You are right: spoken, colloguial French tends to be "sloppier" than the equivalent English.
Maybe just a red herring, but don't forget that the French also gesticulate (hands, general body language) a lot more - indeed a video would have been useful.

Another issue, as we see in recent posts, is that French has a plethora of different technical terms, which often (but not always...) mean exactly he same thing.
"Gauchissement" and "roulis" both refer to roll, either left of right (and NOT to "left rudder", a mistake that's already crept into several posts).
Same for "tangage" and "assiette" which both refer to pitch.

I should know.... I spent about half my life in France, and most of that in the aviation industry.... I still remember being baffled, when I first arrived here, by the confusing use of so many near-synonyms in documentation and reports.

Sorry... but you're wrong, unless you're talking about the "Wright Flyer" and aircraft from that age..
It may well be the logical original 'source' of the term in French aeronautical terminology, but today it just refers to "roll" or "roll angle".

Please mis-trust so-called "technical dictionaries" like the plague.....
I still remember having to switch abrupty from French "Concorde" terminology to "helicopter" terminology (change of occupation, another story...). The "dictionaries" and "vocabularies" were less than useless. Asking a collegue was the usual solution....

CJ

mm43 After your vertical red line, the roll position and heading direction show close relationship. (Actually, throughout, the relationship is clear.) So we see clearly an Heading change(s), relative to Roll. This is not indicative of Pilot overcontrol, imho, it shows rather an unstable a/c in the Lateral axis, as well as the Longitudinal. For the record, My reasoning is that to effect a change of direction of several degrees takes time, indicating rather a chronic condition than an acute one.

I have a 'gut-feeling' as well. I am confident in the Pilots, and the a/c. Those traces tell much, they tell the truth, and they have no axe to grind.
I do not mind in the least being upbraided, ignored, or marginalized. I do not have the credentials to dismiss anything, even myself.

I think it arrogant when sweeping statements are made by pros. I have an excuse.

My first reaction was to assume Pilot induced ROLL.

It is not, imo. The a/p had a similar pattern, at the end of its authority.

More than anything said of the excellent commentary, It is regrettable that esteemed posters would simply dismiss an artifact as irrelevant, or unimportant. Especially w/o supplying a reason, with explanation.

At first blush, the stick stirring and ROLL problems might seem to condemn the PF.

At every turn, to me, there is a simple explanation. It may have bearing it may not. I carry it with me as I read, and I think people are wandering too far into a blanket condemnation of the Pilot Crew. Also of the a/c.

Both sides are carrying and wearing their bias openly, and it seems objectively to me to be foolish.

Stall Recovery
 

I know it has been posted several times before......

Stall Recovery FCTM.
ISSUE DATE: 15 JUN 10


STALL RECOGNITION
The flight crew must apply the stall recovery procedure as soon as they
recognize any of the following stall indications:

‐ Aural stall warning
The aural stall warning is designed to sound when AOA exceeds a given
threshold, which depends on the aircraft configuration and Mach number.
This warning provides sufficient margin to alert the flight crew in advance
of the actual stall even with contaminated wings.

‐ Stall buffet
Buffet is recognized by airframe vibrations that are caused by the non-stationary
airflow separation from the wing surface when approaching AOAstall.
When the Mach number increases, both the AOAstall and CL MAX will decrease.
The aural stall warning is set close to AOA at which the buffet starts.
For some Mach numbers the buffet may appear just before the aural stall warning.

STALL RECOVERY

‐ The immediate key action is to reduce AOA:
The reduction of AOA will enable the wing to regain lift.
This must be achieved by applying a nose down pitch order on the sidestick.
This pilot action ensures an immediate aircraft response and reduction of the AOA.
In case of lack of pitch down authority, it may be necessary to reduce thrust.
Simultaneously, the flight crew must ensure that the wings are level in
order to reduce the lift necessary for the flight, and as a consequence, the required AOA.
As a general rule, minimizing the loss of altitude is secondary to the
reduction of the AOA as the first priority is to regain lift.
As AOA reduces below the AOAstall, lift and drag will return to their normal values.

