It seems to be a BEA concern that FDs were not set OFF as per UAS procedure as they were comming back many times for a while (They are not sure about the effect or indications given to PF). It is still a work in progress at this point.

Seat belts, straps//
 

Fact is.let's say PF was only strapped waist belt..
Would that prevent accurate SS in moderate to strong turbulence ?

Takata;
My understanding of the FDs is that they reflect data being sent to the FCPCs by the FMGECs. At this point, the raw data on the PFD would be the most important thing to look at - the FD's would not be presenting useful information. However, as we know, they may have tried to use the FPV to confirm what the VSI was telling them, and we know it didn't work because the FPV was not available at the time.

The simulator sessions probably have helped here I would think but it is very much a work in progress which much remaining to be understood concerning Phases 2 and 3 of the three phases indicated in this report. Phase 1 stands alone as a topic of great interest, in my view anyway. At some point, a formal calculation needs to be made, (I know that some calculations have been done by some experienced engineers), as to whether the aircraft was recoverable after the stall had fully developed moments after the apogee with AoA >16deg, (meaning stick held fully forward, engines at idle thrust, until very clear indications of rapidly increasing speed were obtained), and whether this would be moreso if the THS were rolled forward, and if so, to what setting.

HarryMan;

My sense of it is, the arm and hand "unit" has sufficient mass to be moved about on its own but that would be turbulence very much in the moderate to moderate + territory. Anything lighter than that would be controllable, but one must not grip the stick firmly but "ride it at the top" while making corrections. Unless the inertial reels fastening the shoulder harnesses are locked tight around the upper body, they won't prevent movement, especially sideways.

That's one view...there will be several thousand others. ;-)

More on V/S
 

PJ2 and DJ77, my thanks to you both. I understand that the recorded changes of selected V/S do not indicate a pilot action, and have no effect on the aircraft with AP OFF. Would they affect the FD and thereby influence the PF's actions?

Regarding the indicated V/S, I note that the source switched several times between IR and ADR. Would that be automatic too?

From a "tourist" PoW (me), the BEA report is not as harsh against pilots than it could be. But, if you "read between the lines", it seems (to me, imho), to reflect some kind of sideration at what BEA people discovered by reading CVR and flight data. Is the final wording more politically correct than it may have been? Have the Air France "leaks" they will buy Boeings, just few days after the black boxes been read (see for example: Air France urged to back Airbus in plane order: Thomson Reuters Business News - MSN Money), something to do with this too kind wording? Some extracts gave my attention (non professional, non pilot, just interested):
One of the co-pilots (the PF) seems to have an altitude "obsession":

- Around 1H45 (p.74): "le copilote propose de demander à monter au niveau 360 non standard" (the co-pilot suggested asking for a climb at non-standard level 360).
- Just after 1H52 (p.75): "Le copilote attire de nouveau l’attention du commandant de bord sur la valeur du REC MAX, qui atteint alors le FL 375." (The first officer again draws the attention of the captain on the MAX REC value, which then reaches the FL 375.). Is this not a remark to obtain a climb permission? The captain didn't comment.
- Around 2H00 (p.9, p.51 et p.75): "malheureusement on ne peut pas trop monter pour l’instant" (unfortunately we can not climb for now): briefing between two co-pilots
- Just after the Captain left (p.75): "Les deux copilotes discutent encore de la température et du REC MAX." (The two co-pilots are discussing again about the temperature and REC MAX.).

In one of the occurences (p.75), the BEA wrote a guess about this "préoccupation constante de l’équipage" (constant concern of the crew): "probablement pour limiter les turbulences." (likely to limit turbulence.). OK. Perhaps.
But there is something strange: at 2 h 06 min 54, the PF said (p.91) "Moins quarante deux on utilisera pas les anti ice c’est toujours ça de pris " (litteral translation: minus forty two we don't have to use anti icing it is always something taken. Blue sentence probably translates: better than nothing).
Why he said this?
Concern about fuel consumption? Same for higher altitude? Same for straight road through ITCZ?
Something to do with salary "add-on"? The salaries of Air France pilots are a non readable black box for people outside the company (and even for many inside).
But it has also been said the company encouraged fuel economy, so it all could be a "good practice" learned by pilots, and very difficult for them to make balance with flight security.

