarded flight-procedures!

Airbus Test Pilot Fernando Alonso in the German WELT of today...

Air-France-Absturz: Crew von Todesflug AF 447 missachtete Flugregeln - Nachrichten Panorama - Weltgeschehen - WELT ONLINE

airtren+ grity
 

@airtren

An excellent statement, and @grity

an excellent ammendment to this statement.

Thank you both.


How was that old tale (at least how i was used to it):

Flying will be be hours of joy and boredom, interspersed with moments of sheer terror.

Be always prepared for the latter.

franzl

Fresh info has just been released

Vol AF 447

Best regards,
HP

Nothing new ?!!!?
 

The "report" is simply the SAME information as released in the previous "note", now labeled a "report"....? Seriously: WTF?

- GY :ugh:

P.S. Admittedly I did NOT do a line by line comparison, but from what I see it is the same!

And for that statement they needed more than 2 month?

It´s not clarifying anything at all.


Only one example:

It would be more interesting to know, wether the aircraft behaviour followed those inputs.

franzl

Try this link for the English version. Work to do at AF.

Safety recs summarised at http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf

Actually, it looks like the safety recommendations are pretty specific, and there are clear references to AoA in both the new note and the recommendations. AF come in for implied criticism due to there being no established procedure for a flightdeck when the captain is not present as well as training in general (it appears that neither PF nor PNF called the "Unreliable IAS" procedure), and there is a recommendation for an AoA display, which will be down to Airbus and Boeing to implement - if the regulators take the recommendations up, as well as for flight recorders to record extra parameters (including all visible instruments).

So no, it's not anything like a final report, but steps forward have been made and it appears that any fears that AF or Airbus would be "protected" from criticism or requests for change were unfounded.

Air Frances early response
 

and? at which place was sitting the so called PF? left the new one with the reportet instruments ahead his nose, or right as in the hours before mayby?

It looks as if two of the three pilots had been napping up until about 0200, and the alert pilot, the captain, leaves the cockpit.

From both the English and French versions.

A 1 h 55 min 57, le commandant de bord réveille le second copilote et annonce « […] il va prendre ma place ».

A 1 h 55, the Captain woke the second copilot and announced "[…] he’s going to take my place".

It would seem there was no playing with the radar with respect to tilt or gain, and they flew on expecting little more than some light to moderate chop.
_____________________

Is the second co-pilot the junior co-pilot, and is he the PF?
Both versions omit what appears to be a name reference in the captain's announcement.

Hi,
This is a "Synthetis Note", not the 3rd Interim Report which would be posted later (likely, following the Press Conf .)

takata, that would be the press conference at 14:30. Do you know, is it being televised?

Well you can be a generous as you like, but if it took me 2 months to produce this level of work output where I work... I wouldn't be working there any more.

If there is one tiny shred of additional information it is this:

The rest we had before.

All this confirms is:

- The crew never mentioned UAS
- The crew never mentioned Stall

Again I may be missing something the more rigorous reader may spot.

- GY

Hi,

I would appear that neither pilot "heard" the stall warning "Stall Stall".
Does it only come from the speakers in the cockpit or does it come through their headsets. Do AF use ANR?

It is not uncommon to observe crews (with a high work load) shut down their audio senses - like this crew did:

rudderrudderrat asked:

The FWC generates the Stall warning and it is sent to the speaker outputs irrespective of pilot ACP control setting or speaker volume (i.e. it cannot be defeated).

Warnings are ALSO sent to the crew headsets directly.

- GY

- CAS1 (ADR1, Captain probes) was erroneous during 29 seconds, starting @ 0210:05.
- CAS3 (ADR3, ISIS) was erroneous during 54 seconds, starting "after" 0210:05 but "before" 0210:16.
So (at least) during 19-29 seconds, two (or three) airspeeds were wrong, meaning that all speeds were rejected by the EFCS and AFS.

I'm not sure, but IIRC the ADI section of the PFD flashes "STALL" in large capital letters as the audible warning sounds.

What can one say but "D'oh!"?

links to new bea documents
 

BEA website seems to be struggling, but links direct to the pdf documents are still working (although takes a couple of tries for me):

The "note":

English: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf
French: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.fr.pdf

The recommendations (actually more a note about them):

English: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol....let2011.en.pdf
French: http://www.bea.aero/fr/enquetes/vol.af.447/reco29juillet2011.fr.pdf


Looking at these, I think (hope) they are more press summaries / extracts released in advance of the complete interim report.


A few things do grab attention:

• Recommendation for video recording of cockpit displays - perhaps implying there is still significant uncertainty about what the pilots actually saw ?
• No training (not just "not a lot" - none!!!) for manual flight or UAS at altitude (let alone alt or direct law)
• No CRM training for capt. off duty [edit: intended meaning no CRM training for the situation of capt. off duty, not that capt. was not trained - too few words used first time!]
• no UAS procedure called, and no mention of stall despite continuous warning for almost a minute at one point :confused:

And what might turn out to be a biggie (or two):

• Control surfaces moved according to pilot inputs (BUT: only pitch axis mentioned, what happened in roll ?)
• Plane moved according to contol inputs "Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope". Why qualify with that ? Maybe there is a nasty deep stall behaviour in there ?

Waiting for the real report now...

@RetiredF4

You might care to read the orange bits in the report a little less selectively:

" Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplane's longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces"

Almost certainly by implication, once the airplane was "outside its flight envelope" this was no longer the case.

From the recommendations re image recording of the instrument displays:-

Are they suggesting a possible explanation is that the displays were not showing the same information as that recorded?