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Originally Posted by takata
(Post 6603831)
This is a "Synthetis Note", not the 3rd Interim Report which would be posted later (likely, following the Press Conf .)
I was wondering about that. Are U sure or is or a guess ? Regards. |
Originally Posted by fizz57
(Post 6603896)
@RetiredF4
You might care to read the orange bits in the report a little less selectively: " Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope, the airplane's longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces" . 1. control surfaces followed pilot control input. Always (as RetiredF4 said) - control systems not at fault 2. plane follows control surface input. until flight envelope exceeded. - plane behaved aerodynamically (and ergo probably didn't lose any bits) ... until outside envelope, where you are into test-pilot territory or even beyond. |
Originally Posted by Infrequentflyer789
Plane moved according to contol inputs "Until the airplane was outside its flight envelope". Why qualify with that ? Maybe there is a nasty deep stall behaviour in there ?
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable). |
Hi AlphaZuluRomeo,
Originally Posted by AlphaZuluRomeo
I was wondering about that. Are U sure or is or a guess ?
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infrequentflyer78 No CRM training for capt. off duty • There is no CRM tr aining for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain p.s. is it coincidence that JAA four weaks after the AF447 chrash became dissolved..... |
airtren;
If I may, I've clarified the meaning of "do nothing" and I think you're turning it into something I never meant and that no airman would mis-interpret. I would have thought that all pilots who fly transports would have understood what I meant and wouldn't think of it as "advice", or take it literally - no pilot would actually "do nothing" and just sit there waiting for the automatics. As for the BEA effort, it's disappointing, but there it is. Some interesting points regarding SOPs and some obvious safety recommendations. I guess we'll have to wait til October. PJ2 |
Originally Posted by sensor_validation
(Post 6603906)
Are they suggesting a possible explanation is that the displays were not showing the same information as that recorded?
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• Throughout the flight, the movements of the elevator and the THS were consistent with the pilot’s inputs.
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Originally Posted by takata
(Post 6603921)
That meant that, outside the flight envelope, simulators can't tell the BEA (for sure) that an imput is actually valid in relation with aircraft control surfaces position: as simulators are not supposed to derive anything accurately out of envelope's flight domain.
Hence, this part could only be verified by test flight (if one want to risk an A330 to verify that) which the BEA did not do up to this point (understandable). BEA qualification could indicate either case I suppose, or nothing at all. |
Originally Posted by Dozy
I think this is the BEA saying that it's impossible to know what the PF was actually seeing, and they don't like having to take it as read that he was seeing the same as the PNF, whose instrument displays were recorded.
A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed. |
Originally Posted by grity
(Post 6603935)
they do not say that the captain was without a CRM training..... I understand that in this training this situation is not part of the rules
Seeing as captain off duty happens rather frequently on long haul, it's slightly suprising (well, to me...) that there is no CRM training for the rest of the crew in that situation. Poor CRM is then unsuprising. |
Agree with takata: Interim report 3 is still the meat that is due today. Still scanning the BEA website. The PR issued on July 25th clearly states the 3rd interim report is due today - the 'synthesis note' does not seem to meet that criteria.
- GY |
@takata - Good point.
However, I can see the concept of a cockpit-area-camera going down like the proverbial lead balloon with pilots' unions... |
Pilots against Cockpit Video Recording
Takata
Having a camera showing all the displays and crew actions (postions/attitudes) would be very helpful rather than having to derive something from recorded data which doesn't give any hint about what can NOT be derived. (e.g. was the PNF reading silently the documentation? was he scanning the displays? looking at the PF actions? did they exchange meaningful regards?) A lot of things needed to understand their actions are lying in cockpit ergonomics and pilot's way to deal with the interface. Most of what would be very helpful to investigation, in this case, is lost without a camera record. About the flight data missing, it seems that it would be better/easier to have them directly recorded rather than filmed. I doubt if recommendations from this accident will change their minds. |
... until outside envelope, where you are into test-pilot territory or even beyond. ==== I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee. It's a fairly conventional aerod. design, and I see no reason we should start comparing it to a 'T' tailed a/c operating with an aft c.g. The fact it stayed at a stable AoA (probably determined by the THS setting) and just rocked its wings (+/- 20° max), maintained a reasonable airflow and forward speed component, make me think all was definitely not lost until say, at a guess, 25 > 20,000 ft. It's for this reason that I banged on loudly earlier about an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areas a bit like the revcounter in many cars, and about insistance on above average manual flying skills, for any aircrew going for a commercial license. One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!). |
Originally Posted by HarryMann
an well positioned AoA instrument, with green and red areas
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Originally Posted by HM
I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee.
'irrecoverable'? |
Originally Posted by BOAC
- where do you get this impression? We were told (in May, certainly) that it was recovering at one point. Who says 'irrecoverable'?