Hope I am not too harsh.

Two questions: did you think the transcription is complete? Seems to me very few is said after Captain came back. And what about (apparently) total ignorance of alarms and synthetic voice?

@ jcjeant: did your post #1028 (It's seem's that is one more stranger for those 3 strangers ... the plane .... ) means you think the plane was a stranger to the crew (and not a strange plane as suggested)? If true, it is the same for me. Who might have suspected such a story if the black boxes had not been retrieved?

Sorry for my Frenchie English. Sorry for this too long and probably stupid post, but the reading of the CVR transcription is so appalling I can't tell nothing. Peace to all these souls.

PJ2
 

PJ2

That clarifies it fine, thanks

Below minus 40 all water is assumed to be ice. So below minus 40 engine anti-ice is not selected on.

I think that explains the quote.

Cockpit seats 1, 2, and 4 were retrieved, along the bodies of PF and PNF. We do not know whether both bodies were retrieved simultaneous with the seat they were sitting in. My guess is that they were, for that would facilitate recovery. Retrieval of other bodies was deferred until after the DNA testing was completed on these two bodies.

This third interim report says very little about the bodies recovered in the last phase, where they were seated in the airplane, and whether the recovered bodies were all seated and belted. The report does say that the autopsy results for the bodies recovered by Ile de Sein were consistent with the autopsy results for the bodies recovered floating.
_______________________

Rather strange that none of the pilots comments on the change in heading as the plane circles back.

whenitreallyhurts must have a problem thinking. Yes, the crash was caused by inappropriate behavior in the cockpit. Now, what does that have to do with the price of airline safety?

Perhaps we should ask WHY? That's a simple three letter word that eludes those anxious to have somebody, that is SOME BODY, to BLAME and be our Judas goat so that "the bad is cast out."

That simple question raises interesting specters that BEA has pretty much confirmed and AF's rant (despite it's one good point) rather confirms. Those pilots were basically untrained for the kind of situation in which they found themselves. There also seems to be a pattern of similar failures. So given a pattern one can deduce the reason for the pattern. AF and ABI positively screwed up the training. And ABI's stall warning system (cough) "Needs work."

Lemurian - jcjeant appears to not recognize the meaning of "preliminary" or "interim."

Hi,

Exactly :ok:

If we want take a look at facts .. BEA report N°3 indicate that the waist belt of PNF was secured and no belts were secured for PF on the seats recovered
But as JD_EE remark .. it's only preliminary report
Maybe in the next report (maybe final) .. they will write that all belts were secured .. I never know .. with BEA ...

whenitreallyhurts
 

'Keeping the rubber side down isn't that hard?

Really? You have experience of flying an A330 close to its ceiling in turbulence at night in alternate law with instruments that are failing? If so you must be one of the few A330 pilots in the _world_ with that experience.

There is a lot of difference between being given a situation that you have been trained for and making errors, and being given a situation that you have never trained for and being expected to ace it from no experience.

It would appear that 'bus drivers are all conditioned that its just going to motor on and you can forget all that 'fly the aircraft stuff' that you might have been taught. All that is needed is a knowledge of the laws and a list of mental exercises to recite at the periodic check and if in doubt pitch and power.

Well in this case that was not true and people died.

This is not so much 'pilot error' as pilots being put in a situation that they had no chance of recovering as they'd never been trained to do so. What reactions they did have were in line with the by rote training they had received.
Indeed it may be that even an ace manual pilot may have had difficulty, given that it was night time in turbulent weather conditions, the lack of reliable instruments and squirrely behavior of an aircraft close to its ceiling with some protections but not others.

But I am sure you would have had no problem with your high skill and infallibility you would have needed no training and just have another story over pastis the next day. :rolleyes:

AF 447
 

Which argument puts it right back in AF s`court.......why were they not trained to see what they were seeing and take corrective action?After reading this for two years it does seem that every opportunity has been given the PF and others that they were finding themselves in a very difficult corner for which they were untrained......shame on AF and ,probably,AB.

Dozy:
Not quite so. There was the matter of a few pitot tubes going AWOL for a bit that was trigger to this event. Absent that, no UAS, and no issues with hand flying way up there where the air is thin, and a bit bumpy. Granted, that is a malfunction, and there are procedures for it, but there was something wrong with the aircraft. Something fundamental.