‐ The secondary action is to increase energy:
When stall indications have stopped, the flight crew should increase thrust
smoothly as needed and must ensure that the speed brakes are retracted.
Immediate maximum thrust application upon stall recognition is not appropriate.
Due to the engine spool up time, the aircraft speed increase that results
from thrust increase, is slow and does not enable to reduce the AOA instantaneously.
Furthermore, for under wing mounted engines, the thrust increase
generates a pitch up that may prevent the required reduction of AOA.

When stall indications have stopped, and when the aircraft has recovered sufficient energy,
the flight crew can smoothly recover the initial flight path.

STALL WARNING AT LIFT-OFF

If the aural stall warning sounds at liftoff, the flight crew must fly the
appropriate thrust and pitch for takeoff in order to attempt to stop the
aural stall warning and ensure a safe flight path.
The flight crew applies TOGA thrust in order to get the maximum available thrust.
Simultaneously, the pilot flying must target a pitch angle of 15 ° and keep
the wings level in order to ensure safe climb.
Then, when a safe flight path and speed are achieved, if the aural stall
warning is still activated the flight crew must consider that it is a spurious warning.

mm43

I have noted before the "zipper" (railroad tracks) artifact on the traces.
First I saw it in THS position, then I noticed it appearing on other telltales.

I first thought it pointed to THS vibration. When I noticed it elsewhere, I changed my mind. I also considered it may be simply a poor representation of the data, and that in poor resolution.

Could it, since it represents to me a vibration, be a representation of a graphical evidence of BUFFET? I respect always your patience and objectivity. I also do not mind criticism, as you may know.

It is honest and has no agenda behind it.

edit: The Rudder deflection mates well with the ROLL, indicating "Co-ordinated" controls?

bearfoil:

If you are talking about the THS jamming or breaking in the nose-up lock position, think carefully before going round the houses again - look at this (again please excuse the low resolution, I only have the PDF to work with):

http://i1088.photobucket.com/albums/...r-elev-ths.png

Yellow : Elevator movement commanded
Green : THS begins following movement (autotrim)

Unfortunately the inputs are never held long or forcefully enough for the THS to make significant movements (remember it took over a minute of nose-up to go from cruise settings to full-aft), and the nose-down elevators last for 10-15 seconds at most - crucially they are immediately followed by a return to nose-up.

Dozy:
At all, or by this particular crew? I find your confidence in your conclusion misplaced.

At about 10,000 fps, you'd have them at about 25,000 feet after 57 seconds from apogee. That's between two and two and a half minutes to get unstalled, get flying speed, and pull up at something less than 2.5 G.
(BOAC's point on "who would drop the nose 30 degrees" is a good one).
It is recoverable, but maybe not a lead pipe cinch, and it takes deciding that "we are stalled, let's unstall!" as the mind set. That seemed particularly absent in this crew if their verbal cues tell us the story.
Your personal conclusion is not supported by how aircraft work.

What is tragic, in this case, is that the crew remained "behind" the aircraft, and thus it crashed. (Whether or not the stall warning is why, or other reasons are why, or more in combination, is an unknown).

I am grateful for mm43 puttin his finger on something that has been bugging me for a while, in terms of "what would the recovery look like if a healthy nose down input was made?" There was some angular momentum to the right as it descended, that would sustain until corrected, which brings us to his point:

If the aircraft hadn't become relatively stabilized in the 15° NU attitude with the THS and the elevator positioned as we know, the chances of entering a spiral dive would have been high.

Particularly given the trouble the PF had flying wings level.

Old Carthusian:From one pilot to another, referring to the bit I Italicized-- they are inter-related. As variables, they act upon one another. (Won't wander off into how dynamic feedback loops reinforce one another, that analogy is perhaps too far afield).

As noted before, we are in agreement on most of the human factors, specifically in re training.