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Air France’s reaction to the publication of the BEA’s third intermediate report Friday 29 July 2011 In its third intermediate report, the French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA) has just presented the exact circumstances of the AF 447 Rio/Paris accident on 1 June 2009. It sheds further light on this tragedy that has deeply affected Air France and the entire air transport community. Air France wishes to pay tribute to the memory of the passengers and crew who lost their lives and extends its most sincere thoughts to their families. From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probes was the initial event that led to the disconnection of the autopilot, the loss of associated piloting control protections and considerable roll movements. After the manoeuvres carried out by the crew in deteriorated and destabilizing piloting conditions, the aircraft stalled at high altitude, could not be recovered and struck the surface of the Atlantic Ocean at high speed. It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation. During this time, the crew, comprising both First Officers and the Captain, showed an unfailing professional attitude, remaining committed to their task to the very end. Air France pays tribute to the courage and determination they showed in such extreme conditions. At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills. Work will now continue to understand the causes and the various technical and human factors that contributed to the events leading to this disaster. It is important to understand whether the technical environment, systems and alarms hindered the crew’s understanding of the situation. The BEA has also issued various recommendations for the European authorities in charge of air safety that Air France has already implemented or will implement as soon as possible. In addition to the elements that will be brought to light by the BEA’s final report and the work of the legal inquiry, we know that the measures already taken have considerably improved the safety of air transport, which is the most important aspect for the air transport industry. These measures prevent such an accident happening again. |
Originally Posted by HarryMann
(Post 6604088)
One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!).
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AF statement:
At this stage, there is no reason to question the crew’s technical skills A statement from Air France rejected the BEA's findings, saying that "nothing at this stage can allow the crew's technical competence to be blamed" for the crash. The BEA recommendations don't seem to support these statements either.... - GY |
Hi,
From the flight recorder data, it has been established that the combination of multiple improbable factors led to the disaster in less than four minutes: the icing of the Pitot probes Improbable factors ? The icing of pitot tubes is not a improbable factor This icing was well know .. cause many anterior accidends before the AF447 event Anyways I hope a more complete interim report will be posted on BEA site. Weird behaviour that posting the synthesis before the 3 interim report if it's any one ........ |
- regarding AF statement
Originally Posted by FE Hoppy
(Post 6604155)
Could not be? Wasn't would be more accurate wouldn't it?
The statement (at least in english) then goes on to contradict itself by saying that the stop-start stall alarm contributed to failure to analyse situation. Why would that have any relevance if the situation "could not be" recovered !? It also states that pitot icing "led to" the roll excursions - new one on me, how :confused: Personally I think AF are grasping at straws, particularly given the comments on training. Also, AF blames the pitots, but they were advised (in plenty of time to prevent this) to change them by AB, and they delayed/refused. I think AF are in trouble on this one. |
Hi,
Warning: crude statement So with this synthesis report .. we know the technical event starting the tragedy The icing of the pitots tubes And we know the human factor Incompetent pilots in the situation cause lack of training (not training at all !!) Methink AF is in BIG trouble cause this report. And me think the BEA and DGAC are also in BIG trouble for the reasons above ! |
Disappointing report!
Is it just me, or is this report really useless? I would have expected plots of the DFDR data and a CVR transcript! Bloody hell, there's nothing new of relevance in there!
Very disappointing. BEA should just dish out the facts! |
Hello HarryMann
There is at least one instance that shows that a member of the A300 family has been recovered from a stall, from a lot lower altitude, 4100ft. A A310, Tarom, approaching Orly, France, 1994 has been recovered at 800 ft, and landed safely, with no injuries or damage, from an uncontrolled climb and stall at 4100ft, pitch of 60 degrees, and airspeed of 30knots. But it was a very well understood stall situation though, with very quick, proper ND, and roll, aggressive reactions from the pilots. So, based on that one could even say that at 10000ft there was hope.
Originally Posted by HarryMann
(Post 6604088)
...I find it quite incredible that so many are suggesting (albeit frequently doing it between the lines), that the aircraft may have been irrecoverable once fully stalled soon after reaching the apogee. It's a fairly conventional aerod. design, and I see no reason we should start comparing it to a 'T' tailed a/c operating with an aft c.g. The fact it stayed at a stable AoA (probably determined by the THS setting) and just rocked its wings (+/- 20° max), maintained a reasonable airflow and forward speed component, make me think all was definitely not lost until say, at a guess, 25 > 20,000 ft. a. Is the actuating of a control surface proportional with the duration of the stick in a certain position? or, b. Is the actuating of a control surface, proportional only with the position of the stick, regardless of its duration? One other thing, and I know this will not be accepted immediately by all Airbus cockpit crew .. I am not convinced that the airbus sidestick design is optimum for all situations (I'll leave it at that for now!). |
Originally Posted by FE Hoppy
(Post 6604155)
Could not be? Wasn't would be more accurate wouldn't it?
Based on the pilots actions, it was not possible to recover the plane. The verb and sentence conveys what it is meant: airplane COULD not be recovered. |
Airtren,
I agree with your semantics but I think that Af are obfuscating. A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors. "Could not" might imply what I wrote or that given the situation nobody could recover the plane, something that has not even been suggested yet. |
I am tempted to say the report contains a lot more valuable information than the AF statement does.