Ian, please don't hate me for what follows:

First note: if the two pilots were both aware of them being in condition UAS, what is the likelihood that they were skeptical of stall warning, knowing that airspeed is a component of stall AoA calculations? That might explain in part the apparent "ignore" of the stall warning.

Second note:

From the latest release, the aircraft went into a condition of unreliable airspeed. What leaped out at BEA was that (if I read this rightly) the crew didn't progress to the unreliable airspeed checklist/procedure as was standard practice at the time. (If I misunderstand that, my apologies).

The information released shows me a PNF who had to focus on flying problems rather abruptly. His requirement to assist (rather than take over from??) the PF, to include the switch to (F/O 3 on the ATT select?? takata's illustration informs this) indicates to me that he felt that the PF was having difficulty with his PFD. Given the number of things going wrong on displays, and the PF being unclear on what he was seeing (from PNF perspective) giving the PF a better inertial unit to run his would be a helpful copilot (role) assisting PF. (If this guess is off, apologies).

In the meantime, hand flying at altitude with UAS in Alt 2: is this trained for?

If not, the PF was playing catch up.

A human factors question arises that may be answered by AF SOPs or habits, or it may not have an answer.

With what appears to be the senior pilot between the two recognizing a pilot who was fighting the aircraft a bit, or chasing it, his initial "talk him back into the scan/situation" is what most of us would do as good copilots ( in terms of our role at the time.)

At what point should/would it have been "I have the controls" when the PF kept chasing the attitude and the PNF kept having to prompt him to go in a different direction? (Aside: Isn't that the question every Captain must have a clear answer to before takeoff, or an instinct for, in terms of his threshold of "that's enough, I have controls" when his copilot is flying?) If the PNF made a number of inputs on the SS but didn't take controls, I know a few CRM people who'd be aghast, as the preference is that one pilot is on controls, the other isn't. (We could probably spend all day debating the intricacies of what's behind that.) WIth a SS, his inputs won't be felt by the PF, so the "summing" function may have less than the desired effect, as opposed to conventional controls where the PF would have felt what PNF was doing. <== Is this a shortcoming of SS, or an advantage? I can see it both ways. (Anyone whose instructor "rode the controls" while you were learning probably sees the issue here).

The SOS call to the Captain was a good idea. I am unclear on the problem that seems to have delayed the Captain's return ... maybe it wasn't delayed, but PNF was in a mild case of temporal distortion -- time was slowing down or speeding up for him.

If the PF was unable to get level, you can argue that PNF can't get to the next logical task: procedure for airspeed indications being unreliable, and announced in the cockpit, acknowledged, and subsequently they follow the step by step UAS procedure.

The PF's flying occupied most of his attention.

Why PF couldn't get to straight and level is a question AF has to answer.

If the aircraft can enter a given mode, (degrade into ALT Law 1 or 2 or direct) then the pilot must be trained to fly it in that mode. Likewise direct law. Not just initial training, but proficiency, and/or refresher.

You never know when you'll need it.

Shadoko
Wife in the back?

HN39;

The switch-over would be automatic. The FDs would not have any influence on the crew's behaviour. Raw data's the thing in circumtances like this. They had attitude, vertical speed, altitude all engine instruments and everything else required for stable flight. All that was missing was airspeed information, and that for less than a minute.

Hi,

Maybe we can add to the missing items list a reliable stall alarm

I agree that it is not an issue of whether the pilots made an error, but to understand why they made an error.

So I was pleased to see it reported that:

If those of us who follow the news remember the Toyota brake pedal scandal in the US we actually have a possible explanation. The people drving the cars swore blind that they pressed the brake pedals but that the cars accelerated. In fact as detailed examination of several incidents showed they pressed the accelarator pedals. When faced by unexpected circumstances people do not do what they think they do. This accident is a prima facia case of such a reaction and no Lonewolf 50, it is not the aircraft. It is inadequate training and a culture which encourages a disregard of SOPs. If there is any blame to be apportioned it is to AF who allowed these circumstances to develop. Both the more experienced pilots could have taken over from the PF and to my mind this is the biggest mystery. Why did neither do so?