As to necessary and sufficient issues:
If no pitot icing, no wreck. That should not be glossed over.
If stall warning doesn't cut out or clip at 60 knots (sensed) would that be a critical difference?
Maybe and maybe not.
The apparent non-recognition of stalled condition is a serious issue, which takes us back to training and recency of experience, and even possible mis diagnosis of their situation.

From what we know about the verbal interchanges (we can't see what anyone nodded at or pointed to with those artful Gallic hands :cool: ) there is some reason to believe that due to UAS influencing, hence lost confidence in air mass gauges, and something else (task saturation from trying to simply maintain straight and level?), the audio alerts, be they bogus or valid, became background noise within at least two brain housing groups ... and perhaps the Captain's as well. There's where we seem to agree on the psychology and task threshold piece.

Dozy

Many thanks, I am well past 'broken'. Thank you for not making a big deal. I say what I think, and since I have no conclusions, I am quickly able to change course, this is after all, a "knife-fight"!

Please notice on your depiction that the THS trace has 'serrata', to me indicating a command, but one insufficient to cause actual deflection.
They exhibit a consistent rate and amplitude, thus probably just an electronic telltale. Notice also the appearance of these saw tooths on either "side" of the normed line. This would say to me the "direction" of the command signal?

Lonewolf. "The problem PF had with ROLL". I know what you mean, but it carries an inference that he was not up to it. Can we agree that the ROLL, like the Pitch, was difficult for other than possible Pilot issues with aviating?

Can they have been convinced (for the most part) throughout the Descent, that they were wicked oversped, and not STALLED?

I think it is clear that is the case. "He's pulling UP". "I hope so, we're at 4000 feet!"

In this particular *situation*. I've always tried to give the crew and the aircraft a fair deal for as long as I've been involved in this discussion.

In this I agree with both BOAC and yourself - that had the situation been correctly recognised then recovery would be technically possible, but it would have required the training that it appears the pilots at the controls did not possess, or a *eureka* moment followed by instinctive flying.

You'll get no argument from me there.

The captain's arrival at that particular point in time seems to be a blessing and a curse in equal measure. It was the Captain that correctly diagnosed the stall condition (possibly in response to the PF's assertion that he had kept the flight controls at the back stops for some time) and had this realisation happened earlier, recovery might have been possible. However it looks to me as though the arrival of the captain distracted the PNF to some extent, when the PNF seemed well on his way to working out the problem, having noticed the PF's tendency to pitch up and attempted to verbally correct him multple times.

If this was the case, then similar things have happened in the past (e.g Kegworth, where the Captain's attempt to revisit the engine indications was interrupted by the radio - and the Mont St. Odile A320 accident, where the PF began to realise something was up with the altitude and vertical speed, but was interrupted by the PNF pointing out that they were off course laterally). Ultimately this comes down to CRM, and using it effectively.

@bear - The "serrata" you describe happen at the start of every THS movement on the graph, even when a large input is made and a smooth progression follows. The THS is behaving as it should, following the long-term trends of the elevator inputs. The reason you're seeing the "serrata" under AP control is because of the constant elevator and THS corrections that occur under autoflight. I'd be prepared to wager that close in, those traces don't look anything like as regular as they appear, and their apparent regularity is due to the limitations of the resolution and rounding maths in the rendering engine of the software used to draw the charts (which looks a lot like Microsoft Excel).

Has the English version been released yet and if so anyone a link?

If it follows their standard nomenclature, it will appear at:

http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp...90601e3.en.pdf

It is not there yet.

I just looked on the BEA site (Aug 3, 17h30 local), and there was no trace yet of the little UK flag that indicates the presence of a translation.

Was told this morning that "It should be on the web tomorrow."

We shall see....

No English translation yet but there is a press release commenting on the report of the removal of the recommendation about the stall warning.

It is in the usual place on BEA site and says that this issue will be adressed by the specialist team(s) set up to look at human factors and man machine interface. They also point out that the warning was continuous for 54 seconds and they will investigate why no appropriate actions seem to have been taken in that time.

No surprises there.

Attitude + Power = Performance Not Valid for Stall Recovery
 

AF447 has contributed substantial hindsight on this situation.