What a shame AF is only thinking of keeping her slate clean rather than to enhance flight safety. I find AF's comments shameful. |
Air France défend ses pilotes (from Le Nouvel Observateur)
Air France, a répondu à ces résultats dans un communiqué en défendant le "professionnalisme" des pilotes, mettant en cause de leur côté la fiabilité de l'alarme de décrochage de l'avion, dont "les multiples activations et arrêts" ont "fortement contribué à la difficulté pour l'équipage d'analyser la situation". Air France responded to these results in a press release defending the "professionalism" of the pilots,for its part blaming the reliability of the stall warning with "multiple stops and starts" which strongly contributed to the difficulties the flight team had in analysing the situation. Personally, although AF is not impartial I think this point is very important. I think the pilots disbelieved the stall warning from the start. In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS. |
Originally Posted by badgerh
(Post 6604312)
Airtren,
I agree with your semantics but I think that Af are obfuscating. A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors. "Could not" might imply what I wrote or that given the situation nobody could recover the plane, something that has not even been suggested yet. Andrew from Addis |
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Interim Report #3, 117 pages (French) , mirror site link:
http://media.webcastor.fr/web/bea/f-cp090601e3.pdf |
Hi,
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Thanks, assume it will also be in English. Hopefully it appears that this report will be more telling.
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Originally Posted by glenbrook
In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS.
Each time the stall w arning was triggered, the angle of attack exceeded its theoretical trigger value |
Hello PJ2,
I am sorry if there is any perception in a negative sense. I am not the good writer that you are. Nevertheless, please take my post, as a long thought out positive feedback, and an additional clarification to the ones you've already posted recently in your replies. As I've noticed the possible misinterpretation along time ago, in the repeated instances of that text, I think such clarifications were long due. I hope will help for future posts. The Forum, and these threads are a learning and information source for many. The audience is a lot wider than just airmen.
Originally Posted by PJ2
(Post 6603956)
airtren;
If I may, I've clarified the meaning of "do nothing" and I think you're turning it into something I never meant and that no airman would mis-interpret. I would have thought that all pilots who fly transports would have understood what I meant and wouldn't think of it as "advice", or take it literally - no pilot would actually "do nothing" and just sit there waiting for the automatics. I am looking forward though to the transcript of the CVR, and an accurate/precise time line of A/C states, and state changes, and pilot actions. Edit: >>> Finally, got the report...... Yes, the transcript of the CVR speaks: the PNF calls the attention of the PF several times to do a ND, during the ascent. Furthermore, it calls the attention of the PF to use very fine stick controls. That's what you've recommended, isn't it? Finally the CVR shows that Captain does not make too much of a difference..... The problem with the Stall Warning is brought forward strongly, which was one of my major issues with the A/C. The graph of the PF stick almost shows that the PF kept the stick in NU, instead of Neutral. Training, training, training is an issue. The PF had a "Glider Pilot License" from 2001, and the AF330 license from December 2008.... >>>> End Edit
Originally Posted by PJ2
As for the BEA effort, it's disappointing, but there it is. Some interesting points regarding SOPs and some obvious safety recommendations. I guess we'll have to wait til October.
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and there is a recommendation for an AoA display, which will be down to Airbus and Boeing to implement Second: where on the vertical display real estate is a good place for an AoA gauge? Opinions will differ. Gratifying to see the BEA seems to agree with something that had me scratching my head. Note: the training issue leaps to the fore. PostScipt: Seeing as captain off duty happens rather frequently on long haul, it's slightly suprising (well, to me...) that there is no CRM training for the rest of the crew in that situation. Poor CRM is then unsuprising. It should be noted that the misleading stopping and starting of the stall warning alarm, contradicting the actual state of the aircraft, greatly contributed to the crew’s difficulty in analyzing the situation. "Crap, the AS is going squirrely, look, SW is sounding, must be from bad AS, look, x is wrong ... " A A310, Tarom, ... recovered at 800 ft, ... from an uncontrolled climb and stall at 4100ft, pitch of 60 degrees, and airspeed of 30knots ... very quick, proper ND, and roll, aggressive reactions from the pilots ... one could even say that at 10000ft there was hope. A clearer statement would be "the pilots were unable to recover from the stall" for whatever reason whether it be lack of training, not realisung they were fully stalled, simple panic or a combination of these and other factors. Personally, although AF is not impartial I think this point is very important. I think the pilots disbelieved the stall warning from the start. In fact I think the very first stall warning, which came only a few seconds after AP disconnect, was a bogus warning caused by UAS. When interrelated elements of a system both go bad, what logic tree or symptom troubleshooting is taught? |
OK, this is the real report. It is very clear that PF was confused from the start and disbelieved airspeed. PNF kept telling him to descend, at one point saying "all three say you are climbing so descend";.
At one point PNF says ";we still have engines so whats happening"; presumably referring to the low airspeed. 2:12:27 PNF You're climbing (Stall warning), Descend descend descend descend PF I was descending then? PNF, Descend Captain: No, you're climbing PF: There I am climbing, ok now descend The focus herein should be why the PF & PNF got so confused, although I am wondering how the PNF and Captain could not notice the PF's input. They realised they were climbing and knew they shouldn't be. |
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