In my post #952 I wrote:

this in my view should be read as 2 separate statements made by the captain

CAP: Là je sais pas
That one I have no idea of

CAP: là ça descends
That one indicates a descent

Subsequently a consensus seems to emerge (#966 #968) that my analysis may be wrong and it is more likely the "Là je said pas" is intended to suggest that the CDB does not know what is going on as a reply to the question of the PF asking what is going on.

One needs the original recordings for the intonations to decide the intention of the wording. Perhaps there is a French native captain who can answer this:

If one wanted in French to reply to an urgent question (from a junior) of what is going on, I believe the proper answer would be: "je ne said pas" or " je ne said pas encore" (I do not (yet) know).

By adding "Là" if taken on it's own it is almost an expression of non-responsability in the sense of "don't ask me" (!!) or at the very least a form of very casual talk, not likely in this situation.

Is this explanation correct?

In French "Là ... et Là ..." is often used to point at different subsequent things.

I am not accusing any pilot just trying to get to the cockpit management issues at hand

Gentlemen I think you are failing to see the wood from the trees.

The aircraft was equipped with substandard parts which were inadequately tested, when this was realised there should have been a mandatory replacement program within a definite time scale.
Down to manufacturers and the authorities.

Air France were also negligent and it took not only the accident but pilot strike action to get them replaced.

Air France carried out a series of simulator tests with similar conditions to the RIO flight, most of the crews crashed.
Those that didn't had a member who flew small aircraft in his spare time.

To AF credit they recruited a committee to look at their operation that included two Anglo-Saxons.
One ex military and the second one whose initial flying course was of two years duration, including an aerobatics test and whose employee gave instructors courses to young first officers to augment their handling abilities.

Whilst there were definite errors on the part of the crew notably the captain leaving the flight deck during ITCZ transit - they were not sufficiently trained to deal with a situation which, before the advent of glass cockpits, was extremely rare.
They were not taught correct pitch power flying - PNF should not have had to delve into a checklist - it should be known by heart.

Which poses a question about the BEA, DGAC and EADS;
Since the inauguration of the airbus we have had a series of accidents involving top Air France and Airbus personnel. Halbesheim, Strasburg, Gulf de Lion, Etihad at Toulouse as well as 447 to name a few (plus the construction software design fiasco between the french and the germans), If EADS can get the design philosophy / human interface so wrong that the one group of pilots that should not be crashing them does then what chance do mere mortals in the third world have????
(this was also demonstrated by a Russian pilot's son!)

As we all know EADS are responsible for the checklists, as are the DGAC in overseeing the AOC holder - so to purely blame Air France and it's pilots is a mistake.

I have known collusion in four western aviation authorities, all carried out in THE NATIONAL INTEREST - it is about time that they exercised their powers in the interest of the passengers and crews.

The industry has had two crew operation forced upon them - I believe it is intrinsically unsafe.( as demonstrated here when PNF was in the checklists and not monitoring PF).

Training has continually evolved along with sophisticated electronics to the detriment of handling skills - this needs to be addressed.

In the good old days most pilots could cope with multiple failures and fly the aeroplane - is the cost of ensuring adequate flying currency too expensive with respect to the cost of a hull loss?

Blind Pew,

Whilst you are essentially correct, you are at risk of being side-lined as an old-school pilot who refuses to see the advantages of modern technology....

To further enhance your argument: There are now automatic messages for pilots exceeding the narrowest of tolerances during hand flying, resulting in gentle phone calls from ops to the PF and/or the captain urging them at the very lest caution if not nudging them to use the automation rather than flying by hand. This clearly results in less hand flying than would otherwise be the case.

One could debate that automated flying is excellent "systems training" but should not count towards flying hours for more than say 10% of the time...

Perhaps some GA flight time (without AP) should be made mandatory, just a block of 2 hours per month of which one hour upper air work and one hour circuits would do the trick.

But life is not like that, unfortunately...
Companies (manufacturers as well as airlines) will always strive for more automation to "cut out the middle man" (less strikes or illness is less money lost) and to compensate for human deficiencies (fatigue, spacial disorientation etc).

Whilst I agree some crashes are the result of the automation, how do we decide the crashes which have been prevented by the same automation? Because that is the side the companies are on.