Three pilots over three minutes could not identify the stall problem; they thought they had another problem, likely overspeed, and were trying to solve that one.

It seems the VSI indication was dismissed.

But they did identify decreasing altitude at 9000 and 8000 and became rightly concerned. At that time the fifth digit had dropped from view. Perhaps that got their attention.

How is it that the altimeter display did not get their attention earlier?

As has been mentioned, on a round altimeter the winding hands would be quite obvious.

But an abnormal descent rate on a flat panel display does not grab the pilots' attention as well as a round altimeter.

Should we be coloring the altitude display red or orange for abnormal descent rates?

BEA
 

For those people who want to know if the BEA has published the English version of the report, you can check the same way as I do. Access the Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses website, select News or Ongoing Investigations for Rio - Paris 2009, and all will be revealed. Even a caveman can do it.

- I wonder actually if the VS was 'high' enough to be either off scale or 'lurking' at the bottom and so not 'seen', since it is 'never there'?

and some cavemen can actually post links, allegedly.http://images.ibsrv.net/ibsrv/res/sr...lies/smile.gif

RBF:
Given that other gauges use the green amber red, why not?

Another way to think through this is to use three different colors, so that those three are not cognatively mixed with the colors on the speed display ...

But of all the suggestions I've seen in this discussion, this one leaps out to me as "Why Didn't I Think of That?" in spades. *tips cap*

On further reflection, perhaps a full scale flat panel VSI indication should be red and blinking to get the crew's attention.

English Version
 

When the English Version is available, it will be announced and linked here:
BEA: Ongoing Investigations: Flight AF 447 on 1st June 2009

RBF

Are we absolutely certain they did not see it? If pre-occupied with an 'overspeed', they would be cognizant of VSI, but, like Altitude, they didn't remark on it till it went "critical"? Overspeed recovery involves an "abrupt" mitigation of descent, unlike any STALL recovery? Also, the VSI was fluctuating, so why trust it implicitly? I think they were flying in a 'blend' of IMC and "seat of pants". Unfortunately, they were relying perhaps a little on the way they "Felt"? So, again, OS wants instant 'g', to the "limit" (and it is available, with protections?). No pressure to endure a ND of 30+ degrees and taptoes to wait for wings 'reload'?

@RatherBeFlying

Yes, great ideas. The one thing about a display is that its not static..meaning, when things start to really go awry, designers should use the display to focus the pilots attention - perhaps remove extraneous detail - as opposed to overloading the crew in situations when you dont want them to be overloaded with information.

When your dropping at -10k fpm its quite easy to calculate when you will instantly go to 0 fpm if the conditions remain unchanged ! If a crew is unaware ( I am assuming ) that they are falling at such a rate, then there is a weakness with the interface. In conditions that fall outside of expected behaviour, clarity of information to the crew is paramount.

Even after two years, the posts here show a diverse range of opinion. I am sure the pilots wanted to get home as much as anyone else on the flight, but they, and everyone else on board had their final flight. The technology is there. The man/machine interface still needs to be addressed.

speedbirdconcorde..... same question?

One would like to think a crew would begin to get concerned when they had lost as little as a 1000' below cleared level -- Attitude Instrument Flying and all that...

Agreed the instrument scan seems to have gone out the window.

Since no mention of altitude was made until 9000' the simplest explanation is that altitude was not in anybody's scan. Otherwise it would most likely have been mentioned by one of the crew much earlier.

Bear...we shall probably never know. One can assume this or that but its really irrelevant if the pilots are not alive to confirm. The only thing I believe we really know at the moment is that confusion reigned in the cockpit.

People lost their lives, so all we have left is the data...from that, we have to ensure that the probable cause of this accident should not result in the same ending ever again...

cheers

Stall warning vs AIRCRAFT STALLED!
 

The purpose of the Stall Warning is to warn of an approaching stall condition and in this accident it is clear that the fact the aircraft WAS STALLED wasn't identified, at least explicitly.