Note for PJ2 - trying to follow your link to 'P114', but please be aware that page numbers here are meaningless since they depend on individual settings of posts per page. If you can link to post numbers that helps.

Re VS - is the AB system like the Boeing? Initial Inertial reading with time related barometric damping? Are you referring to some sort of pilot selectable 'selector' between IR and baro in your post #1080? "There is an "ADR" and "IR" vertical speed selection I see." or is this software driven?

Why would PNF feel the need to change PF to 'IR3'? Does this indicate that IR3 was giving erroneous info?

Why all the queries about SS inputs left and right? Surely the FDR trace will show who was doing what?

vanHorck, blind pew

Go away and read up on historical accidents caused by pilot error. Read about the psychological aspects of accidents. Then come back and comment when you actually know what you're talking about. (Clipper Skippers anyone?). Flying is immesurably safer now than it was in the past precisely because of the increase in computerisation and automation.

Agreed, but all major manufacturers have been guilty of this.


Do you have a reliable source for this? The FDR/CVR were found only a matter of months ago. Prior to that the conditions of flight were largely unknown. If most Air France crews crashed in these conditions then that is a matter of grave concern. I have flown unreliable IAS at altitude in an Airbus simulator numerous times and haven't crashed once, nor do I know anyone who has. I do not fly light aircraft and consider myself averagely skilled. If I can do it why can't they?

Train your crews right and the captain should have no problem leaving the cockpit during ITCZ transit. I don't know of any European major where this is considered a factor during augmented crew ops.

Unreliable IAS is a memory drill and the attitudes and power settings should be known by heart. Why did they not recognise the situation and call for the drill? If you know the pitch and power settings but don't use them what does that say?


Was a checklist ever called for, let alone commenced?


There were a lot more crashes in the good old days. Nostaligia is great fun but you're shooting yourself in the foot with this one.

BOAC

I assume 'p114' refers to BEA's Etape 3 report page, not this thread. It shows the Paramètres longitudinaux traces including the all-important positions of the Side Sticks.

Yes I agree I am an old fuddy duddy and automation has saved many lives but we have had far too many replies on several threads asking as to what the automatics were doing!
If it is so wonderful then why do so many people get it wrong?

CRM has changed things as has the information highway but this is a major western carrier where the aircraft is built and the systems designed.
It is wrong of the press to put the blame on the pilots and airbus to issue a statement that they could have recovered the situation when they obviously didn't understand what was happening.



My source was a senior AF training captain and I believe the exercise was based upon the original acars data. I have no reason to disbelieve him but he is old school as well and amuses himself with aeroplanes outside of work.

I still believe that if one major long haul carrier decided in the 1960s that they needed two years of basic training for their cadets and a further two years or more before they were fully fledged to operate P2 then perhaps the modern system of under a third of that time is a mistake.

Yes I know it is cost orientated but the demise of a major carrier also carries a cost let alone the needless deaths.

Air France is lucky in that it has a captive customer base - the French wouldn't dream of flying with Johnny Foreigner.

Re power attitude - there was a post stating that PNF was reading from a checklist.

I still go 100% behind my comment that it was a lack of airmanship from the captain to leave the flight deck during the transit of the ITCZ. Having crossed it many times over a period of 7 years as a first officer there was NEVER an occasion when the captain was out of the flight deck. It was, especially in the middle of the night and over the South Atlantic, the most demanding cruise phase of a modern airliner -(poss exception CAT over Andes).

If modern training is sufficient to allow relatively low time first officers to man the flight deck during critical phases of flight that why did they crash and why did my last company who pioneered the direct route fly with two full three man crews?

I still believe the regulatory authorities need to get their A@@@ in gear.

thanks to HN and PJ2 and others to clear up the vertical speed settings...




and a question to the calculators abaut the inizial of the first pitchup between 2:10:07 and 2:10:17 detailed on s.44 of the french 3.interim pdf

the AP disengaged at 2:10:05 and before he hold the bird with pitch 3deg through the turbulencen with elevator movments in the range +/- 0.5 deg

PF moved the elevator for 10 sec just up to -1.0 deg (pulling) and the reaction was the beginning of the climb at 2:10:17 with pitch up 12 deg; vertical speed 6000FT/min; acceleration normal 1.3 G after 10 sec

is the system in this high at this speed so sensible that 1.0 deg wrong elevator lets move (pitchup) the heavy bird so fast so strong?

Events around AP disconnect
 

With the DFDR data released in Interim Report no.3, it is now time to add a few observations to my july 10 post #30 on page 2 of this thread. While the earlier post was for still air, the new element is the role that movements of the air masses traversed by the airplane played around 02:10.

In the preceding minute the level of turbulence had been increasing from an amplitude peak-to-peak of about 0.2 g at 02:09:30 to about 0.5 g when the AP disengaged at 02:10:05. At that time the vertical speed was passing through zero, decreasing at the rate of 400 fpm per second, or 0.2 g. The normal acceleration was thus 0.8 g at that point. The airplane’s pitch attitude was then increasing through about zero, i.e. much less than the 2.5 degrees it would have been in steady, unbanked level flight. In the two seconds after AP disconnect until the first movement of the side stick, pitch increased to about 1.3 degrees. The pitch attitude continued to increase progressively from 2:10:08.4 and the vertical speed became positive at about 02:10:10. The engine N1’s which were close to 100% up to 02:10:00, then dropped to about 83% 6 seconds later (the commanded N1 dropped to 75% in about 3 seconds). When the pilot grabbed the SS, he was looking at pitch 1.3 degrees NU, 7 degrees right bank, and –400 fpm vertical speed.

My tentative explanation of these events is that the airplane was traversing the fringe of an area with significant updraft velocity (1024 fpm fits the data). The AP pitched the nose down to maintain altitude, and the A/THR reduced engine thrust to maintain airspeed. After disconnect of AP and A/THR, the FCS increased pitch to regain 1 g normal acceleration, and thrust was locked at significantly less than required to maintain airspeed in level flight in still air.

More analysis to be done by BEA (and perhaps me). Why did AP and A/THR disconnect 2 seconds before the speeds dropped?

- ah - thanks for that. I am waiting for Wednesday to download that.

- and therein, as I'm sure you ?realise?, lies the problem.

Hi vanHorck,
It could, but this is not correct in this context, as you seems obviously not used to hear this kind of talk which is completely informal. "Là" is used in such talk as a pointer meaning "now, at this point". It is very common talk and everybody I know speaks like that in real life, including the PF:

- "Là c’est bon là, on serait revenu les ailes à plat [là]..." => now (at this point) it is good, now we are back to wings level...
- "je suis entrain de descendre là?" ) => Am I descending now?
- "là je monte okay alors on descend [là]..." => Now I'm climbing... okay then now we'll go down...

If one want to point at something (an instrument), he will very likely use "çuilà" (celui-là) or "çuici" (celui-ci):
- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising
- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

or even more undefined, "ça":
- ça monte, ça descend...
but you could find also "là ça" as an attention getter:
- là ça monte, là ça descend


It is obvious from the conversation that the crew is talking freely and that there is no formality between each others, including the captain.

at the start of the event 2:10:07 the ship was rolling 8 deg left 8 deg right and so on every 2 sec to the other side......the acceleration lateral was also left-right-left with around 0.1G

PF put his hand to the stick and was moving the stick from left to right and so on...... nearly counter-syncron with the rolling (s.31)

question: is this the perfekt movment (and he just overreacted a little bit) or will be the dumping effect better if he moves phase-shifted?

I'm asking myself, would this accident also have happened with

- an artificial feel (yoke) instead of a constant bungee force in the stick
- a conventional stall warning

?????

The adverbs:

La (French) - there (English)
Ici (French) - here (English)

are included/embeded when composing "demonstratives" words, which include an indication/meaning of proximity/distance. For instance:

"ce-la" - "that" (English) - there is an implying of "there"
"ce-ci" - "this" - there is an implying of "here"

The use of the addition of "la" in slang/colloquial French sentences, with a meaning/implying of locality (in space or time) relative to the speaker, is quite similar if not identical to the use of proximity/distance qualifiers in other languages, particularly those deriving from, or having a strong Latin influence.

For instance, I would put in that category in the CVR, the

PF's: j'ai plus the vario la
Captain's: doucement avec le pallonier la

But, in the case you pointed to, as that particular use of "la" is IMO, a "shorter "ce-la", which translates into "that", which makes the English translation into "that one" IMO quite correct.