It has been noted that at one point the Stall Warning was sounding continuously for some 54 seconds, with apparently no attention - not one of the crew ever uttered the word "stall", at least in any of the released CVR content. It remains to be seen in the future whether the full CVR transcript will indicate otherwise (assuming it makes the light of day at some point downstream).

However my question (or perhaps statement) is why is there no "YOU ARE STALLED - DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT!" warning? Something that cannot be ignored.

Certainly, overspeed, for example, is upsetting and may lead to bits of the airplane falling off, so being concerned about that is reasonable, but in the order of things being stalled certainly trumps an overspeed condition.

Unless I am having a seriously bad day, all the necessary conditions for the computing system of the aircraft to be aware that things were seriously pear-shaped were still available - and I think it takes just two:

- AoA seriously negative
- Altitude (or vertical speed) winding off the scale

Can there ever be a legitimate combination of such an AoA and vertical speed that is NOT a stalled aircraft? If not then how about flashing a warning on the center glass reading: "AIRCRAFT STALLED! AIRCRAFT STALLED! REDUCE AoA!"?

There are far better qualified folk on this board to define better conditions (factoring more parameters I'd bet) for such a warning, but what is wrong with doing this?

Given the horizontal speed can be suspect whether or not this need be factored into such a critical warning I will leave as an exercise for the reader, but it seems to me this incident and the Buffalo crash seem to warrant a stage 2 warning beyond approach to stall, that instantly and unequivocally let's the crew know what is happening and has the key resolution (AoA reduction) as the key tag-line?

Make the cockpit displays FLASH the message in RED TEXT on a white background every 5 seconds, whatever, but make it clear and unambiguous.

As a reminder, these posts were aligned with the BEA analysis, and likely the recommendation that has been delayed now. Would you put BEA experts in any of those 3 categories?

Let me tackle it one by one:

1. "Understand the Airbus FBW concept"

What does the Stall Warning have to do with FBW?

It is an Emergency Error Message to the pilot, about the state of the plane, that can be fatal. The "media" for transmitting commands from the pilot to the controls can be anything as long as it does the job of carrying the commands. It can be wire (FBW), WI-FI (wireless), optical fiber, cable, compressed gas/air, hydraulic, etc....

Furthermore, regarding its importance, and place within the system, the Message can be generalized. It is not different than ANY Emergency Error Message about a possible fatal situation or condition, relative to the functioning of a box, coming from the box to the operator of that box, with the purpose to trigger an action of the operator of removing the condition, or cause of the situation.

2. "Have never flown an Airbus".

Doesn't Air France action/opinion on the Stall Warning also represent Airbus pilots position and interpretation?

A pilot trained to fly Airbus is also trained to follow certain procedures to bypass the a/c weaknesses.

Good training is a MUST, no doubt. But good training, and peer pressure in the pilot community coming with the good training, while has positive effect, it also, creates a paradoxical situation, in that it is a brain-washing mechanism, that contributes to hiding or minimizing weaknesses, or problems with the a/c.

3. "axe to grind with Airbus."

This is one of the most detrimental criteria, and has become typical.

It makes it very easy to arbitrarily label, categorize and dismiss. It makes it easy to muddy/fog the path to the truth.

GarageYears, et al,
As much as new designs might enhance the salience of a warning, if the crew’s mental model has rejected the warning as being false, inappropriate, or unwarranted in the situation as perceived, then enhancement is of little point.
Remember ‘shut up gringo’ ?
Some other aircraft have, and for good reason, a stick shaker and stick pusher.
Now an electronic version of that sounds very simple, particularly if it repositions trim. However, remember that a ‘rush’ makes for poor law – similarly quick system changes and redesign might have pitfalls elsewhere.
Thus, let the designers think through their system; they probably evaluated such an option in the initial design - certification case to show why it is not required.
Finally all parties must ensure that any change fixes the problem, but do we actually know what the problem is, except perhaps human limitations in perception and understanding.