Even, if his response is relative to someone pointing to the screen to to two items, to which he refers to by their location on the screen, in which case, it would be "there, that one", and "there, that one", the meaning of the translation is still correct.

Lastly, it is reflecting "casual talk", but I would definitely NOT add any association of meaning a degree of responsibility to it...

Hazelnuts39 re: #1110

Virtually from the outset, I have been trying to engage others in a discussion of the possibility of Autopilot loss due to other than UAS, or ICE. It was the fulcrum upon which I placed a snarky insult to PJ2, for which I am eternally regretful.

So thanks. The A/P is programmed to disconnect by itself when it cannot "keep up". The Definition of "Keeping Up" is what got me on PJ2's dark side, I fear. Also, what remains of LAW at this type of disconnect is NORMAL LAW. So, did the dropout cause the UAS instead of ICE? Via airflow disruption due manouvering in turbulent air? Were the first perhaps clumsy inputs of PF the cause of unreliable IAS?

Aside from that interesting discussion is the trail of Flight Path post a/p loss, imho. In ALTERNATE LAW, the a/c is "sensitive". Not in the way of a small fighter, way different. A wide Body is massive, and must be flown gently, when inputting a control if you can sense it at all quickly, it is probably too much? Driving heavy equipment requires a separate set of "Buns".

After A/P drop, the a/c was commanded NU. As his (PF's) first input, can we opine that it was "too much"? Likely without a quick response, the PF may have put in "more"?

HN, you assume a turbulence in cruise that is a given from the beginning (yes?) I believe. The autopilot manages such that the ride is "comfortable", but both pilots obviously were cognizant of airframe movement about the "best" Flightpath? So, as a surprise hand back, the PF must begin his manual flight without a current "feel" for response?

The first step in "correcting" is to stop the trend, not go the other way?

His first input was too much, he forgot to "wait"? With the rolling, is this an evidence of overcontrol?

However the a/p dropped out, isn't allowing the a/c to exhibit "sensitivity" a NO NO?

Somewhere between "Do Nothing" and ACM, isn't there a better transition avaliable?

takata. Bonjour! Thank you for the Pic. Note the damage at the lower collet, evidence of the jackscrew "pulling through" whilst trying to lessen the NU? Jammo?

grity. #1113. A Pilot Induced Roll Oscillation? (PIRO)? Is the SS damped to prevent "Coffee Stirring"? One surprise with all the calcs re: climb and KE is the absence of the rolling factor, a draggy circumstance, and without it, could the a/c have survived?

For what is worth,

In your post #1112

- çuilà (celui-là) monte = this one is rising

Correct is "that" instead of "this"

I would translate "that one is ascending"

- çuici (celui-ci) descend = that one is falling

Correct is "this" instead of "that"

I would translate "that one is descending"

Hazelnut39,

It's a direction of thought, and question that I am certainly interested in...

I've posted at one point, the opinion that the "nose-up" along with the "roll" SS command applied by the PF when taking control from the AP, was because the AP has disconnected during a time interval, in which due to turbulence, it was controlling the A/C in an attempt to return it to level, and thus the A/C was not level yet. So the PF attempted to complete that "return to level" "started but not completed" by the AP.

airtren

Let's assume the pilots were good...let's assume the aircraft was decent....looking at the cockpit of your typical google search Airbus panel, I am struck with this idea.

Your in a very strong tropical thunderstorm. Lightning hits the cockpit, avionics bay, multiple times. Tubes go dead, avionics take a pretty hard hit.

I get the impression that pilots on a dark and rainy night, getting 10k up and down drafts in a cell, have no engine, A/S, or AI reference from non tube instruments.

So your trying to maintain attitude control in what is probably a dark cockpit under IMC conditions and your getting slammed.

If there is an iron gyro back up AI, etc...ok disregard, but I couldn't find one in the pics that I saw.

airtren

Would you consider other than Pitot issues as cause? That would involve other than a "time interval" approach? The A/P is 'dynamic' (constant) in its inputs, No? So the disconnect is "instant", not sequential? The important vector is the 'logic' of its loss? Not the "cause"?

So also the discussion involves a possible "remnant" of NORMAL LAW? Unfortunately, this introduces "mode Confusion".