Hmm, I somehow understand your frustration about this unfortunate systems behaviour, but by all means the Stall warnings were not bogus when they sounded. Even at that time the A/C was still deeply in a stall. Remember this was at Alpha > 30°.
If you want to call something bogus it is the fact that they stopped above a certain AoA.

In this whole event I do not see a single bogus stall warning.
Even not the first ones. Looking at the FDR traces it is clear that at 1,6g the Stall AoA would surely be momentarily exceeded. That should happen somewhere above 1,4g at that speed / altitude.

Still I'm sure the logic for the stall warning will be an item which will be reviewed by Airbus and rightfully so.

Stall Warning need fix
 

We’re both facing possibly the same problem with the charts – alignment, and resolution - which BEA experts and those having the source or better resolutions of the charts don’t.

Your chart that I can see on my screen reading your post, shows that the SW graph is misaligned with the PF stick action graph, being too much to the left, and thus the SW spikes are to much to the left relative to the PF stick graph.

As mentioned, there are 8 SWs in the ‘a/c recoverable window”, which from left to right, are in 2 groups of 4. There is a remaining 2 SWs to the right, between 6000ft and 0ft altitude. These 2 make it total of 10.

While I can give up on the first 2 SWs (the first pair at the left) of the first group of 4 SWs – which I didn’t dismiss initially, because of the PF stick unsatisfactory graph resolution. but I agree, it does not show unambiguously enough longer duration stick movement at this time.

I will stick with the 2 which were left of the first group of 4 (at the left), as there is PF clear corresponding stick motion – less NU first, followed by ND.

The second group of 4 SWs (at the right), is clearly in the ND/NU heavy stick action region. Don’t dismiss a ND action because there is no perfect vertical match – as the SW does not follow the ND action instantaneously.

After more thinking, it is clear to me that the last 2 SWs (out of 10) that show on the graph to the very right, between 6000 ft and 0 ft, which I didn’t include in my previous post, are to be considered as well in this discussion.

They in fact, fall in the same category with the others, as the ability to recover or not recover does not change the character and source of the problem.

It is wrong to say that the failure of the SW to relay the correct information to the pilots does not matter because it was too late for them to recover anyway.

It does not matter if the SW gave the wrong indication once, or 10 times.

It is sufficient to do it once, as it can happen again, and again, in similar situations, if a fix is not developed. The recovery or not recovery from stall is not removing the possible similar behavior on other planes in similar situations.
It is bogus not because it was a Stall Warning out of silence during a Stall.


It is bogus, because it was a Stall Warning giving the wrong indication relative to the PF actions, and relative to the state of the “a/c” relative to Stall.

The message from the PF/NPF/CDB perspective was signaling a transition from NON STALL to STALL, when in fact the transition was from STALL to NON STALL.

You are missing the point, if you think, that the exact internal cause, or the mechanism of triggering the message matters. It does not matter, relative to the needs of the pilots, and state of the “a/c”.

In the same time, you’re making my point – if the internal mechanism was creating the condition in which the STALL Warning went silent, that mechanism need be fixed, in that it need to be depending on more parameters, such that there is a parallelism, that removes the risk that the NCD of one parameter results in NO MESSAGE.

Which one would correspond to WSJ, and which NI? Media makes money from disseminating information, and scandals make money….But there is a gauge that each of us has, and in this case it is not the trash, that you could throw a Blanket Dismissal at.

This crash has been under investigation for more than 2 years now, and many following it had the ability to have a good enough understanding without being influenced by one press article, or another.

What’s the today’s press and TV news in France? More of course... as there is more reaction by the parties involved....

It’s a STALL recovery, in quite drastic height, attitude, and speed conditions first.

One major difference had to do with the pilots basic training, that shaped their flying instinct, and reflex.

is an additional aspect of the Stall Warning, which you may understand or may not, in terms of system error message, relative to system state.

It’s ONE ERROR for three different possible states of the system:

• State 1. transition from NON-STALL to STALL
• State 2. steady STALL
• State 3. transition from STALL to NON-STALL

As long as there is no clear separation between 3 distinct messages, the operator need to understand certain parameters and apply the algorithm to differentiate. In a stressful life and death situation, that's too much.

It is a lot easier to let the computers do the differentiation and showing the right message.

Understanding how THS work is important, very important. But the “information about the THS wheel position change” is not about how it works. It’s about saving the time needed to watch it and memorize its positions to check it. When time is crucial for life or death decisions and actions, any time interval and ant sensory and brain computer and memory cycles that can be spared, are an addition to what can be used to save the situation. So what if other planes don’t have it. Is the validation of other planes needed for Airbus?
There is one very simple, but also major reason to have it: Operating it in relative secrecy, when the results cannot be easily perceived by the entire team in the cockpit contributes to the type of AF 447 accident.

As we speak about this, I still have an unanswered question relative to the Airbus 330 stick functioning:

Is the control surface deflection proportional with the duration of a stick action in a certain position – if it is longer action in a certain position, is the deflection different than shorter action in that position?
....
As all of the above are part of the "a/c to pilot information interface", the current technology level makes a screen large enough to see from all seats, with a clear 3D image animation of the plane with its AoA and roll position space, and position of control surfaces long over due.

Message from BEA, August 3rd
 

Press release on 3rd August 2011

It's an interesting read, full text:

Clearly not every circumstance can be trained, programmed and simulated.
Once we accept that fact then we see a need for augmenting the resources on the flight deck in an emergency situation.
One solution would be an irridium satellite phone uplink with AF operations center supplying flight data and errors. It should also connect a voice channel. It would automatically connect when system errors reach a critical threshold level or manually activated.
It is easy to envisage a pilot receiving a call "This is AF operations: AF447 your a/c has 3 failed pitots and UAS. You are approaching stall, recommend immediate pitch down, side stick forward over...".
Satellite phone costs are cheap and air time would only be used in an emergency. There is presumably already an AF technical operations center which could be set up with the required telemetry systems.
We already see ECAM telemetry. This needs to be taken to the next logical level.

Are they kidding....:ugh::confused:

STALL WARNING
That statement can not be misconstrued. The crew never acknowledged the Stall Warning. The exception could be that they reacted to it inappropriately once stalled.

If one comes from a Nordic or Germanic country, it used to be quite a difference. Not that much anymore, at least with the latter....

A French intellectual may say that:

French have a somewhat different education, in that arts, prose and poetry have a more important role than in other educational systems

French have a Balzac, a Hugo, a Proust, to name a few, which are revered more by the regular people than in other cultures significant writers would be....

French are more artistically and romantically oriented relative to their practical orientation. That shows, that even the simplest technical writing can become a little piece of art prose, with turns and meanders, rather than a very practical, straight forward, concise, easy to read piece of information.

That's what a French intellectual may say...

GPWS works like this, I'd say. "Sink Rate! Sink Rate!" and then "Pull up! Pull up!"

You could have Betty give an explicit suggestion (like "Pull up!") for a developed stall: "Nose down!" or something. Of course I agree that pilots should be able to recognize the development of a stall, but it's been shown that pilots can fly perfectly good airplanes in to the ground without recognizing they're about to do so-- which case presumably led to the development of GPWS to begin with.

I like this idea, although (humor follows) the confusion of messages close to the ground would be interesting: "Sink rate"... "Impending stall"... "Stall! Nose down!"... "Pull up!"

And the last fifty feet, too late too late.

"stall warning"
I decipher this as "Get off of our freakin' back, folks! We're tryin' to do a quality investigation here!" :=

I empathize.

The (...)c'est pas possible - "that's not possible" - of the Captain at 2:12:44

Yes, he said that in the middle of a 5 sec SW burst. I estimate he had probably already heard at least 15 secs of SW from arriving on the FD, and in any case, was he actually referring to the SW or the V/S??

is it possible that the rollinputs are induced from a "karman vortex-street" behind the fuselage of this widebody with his angular incident flow in case of higher AoAs ?


P.S.
what can be a reason for UAS until the ice dedectors has no ise detected........